A financial stability assessment of Irish hedge funds concludes that the diversity of the sector, and its modest market footprint, limit systemic vulnerabilities. A separate assessment focused on open-ended funds shows that the availability of tools to manage liquidity is now widespread, but with further scope to increase use. Strengthening the financial stability lens in the regulation of the non-bank sector has been – and continues to be – a priority for the Central Bank.Speaking at an Irish Funds event, Deputy Governor Madouros outlined the findings of two in-depth assessments recently concluded by the Central Bank: one evaluating financial vulnerabilities in the Irish hedge fund sector, and another examining liquidity management tools by open-ended funds in Ireland.Irish hedge fund sectorPublished today, a financial stability assessment of Irish hedge funds found that the sector, which manages approximately €400 billion in assets, is unlikely to pose systemic risks on its own, given its relatively limited market footprint in core global markets.“The sector is large, but diverse. And that diversity, in and of itself, supports resilience,” Deputy Governor Madouros said. “The market footprint of the Irish hedge fund sector is modest, limiting systemic impacts.”However, the analysis reveals vulnerabilities in certain hedge strategies that could generate financial stability risks, if correlated with hedge funds in other jurisdictions that follow similar strategies and have similar exposures. “A key outcome of our work will be engagement with authorities internationally, to deepen our collective assessment of the global non-bank sector. The insights from this work will also strengthen our ongoing surveillance of hedge funds – because systemic vulnerabilities are not fixed, they evolve over time”, Deputy Governor Madouros said.  Availability and use of Liquidity Management Tools by open-ended fundsThe Central Bank also published analysis on the availability and use of liquidity management tools by Irish-domiciled investment funds.In 2023, the Financial Stability Board published revised policy recommendations on liquidity risk management by open-ended funds. A key focus of these recommendations was on the availability and use of certain types of liquidity management tools (LMTs).“Around 85% of open-ended funds in Ireland have at least one such tool available. This is a significant increase over the past half decade,” Deputy Governor Madouros said. “And that is a positive outcome. It means that asset managers are better equipped to mitigate the effects of liquidity mismatches.”The survey also highlighted that the use of these tools lags availability. Deputy Governor Madouros said “This is an area where we want to continue to see a shift in outcomes: towards greater use, and greater consistency in use, of these liquidity management tools.”To support that, the Central Bank is also publishing today a document outlining good practices in the use of these tools. “Ultimately, the aim is to translate the policy intent of the FSB recommendations, as well as the updated requirements in the European framework, into real-world outcomes”.Strengthening resilience of non-bank financeDeputy Governor Madouros emphasised that strengthening the financial stability lens in the oversight of the non-bank sector remains an important priority for the Central Bank.“As the composition of the financial sector itself is evolving, our approach also needs to adapt,” Deputy Governor Madouros said. “Following progress with a number of policy initiatives at a global and domestic level, our focus at the Central Bank is now shifting towards effective implementation and strengthened surveillance.”“The goal is collective resilience. Not for its own sake, but as a foundation that enables the financial system to weather shocks, serve the economy, and seize the opportunities ahead,” he said.ENDS

Good morning. I am delighted to join you here this morning – and thank you to Irish Funds for organising this event.1As you know, a key part of our job at the Central Bank of Ireland is to focus on ‘tail risks’. Not just what we expect will happen, but what could happen. And the range of possible outcomes that could happen has recently widened considerably. What might have been considered close to unthinkable a few years ago, is no longer so.Unpredictable geopolitical developments – including the ongoing conflict in the Middle East – have increased the likelihood of shocks hitting the global economy and the financial system. In parallel, there are ongoing shifts happening within the financial system, with the emergence of new activities, new business models and new interconnections.Chief amongst these is the continued growth of non-banks, a diverse sector that now holds around half of global financial assets and is at the heart of capital markets functioning.Today, I want to talk about how we navigate this environment to safeguard resilience of this valuable source of financial intermediation, supporting the broader economy. Opportunity, amid uncertaintyBut before I do that, I want to talk about opportunity. Because we should not let uncertainty be a barrier to seizing the opportunities available – of which there are several.Ireland’s funds sector already plays an important role in intermediating flows of capital, with close to €6 trillion in assets under management, serving investors in Europe and globally. This activity entails many economic benefits, including enabling retail investors to access capital markets and diversifying funding sources for companies.As you know, though, Europe’s economy is still very reliant on bank intermediation, with a smaller role for capital markets financing.The good news is that there is now a clear recognition of the need to deepen, grow and integrate Europe’s capital markets – and increased policy momentum to achieve that outcome. That can support productive investment in Europe and, in doing so, strengthen our long-term economic prospects.Another opportunity stems from technological advancements, which can not only improve existing financial services, but also lead to new, innovative financial services. Tokenised finance is an important dimension of that, with the potential to make capital markets more efficient, accessible and integrated.2This context matters. Ireland is already a centre for financial intermediation specialising in activities that are core to the functioning of capital markets. Asset management – and the funds sector – are at the heart of that.  So they have an important role to play in the further integration, deepening and digitalisation of European capital markets.These are important opportunities for Europe, and therefore for Ireland. Indeed, not seizing these opportunities is itself a risk we need to guard against. And, unlike exogenous shocks, that is very much within our collective control. Resilience, amid uncertaintyOf course, opportunity and resilience need to go hand in hand. For the benefits of increased capital markets financing to be realised, and sustained, this source of financial intermediation needs to be robust enough to withstand adverse shocks.Otherwise, investors may not want to channel their savings to capital markets. And companies may not want to rely on these markets to fund their activities.And that brings to the fore the role of non-bank financial intermediation. Non-banks – including the funds sector – are core participants of the capital markets ecosystem. And, as I mentioned upfront, their role in global finance has been expanding. While the sector is very diverse, asset management has accounted for much of the growth in non-bank finance.Given that shift in financial intermediation, our financial stability oversight frameworks cannot stand still. Indeed, if an asset manager were to increasingly venture into new asset classes, their approach to risk management would need to adapt.Similarly, as the composition of the financial sector itself is evolving, our approach – as a risk manager for the system as a whole – also needs to adapt.In addition, over recent years, we have seen episodes where financial vulnerabilities in segments of the funds sector have contributed to market-wide disruptions. During the “dash for cash” in 2020, amplified redemptions in funds investing in less liquid assets, such as corporate bonds, added to selling pressures at a time of deteriorating liquidity.3And the LDI episode in October 2022 revealed how leverage-related vulnerabilities can lead to core market disruptions.4 In both instances, restoring market functioning required extraordinary central bank interventions. These episodes were very different in nature. But they share common features: exogenous shocks hitting the financial system, and – in the presence of financial vulnerabilities – individually rational decisions by market participants becoming collectively damaging.This points to the importance of a macroprudential lens in the regulation and oversight of non-banks, including funds. The objective of this approach is not to constrain the vital role played by funds in delivering their economic functions. Nor is to treat funds like banks – which, of course, they are not. On the contrary, it is to ensure that the funds sector continues to perform its core economic functions, serving investors and the real economy, even during periods of turbulence. In essence, the aim is to safeguard collective resilience. Safeguarding resilience: shifting our focus towards implementation and surveillanceThis is the ‘why’. Let me now turn to the ‘how’. Strengthening the financial stability lens in the oversight of the funds sector has been – and continues to be – an important, multi-year priority for us at the Central Bank.This has been consistent with the policy agenda at a global level. In recent years, the FSB and IOSCO have agreed several policy recommendations, on money market funds, open-ended funds, margin preparedness and leverage in the non-bank sector.5Much of this has been in response to vulnerabilities exposed by recent episodes of stress in segments of the non-bank sector. International work has also focused on the supply of liquidity in markets, recognising that market functioning depends on the interaction between supply and demand for liquidity.Domestically, we have introduced targeted measures in two segments of the investment fund sector: sterling LDI funds, working with colleagues from across Europe, and property funds.6 While there is more to do to develop the macroprudential framework for non-banks fully,7 our focus is now gradually shifting towards implementation and surveillance. Implementation is crucial, translating policy objectives into real-world outcomes. Our focus in this area covers implementation of both internationally-agreed and EU policy initiatives, as well as the two domestic measures we have introduced. And, of course – like with all our policy interventions – this work also entails monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of our domestic measures. Surveillance is an essential bedrock to financial stability oversight. The funds sector is large, diverse, complex and constantly changing. And, at a global level, our understanding of how the sector contributes to systemic risk is still evolving. In recent years, we have been investing in analytical frameworks, including better data, to monitor and evaluate potential financial vulnerabilities – whether due to liquidity mismatch, leverage or interconnectedness – across the sector.8 We also complement that systematic monitoring with a series of deeper dives into parts of the sector that share similar characteristics. And, crucially, we communicate the insights from our work on implementation and on surveillance. Which is an important tool to effect outcomes, in and of itself. Because understanding the nature and evolution of financial vulnerabilities at the level of the system can help individual entities better understand, and manage, their own risks. In focus: liquidity management by Irish open-ended funds and the Irish hedge fund sector In that context, I wanted to use today’s opportunity to convey the main insights from two in-depth assessments we have concluded recently. The first relates to the theme of implementation and is on liquidity management by open-ended funds.The second relates to the theme of surveillance and is on financial vulnerabilities in the Irish hedge fund sector.Let me also take this opportunity to acknowledge the constructive engagement of the sector with this work, including through providing data to enable our assessment.Implementation – liquidity management by open-ended fundsStarting with liquidity management by open-ended funds, this has been an area of regulatory focus – at a global level – for about a decade now. This is because of the potential mismatch between the redemption frequency of open-ended funds, which is often daily, and the liquidity of the underlying assets in which they invest.In times of stress, liquidity mismatches can lead to ‘first-mover advantage’ dynamics, resulting in amplified redemption pressures and asset sales. Following the ‘dash for cash’ in 2020, the FSB published revised policy recommendations on liquidity risk management by open-ended funds in 2023, accompanied by guidance by IOSCO.9 A key focus of these revised recommendations was on the availability and use of liquidity management tools (LMTs).And, specifically, tools that aim to ensure that the costs of asset sales are borne by redeeming investors, rather than investors remaining in the fund. These are sometimes referred to as price-based LMTs, and include swing pricing, anti-dilution levies or redemption fees.These tools, first and foremost, protect fund investors. But they also strengthen collective resilience, by guarding against potential first-mover advantage dynamics in open-ended funds. The policy intent of the revised FSB recommendations in 2023 has been to lead to greater availability, use, and consistency in use, of such tools. Recent changes to the legislative framework in Europe, which are coming into effect soon, also contained enhancements to liquidity management requirements.So, in recent months, we sought to understand better how these tools are being used by Irish-domiciled funds and explore some of the implementation challenges.Let me give you our headline conclusions.10First, there is widespread availability of price-based LMTs.Our analysis suggests that these tools are now widely available in the Irish investment funds sector.Around 85% of open-ended funds have at least one price-based LMT. The availability of those tools has increased by around 40% over the past half decade across the sector.And that is a positive outcome. It means that asset managers are better equipped to allocate transaction cost across investors and to mitigate the effects of liquidity mismatches. Second, use remains less widespread.Our survey of asset managers examined how often these tools were employed over a two-year period, between 2022-3. The share of funds using these tools on at least one occasion over that period was well below availability levels.Of course, it is important to recognise that there is significant diversity within the open-ended funds sector. The good news is that these tools are used more frequently by funds with greater exposure to less liquid assets, such as high-yield bonds.And that the use of these tools increases during periods of stress, as one would expect.Still, only about half of high-yield bond funds used price-based LMTs during the two year-period covered by the survey, which also included episodes of market turbulence.So there is further scope to see increased use of such tools, as part of day-to-day liquidity management by open-ended funds.Third, the approach to use varies, with the market impact of transactions accounted for by only a small proportion of funds.When using price-based LMTs, fund managers seek to estimate – and allocate appropriately – the full costs of conducting a trade.These costs can be explicit, such as broker commissions or taxes. Or they can be implicit, because of a difference between the valuation of an asset and the price at which it is sold, including because the trade itself might have an impact on market prices.The market impact estimate – which is likely to be more important in less liquid markets – is particularly relevant to guard against first-mover advantage dynamics in open-ended funds. Our analysis suggests that the use of a specific market impact estimate – beyond what is captured in bid-ask spreads – remains low across the sector, at around 15% of funds.So, again, there is scope to see greater consistency in use of LMTs, including in terms of the incorporation of any significant market impact estimates. Of course, the estimation of implicit costs can entail operational challenges. So, to support use of these tools, today we have also published a document outlining good practices in the determination of implicit costs.11Overall, this is an area where we want to continue to a see a shift in outcomes: towards greater use, and greater consistency of use, of price-based LMT. The ongoing data that we now collect on the availability and use of LMTs, as well as on fund flows, will help us monitor progress on an ongoing basis. And, as we have outlined in our recent Regulatory and Supervisory Outlook report, the use of LMTs, specifically by bond funds, will be an area of supervisory focus this year.Ultimately, the aim is to translate the policy intent of the FSB and IOSCO recommendations, as well as the updated requirements in the European framework, into real-world outcomes. Surveillance – hedge fundsLet me now turn to our in-depth assessment of the hedge fund sector in Ireland. The reason behind our focus on this segment of the funds sector has been two-fold.First, at a global level, hedge funds have been playing an increasingly important role in core markets, including in US and European sovereign debt markets.12 Second, when we look domestically, this is one of the segments of the funds sector that has amongst the highest levels of leverage. So, in recent months, we have been evaluating more closely the risks and vulnerabilities stemming from the activities of hedge funds based in Ireland. Let me give you our headline conclusions.13First, the hedge fund sector is large, but diverse. And that diversity supports resilience.In total, the Irish hedge fund sector has around €400bn of assets under management.  We estimate it accounts for around 4% of the global hedge fund sector, and more than half of the hedge fund sector in Europe. But equally important is the diversity of the sector. Hedge funds are a broad grouping. Within that, there is a wide range of different strategies.And that diversity matters from a systemic risk perspective. Let me give you a simple comparison. The sterling LDI sector in Ireland had about €350bn of assets under management just before the Gilt market disruption of 2022. But sterling LDI funds are particularly homogeneous. Their investments are largely concentrated in Gilts, and their investors are largely UK pension funds.By contrast, hedge funds are far more heterogeneous. The investments are spread globally and across different asset classes, while investors are from across sectors and countries.That diversity – in and of itself – supports systemic resilience. Second, certain hedge fund strategies entail higher vulnerabilities.Because of that diversity, in our assessment, we examined in more detail potential vulnerabilities associated with different hedge fund strategies.For example, while leverage is employed across the Irish hedge fund sector, it is not equally distributed across different strategies.Leverage-related vulnerabilities are particularly elevated for Relative Value funds. Depending on the definition, the weighted average leverage of these funds is around 30-45 times. Relative Value funds also have a particular concentration on repo borrowing, relative to other hedge funds strategies, making them particularly reliant on repo market functioning.When we looked at the risk of margin calls, Relative Value funds again exhibited higher vulnerability relative to other cohorts. As did credit hedge funds, which also tend to have less liquid investments as well as strong interconnections to credit markets.This matters because credit markets are core to the functioning of the financial system and the real economy.  Third, the market footprint of the Irish hedge fund sector is modest, limiting systemic impacts.So if there are leverage-related vulnerabilities, does this raise the potential for systemic implications from the Irish hedge fund sector?Well, on its own, this is unlikely. And this is because the market footprint of the sector is limited. I started by highlighting the growing importance of the global hedge fund sector in sovereign debt markets. So one of the key areas we examined as part of this work was the relative importance of the Irish hedge fund sector in holding of, or trading in, sovereign debt securities.In practice, this is very small – less than 0.2% of the estimated stock of outstanding sovereign debt in core markets. Similarly, across all asset classes, the maximum footprint of the sector was around 2%. Again, this is relatively modest.So, while there are residual uncertainties, our overall assessment is that the sector – on its own – is unlikely to pose systemic vulnerabilities. There is a ‘but’, however. And it is an important one. There are similar funds, with similar strategies, and similar exposures, in other jurisdictions. So we can only understand the macro-financial effects of increased hedge fund participation in core markets by considering the collective response of global hedge funds to adverse shocks.This is why a key outcome of our work will be engagement with authorities internationally, as we collectively seek to put together the pieces of the global puzzle of capital markets. In addition, we will use the insights from this assessment to enhance our regular surveillance of segments of the hedge fund sector that exhibit the most material vulnerabilities. Because exposures, concentration, and ultimately systemic vulnerabilities are not fixed – they evolve over time.ConclusionLet me finish here, by going back to where I started. We are navigating an environment of both rising tails risks and an evolving financial system. In this context, strengthening the financial stability lens in the oversight of the non-bank sector, including asset management, remains an important priority.Globally and in Ireland, we have made meaningful progress in recent years, but this is an ongoing journey. The next phase of the journey will increasingly focus on effective implementation and strengthened surveillance. The goal is safeguarding collective resilience, amid the ongoing shocks and shifts. Not for its own sake, but as a foundation that enables the financial system to weather shocks, serve the real economy, and seize the opportunities ahead. Thank you for listening this morning. [1] I am very grateful to Mark Cassidy, Brian Gallagher, Neil Killeen, Darragh McLaughlin, Naoise Metadjer, Kitty Moloney, Cian Murphy, Arya Pillai, Martina Sherman, Sean O’Sullivan and Brid White for their advice and assistance in preparing these remarks. [2] See Central Bank of Ireland (2026) ‘DLT and Tokenisation in Financial Services’, Discussion Paper 12.[3] See FSB (2020) ‘Holistic review of the March market turmoil’.[4] See Pinter (2023) ‘An anatomy of the 2022 Gilt market crisis’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper, No. 1019, and Dunne et al (2023) ‘Irish-Resident LDI Funds and the 2022 Gilt Market Crisis’, Central Bank of Ireland Financial Stability Note, Vol. 2023, No. 7[5] See FSB (2025) ‘Enhancing the resilience of non-bank financial intermediation: Progress report’[6] See Central Bank of Ireland (2022) ‘The Central Bank’s macroprudential policy framework for Irish property funds’, and Central Bank of Ireland (2024) ‘The Central Bank’s macroprudential policy framework for Irish-authorised GBP-denominated LDI funds’[7] See Eurosystem (2024) ‘Eurosystem response to EU Commission’s consultation on macroprudential policies for non bank financial intermediation (NBFI)’[8] See, for example, Central Bank of Ireland (2024) ‘Market-based finance monitor’,and Central Bank of Ireland (2025) ‘In focus: The Irish NBFI sector during the April market volatility episode’, Financial Stability Review[9] See FSB (2023) ‘Revised policy recommendations to address structural vulnerabilities from liquidity mismatch in open-ended funds’ and IOSCO (2023) ‘Anti-dilution liquidity management tools –  Guidance for effective implementation of the recommendations for liquidity risk management for Collective Investment Schemes’[10] See Gallagher and White (2026) ‘Availability and use of Liquidity Management Tools in Irish-domiciled hedge funds’, Central Bank of Ireland Staff Insights,[11] See Central Bank of Ireland (2026) ‘Good Practices on incorporating implicit costs into the calibration of price-based LMTs’[12] See Sushko and Todorov (2025) ‘Sizing up hedge funds' relative value trades in US Treasuries and interest rate swaps’, BIS Quarterly Review, December, Barth et al (2025) ‘The cross-border trail of the Treasury basis trade’, FEDS Notes,; and Ferrara et al (2024) ‘Hedge funds: good or bad for market functioning’, ECB Blog,[13] See Fragkou et al (2026) ‘Financial stability risk assessment of Irish Hedge Funds’, Central Bank of Ireland Signed Article,

Central Bank of Ireland today published the annual Financial Conditions of Credit Unions Report, which provides an update on the financial performance and position of the sector for the financial year ended 30 September 2025.

Parus ICAV (CLONE) - Central Bank of Ireland Issues Warning on Unauthorised Firm

The Central Bank of Ireland today announced details of a targeted amendment to the mortgage measures that will exempt certain principal home bridging loans from the Loan-to-Income (LTI) limit. The Loan-to-Value (LTV) limit will continue to apply to these products, and all other elements of the mortgage measures remain unchanged.The amendment recognises that bridging finance products are a feature of the evolving Irish mortgage market and ensures that the regulatory framework adapts appropriately to continue to support market functioning without compromising lending standards or resilience of borrowers and lenders in the mortgage market.Within the measures, a principal home bridging loan is a short-term loan (with a maximum term of 18 months) that facilitates existing homeowners to purchase a new principal home before completing the sale of their current property. Unlike standard mortgages, these loans are repaid from the proceeds of the property sale rather than from regular income.Deputy Governor Vasileios Madouros said: "This targeted amendment reflects our commitment to ensuring the mortgage measures remain fit for purpose as the market evolves. Bridging loans serve a purpose in helping homeowners move between properties, and the LTI limit is less relevant for products where repayment comes from asset sale proceeds rather than regular income.All other elements of the mortgage measures are unchanged. This is a proportionate response to market developments that maintains our core objectives of sustainable lending."The mortgage measures do not aim to replace lenders’ own prudent underwriting criteria. Lenders must continue to assess the suitability and affordability of bridging loans for individual borrowers. Consumer protection rules also apply in full to these products. Borrowers must be fully informed of the risks, and lenders must ensure that bridging finance is appropriate for each customer's circumstances. The Central Bank will monitor the operation of the exemption. This monitoring will form part of the Bank’s ongoing regular assessment of the mortgage measures to identify any unintended consequences or emerging risks.The amendment was developed following engagement with civil society stakeholders and with industry. ENDSNotes to EditorsAbout the Mortgage MeasuresThe mortgage measures are macroprudential regulations that set limits on mortgage lending to support sustainable lending standards and protect the resilience of borrowers and the financial system. The current framework includes:Loan-to-Income (LTI) limits: Maximum of 4 times gross annual income for first-time buyers; 3.5 times gross annual income for second and subsequent buyersLoan-to-Value (LTV) limits: Maximum of 90% for principal home mortgages; 70% for buy-to-let propertiesFlexibility allowance: Lenders may allocate up to 15% of the value of FTB/SSB lending to loans that exceed the limits; 10% for BTL lendingAbout Principal Home Bridging LoansPrincipal home bridging loans are short-term financing arrangements that allow existing homeowners to purchase a new principal home before completing the sale of their current property. Key characteristics include:Maximum term of 18 monthsNo requirement to make capital repayments during the termRepayment from the proceeds of selling the original propertyFurther InformationFrequently Asked QuestionsElaine Scanlon 087 2136313 elaine.scanlon@centrabank.ie / media@centralbank.ie

Goldenstocks T/A Citymend Management Limited - Central Bank of Ireland Issues Warning on Unauthorised Firm

In his latest blog, Governor Gabriel Makhlouf argues that central banks must modernise their digital infrastructure and regulatory frameworks to ensure that central bank money remains the stable foundation of Europe's financial system whilst enabling private sector innovation in a digitally transformed ecosystem.

Good morning.Ongoing events in the Middle East are a stark reminder of the challenges policy makers face in a world increasingly characterised by geoeconomic fragmentation.For central banks tasked with preserving price stability, supply shocks pose both analytical and strategic challenges: understanding their persistence, their impacts on supply chains, and their effects on inflation and growth; and determining how to respond when supply and demand move in opposite directions. My speech today explains how I am thinking about both challenges.The ECB Governing Council held rates unchanged at 2 per cent in March. I want to explain not just what was decided, but how I am thinking about the challenges, including where genuine uncertainty calls for caution and how we communicate this through scenarios.My remarks are organised around three themes: the impact of the shock on the economy; calibrating the monetary policy response; and the key indicators that I will be monitoring.Impact of the shockA significant disruption at one of the world’s key energy supply chokepoints pushes prices up and output down, playing out over different time horizons.The initial supply shock shows up in higher energy commodity prices, passing quickly into consumer and business energy costs. This is the direct effect. Indirect effects follow as businesses pass on higher input costs, contributing to cost-push inflation and broader supply chain disruption, which the 2021-23 period taught us can be difficult to identify in real time.  Second-round effects occur when nominal wages adjust to the new, higher price level.  In the euro area, where collective bargaining is widespread, wage formation can be slow, lagging the initial shock by several quarters. Countries that index wages to inflation – such as Belgium – or where annual wage agreements are the norm – such as France – see quicker adjustment.The conflict also impacts demand through real incomes, investment, confidence, financial conditions, and global trade. Typically, this moves slower than the initial energy price shock, creating a growth headwind that could, over time, pull inflation down.There is wide uncertainty about the conflict’s duration, which significantly affects the shock’s scale and persistence.Initially, futures pricing suggested a short, sharp shock, with energy prices reverting to pre-war levels through late 2026 and 2027, closer to the baseline scenario in the ECB staff March projections (cutoff: 11 March).1 However, as the conflict persists without clear resolution, a more prolonged period of higher prices becomes likely. This approaches the adverse scenario in the staff projections. The projections also include a severe scenario with bigger, more prolonged energy price increases.The baseline scenario has oil and gas peaking around $90/barrel and €50/MWh in Q2 2026, then declining gradually. Under the adverse scenario, oil and gas peak at $119/barrel and €87/MWh in Q2, converging to baseline by Q3 2027. In the severe scenario, oil peaks at $145/barrel and gas at €106/MWh in Q2 2026, declining much more slowly and remaining significantly above both other scenarios.Chart 1 places these scenarios in historical context. Currently, energy prices sit between baseline and adverse scenarios.  However, genuine uncertainty remains.  Both oil and gas volatility is well above long-run averages (Chart 2), though below historic highs. Risks are on the upside for inflation and on the downside for growth, especially through 2026.Chart 3 illustrates how these scenarios feed through to inflation and growth. For inflation, the baseline shows 2.6 per cent in 2026 before returning to around 2 per cent in 2027/28. The adverse and severe scenarios see much stronger headline inflation at 3.5-4.4 per cent in 2026.  In the severe scenario, reflecting the more enduring shock, inflation remains well above target through 2027 (4.8 per cent) and 2028 (2.8 per cent). Core inflation shows less pass-through initially as it excludes energy and food prices, but indirect and second-round effects (mainly through wages) emerge significantly in 2027 and 2028.GDP growth reacts quickly to higher energy prices, falling sharply in 2026.  Compared to December projections expecting growth around 1.2 per cent in 2026 – near the euro area’s growth potential – in the severe scenario, this falls by two-thirds to just 0.4 per cent.  Weaker growth lingers through 2027 before recovering somewhat in 2028.The baseline projections include the market-implied path for policy rates as at the cutoff date of around two 25 basis point increases during 2026.  However, the adverse and severe scenarios make no further assumptions about the policy rate path. The Governing Council is determined to ensure inflation stabilises at our 2 per cent target in the medium term but we are not on a pre-determined path and have adopted, as I hope you all know, a meeting-by-meeting approach.Monetary policy and supply shocksLet’s turn to the monetary policy response.The analysis of the 2021-23 inflation episode, carried out as part of the 2025 strategy assessment, contains important lessons.2 The initial supply shock – pandemic-era bottlenecks, energy prices – led to more persistent inflation through indirect effects working through supply chains and lagged wage adjustment. With hindsight, policy models suggest interest rates could have risen slightly earlier – around one or two quarters – and more forcefully.3So far, most attention has been on the direct effects of higher energy prices. This is expected, but we must also monitor downstream effects, particularly on energy-intensive goods production. Much of this passes through the Straits of Hormuz chokepoint, including chemicals, metals, fertilisers, and helium (crucial for semiconductor chips).Our 2025 strategy statement builds on the learnings from the previous episode, including new data sources to understand how shocks pass through direct and indirect channels and second-round effects.  The expansion of the wage tracker toolkit is one example.The explicit incorporation of scenario analysis into the projection framework to better convey uncertainties is another.  One question I’ve been asked recently is how exactly scenarios are used for calibrating euro area monetary policy.First, a scenario differs fundamentally from a forecast.  A forecast is our best estimate given available information.  Scenarios are internally consistent illustrations of what could happen if energy prices evolve differently from the baseline. This distinction matters. When we have low confidence about a shock’s scale and persistence, including whether inflation dynamics have shifted structurally, a single point forecast gives a false impression of precision.  Scenarios reflect our assessment of current uncertainty.How should scenarios be read?  For me, it’s not about choosing a preferred scenario but ensuring robustness, that our monetary policy approach performs well across potential outcomes.  Scenarios also signal our intention to calibrate responses as the shock develops, showing the Governing Council has thought carefully about each calibration. This aligns with President Lagarde’s ‘three cases’ approach: if the shock is limited and short-lived, look through to avoid doing more harm than good; if it causes a large but not overly persistent target overshoot, take a measured approach; and if inflation is expected to deviate significantly and persistently from target, respond more forcefully.4 However, data is noisy and signals can conflict, so I caution against an overly mechanistic reading.  This is why our March monetary policy statement emphasised “a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach.”5The data I am monitoringBefore discussing specific data, it’s important to note that the macroeconomic backdrop at the start of 2026 differs somewhat from early 2022. This matters when thinking about the shock’s potential impact.  Even before the invasion of Ukraine, inflation was 5 per cent by December 2021, reflecting supply bottlenecks, pent-up demand, and higher gas prices. Monetary policy was accommodative, with a deposit rate of minus 0.5 per cent, below even the low end of the neutral rate range. Time-based forward guidance on asset purchases, coupled with sequencing commitments on rates, limited our agility in responding to inflationary shocks. Indeed, this was another change in the 2025 ECB Monetary Policy Strategy Assessment, to avoid commitments that limit agility when states of the world change.6Contrast this with now.  In February 2026, inflation was around our 2 per cent target and has been for much of the past year; the policy rate was within the neutral rate range – neither accommodative nor restrictive – and longer-term inflation expectations are well-anchored. Another important difference for second-round effects is that the labour market is in a different place than in early 2022.  Back then, strong post-pandemic labour demand pushed job openings to record highs. The labour market has cooled markedly since, with job openings returning to close to pre-pandemic levels for many countries (Chart 4).If the central policy challenge is preventing the temporary from becoming persistent, the natural next question is: how will we know if that’s happening?Let me highlight information I’ll be monitoring, grouped by direct, indirect, and second-round effects.Direct effectsWe need to monitor energy commodity prices closely. The war has disrupted the physical supply chain for energy significantly, including considerable infrastructure damage.  When delivery is more uncertain and shipping and insurance costs rise, this adds upward pressure on prices.  Oil freight rates have spiked sharply since the war started and remain exceptionally high with little sign of easing (Chart 5).Gas storage levels in Europe are another important factor for supply-demand balance. Current storage levels at 28 per cent (24 March) are the lowest for this point in the year since 2022 (Chart 6). Reaching typical EU targets of 90 per cent storage by November could support higher gas prices through spring and summer, further amplifying geopolitical price pressures.Downstream effects in retail energy prices are already showing up in home heating and transport fuel prices. The Eurostat flash estimate for March headline inflation released yesterday was 2.5 per cent. Unsurprisingly, a large part of the March inflation increase was energy prices, which increased sharply.  Core inflation – that is, excluding energy and food – came in at 2.3 per cent, marginally lower than the February reading of 2.4 per cent.  Services and goods annual inflation, at 3.2 per cent and 0.5 per cent respectively, are in-line with the path set out in the December projections. It is too early to expect to see indirect and second round effects in these items. Beyond headline and main category inflation rates, measures of dispersion and breadth of price changes in the HICP basket, such as the percentage of items with inflation rates above a certain threshold, will be watched closely as these can be a leading indicator of broadening price pressures.Indirect effectsFor indirect effects, producer price data indicates pipeline price pressures, but official series like the Producer Price Index (PPI) tend to lag.  For some industries, timely data on prices at different production stages – raw materials, intermediate goods, and final outputs – can provide early indications of future producer price dynamics.Food production is one example, accounting for almost one-fifth of the average household’s spending. We know from 2022-23 that fertiliser prices feed into agricultural input costs with a short lag, usually three to six months, and show up in food commodity prices soon after.  Fertiliser prices rose sharply when Russia attacked Ukraine, taking over 18 months to return to pre-war levels. With high concentration of urea fertiliser production in Gulf states, including Iran itself, prices have increased sharply since the conflict started (Chart 7).I already mentioned the cost of transporting oil as a direct effect I’m monitoring. But increases in fuel and transportation costs contribute to higher marginal costs for goods and services, another source of indirect price pressures.  ECB research suggests supply shocks hit goods prices faster but are more persistent for services prices.7 Diesel and jet fuel prices have risen sharply since the war in Iran started. In both cases, the current spike is not far off previous highs seen at the start of Russia’s invasion (Chart 8).Second-round effectsFor wage dynamics, I pay close attention to both the ECB’s Negotiated Wage Tracker and the Indeed Wage Tracker, developed jointly with colleagues here at the Central Bank of Ireland. The latter has higher frequency, broad coverage across sectors with and without collective bargaining agreements, and tends to lead official data on wage growth. I’m watching not just the level of wage growth but its acceleration relative to trend, particularly in domestic, non-tradeable sectors where energy cost pass-through is happening simultaneously. At this stage, it is too early to expect shifts in wage dynamics, as Chart 9 shows, but I will monitor developments closely to compare with expected wage growth in the March projections (Chart 10).8For expectation formation, standard data sources – consumer surveys, market-based inflation break-evens, the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and the Survey of Market Analysts – will be important. But with one caveat: at times of high uncertainty, these sources can tend to confirm what has already happened rather than anticipate what is emerging. This means we need to watch higher-frequency price data more closely than usual.ConclusionLet me close by returning to the decision we took a couple of weeks ago and what it tells us about how policy makers are approaching this moment.We held rates at 2 per cent because the outlook is genuinely uncertain.  But we are learning to live with uncertainty and to not be paralysed by it.  We have a framework for monitoring how the outlook evolves and a credible commitment to act when data clarifies the direction of travel.  And as I said, we are not pre-committing to a path and not ruling options in or out.  The use of scenarios during exceptionally uncertain times is about ensuring we’re ready to respond in a timely manner as the situation develops. The path ahead is uncertain, but the commitment to price stability is not. [1] ECB, (2026) “ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, March 2026”.  The baseline projections condition on the path of futures prices for energy commodities at the time of the cut-off date of 11 March 2026.  [2] See ECB (2025) for the Monetary Policy Strategy Review material. Occasional paper 371 “A strategic view on the economic and inflation environment in the euro area” provides an overview of historic inflation dynamics.[3] See, for example, Lane (2025), “The 2021-2022 inflation surges and the monetary policy response through the lens of macroeconomic models”, speech at the SUERF Marjolin Lecture hosted by the Banca d’Italia.[4] See Lagarde (2026) “Navigating energy shocks: risks and policy responses”, Speech at 2026 ECB Watchers.[5] ECB (2026) “Monetary Policy Decisions: 19 March 2026”.[6] This particular issue is addressed in more detail in the background note that accompanied the publication of the 2025 Strategy Statement, “An overview of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy – 2025”.[7] See Martinez-Hernandez et al. (2025).[8] Chartpack for speech

The Prohibition Notice (PDF) issued after Mr Buckley signed a Statement of Undisputed Facts, in which he accepted that between 1 February 2021 and 12 December 2023, while he was employed at two different retail intermediaries, he issued invoices to clients directing payment to his personal bank account in place of his employers’ bank details.  Mr Buckley also accepted that he misrepresented his financial qualifications to clients during the course of his employment. The Prohibition Notice issued to Mr Buckley prohibits him from carrying out any controlled functions for an indefinite period. Karen O’ Leary, Director of Enforcement said: “Controlled function holders must comply with the Fitness & Probity Standards and financial services legislation. Those in customer-facing roles bear a particular responsibility to act with integrity and honesty at all times, and a failure to do so risks eroding public trust and confidence in financial services. Where warranted, the Central Bank will investigate and seek to prohibit an individual from performing controlled functions in order to protect consumers from potential harm.”  Additional Information The Fitness and Probity Regime was introduced by the Central Bank under the Central Bank Reform Act 2010 to ensure that regulated firms and individuals who work in these firms are committed to high standards of competence, integrity and honesty and are held to account when they fall below these standards. View further detail on the Fitness and Probity Regime, including the Fitness and Probity Standards.The Central Bank may investigate individuals in controlled functions, including pre-approval controlled functions, if we suspect that they do not have the required fitness and / or probity to perform the role, and we may prohibit them following such investigation, if appropriate.

Good morning and welcome to Central Bank of Ireland. Thank you for joining us for this inaugural gathering of the Savings and Investment Forum. I want to extend a particular welcome to the Tánaiste.Today marks an important milestone.  The Department of Finance's 2024 Funds Review recognised the importance of enabling more retail investment in Ireland.  It recommended establishing this Forum to address that challenge and today provides a timely opportunity to do so.Let me place this initiative within a broader European context. Last week I spoke about the fact that European households and institutions collectively held substantial savings.  In the euro area alone, the stock of deposits is nearing €10 trillion.  Yet investment has not kept pace with the growth in savings.  European Central Bank survey data shows that only a fraction of EU household wealth is held directly in capital markets instruments.  This matters because in order to fund the investments our European economies need – be that for innovation, infrastructure, or the digital and green transitions – we need strong capital markets to complement a strong banking sector in financing a more productive and competitive Europe.The Savings and Investments Union agenda speaks directly to this challenge.  It recognises that unlocking retail participation in capital markets is not merely a financial services matter. It is central to Europe's economic and financial resilience and the welfare of our people.Ireland's position within this narrative is distinctive.  Irish household wealth is heavily concentrated in housing, accounting for roughly two-thirds of total net wealth.  Where households do hold financial assets, these are indirectly in occupational pensions and life insurance and, most importantly, approximately €170 billion sit idle in deposits in Irish banks.The result is that Irish retail participation in financial markets is very limited, even compared to our European peers.  As outlined in our research on retail investor participation, published at the end of last year, Irish households hold just 2.3% of their financial assets in direct investments such as listed equity and debt securities, compared to the EU average of 7.5%.  And Ireland has one of the lowest levels of direct holdings in investment funds in the EU at just above 2.2%, despite being an international financial hub and one of the largest global centres for investment funds, with over €5 trillion in assets under management domiciled here.This low level of direct retail participation reflects a complex interplay of historical, cultural, and structural factors that have shaped how we think about savings and investment.  Yet our research shows that Irish consumers are motivated to invest. They recognise the importance of securing retirement income, providing for their children's futures, and building long-term financial security. However, significant barriers persist.  Psychological and emotional barriers are deeply rooted, perhaps in Ireland's economic history and the financial crises we have experienced. There are knowledge and understanding gaps, including a perception that investment is complex, the preserve of the wealthy and a sense that the investment ecosystem does not serve the full spectrum of potential retail investors.Given the complexity of the issue, no one intervention is enough and it probably requires multiple and sustained efforts from many stakeholders. From my point of view there are three important ingredients to enhancing retail investor participation in Ireland: first, the availability of suitable products; second, that retail investors have the financial education, autonomy and advice to invest; and, third, that retail investors are protected when they do invest, with strong consumer protection frameworks and firms securing their interests.I am heartened by the efforts of policymakers and regulators – domestically and in the rest of Europe – to progress and reinforce these ingredients.  The Central Bank supports efforts to reduce barriers to retail investment.  Products to encourage investment need to be flexible enough to allow product producers to design bespoke offerings that meet genuine consumer needs whilst maintaining sufficient standardisation to ensure comparability and reduce administrative burdens.In my view such endeavours should be accompanied by sustained efforts to improve financial literacy and investment knowledge.  Consumers need to understand not only what they are investing in, but how any investment aligns with their financial goals, and what risks they are taking.  In short, I suggest it must be part of a broader effort to build financial literacy, foster a positive investment culture, and restore public trust and confidence in capital markets.The Government's National Financial Literacy Strategy, launched just over a year ago, recognises this challenge and commits to building the financial capability of Irish citizens. That strategy will be essential to the success of any initiative aimed at broadening retail participation.  Research has shown that financial literacy levels can play an important role in shaping household financial behaviour.  The Central Bank is committed to playing its part, including through our consumer protection framework and supervisory engagements. This Forum is the right place to work through these considerations, bringing together policymakers, regulators, consumer advocates, and industry participants, all of whom have a role to play in contributing to this initiative. We will play our role in supporting the Savings and Investments Union agenda, in line with our mission to ensure the financial system is operating in the best interests of consumers and the wider economy.  For me this means that the regulatory framework supports retail investment, that consumer protections are robust and that trust and confidence in capital markets are restored and sustained.  And, to that end, we are committed to working collaboratively with our colleagues at home and abroad.I am sure today’s discussions will make a valuable contribution to the delivery of better outcomes for our citizens and our economy. Thank you. 

Central Bank of Ireland today launched a commemorative coin celebrating the life and work of renowned Irish playwright Seán O'Casey, on what would have been his 146th birthday. It marks the 100th anniversary of the inaugural performance of his masterpiece The Plough and the Stars at the Abbey Theatre.The silver proof coin will go on sale today (Monday 30 March 2026) at 1pm on www.collectorcoins.ie. Designed by PJ Lynch, there are just 3,000 coins available, and they will retail at €90. Governor Gabriel Makhlouf presented the coin to Seán O'Casey's daughter Shivaun during a launch at the Abbey Theatre attended by the O'Casey family and the current cast of the production, marking a fitting tribute to one of Ireland's most significant dramatic works.The premiere of The Plough and the Stars took place at the Abbey Theatre in 1926, less than ten years after the Easter Rising of 1916. Flawlessly weaving comedy with tragedy, the play tells the story of ordinary lives torn apart by the idealism of the time. This O'Casey masterpiece is a classic of human and political theatre which continues to resonate today.Governor Gabriel Makhlouf said: "Seán O'Casey's The Plough and the Stars remains one of the most powerful and enduring works in Irish theatre. A century on from its premiere, O'Casey's unflinching portrayal of how political upheaval affects ordinary people continues to speak to audiences. This commemorative coin honours O'Casey's artistic genius and the Central Bank is proud to mark this significant cultural anniversary."The Plough and the Stars is running in the Abbey Theatre until 30 April 2026 in an exciting new production directed by Tom Creed. Further informationElaine Scanlon – elaine.scanlon@centralbank.ie 087 213 6313ENDSNotes to the EditorProof coins are collectable coins and are not intended for general circulation. They are minted using specially polished dies and blanks that give them a mirror-like finish. Every year the Central Bank issues a number of collector coin products, on behalf of the Minister for Finance. The Collector Coin Advisory Group advises the Bank in relation to coin themes. The Central Bank invites public submissions in relation to themes.

Good morning everyone.It is a pleasure to join you today at the Abbey Theatre. We are here, of course, to launch a commemorative coin to honour Seán O’Casey, one of Ireland’s most important literary figures, and one whose voice continues to resonate profoundly, both in Ireland and internationally. I am delighted to welcome Shivaun O’Casey, Seán O’Casey’s daughter. It is particularly fitting to mark this occasion in her presence.Thank you to the Abbey Theatre for hosting us here today, a place that is so closely associated with the person whose life and work we are here to celebrate.Commemorative coins are tangible reminders of the individuals and ideas that have shaped our society, and each coin tells a story. Some commemorate moments of political transformation while others celebrate artistic or intellectual achievement. Today’s coin tells the story of a writer who gave voice to the lives, struggles and dignity of ordinary people, and in doing so transformed Irish theatre.Seán O’Casey’s work was rooted deeply in Dublin, in its streets, its tenements, and in the lived experience of its people. He did not merely observe society, he examined it, questioned it, and held it up to scrutiny. His plays explored the intersection of politics, identity, poverty and humanity, often with a combination of realism, compassion and sharp wit.It is especially fitting that we are gathered here at the Abbey Theatre. O’Casey’s relationship with this institution was central to his career. This was the stage on which his most important works were first performed, and where his voice helped shape the identity of the national theatre itself.2026 marks 100 years since the premiere of The Plough and the Stars, a play that remains one of his most powerful and enduring works. When it was first performed here in 1926, it provoked outrage and unrest among audiences. The riots that accompanied its early performances reflected the intensity of feeling surrounding the events it depicted and the questions it raised about national identity, sacrifice and the human cost of political struggle. O’Casey understood more than most that art demands courage. As he wrote, “The artist’s life is to be a life of daring”. Yet today, that same play is rightly regarded as a masterpiece, an essential part of our understanding of Irish history, and of Irish theatre. Its return to the Abbey Theatre reminds us of the enduring relevance of O’Casey’s work. The questions he posed remain meaningful. His characters remain recognisable. And his insights into human nature and society continue to resonate.This ability to challenge, to provoke and to endure is the hallmark of great art. Seán O’Casey understood that theatre was not simply entertainment. It was a way of seeing ourselves more clearly. It was a means of exploring uncomfortable truths and of deepening our understanding of one another. His work captured not only the historical moment in which he lived, but also the universal experiences of hope, loss, resilience and dignity.In this way, his legacy extends far beyond the stage. He helped shape how Ireland saw itself, and how it was seen by the world.Those who knew him best also remember the person behind the playwright. Shivaun O’Casey has spoken warmly of her father’s imagination and spirit, recalling how he would turn ordinary moments into adventures for his children. It is a reminder that the creativity we celebrate today was not confined to the stage, but it was part of how he lived his life. Before I conclude, I would like to thank the many people who have helped to make today’s event possible. I want to acknowledge the Central Bank’s Currency Centre team, whose dedication and expertise ensure the continued success of the collector coin programme. Thank you also to our colleagues that are here with us today from the Royal Dutch Mint as well as the designer of this commemorative coin, PJ Lynch. Finally, I would also like to recognise the important contribution of the Numismatic Advisory Panel, whose guidance helps shape the themes and subjects we commemorate.Seán O’Casey once transformed the ordinary into the extraordinary through the power of his words. He did not write to comfort but rather to confront. Today, we honour him with this coin, a small object, but one that carries lasting meaning.He may well have viewed such recognition with characteristic wit and scepticism. But I hope he would also recognise it as an expression of gratitude for the stories he told, the truths he revealed, and the enduring legacy he left behind.It is a privilege to honour him today.Thank you.

The Central Bank Commission has appointed Elizabeth Mahon as Secretary of the Central Bank, effective 30 March.  Elizabeth has also been appointed to the role of Head of Governance in the Central Bank.Elizabeth has more than 20 years' experience in financial services, principally in the banking sector, where her career has focused on strategy and implementation, management consulting, organisational change, and stakeholder management. Since 2022 she has worked at the Central Bank as Head of Strategy & Foresight.Neil Whoriskey, the current Secretary of the Central Bank, has been appointed as Head of Internal Audit. He has previously held a variety of leadership roles in the Central Bank including in the areas of governance, communications, strategy & planning and European co-ordination.Announcing the appointment, Governor Gabriel Makhlouf said: “I am delighted to announce the appointment of Elizabeth Mahon to the role of Secretary of the Central Bank of Ireland and Head of Governance. The role of Secretary sits at the heart of our governance framework, ensuring that our decision-making processes are robust and to the highest standards. I would also like to thank Neil Whoriskey, who is stepping down after 15 years as Secretary, for his commitment and dedication.”

Governor Gabriel Makhlouf of the Central Bank of Ireland today emphasised the critical need to strengthen Europe’s Single Market as the foundation for mobilising the continent’s substantial savings in an increasingly fragmented global environment.

In his remarks, Governor Gabriel Makhlouf emphasised that Europe must mobilise its substantial savings by strengthening economic growth, completing the Single Market, and building more integrated capital markets, as capital currently flows abroad due to perceived higher returns elsewhere. He argued that central banks must anchor price stability and financial stability as preconditions for effective capital allocation, and that by addressing these fundamentals, European savings will naturally remain invested within Europe, creating sustainable prosperity.

Naperte Designated Activity Company (CLONE) - Central Bank of Ireland issues warning about unauthorised firm

TD ICAV (CLONES) - Central Bank of Ireland Issues Warning on Unauthorised Firm

Castleforbes Wealth (CLONE)– Central Bank of Ireland issues warning about unauthorised firm

West Invest Bank - Central Bank of Ireland Issues Warning on Unauthorised Firm

Walsh Trust Bank - Central Bank of Ireland Issues Warning on Unauthorised Firm