The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published today its Final Report on Valuing Collective Investment Schemes (CIS), which sets out a comprehensive and updated set of recommendations to further enhance the reliability, consistency and transparency of valuation practices across global investment funds. The report updates and consolidates IOSCO’s earlier Principles on valuation for collective investment schemes and hedge funds respectively. It takes into consideration feedback from market participants and developments in financial markets such as the rise in funds investing in less liquid, harder-to-value assets, including private assets, and the increasing participation of retail investors in such funds. Accurate valuation of fund assets is critical to investor protection and to maintaining confidence in financial markets. It underpins the calculation of net asset value (NAV), ensuring that investors subscribe and redeem units at fair prices and are treated equitably. The report sets out a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening valuation practices across jurisdictions and market participants. These focus on: Robust governance and oversight arrangement, including under stressed market conditions; Management of conflicts of interest; Sound and consistently applied valuation methodologies; Appropriate use and oversight of third-party valuation providers; and Transparency, disclosure to investors and record-keeping. The recommendations are designed to be proportionate and adaptable across different types of funds and jurisdictions, while promoting a more harmonized and a more globally consistent framework for fund valuations. “Reliable valuation practices are fundamental to fair and efficient markets. IOSCO’s updated recommendations will further ensure that investors are treated fairly and that fund valuations remain robust, including in periods of market stress.”- Jean-Paul Servais, IOSCO Board Chair “This work reflects IOSCO’s continued focus on strengthening the resilience of the asset management sector. The recommendations provide comprehensive practical guidance to address potential valuation challenges arising from the growing investment in less liquid assets and growing use of more complex investment strategies. They also complement IOSCO’s broader commitment to fortifying the resilience of open-ended funds to support financial stability.”- Jessica Reyes, Chair of IOSCO’s Committee on Investment Management, and Head of Asset Management Policy Division at the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF)

The nature of money has never been static. Over the centuries, financial innovation has reshaped how money is created, transferred and stored, often enhancing efficiency, broadening access and boosting economic welfare. When such innovations reach scale, they alter the structure of the financial system, with consequences for financial stability, monetary policy and the international monetary order. One recent innovation has been stablecoins. These are privately issued digital tokens pegged to fiat currencies and typically backed by portfolios of traditional assets. Their rapid rise has raised questions about their benefits and challenges. To understand the unfolding changes, it is worth looking at how earlier innovations transformed financial markets. Hyun Song Shin and his co-authors were among the first to examine these issues through a historical lens, drawing parallels with earlier monetary innovations, namely the “bank money” issued by the Bank of Amsterdam, which can be seen as an early form of stablecoin.[1] Backed by high-quality assets and providing a stable unit of account, bank money offered a trusted means of settlement and went on to become a key international currency for more than a century. Its eventual decline, however, illustrates how such trust can dissipate once confidence in the underlying assets weakens, even if the money is issued by a public deposit bank. More recently, a private and closer analogue of stablecoins emerged: money market funds. These created a highly liquid investment instrument that offered a market-based yield while promising a stable value, reshaping financial intermediation. In my remarks today, I will examine the parallels and differences between the emergence of money market funds and that of stablecoins to provide a perspective on the challenges posed by stablecoins and other forms of tokenisation for today’s financial system. I will argue that private monetary innovation can offer significant benefits. But I will also show that it can heighten financial stability risks, affect monetary policy transmission and alter the international monetary order. Central banks and regulators need to be ready to adapt regulation, monetary policy implementation and payment infrastructure in an agile manner to safeguard financial stability, preserve monetary control and anchor their currency’s role in the digital age. The rise of money market funds The emergence of money market funds in the 1970s was initially a distinct US phenomenon, driven by regulation and the macroeconomic environment. The key backdrop was Regulation Q, introduced in the aftermath of the Great Depression, which imposed interest rate ceilings on bank deposits in order to contain “excess competition” among banks. As higher inflation gave rise to higher market interest rates, investors sought liquid alternatives delivering higher yields.[2] Money market funds met this demand by investing in a diversified portfolio of high-quality, short-term market instruments, while aiming to maintain a stable net asset value and promising redemption at or near par. In doing so, they replicated some of the key attributes of bank deposits, most notably stability of value and liquidity. Over time, money market funds became central actors in wholesale funding markets and major buyers of short-term financial instruments, such as commercial paper, repurchase agreements and Treasury bills. The rise of money market funds in the United States led to some bank disintermediation as savings migrated from bank deposits into money market funds (Slide 2, left-hand side). As a result, banks increasingly shifted towards wholesale funding, such as repos and other market-based sources, making part of their funding more short-term, expensive and volatile (Slide 2, right-hand side).[3] At the same time, money market funds benefited the financial system and the economy more broadly. Governments enjoyed access to a wider and more diversified investor base for short-term sovereign debt, while financial intermediation shifted away from banks towards capital markets, contributing to the expansion of market-based finance (Slide 3, left-hand side). While the first money market funds in Europe were established in the early 1980s, it was not until the 1990s that they really took off. They have since become an integral part of the euro area financial system. By increasing competition for savings and offering households and firms attractive alternatives to bank deposits, money market funds made it harder for banks to extract excess rents in protected deposit markets. Evidence from Germany suggests that the authorisation of money market funds in 1994 led to more intense competition in deposit markets, as evident in a visible decline in bank deposit margins around that time (Slide 3, right-hand side). This was also reflected in banks’ stock prices: the Deutsche Bundesbank’s decision to drop its initial resistance to money market funds led to negative abnormal stock returns of -2.4% for German banks immediately after it was announced.[4] Thus, the advent of money market funds offered benefits to investors in the form of higher returns and greater choice, while financial markets became deeper and more diversified. Challenges from stablecoins Stablecoins share several features with money market funds. Both invest in a portfolio of short-term safe assets and aim to offer redemption at or near par into fiat currency. And both operate outside the traditional banking system, thereby potentially contributing to the disintermediation of banks. But there are also important differences, especially in terms of remuneration and use cases. The attractiveness of money market funds has traditionally rested on their ability to offer competitive market yields. Stablecoins, by contrast, do not generally pay interest, at least not directly.[5] Stablecoins do not therefore constitute an attractive store of value, compared with money market funds or remunerated bank deposits.[6] And yet, this has done little to curb demand. Global stablecoin market capitalisation has increased swiftly and is now close to USD 300 billion, although growth has moderated recently. The two largest US dollar-denominated stablecoins, Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC), account for roughly 90% of the total market. Euro-denominated stablecoins have so far played only a marginal role, with a combined market capitalisation of approximately EUR 500 million (Slide 4). The appeal of stablecoins is expected to lie mainly in their potential use as an efficient means of payment and settlement – functions that are not offered by money market funds. Stablecoins promise to provide near-instant settlement, programmability, global accessibility and a cheap way of sending money across borders.[7] So far, stablecoins have primarily been used to settle transactions in crypto markets, with crypto trading remaining the dominant use case by far. Other use cases account for only a small share of current activity, but they are expected to grow over time, although there remains a high degree of uncertainty about their future trajectory (Slide 5, left-hand side). Around 85% of the transaction volume on crypto trading platforms involves exchanges between stablecoins and other crypto-assets, even though other types of transactions are gaining ground (Slide 5, right-hand side). The rapid growth of stablecoins worldwide means that central banks must assess their implications carefully. Three aspects stand out: financial stability, monetary policy and the international financial order. Stablecoins can trigger runs and fire sales The first area of concern is financial stability. In general, the expansion of market-based finance, including via money market funds, has contributed to financial stability by offering greater diversification opportunities for both investment and funding, and by making the system more resilient by not relying exclusively on bank intermediation. But the experience with money market funds has also shown that such instruments can give rise to new fragilities in the financial system.[8] The first fragility concerns bank disintermediation. The greater reliance on more volatile wholesale deposits and short-term market-based debt since the advent of money market funds is likely to have amplified banks’ vulnerability to runs.[9] Stablecoins could imply a new wave of bank disintermediation, even if they are unremunerated. If households and firms replace bank deposits with stablecoins, banks are likely to face a less stable deposit base as retail deposits are replaced by wholesale deposits.[10] This shift would make banks’ liabilities more concentrated, rate-sensitive and volatile. The second fragility relates to the risk that money market funds, or stablecoins for that matter, may face runs themselves. This risk became evident during the global financial crisis, which exposed the vulnerability of money market funds to runs and the lack of a safety net to mitigate systemic risks. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck”, meaning that its net asset value fell below par, triggering widespread redemptions, fire sales and a freeze in short-term funding markets (Slide 6, left-hand side).[11] We have seen money market funds come under stress on several further occasions in recent years, such as during the European sovereign debt crisis and, more recently, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.[12] Stablecoins may exhibit similar vulnerabilities. Due to their liquidity mismatch and a potential loss of trust in the quality of the assets, they are also subject to the risk of runs.[13] And with the size of the largest US dollar-pegged stablecoins now approaching that of the largest US money market funds, their impact on financial markets could be significant (Slide 6, right-hand side). How such runs might eventually play out will depend critically on a stablecoin’s reserve assets (Slide 7, left-hand side). Tether, for example, holds parts of its reserves in relatively illiquid and risky assets, including commodities, loans and crypto-assets, making it more vulnerable to a loss of confidence in the quality or liquidity of those reserves – much like the Bank of Amsterdam in the second half of the 18th century. USD Coin is mainly backed by sovereign bonds and repos, which could imply spillovers to sovereign debt markets and broader fixed-income markets if large redemption requests were to force fire sales. An additional complication derives from the fact that stablecoins are subject to 24/7 settlements while the reserve assets may still be subject to traditional settlement at T+1 or T+2.[14] By contrast, European stablecoins are legally required to hold a high share of their reserve assets in the form of bank deposits. Under the EU’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) at least 30% of stablecoin reserves must be held as bank deposits, rising to 60% for significant stablecoins.[15] While these requirements aim to increase the liquidity of reserves and limit disintermediation, they also make stablecoins less profitable for issuers and could amplify financial contagion between stablecoins and the traditional banking sector, for example by exposing stablecoins to bank default risk.[16] The events of March 2023 highlighted these risks in the United States. USD Coin’s peg came under pressure because part of its reserves were held as deposits at the failing Silicon Valley Bank, raising doubts about the quality and availability of its assets.[17] Conversely, a run on a stablecoin could lead to sudden withdrawals of reserves held at banks, implying contagion in the opposite direction. Since MiCAR came into force in 2023, euro area banks’ deposits from crypto exchanges and stablecoin issuers have increased notably, even if they still remain small relative to the exposed banks’ total assets (Slide 7, right-hand side). Stablecoins affect financial conditions and monetary policy transmission The second challenge concerns monetary policy. Conceptually, it is important to distinguish between changes induced by the broad-based adoption of stablecoins and changes in the transmission of policy rate decisions. Regarding the structural changes induced by a potential shift towards stablecoins, the implications could be similar to those of the rise of money market funds. The shift towards more volatile wholesale funding would tend to raise banks’ funding costs and tighten their regulatory liquidity requirements, which could induce them to increase their holdings of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) and could constrain banks’ capacity to extend credit to firms.[18] Overall, this would tend to tighten financing conditions in the economy, especially for bank-dependent borrowers like small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, the adoption of stablecoins could imply an easing of financial conditions if issuers were to invest their reserves in short-term government securities, creating an additional demand for those securities.[19] Hence, similar to money market funds, stablecoins could contribute to channelling liquidity into market instruments.[20] This would reduce yields on government debt, which would likely also be transmitted to other short-term rates in the economy. This is already visible in the United States, where major US dollar stablecoin issuers have become sizeable holders of short-term sovereign debt (Slide 8, left-hand side). BIS research finds that a large inflow into US dollar‑backed stablecoins may lower three-month US Treasury bill yields significantly, with limited to no spillovers to other tenors, leading to a steepening of the yield curve.[21] If stablecoin issuance prompts banks to rebuild their liquidity buffers by buying government securities, this could reinforce the easing in financial conditions.[22] However, the general reallocation towards government debt could also result in a crowding out of private borrowers. Given these countervailing effects, the net impact of the broad adoption of stablecoins on financial conditions is uncertain and depends, among other things, on the type of reserve assets. However, in relative terms, bank lending conditions are likely to tighten relative to market conditions.[23] The second question is how changes in the policy rate are transmitted to financial conditions and the real economy. The traditional bank-based transmission of monetary policy operates through bank balance sheets. When policy rates change, banks adjust their deposit rates, lending conditions and credit supply. Money market funds have altered the strength of these adjustments. By offering a market-based alternative to deposits, they have made bank funding costs more sensitive to market conditions. But the extent of this effect depends on the relevance and accessibility of money market funds in the financial system: in the United States their share relative to GDP is twice as high as in the euro area (Slide 8, right-hand side). The recent tightening cycle illustrates this. In the euro area, deposits shifted mainly from overnight deposits into time deposits and bank bonds, with only limited migration into money market funds. By contrast, the United States experienced substantial deposit outflows from banks into money market funds (Slide 9). For stablecoins, however, this channel is likely to play out differently – at least if stablecoins are unremunerated. Higher policy rates would increase the opportunity costs of holding unremunerated stablecoins, reducing their attractiveness and prompting investors to rebalance towards yield-bearing financial assets, including bank deposits. Recent research indeed shows that, unlike money market funds, stablecoins tend to experience outflows following contractionary US monetary policy shocks, behaving more like unremunerated bank deposits (Slide 10, left-hand side).[24] This is consistent with descriptive evidence on the co-movement of stablecoin growth relative to other instruments with policy rates (Slide 10, right-hand side). The net impact of stablecoins on monetary policy transmission is then shaped by two opposing forces. On the one hand, greater reliance on wholesale funding would strengthen transmission – as wholesale funding costs reprice more rapidly and more strongly in response to policy rate changes. ECB research shows that, in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, banks that rely more heavily on wholesale funding increase both lending and deposit rates more strongly and cut loan growth by more, while at the same time increasing the uncertainty around the impact of monetary policy actions (Slide 11).[25] On the other hand, monetary policy tightening may prompt stablecoin holders to shift back part of their holdings into bank deposits, dampening the initial transmission impulse. The net effect hinges on the elasticity of this substitution. If stablecoins are adopted primarily as a payment instrument rather than a store of value, users are likely to maintain stablecoin holdings for transactional convenience even as interest rates rise. Under this scenario, stablecoin adoption would on balance strengthen monetary policy transmission. Finally, unremunerated stablecoins, if systemically relevant, could reinforce the zero lower bound constraint on the policy rate, as negative interest rates could render stablecoins’ business model unprofitable, leading to a collapse of the market. In fact, the significance of the money market fund industry in the United States likely contributed to the Federal Reserve shying away from negative interest rates. Stablecoins could cement the international dominance of the dollar The third aspect concerns the international monetary order. The expansion of US dollar-denominated money market funds has reinforced the global role of the dollar. By supplying short-term dollar funding, they deepened and internationalised wholesale dollar funding markets.[26] Through the Eurodollar market, money market funds expanded cross-border dollar credit and strengthened the private international dollar system. The US dollar-based system became self-reinforcing through network effects that created persistence and inertia.[27] This can be seen in global funding markets, where the share of the US dollar has held up well over recent years, remaining close to its long-run average, unlike with foreign exchange reserves where the dollar has gradually lost some ground, in part driven by shifts in the geopolitical landscape (Slide 12). A dollar-based financial system has profound implications for monetary policy autonomy and international monetary policy transmission. Not least due to the dominant role of the dollar, US monetary policy has become a major driver of the global financial cycle.[28] The growing use of stablecoins may further cement the international dominance of the US dollar. Today, virtually all stablecoins in circulation are denominated in dollars, with other currencies playing a negligible role (Slide 13, left-hand side).[29] ECB research suggests that significant dollar-denominated stablecoin issuance could amplify the international transmission of US monetary policy (Slide 13, right-hand side). Under a scenario of broad US dollar-backed stablecoin adoption – a scenario more relevant for emerging market economies – a contractionary US monetary policy shock creates greater spillovers to real economic output abroad than under a scenario of no stablecoin adoption.[30] Global US dollar stablecoins could create new cross-border networks where dollarisation emerges as a byproduct of the adoption of the new technology, rather than a deliberate currency choice. In jurisdictions with weaker monetary credibility, residents may increasingly hold dollar-denominated claims, intensifying currency substitution and endangering monetary sovereignty by weakening the impact of domestic monetary policy and strengthening the role of the exchange rate for domestic inflation.[31] But even for regions with strong monetary credibility, the persistent dominance of US dollar stablecoins could, over time, have undesirable consequences if it strengthens US dollar invoicing and global liquidity holdings. From a European perspective, this could eventually limit the euro’s role in emerging forms of tokenised finance and in the international monetary system more generally. As with the rise of money market funds, the dollar’s dominance would be reinforced, not necessarily owing to stronger economic fundamentals but due to network effects, scale and first-mover advantages. Preserving the role of central bank money in a digitalised financial system What do these challenges imply for central banks today, and for the ECB in particular? A key implication is that central banks cannot remain passive observers of these developments. History has shown that, once private forms of money are widely adopted, they shape the structure of the financial system in ways that can be difficult to reverse. The appropriate response is therefore not to resist innovation but to ensure that it develops within a framework that preserves stability, monetary control and trust in the currency. First, as regards financial stability, the lesson from money market funds suggests that appropriately regulating stablecoins is critical to containing financial stability risks. This includes requirements concerning the quality and liquidity of reserves, transparency about reserve composition and valuation, and redemption safeguards. Second, on monetary policy, central banks need to adapt their analytical frameworks. Changes in the composition and stability of bank funding require close monitoring, as they may alter the strength and speed of monetary transmission. A shift towards more rate-sensitive and less stable funding can amplify the responsiveness of bank lending to policy changes, while shifts into and out of stablecoins in reaction to rate changes could have the opposite effect. Third, at the international level, central banks, alongside other players, should help ensure that the emerging tokenised financial system remains open and multi-currency in nature. However, as stressed by ECB President Lagarde in a recent speech, many of the advantages of stablecoins arise from the technology on which they are based rather than from the characteristics of the instrument itself.[32] Hence, the appropriate strategic response of the Eurosystem lies in the continued digitalisation and technological development of the monetary and payment infrastructure. This is exactly the strategy the ECB has chosen in order to preserve the anchoring role of central bank money in an increasingly digitalised world: providing a public settlement asset that complements and enables private assets like tokenised deposits and stablecoins (Slide 14). The Eurosystem’s strategy has two complementary dimensions: the digital euro as a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and tokenised central bank money as a wholesale CBDC. A digital euro preserves the public anchor of the monetary system The Eurosystem’s payment landscape is undergoing some fundamental changes (Slide 15). Cash use in shops is declining while card and mobile payments are expanding rapidly. At the same time, a large and increasing percentage of card transactions are processed through non-European providers. International players are market leaders in significantly more euro area countries than domestic alternatives, as payment markets remain fragmented across countries and payment channels.[33] In this evolving landscape, a digital euro serves three main purposes. First, it preserves citizens’ access to public money, which is fundamental for maintaining trust in the privately created money offered by banks and, potentially, non-banks. Second, it strengthens European strategic autonomy by reducing our dependence on non-European payment providers and infrastructures. And third, by providing a pan-European payment solution with legal tender status, it reduces fragmentation in the European payments landscape. This could also foster private innovation in retail payments.[34] In a world with increasing geopolitical tensions, the introduction of the digital euro is an indispensable step to maintain European sovereignty and foster European integration, providing benefits to all stakeholders: consumers, merchants, banks and innovators (Slide 16). A wholesale CBDC provides a public settlement asset and fosters innovation In parallel, the Eurosystem is working on a wholesale CBDC. Tokenisation holds much promise to improve the efficiency of the financial and payment system, for example by removing settlement risk and allowing greater flexibility through 24/7 operations. But it still requires a safe, trusted and scalable public settlement asset – a function that private assets like stablecoins cannot fulfil in the same way. The Eurosystem is currently working on two projects that aim at providing tokenised wholesale central bank money: Pontes and Appia (Slide 17).[35] Pontes is the first step towards a more tokenised financial system. It enables digital ledger technology (DLT)-based transactions to be settled in central bank money, providing a bridge between DLT platforms and our TARGET services. Appia intends to provide the broader vision of what a future-proof, innovative and integrated European financial ecosystem could look like. This includes topics like the provision of tokenised central bank money, the implementation of monetary policy and collateral management on DLT, and the treatment and interoperability of tokenised traditional assets, as well as cross-border aspects. The broader aim is to provide a framework in which private innovation can thrive. This will ensure that the euro remains a safe and attractive means of payment domestically while also fostering its international role, complementing other initiatives such as the interlinking of our fast payment system TIPS and the expansion of our liquidity line framework EUREP. Conclusion Let me conclude. In my remarks this morning I have described how the nature of money is changing and how one recent innovation – fiat-pegged stablecoins – may affect the core of central banks’ business: monetary policy, financial stability and the international monetary order. While stablecoins promise efficiency improvements in the payment and settlement domain, much of these improvements derive from the underlying technology, not from the instrument itself. Therefore, the proper response by central banks is to keep up with technological innovation and define the framework in which private innovation can thrive. This helps ensure that new forms of private money, including stablecoins and tokenised deposits, complement rather than displace public money, preserving its central role as the ultimate settlement asset. It remains to be seen whether, in such an environment, stablecoins can find their place in the financial system just as money market funds did 50 years ago, or whether other innovations, like tokenised deposits, will prove to be the more promising alternative. In any case, as shown by the example of money market funds, innovation alone is not sufficient to guarantee lasting success. We also need to provide guardrails to preserve financial stability, monetary policy transmission and the international role of the euro. Annexes 1 June 2026 Slides Bolt, W., Frost, J., Shin, H.S. and Wierts, P. (2024), “The Bank of Amsterdam and the Limits of Fiat Money”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 132, No 12, pp. 3919-3941; Frost, J., Shin, H.S. and Wierts, P. (2020), “An early stablecoin? The Bank of Amsterdam and the governance of money”, BIS Working Papers, No 902, Bank for International Settlements, November. Federal Reserve History, “Money Market Mutual Funds”. The difficulties banks faced in attracting funding eventually led to the gradual phase-out of Regulation Q. This allowed them to compete for deposits, albeit at higher deposit rates. Fischer, K.H. and Pfeil, C. (2004), “Regulation and Competition in German Banking: An Assessment”, in Krahnen, J.P. and Schmidt, R.H. (eds.), The German Financial System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 291-349. In the United States, the interest income earned by some stablecoin issuers is used for indirect remuneration, for example via profit-sharing arrangements. Indirect remuneration can arise when intermediaries such as crypto lending platforms, DeFi protocols or exchanges offer “earn products”, which allow users to deposit stablecoins and receive a return. In the EU, indirect interest is prohibited under MiCAR. This applies mainly for advanced and stable economies. For economies with high inflation and depreciating or volatile currencies, access to a strong currency via stablecoins can provide an attractive store of value. The cost advantage narrows substantially once one accounts for on- and off-ramping costs and foreign exchange conversion costs. Bouveret, A., Martin, A. and McCabe, P.E. (2022), “Money Market Fund Vulnerabilities: A Global Perspective”, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No 2022-012, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. See Ivashina, V. and D. Scharfstein (2010), “Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 97(3), pp. 319-338. Aggregate deposits could also shrink, for example if stablecoins held their reserves in government securities bought from banks. Under MiCAR, the risk of a smaller deposit base is mitigated by requirements on minimum holdings of deposits with credit institutions. An additional concern is distributional. The banks receiving stablecoin deposits are likely to be large wholesale banks, while deposits may flow out mainly from smaller banks, which are typically important lenders to SMEs. In quantitative terms, the redemptions from money market funds in 2008 were massive. Overall, the flows out of prime institutional share classes amounted to USD 400 billion during the first two weeks of the crisis. See Schmidt, L., Timmermann, A. and Wermers, R. (2016), “Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds”, American Economic Review, Vol. 106, No 9, pp. 2625-2657. See also Bengtsson, E. (2013), “Shadow banking and financial stability: European money market funds in the global financial crisis”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 32(C), pp. 579-594. Chernenko, S. and Sunderam, A. (2014), “Frictions in shadow banking: evidence from the lending behavior of money market mutual funds”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 27, No 6, pp. 1717-1750; Breckenfelder, J. and G. Schepens (2025). “From purchases to exit: central bank interventions in corporate debt markets”, Working Paper Series, No 3055, European Central Bank. Kosse, A., Glowka, M., Mattei, I. and Rice, T. (2023), “Will the real stablecoin please stand up?”, BIS Papers, No 141, Bank for International Settlements; Anadu, K., McCabe, P., Perez-Sangimino, J.P. and Swem, N. (2026), “A Framework for Understanding the Vulnerabilities of New Money-Like Products”, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No 2026-002, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Wang, J. (2025), “Banks in the Age of Stablecoins: Some Possible Implications for Deposits, Credit, and Financial Intermediation,” FEDS Notes, No 2025-12-17-1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Gorton, G.B. and Zhang, J.Y. (2023), “Taming Wildcat Stablecoins”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 90, No 3. Instant settlement, continuous trading and global accessibility also mean that runs could propagate in real time, leaving little room for timely intervention. This poses new challenges for central banks in their role as lender of last resort. A tokenised financial system operates around the clock, yet emergency liquidity facilities have traditionally been designed for business-hour crises. See Adrian, T. (2026), Tokenized Finance, IMF Notes, International Monetary Fund, April. Under MiCAR, having a large market size is one of the main criteria for classifying a stablecoin issuer as significant. Large market size is defined by market capitalisation, the value of tokens issued or the size of reserve assets exceeding EUR 5 billion. A recent paper has argued that EU regulation discourages the development of stablecoins in Europe and makes proposals how this could be changed, including by reducing the required share of reserves held as bank deposits, allowing for direct remuneration and giving stablecoins access to the ECB’s balance sheet. See Reichlin, L., Sangers, B. and J. Zettelmeyer (2026), “A new strategy to contain stablecoin risks in the European Union”, Bruegel Policy Brief, No 09/2026. An even more extreme example is the collapse of TerraUSD, which was not backed by assets but relied on an algorithmic peg. In addition, increasing holdings of HQLA may become more difficult as stablecoins raise aggregate demand for HQLA, unless the supply of HQLA also expands. As a result, banks could curtail their loan supply. This would only happen if the net demand for government securities increased, which would not necessarily be the case, for example if the increase in stablecoin holdings was accompanied by a divestment from money market funds. The implications may extend beyond sovereign bond markets. In 2025, for example, Tether was a major buyer of gold and surpassed the largest official buyers, suggesting that large stablecoin issuers can affect prices across a wide set of safe assets if the sector continues to expand. See ECB (2026), Report on the international role of the euro, June (forthcoming). Ahmed, R. and Aldasoro, I. (2025), “Stablecoins and safe asset prices”, BIS Working Papers, No 1270, Bank for International Settlements. Born, A. et al. (2026), “Euro stablecoins and their potential effect on sovereign bond markets”, Macroprudential Bulletin, Vol. 33, ECB. Altavilla, C. et al. (2026), “Stablecoins and monetary policy transmission”, Working Paper Series, No 3199, ECB. Aldasoro, I. et al. (2025), “Stablecoins, money market funds and monetary policy”, Economics Letters, Vol. 247(C). ECB research finds qualitatively similar results for ECB monetary policy; Altavilla, C. et al. (2026), op.cit. Altavilla, C. et al. (2026), op.cit. Aldasoro, I., Ehlers, T. and Eren, E. (2022), “Global banks, dollar funding, and regulation”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 137(C), July. Farhi, E. and Maggiori, M. (2018), “A Model of the International Monetary System”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 133, No 1, pp. 295-355. Jiang, Z., Krishnamurthy, A. and Lustig, H. (2024), “Dollar Safety and the Global Financial Cycle”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 91, No 5, pp. 2878-2915. Krogstrup, S. (2026), “Stablecoins and Money”, speech at the Centre for European Policy Studies, 21 January. Ferrari Minesso, M. and Siena, D. (2026), “Private money and public debt. U.S. Stablecoins and the global safe asset channel”, Working Paper Series, No 3174, ECB. Aldasoro, I., Frost, J. and Ito, H. (2026), “The impact of stablecoins on the international monetary and financial system”, BIS Papers, No 170, Bank for International Settlements. See also Lagarde, C. (2026), “Stablecoins and the future of money: separating functions from instruments”, speech at the Banco de España LatAm Economic Forum, 8 May. See ECB (2025), “Preparation phase of a digital euro – Closing report”. See ECB (2025), “Digital euro innovation platform”, September. See ECB (2025), “ECB commits to distributed ledger technology settlement plans with dual-track strategy”, press release, 1 July; and ECB (2026), “Appia – paving the way for a future-ready, integrated financial ecosystem leveraging tokenisation and DLT”, press release, 11 March.

The Securities Services business of BNP Paribas today announces the appointments of Robert van Kerkhoff as Head of Institutional Investors Sales & Client Coverage, and Alison Gurd as Head of Client Experience & Servicing. Both report to Alessandro Gioffreda, Head of Client Coverage & Territories, Securities Services.  These two senior roles, sitting within Securities Services’ Global Client Coverage & Territories department, play a key part in driving the continuous enhancement of the bank’s client journey and service delivery globally.  Van Kerkhoff leads the commercial strategy and global client coverage of Securities Services’ institutional investor franchise, with a focus on accelerating growth through the Group’s integrated bank model. Based in Madrid, he plays a key role in deepening collaboration with the bank’s Financial Institutions Coverage, Global Markets and Global Banking business lines. Van Kerkhoff brings over 25 years of industry experience, having held various senior roles across the Group, most recently as Regional Head of Luxembourg, Ireland and the Channel Islands for Securities Services, and CEO of BNP Paribas S.A. Luxembourg Branch.  Gurd, based in London, leads Securities Services’ end-to-end client services strategy and ensures global client-facing and proposal teams consistently deliver excellence in execution and relationship management. She brings over 35 years’ experience in the securities services industry, and most recently served as BNP Paribas’ Country Head and Head of Securities Services in the Channel Islands. Alessandro Gioffreda, Head of Client Coverage & Territories, Securities Services, BNP Paribas, said: “We are pleased to have Robert and Alison in these pivotal roles, where their expertise and leadership will enrich our client engagement and support the sustainable growth of our business. Their appointments also reflect our commitment to anticipating and adapting to evolving client needs, ensuring we continue to deliver excellence and build on the long-term success of BNP Paribas’ Securities Services business.” 

Japan Exchange Group released Trading Overview in May 2026. Cash Equity Market - In May 2026, the daily average trading value for the Prime Market (domestic common stocks) was JPY 12.1892 trillion.- The daily average trading value for the ETF market was JPY497.4 billion. Derivatives Market - In May 2026, total derivatives trading volume was 34,660,031 contracts- In May 2026, total derivatives trading value reached JPY 305 trillion.- In May 2026, trading volume for the night session was 16,055,910 contracts and the ratio of the night session was 46.3%.- In May 2026, trading volume for Securities Options was 729,873 contracts and the highest record.- In May 2026, trading volume for mini-10year JGB Futures (Cash-Settled) was 13,696 contracts and the highest record. Reference(TSE) Reference(OSE and TOCOM) (note)･Changes in line with the TSE Market RestructuringIn line with the TSE market restructuring put into effect on April 4, 2022, the format of the Domestic Stocks section of the Preliminary Figures for Trading Conditions in April has been changed from the former market divisions to the new market segments from April 4, 2022.･Data contained in the PDF file in the above Reference(OSE and TOCOM) includes trading volume/value for Flexible Futures and Options.

(1) FX Daily Futures contracts(Click 365) The total trading volume of FX Daily Futures contracts (Click 365) was 1,706,918 ( -14.6% MoM / +19.2% YoY ) and its average daily trading volume was 81,284. See the TABLE 1 for the composition of the trading volume. [TABLE 1] Items（Top 10 items in the current month）May 2026 Trading Volume一Daily AverageChange on Previous MonthYear on Year Change   Click 365 1,706,918 81,284 -14.6% 19.2%   Turkish Lira -Japanese Yen 498,911 23,758 -18.6% 226.2% U.S. Dollar-Japanese Yen 396,728 18,892 -20.9% -32.3% Mexican Peso-Japanese Yen 168,306 8,015 -22.8% 4.3% South African Rand-Japanese Yen 166,669 7,937 1.2% 119.5% Australian Dollar-Japanese Yen 114,725 5,463 -21.9% 35.2% Hungarian Forint-Japanese Yen 103,338 4,921 30.0% 537.0% British Pound-Japanese Yen 63,375 3,018 -2.2% -25.0% New Zealand Dollar-Japanese Yen 46,759 2,227 41.1% 2.6% Euro-Japanese Yen 31,221 1,487 -32.6% -32.5% Offshore Chinese Yuan-Japanese Yen 20,744 988 206.2% 27.2% Other Currency pairs 96,142 4,578 -22.9% -40.7% Items(Top 5 items in the current month)May 2026 Trading valueTotal swap points   Click 365 1,519,328,651,611     Turkish Lira -Japanese Yen 17,362,102,800 752 U.S. Dollar-Japanese Yen 631,789,340,000 3,507 Mexican Peso-Japanese Yen 154,589,061,000 3,807 South African Rand-Japanese Yen 163,668,958,000 3,796 Australian Dollar-Japanese Yen 131,319,971,250 2,885   (2) Equity Index Daily Futures contracts (Click kabu 365) The total trading volume of Equity Index Daily Futures contracts (Click kabu 365) was 3,789,307 ( -9.1% MoM / +18.6% YoY ) and its average daily trading volume was 180,558 .See the TABLE 2 for the composition of the trading volume. [TABLE 2] ItemsMay 2026 Trading VolumeDaily AverageChange on Previous MonthYear on Year Change   Click kabu 365 3,789,307 180,558 -9.1% 18.6%   Nikkei 225 Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 827,026 39,382 -12.0% - DJIA Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 607,812 28,943 -23.1% - DAX® Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 6,870 344 14.4% - FTSE 100 Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 19,854 1,045 -13.5% - Gold ETF Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 40,788 1,942 -26.8% - WTI ETF Futures contract with Reset Date26 190,643 9,078 -41.1% - NASDAQ-100 Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 890,072 42,384 13.2% - Russell2000 Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 34,907 1,662 -27.7% - Silver ETF Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 21,025 1,001 62.7% - Platinum ETF Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 2,374 113 16.1% - Nikkei 225 Micro Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 1,147,936 54,664 -2.6% - ItemsMay 2026 Trading valueTotal DividendsTotal Interests   Click kabu 365 7,272,655,810,700 6,192 -25,470   Nikkei 225 Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 5,481,941,841,000 - -3,370 DJIA Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 310,215,088,560 1,053 -1,637 DAX® Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 17,237,517,000 - -4,961 FTSE 100 Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 20,650,145,400 4,621 -2,806 Gold ETF Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 273,038,950,800 - -6,378 WTI ETF Futures contract with Reset Date26 99,039,038,500 - -505 NASDAQ-100 Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 270,127,951,280 201 -947 Russell2000 Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 10,192,494,930 317 -767 Silver ETF Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 23,134,858,750 - -1,074 Platinum ETF Daily Futures contract with Reset Date26 6,564,584,800 - -2,697 Nikkei 225 Micro Daily Futures contract with Reset Date/26 760,513,339,680 - -328   (3) Interest Rate Futures contracts The trading volume of Interest Rate Futures contracts was 62,259 ( +20.5% MoM / -39.7% YoY ) and its average daily volume was 3,459 . See the TABLE 3 for the composition of the trading volume. [TABLE 3] ItemsMay 2026 Trading VolumeDaily AverageChange on Previous MonthYear on Year Change   Total of Interest Rate Futures contracts 62,259 3,459 20.5% -39.7%   Three-month TONA Futures 62,259 3,459 20.5% -39.7%   Options on Three-month TONA Futures - - - -   Put - - - - Call - - - - (4) Total all products Combined trading volume for all TFX products was 5,558,484 (-2.2% YoY ) and its average daily trading volume was 265,301 .FX clearing transactions were delisted on September 30, 2025. ALL products excluding FX clearing transactions increased -10.6% month-on-month and +17.5% year-on-year.

Thank you, Jack, for that kind introduction. It is a great privilege to be here tonight with you, Ambassador Kennedy, and your family. And thank you to the JFK Library Foundation and the committee members for this honor.1 President Kennedy was an inspiring public servant who demonstrated compassion, grace, ingenuity, and courage during trying times. He was also a towering figure in my early life. In November 1963, I was a fifth grader at Blessed Sacrament School in Washington, D.C. That terrible afternoon, our teachers were suddenly called to the principal's office, only to return in tears. I remember that moment very clearly, and the dark days that followed. They made an indelible impression on me. I am one of the many whom President Kennedy inspired to serve the public. Sixty-two years on, it is worth remembering how fortunate we are to be Americans today, and to enjoy the fruits of 250 years of progress toward the Founders' timeless ideal that all of us are created equal. We inherit and hold in trust a nation built on the promise of freedom. We are blessed by the courage of previous generations who worked, sacrificed, and dreamed so that we could live in the strongest, most prosperous nation in the world. The United States has long been the leader of the world's freedom-seeking people—the indispensable nation. Other countries know us as a nation built on integrity, and that integrity must be maintained. President Kennedy upheld that tradition and resisted the expansion of authoritarianism, which is the antithesis of American values. He embraced and worked to strengthen the system of international economic and security arrangements that has now been in place for some 80 years—arrangements that have supported democracy and freedom and served the United States, and the world, extremely well. Here at home, our great public and private institutions are the foundation and the embodiment of our democracy. Our universities and research institutions are a critical national resource and the envy of the world. The same is true of our Constitution, our legislative bodies, and our court system. The Federal Reserve is just one of many such public institutions. Since our founding in 1913, the Fed's role has been to provide economic and financial stability. We use our monetary policy tools to promote maximum employment and stable prices. We regulate and supervise banks. We operate critical parts of the payments system. And we use our powerful liquidity tools as a first responder in times of financial crisis. Over the past 20 years, we have been called upon to forcefully deploy those emergency tools in two world-historical crises that pushed the financial system and the economy to the point of failure—the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. While these twin crises created great hardship for families and businesses, the U.S. economy performed by far the best of any comparable economy through those difficult years. Many in the private and public sectors played a hand in achieving that outcome. I would like to single out the work in both crises of the career staff at the Fed, a truly extraordinary group of committed public servants who serve all Americans. Serving alongside them for the past 14 years has been a great honor. Even in good times, central banks make monetary policy decisions under high uncertainty—about the true state and path of the economy, and the timing and scope of the effects of our policies. At the Fed, we are, of course, human and thus imperfect. When we make mistakes, we acknowledge them and change course. What the public has every right to expect is that we will make our decisions based only on our best economic analysis of what would most benefit the people we serve. We do not take into account the fortunes of any political party or politician in making those decisions. Like many other institutions, the Fed has been undergoing a stress test. Congress wisely chose to insulate monetary policy decisions from political pressure. All other advanced economy nations have done the same. Our federated structure is a bit complex, but the legal protections that support the non-political conduct of monetary policy are straightforward. Fed governors and Reserve Bank presidents hold office with legal protection against removal. We serve long terms unrelated to the four-year presidential election cycle. When a new administration takes office, its role is to fill vacancies on the Board of Governors, and for Chair and Vice Chair, as and when they arise, subject in all cases to Senate confirmation. Administrations play no role in the selection or oversight of the 12 Reserve Bank presidents. These protections have served the public well, and administrations from both parties have respected them. If any administration finds a way to remove Fed officials over policy differences, then future administrations will do so as well. The public would lose faith that the central bank will make decisions based only on what's best for all Americans. The Fed's credibility would be lost. That credibility enables the Fed to support a strong and stable economy for the benefit of American families and businesses. Our credibility has been built and sustained over many decades, and we have a duty to safeguard that priceless asset for our fellow citizens and for generations to come. As Americans, we are motivated by the belief that freedom and democracy greatly enhance human fulfillment. The work to preserve and strengthen our own democracy can be noisy, frustrating, and, at times, embattled. Partisan political differences are normal—indeed essential—in a thriving democracy. But we ought to be united in our commitment to the higher principles that define our nation. Chief among them is respect for the rule of law. As John Adams wrote, ours is "a government of laws and not of men."2 Our public institutions carry us forward through change. These institutions embody our commitment to freedom, democracy, and service of the public good. The philosopher Edmund Burke warned that democratic institutions take much time, effort, and patience to build but can be torn down all too quickly.3 It is essential that we preserve what is good about these institutions, even as we strive to improve them. While we will have political differences, at the end of the day, we all love this wonderful country, and want what is best for it and for our fellow Americans. In the eternal words of President Kennedy: "Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country."4 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. See John Adams (1775), "VII. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay," Papers of John Adams, vol. 2, Massachusetts Historical Society, March 6, paragraph 20.  3. "Rage and frenzy will pull down more in half an hour than prudence, deliberation, and foresight can build up in a hundred years," Edmund Burke (1881), "Reflections on the Revolution in France," The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke, vol. 3, pp. 231–563 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company).  4. See John F. Kennedy (1961), "Inaugural Address," speech delivered at the Inauguration of the 35th President of the United States, January 20, Washington, paragraph 26. 

ASIC is seeking further feedback on a proposal to streamline 17 financial reporting and auditing relief instruments into two, as part of our ongoing commitment to regulatory simplification. The two draft instruments are: ASIC Corporations (Annual and Half-year Reporting) Instrument 2026/XXX (the draft Financial Reporting Instrument), and ASIC Corporations (Auditing) Instrument 2026/XXX (the draft Auditing Instrument). The new instruments will make it easier for users to understand available relief and reduce the number of legislative instruments dealing with financial reporting and auditing. These changes respond to stakeholder feedback received about the consolidation pilot in Report 813 Regulatory simplification (REP 813) and that is outlined in Report 830 Regulatory simplification progress report (REP 830).  Copies of the draft instruments are available at CS 54 Proposed consolidation of financial reporting and auditing instruments. Providing feedback Submissions should be sent to rri.consultation@asic.gov.au by 5pm AEST on 10 July 2026. Background The draft Financial Reporting Instrument consolidates the following instruments: ASIC Corporations (Reporting by Stapled Entities) Instrument 2023/673 ASIC Corporations (Parent Entity Financial Statements) Instrument 2021/195 ASIC Corporations (Financial Reporting: Natural Person Licensees) Instrument 2017/307 ASIC Corporations (Foreign-Controlled Company Reports) Instrument 2017/204 ASIC Corporations (Rounding in Financial/Directors’ Reports) Instrument 2026/183 ASIC Corporations (Disclosing Entities) Instrument 2016/190 ASIC Corporations (Synchronisation of Financial Years) Instrument 2016/189 ASIC Corporations (Directors’ Report Relief) Instrument 2016/188 ASIC Corporations (Electronic Lodgment of Financial and Sustainability Reports) Instrument 2026/59 ASIC Corporations (Disregarding Technical Relief) Instrument 2026/180 ASIC Corporations (Post Balance Date Reporting) Instrument 2025/437 ASIC Corporations (Non-Reporting Entities) Instrument 2025/436 ASIC Corporations (Related Scheme Reports) Instrument 2025/438 ASIC Corporations (Stapled Group Reports) Instrument 2025/439 The draft Auditing Instrument consolidates the following instruments, removing requirements in section 6(i), (s) and (v) of ASIC Corporations (Audit Relief) Instrument 2016/784 (Instrument 2016/784): ASIC Corporations (CCIV Auditors) Instrument 2024/668 ASIC Corporations (Auditor Independence) Instrument 2021/75 ASIC Instrument 2016/784 Related information CS 54 Proposed consolidation of financial reporting and auditing instruments

Market Notice # 20 (May 31st, 2026) provided constituents and weightings of all QSE indices effective June 1st, 2026. QE Index  Barwa Real Estate will replace Vodafone Qatar in the QE Index.  QE Al Rayan Islamic Index No change in the Index constituents.  QE All Share Index & Sectors No change in the Index constituents.

This morning, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) took historic action to permit the listing of a true bitcoin perpetual contract by a CFTC-registered exchange. In doing so, the Commission charted a path for one of the most liquid segments of the crypto asset markets to exist within the U.S. regulatory framework. Having true perpetual contracts in the United States is a major step forward in delivering on President Trump’s goal of cementing America as the crypto capital of the world. Unlike a traditional futures contract, which was designed for markets that close overnight and on weekends, a perpetual contract (also known as a “perpetual” or “perp”) is a type of derivative contract that has no fixed expiration date. Instead, counterparties periodically exchange a funding rate payment, similar to variation margin, that is designed to maintain relative price parity with the underlying asset’s spot price. In markets that operate 24/7, the lack of an expiration date allows market participants to maintain continuous price exposure without periodic expirations and the associated costs of rolling over contracts. Perpetual contracts were first theorized in a discussion paper published in 1992 by Nobel-prize winning economist Robert Schiller.1 Since then, perpetuals have become a foundational risk management and price discovery tool in the global crypto asset markets. Yet, despite clear market demand and the CFTC’s statutory obligation to promote responsible innovation, the CFTC has – until now – failed to provide a workable pathway for crypto asset perpetuals to exist in a compliant manner in the United States. As a result, perpetual trading activity has predictably occurred offshore. With liquidity fragmented across foreign platforms, American crypto asset firms were competitively disadvantaged, and U.S. market participants were effectively barred from accessing these markets. Under my leadership, the CFTC has taken a different approach. One that is consistent with the CFTC’s mandate to promote responsible innovation and fair competition, and one rooted in the belief that responsible innovation requires regulatory clarity. The Commission’s long-standing, principled oversight of the commodity derivatives market will now include a workable framework for true crypto asset perpetual contracts. This is a framework that can limit excessive leverage, volatility and systemic risk, rather than pushing those risks offshore to unregulated venues. While today’s approval of the bitcoin perpetual may seem novel, history tells a different story. For more than a century and a half, America’s commodity futures markets have functioned as a proving ground for innovation and evolved alongside technological progress. From agricultural futures in the nineteenth century, to electronic trading in the twentieth century and bitcoin futures under Trump 1.0, our markets have consistently adapted to new forms of commerce, risk transfer and capital formation. Crypto assets and blockchain-based financial infrastructure represent one of the many next chapters in that story. In my view, the question was never whether crypto asset perpetual contracts would exist. Instead, the question was whether they would exist under American oversight, American standards and American rule of law. For too long, bureaucratic regulators approached the new frontier of finance with the assumption that innovation itself represented a threat to the public interest. This decelerationist approach resulted in regulation by enforcement and forced American innovators to flee the U.S. and build beyond our borders. Fortunately, thanks to the leadership of President Trump, those days are behind us, and the U.S. is now the crypto capital of the world. Today’s action to onshore crypto asset perpetuals was the natural extension of this American achievement and reinforces U.S. leadership in digital financial technology. Although the work is far from finished, today marks an important milestone. For the first time, the world’s most sophisticated financial system has opened the door for crypto asset perpetuals to operate within its regulated framework. And while Congress has an important role to play in delivering long-term statutory clarity for crypto asset markets, the CFTC will continue advancing initiatives related to tokenized collateral, crypto asset market structure, and prediction markets. Innovation is coming onshore. American crypto asset perpetuals are here, and the U.S. will continue to lead in this new frontier of finance. This op-ed was originally published in CoinDesk.

On the 250th anniversary of American independence, this year’s ISDA Annual General Meeting (AGM) was held in Boston, a city that played a prominent role in the American Revolution. In his opening remarks, ISDA chief executive Scott O’Malia drew a parallel between those events and what he described as a revolution currently taking place in financial markets – a transformation driven by rapid advances in technology. That transformation formed the basis for much of the first day of the conference, with discussions on the evolving legislative and regulatory framework for digital assets, the efficiencies tokenisation can bring to collateral processes, the outstanding legal questions that need to be addressed to enable the safe and efficient use of digital assets, and the impact of artificial intelligence on financial markets. These issues may not be affecting everyone’s day job right now, but they are dominating the US regulatory agenda – making it important that the implications are discussed and understood. But technology wasn’t the only focus of the AGM. Following publication of the revised US Basel III endgame proposal on March 19, and with the first US Treasury clearing mandate fast approaching at the end of December, regulatory issues were also a core discussion point. We were fortunate to welcome Commodity Futures Trading Commission chair Michael Selig, Securities and Exchange Commission commissioner Mark Uyeda and Bank of England executive director of prudential policy David Bailey for keynote sessions on the current regulatory agenda. This issue of IQ provides a snapshot of some of the issues discussed at the event. ISDA would like to take this opportunity to thank all our sponsors and exhibitors, our speakers and our delegates. We’re already looking forward to the next AGM in Singapore, so please save the date: April 13-15, 2027.

The Commission has struggled with the climate disclosure proposal for years. Today we are proposing to rescind the rule that the Commission adopted in 2024. I support the rescission proposal and look forward to hearing feedback from the public. I understand why some people strongly support a climate disclosure rule from the SEC. Many people believe that climate change is an existential threat that justifies commandeering any tool to address the problem. Among the tools they eye is the corporate disclosure framework. Climate disclosure advocates point to other jurisdictions that have turned to their securities disclosure regimes for information about greenhouse gas emissions and other climate-related issues. They have watched as those coopted disclosure regimes have reshaped not just what companies disclose, but the products they make and the way they make them. Designing securities disclosure to be a lever of change, however, exceeds the authority Congress gave to the SEC. Congress directed us to establish a disclosure regime that helps investors understand the company’s fundamental business and financial characteristics. As I have explained elsewhere, the target audience of our disclosures is investors as a class.[1] Investors as individuals are not a uniform group, but as a class they share a common interest in financial returns. That defining characteristic of investors must focus our mandated disclosures. While Congress has told us to consider whether additional disclosure is necessary or appropriate in the public interest the Supreme Court has clarified that we must view “public interest” through the lens of our mission. Unless Congress explicitly has directed otherwise, we do not have the authority to craft boundless disclosure rules to respond to stakeholder demands, investors’ idiosyncratic interests, or our own curiosity. When we proposed and adopted the climate rule, I was concerned that we were exceeding our statutory authority by crafting a highly prescriptive and expansive set of disclosures designed for a purpose other than informing investors. Today’s proposal sets forth these concerns and affords the public the opportunity to weigh in. Adhering to a merit-neutral, materiality-centric disclosure framework is not only consistent with the SEC’s statutory authority, but also good for the health of our capital markets. An effective disclosure framework helps capital flow to its highest and best use. When money gets to the people who can put it to productive use, society benefits. Allocating capital into the right hands means more cures for disease, greener energy, technologies that make our lives easier and more enjoyable, cleaner water and air, better infrastructure, healthier and more abundant food, and educational tools that empower our children to become the next generation of problem-solvers. This proposal, if adopted, is a step toward restoring our disclosure framework to its intended purpose and thus to helping our capital markets better serve society. [1] Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, The Art and Science of Materiality: Remarks at SEC Speaks (Mar. 19, 2026), available at: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/peirce-remarks-sec-speaks-031926.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. And thank you, Fred [Ryan], for your generous introduction. Before I begin, I should like to take a moment to recognize what a profound privilege it is for me to address the Reagan National Economic Forum. Prior to sharing a few reflections, I must note that the views I express here today are my own as SEC Chairman and do not necessarily reflect those of the SEC as an institution or of my fellow Commissioners. There is something quite fitting about gathering on a California morning such as this one, because it calls to mind a few of President Reagan’s most enduring words: “Morning in America.” And nowhere are those words more at home than here — in this library, a fixed monument to a free-market legacy. At its opening ceremony in 1991, President Reagan articulated his hope that the library would become “a dynamic intellectual forum where scholars interpret the past and policymakers debate the future.”[1] Today, I believe that we are proving that his hope was well placed. With that in mind, I do not take lightly the moment in which I stand before you, especially in this milestone year as the United States approaches its 250th anniversary — an occasion that invites not merely nostalgia but a renewed resolve. A resolve like that of President Reagan’s — to restore the ideals of our forebears: that the government is not meant to control a people, but to set them free to flourish. To prove, again, that America’s best days are never behind her. It was this vision that won hearts across America in the 1980 election. But vision alone does not renew a nation. What set President Reagan apart was something rarer: an instinctive understanding of a people weary from the Carter years and starved of hope — and an extraordinary ability to rekindle it. On the tail of his landslide victory, crossing New York City in a motorcade, he noted in a diary entry that “one thing was unusual and very humbling. The streets were lined with people as if for a parade... They cheered and clapped and I wore my arms out waving back to them.” Then he concluded with a somber conviction: “I keep thinking this can't continue and yet their warmth and affection seems so genuine I get a lump in my throat. I pray constantly that I won't let them down.”[2] And today we assemble together because he did not. Because his belief in the “miracle of the marketplace”—and in the American people—pulled our nation up from the ashes of despair and placed it on a firm path toward renewal. Miracle of the Marketplace As a young lawyer, I witnessed some small measure of that renewal firsthand. In the summer of 1982, I worked in New York, and by 1984, my career had carried me back there. By that time the deep malaise of the Carter years had finally sunset, and morning in America, as Reagan hailed it, had dawned. As I navigated the city, I recall a certain palpability to the promise of a new day. A new energy resounded through the streets. A rebounding economy was reviving the hearts and minds of many who had lost faith in — or at least doubted — America’s future. It was a transformation that President Reagan understood at its root. In his first year as President, he expressed his core beliefs about free enterprise. “Trust the people,” he told a crowd from the World Bank and IMF. “Countries that have achieved the most spectacular, broad-based progress are neither the most tightly controlled, nor the biggest in size, nor the wealthiest in natural resources. No, what unites them all is their willingness to believe in the magic of the marketplace.”[3] “The magic of the marketplace.” It was not so much a memorable alliteration as it was—and is—an empirical truth. Indeed, President Reagan understood that the greatest weapon to end the Cold War was not a strong military fist alone, but the invisible hand behind it—free markets lifted by a free people. That philosophy traveled further than any of us had imagined. Thirty-eight years ago today, in fact, President Reagan embarked on Air Force One for his first visit to the Soviet Union. He took to his diary that evening and recorded that when he walked outside the Ambassador's residence in Moscow, “It was amazing how quickly the street was jammed curb to curb with people—warm, friendly people who couldn’t have been more affectionate.”[4] A short account, yet one that symbolizes the sweeping reach of President Reagan’s ideology, crossing the Iron Curtain before he ever did. Years before he set foot on Soviet soil, President Reagan’s free-enterprise philosophy had been steadily permeating a people suffocating under the weight of communism. His economic “offensive strategy” was loosening the grip of its leaders. And the American free-market prosperity that he unleashed kept compounding the economic pressure—until finally the Berlin Wall fell and communism collapsed, all without any troops marching into Moscow. In the end, the most powerful army that President Reagan deployed was an idea. The lesson that he left us is not an historical artifact; it is an archetype: Free markets do not just create wealth. They generate gravity, pulling people toward them—across oceans, across ideologies, and as President Reagan proved, even across the Iron Curtain. So much so, that after the Berlin Wall fell, countries across the former USSR and Eastern Europe began building market economies out of the rubble of central planning. In turn, more wealth has been created since the wall fell than in all prior human history. In many respects, President Reagan’s belief in free markets inspired — and still underpins — my own. As a young graduate, I watched as the Soviet and communist system of central planning collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions, while President Reagan’s America empowered its citizens to innovate, to invest, and to build wealth within predictable and enforceable legal frameworks. President Reagan held that our markets affirm the dignity of the human spirit and liberate its potential as no other alternative can. He believed, as do I, that markets, structured properly, can unleash the might of American dynamism as no monarch or government ministry possibly could. But principles do not preserve themselves. And to maintain their might, markets require rules that are clear enough to guide but restrained enough not to suffocate. Where the SEC Has Been Shortly after his re-election victory, President Reagan became the first—and remains the only—sitting president to ring the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. He opened his remarks that morning with a characteristic clarity: “I’d like to say a few words about where this country’s been, and where we’ll be going from here.”[5] Today, to echo President Reagan, I should like to say a few words about where the SEC has been, and where we will be going from here. Perhaps no comedic line better captures President Reagan’s philosophy than one so beloved that it practically became a catch phrase, which you can probably recite with me: “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I'm from the Government, and I'm here to help.” Over my three tours at the SEC, I have discovered six equally terrifying words: “We should create another disclosure requirement.” Like President Reagan, I have come to understand the challenge of inheriting a regulatory environment gripped by government control that inhibited investment and punished success. In his inaugural address, President Reagan made clear a doctrine that he held that I also embrace today, that “Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it.”[6] For context, Congress has tasked the SEC with three mutually reinforcing aims: to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. But seized by a sort of “regulatory adventurism,” past Commissions constructed around those three pillars a thicket of obligations that were unmoored from any of them. As a result, the SEC’s disclosure regime became conscripted to serve interests beyond those of the Supreme Court’s objective standard of the reasonable investor. And the path to going public grew so costly, so litigious, and so politically fraught that countless entrepreneurs chose to remain private or to list elsewhere. The agency charged with stewarding the world’s greatest capital markets had become, in many ways, an imposing obstacle to them. Indeed, as our disclosure and general regulatory burden expanded, the number of our public companies has dwindled. From the time that I left the SEC as a staff member in 1994, to when I returned as Chairman just over a year ago, the number of companies listed on the U.S. exchanges had fallen by roughly 40 percent — a decline that represents more than a data point; it is a lost opportunity for workers and savers to share in the prosperity of the next generation of American enterprise. This regulatory overreach proved equally as damaging to digital asset innovation. The agency that I inherited had become defined — distinguished, even — by a regulatory hostility that pushed digital asset ventures overseas. Its driving philosophy seemed to be that the new technology itself — rather than malign individuals who might exploit it — was sinister and suspect and must be stamped out accordingly. As a result, innovators made the only rational choice. They left. But — like President Reagan — when presented with this decline, under President Trump’s leadership we have a duty to reverse it. And I am pleased to report that we are equal to the task. For President Reagan, it was “morning in America.” For us, it is a “new day at the SEC.” Where the SEC Is Going President Reagan did not tinker around the edges of a broken system. Rather, he returned it to first principles at its core. And that is precisely the path that this Commission is charting. First, we are advancing our regulatory posture to bring it into alignment with the world as it is, rather than as it was when many of our rules were first written. As I alluded to earlier, under the previous administration, innovators found that engaging with the SEC quickly gave way to getting investigated by it. The market rendered its verdict, and an entire generation of digital asset innovation developed outside the United States. So, over the past year, this SEC has moved purposefully on President Trump's goal of making America the crypto capital of the world. First, we launched Project Crypto — now a joint effort with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission — to modernize our rules and regulations to facilitate markets' moving on-chain. Building on this initiative, we recently delivered long-overdue clarity for market participants that distinguishes which digital assets are considered securities, and which are not. Finally, among other measures underway, we are advancing work on a forthcoming innovation exemption for tokenized listed securities and taking steps to clarify how onchain trading systems fit within existing regulations. Now, the SEC’s advancement of modernized rules is only as purposeful as the clarity with which we apply them. Indeed, jurisdictional ambiguity can stifle innovation just as surely as ill-devised regulation — and for too long, it has. So after decades of fragmented oversight and overlapping authorities, CFTC Chairman Mike Selig and I have ushered in a new era of harmonization between our two agencies, replacing what I call a regulatory no-man’s land with a field of fertile ground for innovation to take root and flourish — and providing market participants the clear path forward that they have long called for. Lastly, perhaps nowhere is our forward ambition more evident than in our resolve to transform the SEC rulebook. As I mentioned previously, over time, many disclosure requirements that began as a framework to illuminate have become instruments to obscure. In losing sight of materiality as its north star and accumulating new rules without excising the extraneous, the agency steadily built a disclosure labyrinth so complex and costly that going and staying public became less and less compelling. So, we are moving decisively to Make IPOs Great Again. Building upon our recent proposal to afford companies the flexibility of quarterly or semiannual reporting cadences, last week we put forward two rule proposals that would further reduce the burdens of being a public company, by recalibrating disclosure requirements and making it easier for companies to access the public markets quickly and when market conditions are most favorable. And I am pleased to announce that today, we have proposed the rescinding of the prior administration's ill-advised climate rule — retethering our rulebook to the simple principle that the SEC exists to serve allinvestors, not to advance an agenda of the politicized few with axes to grind or business models to aggrandize. Now, as substantial as they are, the reforms that I have outlined amount to a beginning, not a summation. Across every dimension of our mandate, the SEC has reclaimed its course — and is moving forward with equal parts rigor and restraint. Conclusion Under my leadership, I intend that the Commission work to ensure that the United States is well-positioned to seize on the excitement for economic opportunity that President Trump’s pro-growth policies have inspired — and to build upon the decades of economic strength that the Reagan Revolution ignited. When he took the oath of office, President Reagan inherited a despondent nation wandering in economic desolation, with no guiding light to lead it out. But over eight years, his administration achieved an unrivaled turnaround, transforming a once barren land into a beacon of prosperity. Of course, he left America not merely richer, but more itself — more confident in what free people and free markets can accomplish together. The resulting optimism revived not only the spirit of the American people, but also the economy that they helped to reconstruct — yielding twenty million new jobs and significant declines in unemployment, inflation, and the prime interest rate alike.[7] Today, we share in that success, but no less in the worldview that kindled it: that by trusting a free people to participate in free markets, we can beget decades of economic prosperity for generations to come. So, let me close where I began — with the words that President Reagan spoke 35 years ago in this very place. “For 10 years after we summoned America to a new beginning, we are beginning still... With each sunrise, we are reminded that millions of our citizens have yet to share in the abundance of American prosperity. Can't we pledge ourselves to a new beginning for them?... May every day be a new beginning and every dawn bring us closer to that shining city upon a hill.”[8] Indeed, 45 years after President Reagan summoned America to a new beginning, we are beginning still. On the cusp of 250 years of our Republic, and at the dawn of a new Golden Age under President Trump, the question before us is not whether the American people possess the ambition or the ability to lead our nation toward new beginnings. It is whether we, as regulators, possess the will to let them. In this new day at the SEC, I am confident that we do — and that by preserving the promise of our capital markets for the next quarter millennium, we will heed the call to carry our nation ever closer to that shining city upon a hill. So, ladies and gentlemen, I am grateful, once again, for the opportunity to participate in this Forum. Thank you very much for your attention. And I look forward to the work ahead of us. Thank you.  [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcbltLekSM0  [2] https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/white-house-diaries/diary-entry-03131981 [3] https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-annual-meeting-boards-governors-world-bank-group-and-international-monetary [4] https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/white-house-diaries/collection/president-reagan-s-first-trip-to-the-soviet-union/diary-entry-05291988 [5] https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-brokers-and-staff-new-york-stock-exchange-new-york-new-york [6] Reagan inaugural address [7] https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/the-presidency/economic-policy [8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcbltLekSM0

Today, the Commission proposes to rescind amendments to its rules under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that require registrants to provide certain climate-related information in their registration statements and annual reports (the “Climate Rescission Proposal” and the “Climate Rule,” respectively).[1] The Climate Rescission Proposal identifies important policy reasons for rescinding the Climate Rule and discusses the questionable premise underlying the Commission’s purported statutory authority for the Climate Rule. This proposal represents a step towards refocusing our efforts on what matters most to investors: financial materiality.[2] As investors noted, in response to one survey, “future growth for the investment [being] strong” was the number one reason for buying an investment.[3] This is not surprising—investments are made to generate financial returns, not as charitable gifts. While investors are not a monolithic group—each may have different social, political or environmental preferences—the Commission’s focus must remain anchored in material financial and business disclosures, which is precisely what Justice Thurgood Marshall described in TSC Industries v. Northway.[4] The federal securities laws were designed so that investors are provided material disclosure by companies seeking to raise capital from investors and access the public market.[5] The federal securities laws are not general business conduct laws and were never intended to be an amorphous tool to elicit environmental and social policy changes. Unfortunately, the Climate Rule was never about financial materiality. If it had, an impartial observer would have recognized that the concept of materiality—including climate change—is already well embedded in the SEC’s disclosure obligations, whether in the description of the business, risk factor disclosure, management’s discussion and analysis, financial statements, and notes to the financial statements.[6] Instead, the Climate Rule was, for all intents and purposes, a rule to influence how a business operates hidden under a cloak of disclosure. When the Climate Rule was adopted, I did not support it.[7] The rule was the culmination of efforts by various special interests to hijack and weaponize the federal securities laws for their own climate-related goals. Regrettably, the Commission ventured outside of its expertise and set about using its disclosure regime as a means for driving political and social change. This approach was problematic and risked eroding the Commission’s effectiveness and credibility as a financial regulator. Lastly, the Climate Rule was not well-grounded in statutory authority, which I noted then, and which the Commission addresses today. Even without addressing the major questions doctrine and concerns about statutory authority, the Commission conducted a flawed process by failing to re-propose the rule after significant deviations from the original proposal, raising the question of whether appropriate notice was provided under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Climate Rule was challenged in the courts by private and public parties. The litigation was consolidated in the Eighth Circuit (Iowa v. SEC, No. 24-1522 (8th Cir.)), and the Commission previously stayed effectiveness of the rules pending completion of that litigation. In March 2025, the Commission voted to end its defense of the indefensible Climate Rule.[8] The Court of Appeals carefully considered these implications, and today, the Commission seeks to address the court’s concerns, minimizing the need for future judicial review. The Climate Rule should serve as a cautionary tale to financial regulators that their expertise is narrow and their authority is not without limit. We should focus our regulations on matters within our areas of core competency and not attempt to interject our subjective judgment on topics minimally related to that which the legislature has tasked us to oversee. If Congress had wanted the Commission to regulate environmental emissions and other non-financial issues, then Congress knows how to direct the Commission to do so.[9] I thank the staff in the Division of Corporation Finance, the Office of the Chief Accountant, the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, and the Office of the General Counsel and the many other offices that have contributed to this release. I look forward to hearing the views of market participants and other impacted parties on these issues. [1] Rescission of Climate-Related Disclosure Rules, Release No. 33-11421 available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/proposed/2026/33-11421.pdf. [2] See, e.g., the preamble of the Securities Act, which sets forth the purpose of the Act: “[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.” The antifraud provisions of the Securities Act necessitate application of a materiality standard to disclosure. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  Information is material “if there is a substantial likelihood its disclosure would have been considered significant by a reasonable investor.” Id. (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)). [3] See generally U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Off. of the Inv. Advoc., Perspectives on Investing in the U.S.: Insights from THRIVE July 2024 at 8, (April 2025). [4] TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). [5] Supra at n. 2. [6] Remarks at the “SEC Speaks” Conference 2025, Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Washington D.C. (May 19, 2025) available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/uyeda-remarks-sec-speaks-051925. [7] A Climate Regulation under the Commission’s Seal: Dissenting Statement on the Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, (Mar. 6, 2024). [8] https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025-58. [9] See,e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title XV, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

Today, the Commission proposed to rescind1 in their entirety the rules on The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, which the Commission adopted on March 6, 2024 (the “2024 Climate Rules”).2  The 2024 Climate Rules generated national controversy since they were first proposed.  Some commenters supported the proposal, but many commenters argued that the 2024 Climate Rules, as proposed, were outside the scope of the Commission’s authority and were flawed for policy reasons. The Commission proceeded to adopt the 2024 Climate Rules, but the controversy continued. Various legal challenges to the rules were filed and consolidated in the Eighth Circuit.3 Similar to many comments on the proposal, challengers of the adopted 2024 Climate Rules raised authority and administrative procedure arguments and called for the court to vacate the rules. The Commission then stayed the 2024 Climate Rules pending the completion of judicial review of the cases in the Eighth Circuit. In March 2025, the Commission withdrew its defense of the 2024 Climate Rules in the litigation. The court later held the case in abeyance. I have been concerned about the 2024 Climate Rules for some time because of questions raised about the Commission’s authority to adopt them and the soundness of the policy basis to support them. Careful compliance with the statutes governing the exercise of the Commission’s authority and a comprehensive effort to review and reshape the current SEC public company disclosure requirements are key components of my agenda, and I believe serious consideration must be given to rescission of the 2024 Climate Rules to help accomplish both of those goals. We must re-examine the costs, burdens, and benefits of disclosure mandates to make becoming and remaining a public company more attractive again. SEC disclosure obligations should comply with the Commission’s statutory authority, be guided by materiality as the North Star, avoid the practical effect of dictating corporate behavior, and be imposed only when the expected benefits justify the likely costs and burdens. The proposing release to rescind the 2024 Climate Rules identifies, discusses, and reflects the Commission’s preliminary views on these issues. It also requests public comment, which I look forward to reviewing and considering.  Thank you to the following members of the Commission staff for their work on the rescission proposal: Office of the General Counsel  J. Russell McGranahan, Jeffrey Johnson, Jeffrey Finnell, Bryant Morris, Tracey Hardin, Daniel Staroselsky, Leila Bham, Evan Jacobson, John Rady, and David Russo  Division of Economic and Risk Analysis  Joshua White, Oliver Richard, Lyndon Orton, Charles Lin, Aysa Dordzhieva, Ardith Spence, Lauren Moore, Charles Woodworth, Samantha Croffie, and Joseph Luckett Division of Corporation Finance  Jim Moloney, Sebastian Gomez Abero, Luna Bloom, Valian Afshar, and Joshua Gorsky Office of the Chief Accountant Kurt Hohl, Shehzad Niazi, and Erin Nelson 1Rescission of Climate-Related Disclosure Rules, Release 33-11421 (May 29, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/proposed/2026/33-11421.pdf. 2The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Release No. 33-11275 (Mar. 6, 2024) [89 FR 21668 (Mar. 28, 2024)], available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/33-11275.pdf. 3Iowa v. SEC, No. 24-1522 (8th Cir.); see also Liberty Energy Inc. v. SEC, No. 24-cv-739 (N.D. Tex.).

The market opened for three trading days this week as the Federal Government declared Wednesday 27th May and Thursday 28th May 2026, as Public Holidays to commemorate 2026 Eid el Adha celebrations. Meanwhile, a total turnover of 2.398 billion shares worth ₦111.480 billion in 241,313 deals was traded this week by investors on the floor of the Exchange, in contrast to a total of 3.875 billion shares valued at ₦161.757 billion that exchanged hands last week in 334,745 deals. Click here for full details.

Effective June 1, 2026, MIAX Options Exchange, MIAX Pearl Options Exchange, and MIAX Emerald Options Exchange will amend the following fees pending filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission: MIAX Options, MIAX Pearl Options, and MIAX Emerald Options New Trade-by-Trade Report (“TBT”) will be available for monthly subscription and historical data purchase for each respective exchange beginning June 1, 2026 as previously announced in the May 27, 2026 Alert. MIAX Options Exchange Monthly subscription: $10,000 Ad hoc request for historical TBT data:  $6,000 per request per month Qualifying academic purchases of historical TBT data: $18,000 per year for the first year; $1,500 per month for each additional month Subscribers who purchase or have purchased historical 1-Minute Interval Intra-Day Open-Close Report (“1-Minute Report”) data and purchase historical TBT data for the same period: $3,000 per request per month MIAX Pearl Options Exchange and MIAX Emerald Options Exchange (for each exchange) Monthly subscription: $7,000 Ad hoc request for historical TBT data:  $4,000 per request per month Qualifying academic purchases of historical TBT data: $12,000 per year for the first year; $1,000 per month for each additional month Subscribers who purchase or have purchased historical 1-Minute Report data and purchase historical TBT data for the same period : $2,000 per request per month  Attached are highlighted summaries of the June 2026 fee changes.Complete details will be contained in the June 2026 exchange fee schedules, when posted on the MIAX website at MIAX Options Fee Schedule, MIAX Pearl Options Fee Schedule, MIAX Emerald Options Fee Schedule.For additional information, please contact MIAX Sales at Sales@miaxglobal.com or (609) 897-8177.For assistance, please contact MIAX Trading Operations at TradingOperations@miaxglobal.com or (609) 897-7302.

The latest reports for April 2026 are now available. Additional information on Financial Data for FCMs market reports: Historical FCMs Reports

The current reports for the week of May 26, 2026 are now available. Report data is also available in the CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE), which allows users to search, filter, customize and download report data. Additional information on Commitments of Traders (COT) | CFTC.gov Historical Viewable Historical Compressed COT Release Schedule CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE) PRE User Guide PRE Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

The Securities and Exchange Commission today proposed the rescission of overly burdensome and costly rules that require companies to provide certain climate-related information in their registration statements and annual reports. The Commission’s proposal focuses on returning the agency to its core mandate – in line with its legal authority – and restoring a materiality-focused approach to securities regulation. “SEC disclosure obligations should comply with the Commission’s statutory authority, be guided by materiality as the North Star, avoid the practical effect of dictating corporate behavior, and be imposed only when the expected benefits justify the likely costs and burdens,” said SEC Chairman Paul S. Atkins in a statement. The Commission in March 2024 approved amendments to its rules under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to mandate highly specific and granular disclosure from virtually all public companies about climate-related matters such as greenhouse gas emissions, management of climate-related risks, and the financial statement effects of severe weather events. On April 4, 2024, the Commission stayed the climate disclosure rules pending completion of consolidated litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On March 27, 2025, the Commission voted to end its defense of the final rules. On Sept. 12, 2025, the Eighth Circuit issued an order holding the consolidated petitions for review in abeyance until such time as the Commission reconsiders the challenged rules by notice-and-comment rulemaking or renews its defense of the climate disclosure rules.  The Commission is now proposing to rescind the climate disclosure rules in their entirety because they exceed the scope of the agency's statutory authority. Even if it had authority to adopt such final rules, the Commission believes there are independent, compelling policy reasons to rescind them entirely: They are unnecessary and inconsistent with a registrant-specific, materiality-based approach to disclosure that best serves the interests of registrants and investors. They stray well beyond the policy concerns of the federal securities laws. They impose substantial costs on public companies and their shareholders that are not justified by the informational benefits they may provide to some investors. They are at odds with the Commission’s policy objectives of facilitating capital formation and promoting public company status. The public comment period will remain open for 60 days following the publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register. Resources Proposed Rule Fact Sheet Chairman Atkins Statement

SIX is proud to announce today’s disclosure of the 2026 edition’s results of the best equities asset management companies, based on alpha, a risk-adjusted performance measure, an indicator of the manager's over-performance against the market. SIX launched the “EuroPerformance Alpha League Table” ranking 21 years ago. As a renowned provider of high quality financial data, SIX already identified the potential of such an analysis in the market at that time and developed this ranking based on a cutting-edge methodology. It has since become a benchmark on the French market. At a time when passive forms of investment are enjoying an increased popularity, it is crucial to demonstrate the value of active management with comprehensive and detailed data. The calculation of the alpha value requires a precise determination of risk positions. The benchmark, which is an approximation of the actual risks taken by the fund manager, is determined by analyzing the fund's returns using a multi-index regression on investment styles - using Nobel Prize winner William Sharpe's “Return Based Style Analysis” method. This 2026 edition, calculated based on the year 2025, held up well even though the year was once again marked by numerous uncertainties weighing on financial markets. Active management, by its very nature, enables fund managers to stand out more particularly, especially in this kind of highly volatile environment. However, this instability can also undermine investment models and make the search for pure alpha even more challenging. This year, the asset management companies included in the ranking stabilized, and the various indicators remained fairly constant compared with last year, even showing a slight increase. Among the 19 institutions getting a mark, here stands our Top 10: Rank MANAGEMENT ENTITY Frequency Average Alpha Mark 1 SANSO LONGCHAMP ASSET MANAGEMENT 27.42% 4.14% 1.16% 2 AMIRAL GESTION 34.86% 2.44% 0.71% 3 CHOLET DUPONT ASSET MANAGEMENT 20.83% 2.36% 0.48% 4 EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD ASSET MANAGEMENT SA 23.28% 2.10% 0.47% 5 AURIS GESTION 19.25% 2.16% 0.42% 6 CA INDOSUEZ GESTION 40.37% 1.00% 0.42% 7 DNCA FINANCE 22.10% 1.78% 0.39% 8 BNP PARIBAS ASSET MANAGEMENT 17.14% 2.10% 0.35% 9 COMGEST SA 20.15% 1.69% 0.33% 10 FINANCIERE DE L'ECHIQUIER 11.01% 2.86% 0.32% Further information: the extended analysis and methodology of the Alpha League Table 2026. Against a backdrop of market and, above all, geopolitical constraints, active management has demonstrated its relevance and its capacity to differentiate. This highlights that algorithms cannot solve everything and that portfolio managers’ judgement remains an effective way to stand out. Philippe Hellinger, Head FR Funds Products & Press, Financial Information, SIX