John Wood Group PLC (Wood Group) has been fined £12,993,700 for publishing inaccurate information in its financial results.    Following the poor performance of certain projects, Wood Group’s accounting judgements were inappropriately influenced by its desire to maintain previously stated financial results. Wood Group did not have adequate systems, controls or procedures to prevent this from happening. This resulted in Wood Group publishing inaccurate information in its full-year 2022 and 2023 financial results and the half-year 2024 results. The company failed to take reasonable care to ensure that its announcements about those results were not false or misleading. These issues came to light from November 2024 onwards. Wood Group’s share price fell by 78% by April 2025 and its shares were suspended in May 2025.  Steve Smart, executive director of enforcement and market oversight, said:  'Investors rely on accurate information to make decisions. Wood Group failed to provide this and fell well short of the high standards we expect of listed companies.' The FCA opened its investigation into Wood Group in June 2025 and concluded it within 9 months. This is an example of how the FCA is improving the pace of its enforcement investigations.  Wood Group accepted the findings and so qualified for a 30% reduction in its financial penalty. Background Final Notice 2026: John Wood Group PLC (PDF) Wood Group agreed to resolve the case at an early stage and qualified for a 30% discount on the penalty imposed. Without this discount, the FCA would have imposed a financial penalty of £18,562,500 on Wood Group. The FCA announced its investigation of Wood Group in June 2025: FCA Press Release.  The FCA has imposed the financial penalty on Wood Group for the following breaches: Listing Rule 1.3.3R (misleading information must not be published) by failing to take reasonable care to ensure that its announcements were not misleading, false or deceptive and did not omit anything likely to affect the import of the information; and Listing Principle 1 (a listed company must take reasonable steps to establish and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable it to comply with its obligations) On 30 October 2025, Wood Group published its restated financial results for the full years 2022 and 2023, which included material adjustments arising from the misconduct described above.

Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and LSEG today announced that they have entered into an agreement to modernise and upgrade ASX 24’s trading platform, supporting the next phase of growth and resilience. ASX 24 remains the leading trading venue for Australian and New Zealand interest rate, equity and commodity futures and options, underpinned by some of the world’s longest trading hours, a diverse and highly liquid trading community, and the stability of Australia’s AAA-rated market.   This agreement extends LSEG Markets Technology’s track record of supporting Tier‑1 and emerging markets worldwide, including Brazil, Qatar, Argentina, Singapore and others.  Its technology product suite powers global market infrastructures daily, demonstrating scalability, performance and resilience in some of the world’s most demanding trading environments. Under the agreement, LSEG Markets Technology will provide a high‑performance, low‑latency trading platform engineered for speed, resilience, and capacity. The upgrade focuses on increasing resilience and reducing operational risk – giving ASX 24 the agility to innovate, expand its product set and respond to the increasing sophistication of global derivatives trading. Bruce Kellaway, Global Head of LSEG Markets Technology, commented: “ASX 24 plays a vital role not only in Australia but across global derivatives markets. We are proud to partner with ASX in delivering next‑generation trading infrastructure that enhances resilience, strengthens performance, and enables innovation. LSEG Markets Technology underpins major exchanges around the world, and this partnership reinforces our shared commitment to maintaining strong, transparent, and globally competitive markets while demonstrating leadership in delivering world-class markets technology at scale.” Farid Sammur, Head of Markets Technology, ASX, said: “Upgrading ASX 24’s trading platform is a critical investment in the long‑term resilience and performance of Australia’s derivatives markets platform. Our focus is on running a fast, fair, and reliable environment that enables our customers to manage their risk and discover prices. This upgrade positions ASX 24 with the infrastructure to innovate faster, continue to respond to changing participant needs, and maintain a high standard of operational excellence in our market.” ASX and LSEG Markets Technology will work closely throughout 2026 on platform design, testing, migration and participant readiness to ensure a smooth transition. This upgrade lays the foundation for future enhancements to liquidity, transparency and product innovation across one of the world’s most actively traded interest‑rate derivatives ecosystems.For further information regarding the platform project please see here - ASX 24 Platform Replacement Project

The Disciplinary Committee of Nasdaq Stockholm (the “Exchange”) has found that Intellego Technologies AB (the “Company”) has breached the rules of Nasdaq First North Growth Market (the “Rulebook”) and therefore decided that the shares in the Company shall be delisted from Nasdaq First North Growth Market. The Disciplinary Committee notes that it is undisputed that the Company’s disclosures regarding its revenues and results for the period January–September 2025 have been gravely inaccurate and misleading. According to KPMG’s reports, nearly 99 percent of the revenue reported should not have been recognized as revenue. During 2025, the Company also published a series of press releases containing information that was directly untrue and, in several cases, knowingly misleading. The public has not been able to rely on the Company’s disclosures, and the Company has acknowledged that its conduct was in breach of the Rulebook. Other breaches of the Rulebook cited by the Exchange must, according to the Disciplinary Committee, be regarded as absorbed by the long‑standing and systematic violations that form the core of this matter. The Company’s actions were of a nature that could seriously damage public confidence in the securities market. No sanction other than delisting can be considered for the Company’s extremely serious violations. Intellego Technology AB’s shares shall therefore be removed from trading on Nasdaq First North Growth Market. The Disciplinary Committee’s decision is available at: https://www.nasdaq.com/market-regulation/nordic/stockholm/disciplinary/decisions-sanctions

Market structure is increasingly being shaped by fragmented liquidity channels and strategic control over data, speed and who has what connectivity: 78% of all respondents to our study expect bilateral trading to increase as a result; and;    100% of sell-side respondents interviewed anticipate a further decline in equity trading on a Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs). The majority of buy-side remain dependent on an unsustainable legacy model where the sell-side absorb their connectivity costs and act as the primary access point to liquidity: As bi-lateral trading takes a greater market share, reduced commissions and rising infrastructure costs are straining the traditional sell-side subsidy model.  Smaller buyside firms are having connectivity solutions withdrawn, creating a two-tier access framework favouring higher-volume clients.. 89% of sell-side respondents state that a client’s commercial viability now determines whether connectivity continues to be subsidised.  In the first of a Series of three short reports titled, Markets Unstructured: The Importance of Connectivity in the Reinvention of Markets, research by Market Structure Partners (MSP) reveals that declining use of CLOBs is expected to accelerate and that equity markets are now exhibiting signs of “bondification”: orders that once interacted transparently on lit books are increasingly executed bilaterally.  Retail and Institutional investors increasingly want access to a variety of cross-asset liquidity channels but the barriers to achieving this are rising.    The background to the Study is a change in market structure attributed to a lack of central governance over data quality that has left issuers and investors with little confidence in the traditional exchange model, once valued as the gatekeeper of market integrity.  The benefits have accrued to only two groups of participants, both of which have had the greatest impact on the reinvention of markets:   Traditional Exchanges, which have been allowed to separate data from the trading activity that it underpins and sell it as a separate commodity.  This has sustained the frictional costs of trading borne by investors in a competitive environment and, instead of reinvesting the revenues from data in equity markets (as proved in MSP’s There’s No Market in Market Data Report, 2025), most exchanges appear to have used the profits to invest in other non-equity businesses.  It has also caused asymmetries in access to other CLOB data, undermining lit markets and preventing alternative trading platforms, who were more willing to invest in equity markets, from being fully rewarded for their efforts.  Electronic Liquidity Providers, which have used the power of technology to clean and store the data for their own use and then have found themselves further benefitting from data asymmetries created when markets fragmented.  This has allowed them to build strong balance sheets, meaning they can now face the buy-side directly.  They have stepped into the vacuum of underinvestment in CLOBs and data and now offer bi-lateral trading platforms where their data is free and customers have greater certainty of execution than on a CLOB.  However, full reporting of their data relies on voluntary use of standards, further reinforcing the likelihood of more data asymmetries as their market share increases. Consequently, a new class of market “gatekeepers” is emerging - firms with the economic power and infrastructural control to determine access to liquidity, dictate the terms of participation, and shape the degree of transparency, often within wholly discretionary frameworks. This reflects a structural realignment: control over data, trading infrastructure and balance sheet capacity is concentrating among actors that now operate as de facto arbiters of market access and price formation. Connectivity - the infrastructure of interfaces and telecoms pipes that transmit, process, and display high-density message traffic between market participants and liquidity channels has now become systemically important. Once regarded as simply operational plumbing, paid for by the sell-side so that buy-side firms and retail investors could route orders to them for onward routing to a market, it is morphing into core market infrastructure, the control and development of which is critical for market integrity. Yet the economics of the current connectivity model is under threat. Legacy services that were developed in asset silos for routing to a handful of trading venues, when sell-side order routing and membership of a venue was a valued commodity for which the buy-side was willing to pay commissions, are becoming less relevant in an increasingly multi asset environment where multiple liquidity pools exist, and membership of a venue is of little significance because no single venue is the arbiter of market integrity.  The buy-side are increasingly facing ELPs direct but have no control over the data they receive. Sell-side firms can no longer justify sponsoring buy-side connectivity without the guarantee of significant trading flow to generate commissions.  As a result, the buy-side must start to take responsibility for developing their own access to a growing number of dispersed liquidity pools, an expenditure that they have previously not had to bear. The Holy Grail for the future growth of markets is low-cost, state-of-the-art, multi-asset connectivity with high quality data.  This first paper will be followed by a second paper that shows the paths the buy-side are exploring for connectivity solutions, and a third paper that recommends required industry actions to maintain market confidence and support the transition. Niki Beattie, CEO of MSP and one of the authors of the report comments “When trading became a competitive environment, policymakers forgot to ask themselves the question as to who, or what body, would ensure total market integrity.  As a result, data quality deteriorated and issuers and investors became disadvantaged.  Benefits accrued to only a handful of participants who are responsible for a fundamental shift in the market ecosystem, away from Central Limit Order Books to a proliferation of bi-lateral liquidity channels.    As markets reinvent themselves, policymakers need to shift their focus to ensure that issuers and investors have access to resilient and broad connectivity channels to as many liquidity pools as possible at the lowest possible cost, along with a data set that ensures market integrity.   Significant challenges exist to overcome this, but if they are not addressed market integrity will continue to breakdown.”  Rebecca Healey, also one of the authors of the report said: The next stage of market evolution will be shaped less by individual venues or protocols and more by how connectivity is structured, governed, and financed. As connectivity becomes an integral component of market structure, rather than a neutral layer beneath it, its design increasingly reflects shifts in policy, technology, and incentives. The main challenge with delivering the new trading requirements is that the connectivity infrastructure needed to support them continues to be funded by brokers – even as those brokers increasingly see less of the flow that they pay third party vendors to access.  That economic model is already failing. The legacy “connectivity club” - broker-sponsored access, order routing to self-regulated CLOB monopolies, and the use of proprietary interfaces – was also not designed for an environment in which AI is extending electronic workflows into historically voice-based, multi-asset markets moving at increasing speed.” A copy of the Paper I report is attached.

 AiMi, the award-winning fintech bringing agentic AI to trading and market data operations, today announced the launch of its Incident Management solution, designed to give capital markets firms immediate visibility and operational control across trading venue and vendor-related incidents. The new capability transforms fragmented, sporadic outage alerts and service degradation notices into structured, actionable real-time intelligence, automating incident tracking.Managing trading venue and vendor-related incidents is one of the most time-critical operational challenges facing capital markets firms. With a constant stream of outage alerts, delivery delays, service degradations and maintenance updates, teams must manually reconcile their own operations against notifications from exchanges and service providers to understand the source of the issue and the action required. Regulatory frameworks on both sides of the Atlantic, including ESMA RTS 7, SEC Regulation SCI, and DORA's ICT major incident reporting requirements, demand that firms detect, classify and escalate operational incidents within tight timeframes. However, with traditional and crypto trading venues and vendors communicating outages in fragmented, unstructured formats, identifying operational impact and filtering background noise demands significant manual effort, leaving firms exposed to delayed response and increased operational risk. AiMi’s Incident Management solution deploys autonomous, adaptable AI agents to continuously ingest, interpret and structure notifications from stock exchanges and service providers. Each notice is analysed in real-time, with structured incident records created or updated instantly - eliminating manual triage and ensuring that nothing is missed. The solution applies a firm’s custom business logic and trading and market data infrastructure inventory to identify the specific impact on the firm, ensuring each record reflects real-world operational impact. AiMi’s agents continuously: Ingest and interpret unstructured outage alerts, degradation notices and maintenance updates from trading venues and vendors Classify operational impact based on severity, environment, and a firm’s specific trading and market data footprint Maintain a complete, auditable incident lifecycle from first alert to final resolution Every state change, severity update, communication and resolution action is captured in a structured, auditable timeline, giving operations and technology teams complete visibility across active and historical incidents through severity dashboards, state tracking and advanced filtering. When action is required, AiMi integrates directly with internal platforms including Jira and Slack, enabling seamless handoff to delivery teams and ensuring incidents are resolved with the same speed and precision with which they are reported."When responding to infrastructure alerts, firms must manually reconcile their own operations against the notifications sent by exchanges and service providers - often spending valuable triage time investigating what turns out to be a street-wide issue. Our Incident Management solution streamlines that process, giving firms a consistent, reliable reference point for known outages, issues and scheduled maintenance, whilst ensuring that lower-severity events such as file delays and price restatements receive the attention they deserve rather than being lost in the noise.", explained Philip William, Chief Product Officer at AiMi. The launch of Incident Management extends AiMi’s end-to-end agentic platform for trading and market data operations, complementing the existing change management workflow for tracking exchange-driven and vendor-driven changes. Firms can now manage the full operational lifecycle - from tracking changes to responding to live incidents - through a single, intelligent platform, with complete traceability and human-in-the-loop oversight at every stage.

CoinShares International Limited ("CoinShares" or "the Group") Nasdaq Stockholm: CS; US OTCQX CNSRF, with an announced merger with Vine Hill Capital Investment Corp Nasdaq: VCIC, the European leading investment company specialising in digital assets with over $6 billion in assets under management, today announces the launch of CoinShares BNB Staking ETP Ticker: CBNB, expanding its range of physically-backed digital asset exchange-traded products available to European investors. The product offers 0% management fees, 0.25% staking yield and is 100% backed by on-chain BNB holdings, providing investors with regulated exposure to the BNB Chain ecosystem through their existing brokerage accounts. BNB is the native token of BNB Chain formerly the Binance Smart Chain, one of the world's largest blockchain ecosystems by transaction volume and total value locked. The network powers thousands of decentralized applications across DeFi, gaming, and real-world asset tokenization, with over $171 billion in TVL and more than 302 million daily transactions. BNB's staking mechanism enables token holders to earn yield while contributing to network security, making it well-suited for a staking ETP structure. As institutional adoption of blockchain infrastructure accelerates, BNB offers investors regulated exposure to a high-utility ecosystem token with established demand and deflationary supply dynamics. Product Details: ●     Product Name: CoinShares BNB Staking ETP ●     Ticker: CBNB ●     Management Fee: reduced to 0.00% p.a. ●     Staking Yield: 0.25% p.a. ●     Backing: 100% physically backed ●     Listing Venues: SIX Jean-Marie Mognetti, CEO of CoinShares, commented: "Adding BNB to our Physical ETP range reflects the continued maturation of digital asset markets and sustained investor demand for regulated access to major blockchain ecosystems. Our 0% management fee structure ensures investors retain more of their exposure. This launch is another step in building the most comprehensive digital asset investment platform in Europe."  BNB Chain Blog, "BNB Chain in 2025: Making Scale the Standard" – bnbchain.org 2 DeFiLlama – defillama.com/chain/bsc  

The FCA would also streamline the scheme, so millions get compensation in 2026. We're considering over 1,000 responses to our proposals for a compensation scheme for motor finance customers who were treated unfairly. If we proceed with a scheme, we are likely to make several changes. If we do go ahead, we expect to publish final rules in late March. The timing of publication will be outside market hours and we'll confirm the date in advance.   Final decisions on the scheme have not yet been made. But to help firms prepare and ensure consumers get any money owed promptly, we're setting out some details now on how we intend to streamline the consumer journey and make it smoother for firms to operate. Given the scale and complexity of the scheme and in response to feedback, we're likely to introduce an implementation period of 3 months, with up to 5 months for older agreements. Firms could choose to process claims under the scheme sooner. We would also streamline the process for consumers and firms. People who complain before the scheme starts would no longer be asked if they wish to opt out. Instead, within 3 months of the end of the implementation period, their lender would tell them whether they're owed compensation, and how much.   Consumers receiving a redress offer would be able to accept it immediately, rather than waiting for a final determination.   Firms would not be required to write to customers via recorded delivery. We would allow a range of channels that best meet consumers' needs with appropriate safeguards to prevent fraud.   Even with an implementation period, streamlining the process means millions of people would receive compensation in 2026. Our advice remains that anyone concerned they weren't told about commission involved in their motor finance deal should complain now. Doing so means they should get any compensation sooner. There is no need to use a claims management company (CMC) or law firm, and those who do may lose over 30% of any compensation.  We've cracked down on poor practice by FCA-regulated CMCs. Over 800 misleading adverts have been removed or amended since January 2024 and we've intervened with 5 CMCs causing harm: 2 reduced exit fees and 4 agreed to stop taking on new clients until they can show they comply with our rules. The likely changes to the scheme were supported by many consumer groups and firms that responded to our consultation. As well as providing a better experience for consumers, the changes would help keep the cost of delivering the scheme proportionate, supporting a well-functioning market for the millions of people that rely on it. 

Former financial advisor David McEwen has been convicted of four charges of breaching an FMA Stop Order. He has been banned from being a director or promoter, or involved in the management, of a company in New Zealand and for providing financial advice services for 7 years. He has also been fined $15,000 and his application for a discharge without conviction was dismissed. The penalties come after he pleaded guilty in November 2025 to four charges relating to breaching a 2023 Stop Order, imposed by Financial Markets Authority (FMA) – Te Mana Tātai Hokohoko. FMA Head of Enforcement Margot Gatland said the Stop Order was made to prevent material financial harm to Mr McEwen’s clients. “We focus our enforcement actions on preventing and addressing significant harm to consumers, markets and our financial system. Mr McEwen breached our Stop Order in various ways almost immediately after it was made, after he had left New Zealand.” The conduct that breached the Stop Order was similar to the conduct that caused the FMA to issue the Stop Order. “He continued to seek money from former clients and obtained around $17,000 after the Stop Order was issued.” The FMA has previously issued warnings about financial products offered by Mr McEwen or businesses associated with him.   This includes advising former and existing clients to check their credit and debit card statements for possible unauthorised payments. The FMA received complaints from his clients where it was suspected that credit and debit card payments had been made on their accounts without their authority. Previous FMA warnings and our media releases which are linked to Mr McEwen and associated entities can be found here: David McEwen | Financial Markets Authority Background Mr McEwen breached the terms of the Stop Order in three ways, by: a. Offering and issuing financial products, and associated restricted communications, in relation to Cosmopolitan Holdings 2024 Pty Ltd, an entity Mr McEwen incorporated in Singapore on 11 November 2023 (after the FMA had begun investigating him but before making the Stop Order). In response to those offers investors made payments totalling $173,000. b. Offering and issuing financial products, and associated restricted communications, in relation to Agtech 3 Ltd, an entity captured by the Stop Order. c. Issuing units in the International Opportunities Partnership, an investment vehicle Mr McEwen created in July 2024 (after the Stop Order was made). These units purported to replace, without investor consent, financial products that investors held in relation to other entities associated with Mr McEwen. In return, Mr McEwen asked investors for an “administration fee” which would be incurred by all investors “based on the value of each investment … to assist with costs associated with formation of the partnership and issuance of units”. These units were issued to an unknown number of investors. By 8 August 2024, 23 investors had paid $17,046.49 to Mr McEwen for this “administration fee”.

The Regulatory Reset Good afternoon, it is great to be here. Let me begin by thanking Hal Scott for convening this roundtable on bank liquidity and the lender of last resort. Under President Trump’s leadership, the Treasury Department has coordinated a fundamental reset of financial regulation. And the regulators have certainly not wasted time.  They have ended decades of regulation by reflex and rolled back the Biden administration’s regulatory excesses. They have tackled the problem of “too small to succeed” and affirmed a commitment to preserving the community bank model. They have refocused bank supervision on material financial risk. They have recommitted to regulatory tailoring. They are clearing the way for digital assets and other responsible innovation. And very soon, they will propose a modernization of bank capital that simplifies and rationalizes the framework, ends the capital arbitrage that drives financial activity to nonbanks, and ensures competitive parity for smaller banks. Bank liquidity is the next big-ticket item. This roundtable is on a critically important topic with immediate real-world implications for this historic time. Artificial intelligence is no longer science fiction. The onshoring of American manufacturing is no longer aspirational. The competition for critical minerals is no longer abstract. To unlock the vast promise of this transformation and secure America’s Golden Age, we confront the pressing necessity of unlocking hundreds of billions—potentially trillions—in new lending capacity to finance AI infrastructure, domestic supply chains, and the defense industrial base. The problem, however, and the reason this roundtable is timely, is that the framework for supervising and regulating bank liquidity created in response to the 2008 financial crisis has excessively and unnecessarily limited banks’ ability to do what they are supposed to do—lend. The debate on bank liquidity goes directly to whether we will have a financial system that supports growth and economic security—or quietly stifles it under the guise of prudence. Which is all to say, liquidity regulation1 is an area of steady and serious focus for the Treasury Department. The Case for a Fresh Look During the 2008 crisis, liquidity evaporated suddenly. Wholesale funding froze. Fire sales impaired balance sheets across the system. Governments and central banks were compelled to step in. The legitimacy of the financial system and our institutions generally came into question. Post-crisis liquidity regulation has succeeded in reducing the likelihood of a redux of 2008. But its genesis also gives us cause for a fresh look. Liquidity regulation was novel and even muddled guesswork, an inevitable overcorrection written in the dark shadow of the crisis. On this first point, liquidity had historically been the province of supervision, not formula. There was simply no precedent for prescribing numerical liquidity buffers in rule. There also was no settled conceptual framework for calibrating those numerical requirements, as even then-Governor Tarullo recognized.2 Capital regulation rests on a calibration framework for assigning exposure-specific requirements. The architects of liquidity regulation, in contrast, assigned inflow and outflow rates based on historical experience and intuition. Call it two parts data, one part gut, and a heavy dash of post-crisis trauma. Another reason for a fresh look is that things have changed considerably since. The speed at which liquidity stress can be triggered and transmitted—already fast in 2008—has only accelerated, as we saw in March 2023. After March 2023, almost everyone now agrees that operational readiness and discount window stigma need a better solution. SVB, Signature, and First Republic each had substantial holdings of Treasuries and agency MBS. But that liquidity existed only on paper. Collateral was not fully prepositioned. Discount window access was untested. That was in part because the policymakers who had designed the framework were so keenly focused on reducing dependence on the lender of last resort so as to mitigate moral hazard.3 Then reality intervened in March 2023. Now, the conversation is about reducing discount window stigma, incentivizing collateral prepositioning, and normalizing routine testing of central bank facilities. The upshot is that we should not treat post-crisis liquidity regulation as somehow sacrosanct. These rules are working drafts, not tablets handed down from the mountain. With the benefit of some distance from the crisis, it is time for a fresh look. Re-assessing the Costs and Benefits Shifting then to the costs and benefits. At its core, liquidity regulation necessarily draws a line: to what extent should banks self-insure liquidity risk, and how much of that risk should be borne by the lender of last resort? Requiring banks to fully self-insure even severe liquidity risk comes at a steep cost. When 25 percent of large banks’ balance sheets are allocated to safe assets—up from roughly 10 percent before the crisis—that necessarily means less lending for mortgages, small businesses, AI hyperscalers, and critical infrastructure. Those costs must be balanced against the benefits. To foster resiliency, we should guard against the run risks posed by excessive reliance on short-term wholesale funding. That lesson from 2008 remains intact. Liquidity regulation should also support orderly resolution. As SVB’s Thursday turmoil reminds us, buffers buy time—ideally until the Friday close—so that authorities can arrange a sale or otherwise implement an orderly wind-down.  Liquidity regulation also should enhance operational readiness for stress. In particular, banks should be encouraged to preposition collateral and test central bank facilities. Given these objectives, one clear shortcoming is that banks generally have proven unwilling to draw down buffers during stress periods. The architects of liquidity regulation were explicit that buffer useability was critical to achieving their intended effect.4 But in practice, both regulators and markets have treated the buffers as untouchable hard minimums. As a result, instead of acting as shock absorbers, buffer requirements can actually exacerbate the hoarding of liquid assets, accelerating the transmission of liquidity stress throughout the system. And here’s an irony: by driving banks to exhaust regulatory buffers before accessing the discount window, we have entrenched discount window stigma. If you only go to the window when things are really bad, then going to the window signals that things are really bad. The framework has also done little to enhance readiness and willingness to use the central bank’s facilities. Indeed, as policymakers at the time made clear, the intent was 180 degrees the opposite, in effect deputizing large banks as liquidity insurers for the financial system writ large. That was a mistake. Use of the lender of last resort during severe stress is not a policy failure. That’s what the central bank is designed to do—prevent liquidity spirals. When banks monetize liquid assets through sales or repo, that simply redistributes reserves, potentially even spreading liquidity stress across the system. Because only the central bank can create new reserves, only the central bank can add the aggregate system-wide base liquidity that typically is necessary to counteract a flight to safety. That unique power positions the central bank as the natural insurer against severe liquidity stress. Potential Reforms Given this misalignment in liquidity regulation, there is a strong case for a wholesale revisiting of the framework. But that should not hold up near-term reforms to restore the lender of last resort to its intended role. To that end, the liquidity coverage ratio requirements and other liquidity rules5 should give appropriate capped recognition of borrowing capacity associated with collateral prepositioned at the discount window.  This is a targeted, sensible reform that simply recognizes that prepositioned, collateralized borrowing capacity is real, monetizable liquidity. This reform would help rebalance the boundary between self-insurance and the lender of last resort. It also would enhance operational preparedness by creating strong incentives for prepositioning collateral and regular testing. And it could reduce discount window stigma by normalizing access. The cap on recognized discount window borrowing capacity is a critical feature. Self-insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity risk remains critical for resiliency and orderly resolution. In designing and calibrating the cap, regulators could explore whether it should be sized for each bank based on the bank’s demonstrated usage of the discount window. For example, recognized borrowing capacity could be capped at the lesser of the overall ceiling and some multiple of the bank’s discount window borrowing over a specified period of time. That approach could ensure that this borrowing capacity is indeed real liquidity while helping to reduce discount window stigma. Regulators could also explore a mechanism to adjust the cap during severe stress. Temporarily increasing recognition could enhance buffer useability by temporarily adjusting banks’ liquidity metrics. Increasing the cap during stress also could interact with incentives for ongoing, limited use to create automatic structural stabilizers that involve the discount window early on when stress is incipient. Importantly, none of this need undermine market or regulatory discipline. Central bank borrowing would remain collateralized, subject to conservative haircuts, and limited to solvent institutions. Capital requirements would remain appropriately calibrated. Supervisors would retain their access and discretion. What this would do is align liquidity regulation with the appropriate role of the lender of last resort. The central bank can, should, and indeed must, step in to provide liquidity during periods of severe stress. We should design the framework accordingly. Conclusion Over the last year, the regulators have made significant progress toward a financial system that supports Parallel Prosperity for both Wall Street and Main Street. Liquidity reform will be a critical step toward getting banks back into lending—back into financing homes, factories, infrastructure, and innovation.  In parallel with this work, Treasury will continue to coordinate complementary reforms. The administration will continue to advocate for targeted deposit insurance reform, in particular expanded coverage for noninterest-bearing transaction accounts. I expect FinCEN and the bank regulators will soon propose a rule to recenter AML/CFT supervision on program effectiveness, and enhance FinCEN’s role in AML/CFT supervision and enforcement. I expect the bank regulators will soon revamp the model risk governance guidance that has constrained responsible AI adoption. And we will continue to push for agreements among the bank regulators to reduce duplicative examinations.  With this progress, I would encourage you to think ambitiously about the future of finance and financial regulation. To that end, Treasury will begin to rethink the appropriate activities of banking organizations, with an eye in particular toward facilitating responsible adoption of new technologies. Thank you for the time today, and I look forward to hearing your thoughts. 1. Liquidity regulation includes the liquidity coverage ratio requirement, the net stable funding ratio requirement, internal liquidity stress tests conducted pursuant to rule, the resolution liquidity adequacy and positioning requirement, and the resolution liquidity execution need requirement, as well as the related supervisory expectations with respect to liquidity risk management. 2.In November 2014, then-Governor Tarullo said, “Liquidity regulation is still a relatively new undertaking . . . . There is still need for conceptual work on such questions as how to specify the extent to which banks should be required to self-insure against liquidity risk . . . .” Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Liquidity Regulation, Remarks at The Clearing House 2014 Annual Conference (Nov. 20, 2014). 3.At the time, then-Governor Stein argued that “liquidity regulation . . . reflect[s] a desire to reduce dependence on the central bank as a lender of last resort (LOLR)” and that “a central premise must be that the use of LOLR capacity in a crisis scenario is socially costly.” He rationalized that premise in part on the assumption that “the use of an LOLR to support banks when they get into trouble can lead to moral hazard problems.” Jeremy C. Stein, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Liquidity Regulation and Central Banking, Remarks at “Finding the Right Balance,” 2013 Credit Markets Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (Apr. 19, 2013). Governor Stein did however express an openness to counting some committed LOLR capacity in the liquidity coverage ratio requirement, but only to the extent it had an upfront fee. 4.Id. (“The [Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision] has also made clear its view that, during periods of stress, it would be appropriate for banks to use their [high-quality liquid assets], thereby falling below the minimum. However, creating a regime in which banks voluntarily choose to do so is not an easy task. A number of observers have expressed the concern that if a bank is held to an [liquidity coverage ratio] standard of 100 percent in normal times, it may be reluctant to allow its ratio to drop below 100 percent when facing large outflows, even if regulators were to permit this temporary deviation, for fear that a decline in the ratio could be interpreted as a sign of weakness.”). 5.The regulators could consider adjustments to other liquidity regulations, including the internal liquidity stress tests and the resolution-related liquidity requirements.

CME Group, the world's leading derivatives marketplace, today announced that its Dairy futures and options products set a new open interest (OI) record of 403,113 contracts on February 27. In addition, Dairy futures and options reached a new record monthly average daily volume (ADV) of 11,234 contracts in February. The previous ADV record was 9,514 contracts in September 2025.  "Tightening nonfat dry milk and butter inventories along with strong demand for whey protein have led clients to turn to CME Group in record numbers to manage their risk," said John Ricci, CME Group Managing Director and Global Head of Agricultural Products. "Our commitment to our clients centers on providing a range of precise hedging tools to help them navigate all market environments." Other records achieved across the company's Dairy products included: Class IV Milk futures and options traded a record monthly ADV of 1,443 contracts Cash-Settled Cheese futures and options reached a record OI of 90,378 on February 26 and monthly ADV of 2,985 contracts For more information on CME Group Dairy futures and options, please visit here.

Contract Volume   February 2026 Contracts February 2025 Contracts % Change 2026 YTD ADV 2025 YTD ADV % Change Equity Options 673,138,700 645,974,202 4.2% 35,300,486 32,141,189 9.8% ETF Options 528,868,475 390,730,326 35.4% 27,840,677 20,343,890 36.9% Index Options 115,505,874 86,239,572 33.9% 5,829,700 4,457,364 30.8% Total Options 1,317,513,049 1,122,944,100 17.3% 68,970,863 56,942,443 21.1% Futures 5,115,647 4,579,259 11.7% 248,702 224,510 10.8% Total Volume 1,322,628,696 1,127,523,359 17.3% 69,219,565 57,166,953 21.1%   Securities Lending   February 2026 Avg. Daily Loan Value February 2025 Avg. Daily Loan Value % Change February 2026 Total Transactions February 2025 Total Transactions % Change Market Loan + Hedge Total 204,479,775,338 173,392,866,585 17.9%  267,500  276,596 -3.29%   Additional Data Market share volume by exchange Open interest Historical volume statistics

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today announced two final rules to reduce the regulatory burden for community banks. These actions build upon the OCC’s ongoing efforts to tailor bank supervision and regulation to bank risk profile and reduce burden for its regulated institutions so they can focus resources on core functions and support economic growth. “Community banks serve critical constituencies and lend to Main Street businesses, that in turn support vibrant local economies,” said Comptroller of the Currency Jonathan V. Gould. “Unfortunately, over the last couple of decades, regulatory burdens coupled with the proliferation of a one-size-fits-all supervisory framework have cut the number of community banks across our nation in half. As Comptroller, I’ve prioritized addressing the challenges of community banks by streamlining regulation and tailoring supervision. Today’s actions execute on meaningful reforms as we continue working to help these institutions best serve the American people on a level playing field.” In a final rule, the OCC rescinded its Fair Housing Home Loan Data System regulation, removing obsolete and largely duplicative data collection requirements on applications for home loans that applied only to national banks. The final rule eliminates regulatory burden for these institutions without having a material impact on the availability of data necessary for the OCC to conduct its fair housing-related supervisory activities. In a separate final rule, the OCC simplified licensing requirements for corporate activities and transactions involving community banks. The final rule broadens eligibility for expedited or reduced filing procedures to community banks. These changes are intended to reduce burden related to corporate activities and transactions by community banks. Related Links Bulletin 2026-05, “Rescission of 12 CFR 27, ‘Fair Housing Home Loan Data System’: Final Rule” Final Rule, Fair Housing Home Loan Data System (PDF) Bulletin 2026-06, “Community Bank Licensing Amendments: Final Rule” Final Rule, Community Bank Licensing Amendments (PDF)

ISDA and EMTA, Inc., the trade association for emerging markets, have jointly published a revised set of standard definitions for foreign exchange (FX) derivatives transactions, which update key market practices and consolidate various FX and FX-related product templates and provisions into an integrated document. The 2026 FX Definitions will be implemented on November 22, 2027, and will replace the 1998 FX and Currency Option Definitions as the market standard for FX derivatives transactions. From the 2027 implementation date, global financial messaging services provider Swift is no longer expected to support the 1998 definitions. The updated FX definitions include revisions to disruption events and fallbacks for deliverable transactions, incorporate the EMTA template terms and market practices for non-deliverable FX transactions, contain provisions for calendar adjustment events and align the calculation agent standards with those in the 2021 ISDA Interest Rate Derivatives Definitions. Importantly, the 2026 FX Definitions also consolidate the various supplements and provisions published by ISDA and EMTA since 1998 into an integrated document and eliminate the need for separate master confirmation agreements. Available in digital form on the ISDA MyLibrary platform, a revised version of the definitions will be published in full each time a future update is required. “The 2026 FX Definitions reflect the various changes in regulations, market practices and technology that have occurred since the last definitions were published in 1998. The result is a modern, digital set of definitions that will keep pace with future developments and support the safe and efficient trading of FX derivatives in the 21st century,” said Scott O’Malia, ISDA’s Chief Executive. Michael Chamberlin, Executive Director of EMTA, and Leslie Payton Jacobs, long-time Managing Director and current Consultant, reiterated EMTA’s commitment to the seamless and successful unification of the various FX industry tools and products under a single administrative and documentary umbrella, which will enhance efficiencies in the trading and settlement of FX derivatives products generally. “The new definitions pull significant ISDA and EMTA documentation published since 1998 into a single document, making them much easier to navigate, while the digital format means the definitions can be seamlessly updated whenever necessary. With an implementation date of November 2027, market participants have plenty of time to prepare for the switch, and ISDA will continue to support the market as these important changes are made,” said Katherine Tew Darras, ISDA’s General Counsel. The 2026 FX Definitions are available here. ISDA has also published a roadmap to help guide market participants in their implementation efforts, as well as a fact sheet highlighting the key changes. Additional educational materials will be published in the coming months to assist with the industry transition. More information about the 2026 FX Definitions is available on the FX Definitions Update InfoHub. ISDA members can also join the ISDA FX Operations Group and the ISDA FX Definitions Update Group to follow implementation developments.

Farmer sentiment improved modestly in February, as the Purdue University/CME Group Ag Economy Barometer rose by 3 points from January to a reading of 116. The increase was driven by a stronger assessment of current conditions; the Current Conditions Index climbed 11 points, while the Future Expectations Index slipped by 1 point and fell to its lowest level since September 2024, standing 45 points below its February 2025 reading. Although concerns about agricultural exports moderated somewhat compared to January, they remain elevated relative to December. The survey was conducted Feb. 2-6.  "Although producers reported stronger current conditions in February, the overall survey sentiment suggests farmers are carefully weighing short-term stability against longer-term uncertainty," said Michael Langemeier, the barometer's principal investigator and director of Purdue's Center for Commercial Agriculture. "Many operations are still feeling financial pressure compared to a year ago, which is evident in their cautious investment strategies and a more reserved outlook for the coming year." Approximately 44% of respondents said their farm operations were worse off in February than a year earlier. Looking ahead, producers remained cautious about their financial outlook, with 29% expecting their farm's financial performance to worsen over the next 12 months, compared to 18% who anticipated an improvement. The Farm Capital Investment Index edged up 3 points to 50, but investment plans remain subdued, as just 7% of respondents reported plans to increase farm machinery purchases in the coming year. Since 2016, the February barometer survey has included questions about producers' long-term growth plans. This year, approximately 15% of respondents said they plan to reduce the size of their operation, while 34% reported no plans to grow. By contrast, 51% indicated they expect to expand their farms over the next five years, including 14% who plan to increase their operation's size by 10% or more. The survey also found that 36% of producers plan to bring another family member into the business during the next five years, signaling a continued emphasis on expansion and succession planning despite ongoing financial concerns. Producers' outlook for U.S. agricultural exports improved slightly from January but remained more pessimistic than at the end of 2025. In February, 14% of respondents said they expect U.S. agricultural exports to decline over the next five years, down from 16% in January but still notably higher than the 5% who expressed that view in December.  Producers remained optimistic about short-term farmland values in February, while their outlook for long-run land values continued to soften. The Short-Term Farmland Value Expectations Index rose from 117 to 123. In contrast, the Long-Term Farmland Value Expectations Index, which reached a record high of 166 in December, declined to 152 in January and 150 in February. Respondents identified alternative investments, net farm income and interest rates as the three most influential factors shaping farmland values. The February survey also asked producers how they plan to use payments from the Farmer Bridge Assistance Program, announced in late December. Nearly half (47%) said they intend to use the funds to pay down debt, while 27% plan to strengthen working capital. The remaining respondents indicated the payments would be used for family living expenses (12%) or to invest in farm machinery (14%). Producers' views on the broader direction of the U.S. economy weakened slightly for the second consecutive month; the percentage who indicated the U.S. is headed in the "right direction" declined from 62% in January to 59% in February.

CME Group, the world's leading derivatives marketplace, today announced that its Dairy futures and options products set a new open interest (OI) record of 403,113 contracts on February 27. In addition, Dairy futures and options reached a new record monthly average daily volume (ADV) of 11,234 contracts in February. The previous ADV record was 9,514 contracts in September 2025.  "Tightening nonfat dry milk and butter inventories along with strong demand for whey protein have led clients to turn to CME Group in record numbers to manage their risk," said John Ricci, CME Group Managing Director and Global Head of Agricultural Products. "Our commitment to our clients centers on providing a range of precise hedging tools to help them navigate all market environments." Other records achieved across the company's Dairy products included: Class IV Milk futures and options traded a record monthly ADV of 1,443 contracts Cash-Settled Cheese futures and options reached a record OI of 90,378 on February 26 and monthly ADV of 2,985 contracts For more information on CME Group Dairy futures and options, please visit here.

The semi-annual review of the Austrian indices by the Index Committee has resulted in a change in the composition of the ATX. Palfinger AG is returning to the Austrian benchmark index for the first time since 2010, replacing CPI Europe AG. There has also been a change in the ATX five, which comprises the five highest-weighted shares in the ATX: voestalpine AG has been added to the index, replacing VERBUND AG. The composition of the ATX is based on two key criteria: average daily share turnover (liquidity) and free float capitalization of the company.  In addition, the index review resulted in a change in the free float factor for STRABAG SE, which will be increased from 0.2 to 0.3. The free float factor reflects the weighting of the free float – i.e. the proportion of freely tradable shares – in the indices of the Vienna Stock Exchange. Holdings of less than 4% are considered free float. The higher the free float and thus the factor, the greater the weighting of the share in the index. All changes will take effect on 23 March. The next scheduled review of the composition of Austrian indices will take place in September 2026. The free float factors will be updated again in June 2026. The ATX calculation is based on a purely quantitative methodology that is laid down in a set of rules. In accordance with "The Rules for the Austrian Indices of the Vienna Stock Exchange", the Vienna Stock Exchange may add or remove companies after the semi-annual review (March and September). The calculation parameters (number of shares, free float factors and representation factors) are reviewed on a quarterly basis (March, June, September and December). Once a month, the Vienna Stock Exchange publishes the "ATX watchlist", which ranks stocks according to liquidity and capitalised free float. Institutional investors, trading members, issuers of financial products, academics and the Vienna Stock Exchange contribute their expertise to the Index Committee, which decides on the rules governing the indices. Download: Press photos on ATX, trading & indices

The Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), the independent banking, financial services, and markets regulator of Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) has announced the reopening of Nasdaq Dubai, effective Wednesday, 4 March 2026 at 10.00am GST. Nasdaq Dubai is the international financial exchange based in the DIFC, providing a platform for regional and global investors to trade equities, derivatives, sukuk, and conventional bonds.  The DFSA continues to closely monitor developments in the region, and remains in regular contact with local authorities and relevant advisories.

Fiserv, Inc. (NASDAQ: FISV), a leading global provider of payments and financial services technology, has published the Fiserv Small Business Index for February 2026, indicating that higher average tickets and shifting winter demand drove small business sales up slightly in February. The seasonally adjusted Index remained at 143. Year-over-year sales grew (+1.2%) despite transactions (foot traffic) slowing (-0.8%) year over year. Month-over-month sales (+0.2%) and foot traffic (-0.1%) changed little compared to January. Sales growth was largely driven by higher tickets, which grew both year over year (+2.0%) and month over month (+0.3%). “Small businesses showed resilience in February, with sales seeing a modest rebound despite a second consecutive month of harsh winter events,” said Prasanna Dhore, Chief Data Officer, Fiserv. “With many consumers reprioritizing their spend due to seasonal events, sales grew for service-based businesses, while restaurant sales declined because of slower foot traffic.” Key Takeaways Demand shifted in February due to cyclical patterns and weatherSubsectors that realized a year-over-year sales boost in the wake of harsh weather included Repair and Maintenance (+1.5%), Health and Personal Care Retailers (+3.0%) and Accommodations/Hotels (+4.3%). Seasonal patterns contributed to sales growth as well, with Professional Services up (+4.2%) as pricing for Tax Preparation, Business Services, and Legal Services grew. Retail showed notable demand shifts.Retail sales grew slightly (+0.6%) year over year and were flat compared to January. Foot traffic fell (-0.2%) from January but rose (+1.4%) year over year. Food and Beverage Stores (+0.8%), Motor Vehicle Parts (+0.9%) and Health and Personal Care Retailers (+0.5%) had small but meaningful gains month over month, likely in direct response to weather-related events. Food & Beverage Stores saw a slight decline in year-over-year sales (-0.1%) despite foot traffic growth (+0.5%) as consumers chose more budget-friendly options. Small business restaurant sales slowedFood Services and Drinking Places (Restaurants) sales were flat compared to January and year over year (+0.1%), suggesting some consumers may be deprioritizing eating out. Foot traffic declined month over month (-0.4%) and year over year (-2.1%). Lackluster restaurant sales were most present at Limited-Service Restaurants (-1.8% year over year); Full-Service Restaurants performed much better, growing (+1.4%) year over year. Winter Storm Drags Sales in the NortheastFor the second straight month, a winter storm in the final week impacted small business sales in a large portion of the northeast. Rhode Island (-9.9%) and New York (-2.9%) sales dropped significantly year over year, as February's blizzard made surface travel very limited.  To access the full Fiserv Small Business Index, visit fiserv.com/FiservSmallBusinessIndex.

Danish fintech company, Aryze, which builds payment infrastructure across bank rails and blockchain rails, has selected Muinmos to strengthen its compliance as it scales globally. Aryze selected Muinmos for its automated and advanced KYC and KYB capabilities. Muinmos’ KYC solution offers comprehensive global coverage and automation across all types of KYC/KYB/AML checks, including support for clients offering FX, CFDs, digital assets and stocks. The platform is integrated with multiple data sources and performs real-time monitoring to reflect changes in regulatory requirements, client data, and risk profiles, providing a smooth customer experience and operational efficiency. The partnership strengthens Aryze’s governance-first approach as the company expands internationally, supporting operational clarity across onboarding, reconciliation, reporting, and oversight. Bertram Seitz, CEO, Aryze said, “We chose Muinmos because they deliver KYC and KYB in one powerful, automated platform. Their robust infrastructure and international footprint give us the scale and resilience we need, while our shared Danish foundation ensures strong alignment. It’s a partnership built for compliant global growth.” Remonda Kirketerp-Moller, Founder and CEO, Muinmos added, “This partnership unites two firms that share a vision for the future of the industry, and what excites us about this partnership is that Aryze is committed to bringing the same rigorous compliance standards to blockchain as you see in traditional finance. Aryze is doing impressive work with tokenization, branded stablecoins, and cross-border payments, and we share their vision that innovation and regulatory rigour must go hand in hand. Our infrastructure is built to handle the volume and complexity that comes with scaling globally, and we are ready to support Aryze every step of the way."

The Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) today announced the appointment of Michaela Fleischer as Chief Operating and Financial Officer, effective March 1, 2026. In this newly created role, Michaela will provide strategic and financial leadership, as well as drive continued operational excellence across the organization. As demand for secure and automatically verifiable organizational identities increases across industries, GLEIF introduced the new role of Chief Operating and Financial Officer to safely advance its mission and further strengthen the growing ecosystem promoting uptake of the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) and the verifiable LEI (vLEI). Leading the 'RUN' dimension of GLEIF’s mission, Michaela will focus on the continued delivery of safe, reliable, and resilient operations for the Global LEI System. She will be responsible for overseeing and evolving GLEIF’s well-established operational, financial and administrative functions, including financial planning and sustainability, organizational effectiveness, and day-to-day operations. This strategically complements GLEIF’s 'GROW' agenda, led by its CEO Alexandre Kech, by further strengthening the operational foundation to support increasing LEI and vLEI adoption, the development of new use cases, and the growth of the broader ecosystem. As Managing Director of GLEIF Germany, Michaela will be based at GLEIF's German Office in Frankfurt am Main and report directly to the CEO. A seasoned global executive, Michaela brings decades of leadership experience from top financial and technology companies and a proven record of consistently delivering transformative growth through operational and technology innovation. Michaela joins GLEIF from the crypto infrastructure service provider Finoa, where she served as Chief Operating Officer. Her previous roles at Deutsche Bank, N26, Holvi, and Revolut spanned senior responsibilities across operations, finance, governance, and organizational leadership, supporting organizations through phases of rapid growth, transformation, and increasing regulatory scrutiny. Alexandre Kech, GLEIF CEO, said: “As our ecosystem continues to grow to encompass new geographies, sectors and participants, we recognize the need to strengthen our own capabilities to help enable businesses everywhere to participate in the digital economy. This is why I am delighted to welcome Michaela as our new Chief Operating and Financial Officer. With an extensive background in banking and IT, Michaela brings the perfect combination of operational excellence, industry expertise, and people-first leadership mentality. This will be instrumental in advancing our work to accelerate the adoption and integration of the LEI and vLEI all around the world.” Commenting on her appointment, Michaela Fleischer said: “I’m honored to join GLEIF at such a pivotal time for the organization as it enters a new phase of growth and innovation. The expanding LEI and vLEI ecosystem is shaping the future of trusted organizational identity across industries worldwide, and I look forward to working closely with the GLEIF team and stakeholders from across the entire Global LEI System to drive this transformation together.” For more information on the LEI and vLEI, please visit the GLEIF website.