The last ledger: EIA’s Iran report captures a $48bn oil trade on the eve of the war
The US Energy Information Administration recently published its annual report on Iran’s petroleum exports and, with its data compiled in March, it now reads as something its authors didn’t quite intend: the final official snapshot of Iran’s oil export machine before the conflict shut it down, arriving in the same days that Washington and Tehran announced a deal to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
The report is mandated by the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum (SHIP) Act, enacted in April 2024 as part of the wave of Iran-related sanctions legislation that followed October 2023. The Act did two things: it created sanctions exposure for foreign persons who knowingly participate in the Iranian petroleum trade, including vessel owners, port operators and refineries, and it required the EIA to publish an annual public accounting of that trade: the revenues, the volumes, and the named ships and ports of the shadow fleet that moves it. The reporting obligation continues each year until the President certifies that Iran’s illicit oil exports have ended.
The June 2026 edition, the third in the series, lands at the moment that the entire apparatus sits at the centre of the global energy shock and just as the shock looks set to ease.
A $48 billion business with one customer
The headline figures show a trade that had not merely survived sanctions but settled into a stable, lucrative routine. EIA estimates Iran’s crude oil and condensate export revenues at $48 billion in 2025, barely changed from $49 billion in 2024 and well above the $5 billion trough of 2020, when US sanctions pressure was at its peak.
Volumes tell the same story: exports averaged 1.58 million barrels per day in 2025, the highest since sanctions were fully reimposed and up from just 343,000 b/d in 2020.
The more remarkable figure is where those barrels went. Of the 1,576 thousand b/d Iran shipped in 2025, an estimated 1,567 thousand, 99.4%, was destined for China. Exports to all other destinations combined collapsed to just 9,000 b/d, down from 60,000 in 2024 and 1.37 million b/d back in 2018, when Iran still sold across a diversified customer base. The residual trickle reached Syria, the UAE, Brunei, Bangladesh, Russia and Venezuela, often settled through barter, swap arrangements or lines of credit rather than cash.
Pricing data underline how routine the trade had become. While Iranian sale prices are opaque, the report cites trade press indications of Iranian Light selling at a discount of just $8–$10 to Brent as of January 2026, a notably narrow haircut for sanctioned barrels, and a measure of how confident buyers had grown in the supply chain.
The shadow fleet, named
The report’s appendices list hundreds of vessels, identified by name and IMO number, involved in moving Iranian crude and products between 2020 and 2025, the great majority with unknown ownership. The fleet skews heavily towards VLCCs and Suezmaxes for crude, supported by a sprawl of smaller product and LPG carriers. EIA notes the lists are likely incomplete: operators routinely disable identification transponders, conduct ship-to-ship transfers, and relabel cargoes as originating elsewhere.
The destination port list runs through more than twenty Chinese ports, with Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam serving as well-documented waypoints for cargoes ultimately bound for China. One footnote records the exception that proves the rule: a single contraband cargo seized by the US government in 2023 and rerouted to Houston.
The compliance dimension
For sanctions and compliance teams, the appendices are the operative part of the document. This edition adds IMO numbers alongside vessel names for the first time in the series’ main tables — a material upgrade, since IMO numbers persist through the name changes and reflagging that dark-fleet operators use to launder vessel identities. A tanker listed here under one name may already be trading under another; the IMO number follows it.
That makes the report a de facto screening resource for the maritime chain — charterers, P&I insurers, bunker suppliers, port agents and trade finance banks — even though inclusion in an EIA appendix is not itself a sanctions designation. The legal exposure sits in the SHIP Act’s sanctions provisions and OFAC’s designation authority; the EIA lists are the publicly available map of where that exposure is concentrated. The destination port tables carry the same weight in the other direction: the Act contemplates sanctions on foreign port operators that knowingly receive Iranian cargoes, and the report names ports across more than twenty countries.
The report also illustrates the enforcement gap that has kept Congress engaged. Despite three editions documenting a growing trade, the revenue and volume series themselves are the evidence that designation activity has not kept pace with the fleet’s expansion, a point legislators have pressed in successive oversight letters, and one reason further Iran petroleum sanctions bills remain in circulation.
Why it matters now
Everything in this report describes the world as it stood in March. In the months since, the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz took the bulk of Gulf exports, Iran’s included, off the water, with the EIA’s own Short-Term Energy Outlook estimating more than 11 million b/d of regional production shut in. Then, on Sunday, the US and Iran announced an initial agreement to end the war and reopen the strait, with a formal signing reported for later this week and a 60-day ceasefire window for broader talks. Oil fell more than $4 a barrel on the news. The terms have not been published, and the route to restored flows runs through mine clearance rather than the flick of a switch, so the report’s pre-war picture remains the only firm measure of what is now potentially being switched back on.
For markets, the report is the baseline against which the resolution will be measured. It quantifies what a restored Iranian trade looks like: roughly 1.6 million b/d, almost entirely China-bound, generating close to $50 billion a year. It also clarifies the asymmetry of the disruption — the cargoes no longer flowing were overwhelmingly feeding Chinese refineries, not Western markets, which reshapes who carries the supply shock and who has the strongest incentive to see the strait reopened.
And as the fighting winds down, the report doubles as a reference for what comes next: a named fleet, a mapped port network, and a sanctions-evasion infrastructure that took years to build and will not be dismantled by the time the tankers sail again. For compliance teams the more pointed question is what happens to the legal scaffolding around it. European leaders have already floated sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable nuclear commitments, and any easing would land directly on the SHIP Act apparatus this report maps — the designations, the screening obligations and the port-operator exposure that define the trade as illicit today. Whether the named vessels stay on the watchlists or migrate back towards open commerce is now a live regulatory question rather than a hypothetical one. Until the terms are published, the shadow fleet documented here remains exactly that, and the report stands as the reference point against which any unwinding will be read.The post The last ledger: EIA’s Iran report captures a $48bn oil trade on the eve of the war first appeared on LeapRate | Online Trading Industry News, Broker Intelligence & Fintech Analysis.
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