Remarks At Innovation Advisory Committee Conference, CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig, Washington, DC | August 20, 2026
Thank you. Good afternoon and welcome to the Innovation Advisory Committee’s inaugural meeting.
We’ve assembled some of America’s greatest builders, thinkers, and entrepreneurs here in our nation’s capital to engage in a series of conversations about where our financial markets are headed, and what role America, and, in particular, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), will play in shaping that future.
Before we get started, I’d like to take a step back and discuss why American leadership on this new frontier of finance matters. But, before I do, I must provide the standard disclaimer that the views I express here today are my own as Chairman and don’t necessarily reflect those of the Commission.
Built for the Frontier
For more than half a century, the CFTC has stood at the center of innovation in America’s financial markets, helping ensure that innovation can flourish while markets remain fair and resilient.
When President Gerald Ford signed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act into law in 1974, America’s derivatives markets were being transformed by an explosion of interest in a wide range of novel instruments – from contracts on currencies, to petroleum allocations, to Ginnie Mae certificates.[1]
Despite federally regulated commodity exchanges having existed since the 1920s, prior law only covered contracts in an enumerated list of agricultural commodities, like wheat, corn, cotton, and rice. The balance of contracts was subject to the same patchwork of state laws that had prompted Congress to institute federal commodity laws in the first place. As a result, America was falling behind.
The history of America’s earliest commodity exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, has been described as a saga of “fending off countless politicians on both the state and national level, all of which seemed intent on shutting the Board down.”[2] In 1848, a group of merchants established the Board above a flour store to enforce a set of codes and rules for buying, weighing, and grading commodities and to arbitrate disputes among traders.[3]
By 1859, a convention emerged whereby parties who had committed to buy or to sell a commodity could make or receive a payment to or from the other party based on the change in price of the commodity instead of making or taking physical delivery.[4] They standardized a promise – a measure of grain, a price, a date – so that a farmer hundreds of miles away could lock in her season before the first frost, and so that a miller could plan his year without relying solely on hope to make ends meet. These arrangements came to be known as futures contracts.
The response to this innovation in the markets was remarkably similar to what we have seen with some of the technologies we’re here to discuss today. As these early markets began to take shape, state lawmakers across the country moved to subject these exchanges to a wide range of state “anti-gaming” and “anti-bucket shop” laws.[5] One lawmaker urged federal action, exclaiming that “[t]he grain gamblers have made the exchange building in Chicago the world’s greatest gambling house.”[6] Karl Marx called exchanges “gambling” parlors “where little fish are swallowed by the sharks.”[7]
The same rhetoric has been used to delegitimize and undermine our markets for more than a century.
But when lawmakers considered legislation to amend the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”) and codify, once and for all, a comprehensive federal regulatory framework for commodity exchanges, they recognized then what we know to be true today: regulation and innovation must go hand in hand. Without clear rules of the road, builders, visionaries, and entrepreneurs always leave for brighter shores.
So, Congress established a federal system of market regulation designed to be future-proof. It created a new federal agency – the CFTC – and provided it with “exclusive jurisdiction”[8] over commodity derivatives markets. Lawmakers also included a statutory mandate that the agency “promote responsible innovation.”[9]
Recognizing that virtually anything,[10] tangible or intangible, might serve as the underlying for a derivative contract, lawmakers defined the term “commodity” to include “all goods and articles, . . . and services, rights, and interests” that may be the subject of a derivative contract.[11] This included events, contingencies, and incidents that take place which are beyond the control of the contracting parties.[12] With an “essentially unbounded field of potential commodities,”[13] exchanges were free to innovate and offer a wide range of novel financial instruments under a single federal regulatory framework.
The breadth of this definition makes clear that lawmakers intentionally chose not to fragment regulatory authority over commodity derivatives markets based upon the underlying commodity. They reasoned that “[t]he nature of the underlying commodity is not an adequate basis to divide regulatory authority.”[14] Instead, lawmakers opted for simplicity and ease of administration, explaining that “the fact that a futures contract market does not fit into the traditional mold where there are both hedging and price-discovery functions should not be the determining factor in whether the contract is regulated by the CFTC.”[15]
These contracts were now required to trade on CFTC-registered exchanges, known as designated contract markets (or “DCMs”). DCMs would be overseen by the CFTC but also operate as self-regulatory organizations that would serve as the first line of defense in policing rules to protect market integrity. The patchwork of state laws that once undermined the ability of exchanges to operate across the country would no longer apply to these federally regulated exchanges.
With clear rules of the road, pioneering exchange operators set out onto the vast frontier of finance and designed many of the contracts that are popularly traded today, like weather, interest rate, and equity derivatives.
After observing the evolution of these markets under CFTC supervision for some decades, Congress made additional modifications to the CEA to further future-proof the framework with the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (the “CFMA”). We’re pleased to have with us today former CFTC Acting Chairman, Walt Lukken, who was heavily involved in the development of the legislation as an advisor to the then Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman, Richard Lugar.
The CFMA replaced the CEA’s legacy system of prescriptive regulation with a principles-based regulatory framework. The regime afforded market participants the flexibility to operate within core principles so that their ability to innovate is not constrained by hard rules.[16]
More recently, Congress again amended the CEA under the Dodd-Frank Act to expand the agency’s authority to more comprehensively cover the universe of swaps. Lawmakers also chose to include within the CFTC’s jurisdiction offerings of commodity transactions on a margined, leveraged, or financed basis to retail participants, which must trade on a DCM as futures.
The results of these developments are reflected by the sheer size and depth of our derivatives markets. At the time that the Commodity Futures Trading Act was enacted in 1974, the U.S. derivatives market was valued in the low hundreds of billions of dollars notional. Today, the CFTC regulates approximately half of the $1.2 quadrillion notional global derivatives market.[17] This is not an accident. It is the result of American regulation keeping pace with American innovation.
But unfortunately, our history reflects that, at times, we’ve lost our way. Commodity options were prohibited in the U.S. until 1974 due to concerns that the contracts were instruments of manipulation and destabilizing speculation.[18] And there’s been a lot of debate about Congress’ decision to ban onion contracts in the Onion Futures Act of 1958,[19] as well as the movie box office revenue contract prohibition that found its way into the 2008 financial crisis reforms.[20]
* * *
Today, we’re once again at an inflection point. Another moment when the choices we make will shape the markets and opportunities of the decades ahead.
We’ve crossed the Rubicon and are standing at a new frontier of finance. It’s not a question of whether innovations like blockchain, artificial intelligence, and prediction markets will transform our markets. It’s a question of where this innovation will take place and who will write the rules.
America can either accelerate and continue the regulatory tradition that made our markets the greatest on Earth, or it can decelerate and let other countries take the lead. We can be optimistic about the future. Or we can fear it.
In this administration, we are choosing to lead. Under President Trump’s leadership, America will not simply participate in this new frontier of finance. We will shape it.
Today, I’ll preview our innovation agenda, or what I refer to as the “Roadmap for the New Frontier of Finance” (or “Roadmap”).
Setting the Standard: Roadmap for the Crypto Capital of the World
During the prior administration, the American crypto industry weathered a perfect storm of anti-crypto armies, de-banking, regulation by enforcement, and offshore exchange failures. After taking the oath of office on January 20, 2025, President Trump quickly followed through on his commitment to “fire Gary Gensler” and make the United States the “crypto capital” of the world.[21]
Under the prior regime of regulation by enforcement, businesses could not know in advance whether their actions were legal or illegal, whether they were guilty or innocent, because there were no clear rules on the books.
Many of you in this room today were victims of this wayward approach to regulation. You built companies, created jobs, invested capital, and tried to comply with the law, only to find yourselves navigating a regulatory system where the rules could change after the fact. This is the type of persecution we see in banana republics. It’s unacceptable in the United States.
That’s why I partnered with Chairman Atkins at the Securities and Exchange Commission on Project Crypto to codify a clear taxonomy for crypto assets that provides certainty to the marketplace as to which types of crypto assets are securities, and which are not.
I remain hopeful that Congress will deliver to the President’s desk bipartisan crypto asset market structure legislation that codifies this jurisdictional line and establishes statutory core principles for crypto asset spot markets. While we have other tools in the box if the bill doesn’t pass, I want to be crystal clear: the most important step towards future-proofing this industry is passing this bipartisan bill.
Passing CLARITY is the surest way that we can prevent another Gary Gensler from running a rogue campaign of lawfare against the individuals and companies in this room. I’d urge you all to continue engaging with Capitol Hill to ensure that this bill gets across the finish line. We stand ready to begin immediately implementing the bill if passed.
If CLARITY continues to stall because of Democratic obstruction, the CFTC will utilize its existing authorities to begin establishing a regime for crypto asset markets. We owe it to the American people to do so.
President Trump promised to deliver a crypto asset market structure, and we will help him deliver if Congress will not.
We will heed President Trump’s call to “codify a future-proof digital asset market structure that cannot be undone by the crypto haters.”[22]
To achieve this, I’ve directed the CFTC staff to begin exploring rules to codify a CFTC market structure for crypto assets using the agency’s existing authorities. This could enable current registrants as well as non-registrant crypto exchanges to be designated by the CFTC as a type of DCM known as a crypto asset market and offer crypto asset trading on a leveraged or margined basis subject to purpose-fit rules under the CFTC’s regulatory oversight.
I’ve also directed staff to engage with developers of onchain finance protocols to establish ways in which developers can offer their protocols in a legal and compliant manner in the United States. Future-proofing developer protections once and for all.
We’re going to give CLARITY its breathing room for a vote, but if the Democrats cannot support a bipartisan work product, which reflects compromises from both sides of the aisle, and ultimately send a fair version of the bill to the President’s desk, then rest assured, I will direct CFTC staff to move swiftly to propose these new rules for the industry.
Winning the AI Race: Roadmap for Compute Market Dominance
Now, as President Trump said, “America is the country that started the AI race. And . . . America is going to win it.”[23]
Access to advanced GPU clusters and compute capacity increasingly determines who can compete, who can innovate, and ultimately, who can lead. As demand for compute grows, so too does the need for markets capable of efficiently allocating scarce resources and managing risk.
If the lessons of history are any guide, well-functioning spot, forward, and derivatives markets emerge in conjunction with demand for scarce and economically significant commodities. Compute is proving to be no different. Transparent markets can transform compute from a costly and unpredictable input into a commodity with reliable price discovery and effective hedging, which will strengthen America’s capacity to lead the AI revolution.
America’s AI Action Plan calls upon the federal agencies to ensure access to large-scale compute for startups and academics by improving the financial market for this ever-critical digital commodity.[24]
And we’re partnering with the Department of Commerce to get this done. Our first step was to issue a request for comment on compute markets, which was released earlier this week. From there, we’ll take stakeholder feedback into consideration and develop a gold standard regulatory framework for these new commodity markets.
Just as American markets helped establish the gold standard for trading the commodities that powered the industrial economy, we will do the same for the commodity that will power the intelligence economy.
Forecasting the Future: Roadmap for American Prediction Markets
Today, prediction markets find themselves enduring the same type of assault from state and national politicians that plagued the Chicago Board of Trade for much of its early existence. Although Congress gave the CFTC the exclusive authority to regulate DCMs that offer trading in derivatives, many states seek to nullify federal law and apply state anti-gaming laws to DCMs.
These state actors are sadly suffering from what the late CFTC Chairman Philip McBride Johnson called NFS, or Name Fixation Syndrome. NFS, he explained, “is an intellectual malady that causes the listener to hear only the first part of a phrase, such as TREASURY BOND futures, SOYBEAN futures, OIL futures, [SPORTS futures,] etc. Without treatment, this can lead the patient to think that the futures should be regulated by the same agency that supervises the NAME. The consequences, of course, are preposterous.”[25]
I’m happy to report that we are not afflicted with NFS here at the CFTC. That’s why we’ll continue to promote responsible innovation in lawful derivatives and defend our exclusive jurisdiction in court. As President Trump said, “[o]ther countries are after this new form of financial market, and we want to remain at the top.”[26]
But we’ll not only defend our jurisdiction, we’ll also exercise it by establishing clear rules of the road for these markets.
Despite what some diagnosed with NFS may have you believe, prediction markets aren’t new. Our statute expressly classifies as commodities events, contingencies, or incidents that take place which are beyond the control of the contracting parties.[27] Derivatives on these commodities are known as “event contracts” and they have traded in our markets for decades.
Yet, the CFTC never instituted a comprehensive regulatory framework to address the unique policy considerations associated with these products. Instead, prior administrations put their heads in the sand, thinking that the markets would go away, and, when that failed, tried to outlaw the products entirely. We witnessed the same story that we did with commodity options and crypto assets unfold with event contracts – regulators tried to ban them and drove the innovators offshore to places like the Bahamas. We all know how this story ends.
We’re not going to take this approach anymore at the CFTC. Here’s our Roadmap for prediction markets:
First, we recently proposed amendments to CFTC Rule 40.11. While every event contract must satisfy the core principles and not be readily susceptible to manipulation, Congress recognized that certain types of event contracts, specifically those involving war, terrorism, assassination, gaming, and illegal activities, raise additional public policy considerations. The CFTC has the discretion to prohibit any such contract when doing so is in the public interest.[28]
However, our statute does not define key terms like “gaming” or “involve” or establish public interest criteria for us to consider. As a result, contracts are at risk of rejection based upon arbitrary whims or political biases, and DCMs have been left operating in the dark.
The prior administration attempted to prohibit event contracts on politics, sports, and cultural events in the name of the public interest – without ever defining what is in the “public interest.” Under this approach, the public is not the judge of its interest but instead whoever is in control of the Commission.
Our proposed amendments to CFTC Rule 40.11 are intended to address these issues by defining key terms and enumerating public interest criteria for Commission consideration.
Second, we proposed a rule to modernize the reporting framework for fully collateralized event contracts. The proposal would establish a durable regulatory framework that provides the Commission with the information it needs to oversee these markets while eliminating unnecessary complexity and regulatory burden.
Finally, I expect the Commission will soon propose a series of amendments to Parts 38 and 40 of the CFTC’s regulations to modernize the core principles and listing rules governing DCMs that list event contracts and institute consumer protection requirements. We’ve heard the concerns of public commenters about inadequate consumer protections for retail loud and clear. These amendments would also establish clear expectations for product governance, market design, and incentive programs.
* * *
We have a lot of work ahead of us at the CFTC. But we’re energized by the innovation happening in our markets. Due, in large part, to the ingenuity of you all in the room today.
You’ve withstood anti-crypto armies, doomerism, and a lot of subpoenas. But you continued to build and innovate here in the United States.
That’s why we asked you all to be a part of the very first Innovation Advisory Committee. To bring together the people building and innovating in the United States and ensure that the new frontier of finance remains on American soil.
Thank you all for your service. I look forward to today’s discussions.
[1] Philip McBride Johnson, Thomas Lee Hazen, Susan C. Ervin, Charles R. Mills & Kathryn M. Trkla, Derivatives Regulation §2.03 (Second Edition 2004).
[2] oh H. Stassen, The Commodity Exchange Act In Perspective: A Short and Not So-Reverent History of Futures Trading in the United States, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 825 (1982).
[3] Id.
[4] Johnson and Hazen, supra note 1, at §2.02.
[5] Id.
[6] 61 Cong. Rec. 4761, 4763 (Aug. 9, 1921) (remarks of Sen. Capper).
[7] 3 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 440 (Friedrich Engels ed., Progress Publishers 1959) (1894).
[8] 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).
[9] 7 U.S.C. § 5(b).
[10] “Even the SEC envied the CFTC—or soon envied it. Congress buried among the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act an expanded definition of the term ‘commodity’ to include literally anything, with one exception [for onions], which was or might In the future be the subject of futures trading.” Stassen, supra, note 2, at 833-34.
[11] See Johnson and Hazen, supra note 1, at §2.03.
[12] See 7 U.S. Code § 1a(19)(iv) (defining “excluded commodity” to include “an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency (other than a change in the price, rate, value, or level of a commodity”).
[13] See Johnson and Hazen, supra note 1, at §2.03.
[14] Report on S. 2391 of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, S. Rep. No. 95-850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (May 15, 1978).
[15] Id.
[16] See Heath P. Tarbert, Rules for Principles and Principles for Rules: Tools for Crafting Sound Financial Regulation, Harvard Business Law Review, Vol. 10 (2019–2020), Harvard Business School, 2020.
[17] See Michael S. Selig, The New Era of Finance Needs Innovation More Than Consensus, The Economist (Aug. 6, 2026), available at https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/08/06/the-new-era-of-finance-needs-innovation-more-than-consensus.
[18] See Jerry W. Markham, The History of Commodity Futures Trading and its Regulation (1987).
[19] See, e.g., Roger W. Gray, Onions Revisited, 45 J. Farm Econ. 273 (1963).
[20] See, e.g., Paul G. Anderson, Note, Back to the Future(s): A Critical Look at the Film Futures Ban, 29 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 179 (2011).
[21] Donald J. Trump, Keynote Address at the Bitcoin 2024 Conference, Nashville, Tenn. (July 27, 2024).
[22] Donald J. Trump, @RealDonaldTrump on Truth Social (May 27, 2026).
[23] Donald J. Trump, President Trump Speaks at Artificial Intelligence Summit, Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2025).
[24] See The White House, Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan (Jul. 23, 2025), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf.
[25] Johnson and Hazen, supra note 1, at §4.05.
[26] Donald J. Trump, @RealDonaldTrump on Truth Social (May 26, 2026).
[27] See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19)(iv) (defining “excluded commodity” to include “an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency (other than a change in the price, rate, value, or level of a commodity”).
[28] See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C).
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