CFTC's Weekly Swaps Report has been updated, and is now available: http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/SwapsReports/index.htm.Additional information on the Weekly Swaps Report. Archive Explanatory Notes Swaps Report Data Dictionary Release Schedule Released: Weekly on Mondays at 3:30 p.m.

FINRA announced today two key additions to our senior leadership team to enhance engagement with regulators, policymakers, industry stakeholders and the media.   Chris Rosello Chris Spina   Chris Rosello joined FINRA on April 6 as Senior Vice President, Global Government Affairs, bringing together the Office of Government Affairs and the Office of International Affairs under unified leadership. Based in Washington, D.C., Rosello oversees FINRA's strategic engagement with federal, state and international regulators, Congress and other key stakeholders on legislative and regulatory matters affecting the securities industry. Chris Spina joined FINRA today as Senior Vice President, Corporate Communications. Also based in Washington, D.C., Spina leads FINRA's strategic communications, media relations and public engagement efforts to advance FINRA’s mission of protecting investors and safeguarding market integrity, while strengthening relationships with key audiences. Both senior leaders report to Marcia Asquith, Executive Vice President, Board and External Relations at FINRA, and bring extensive experience at the intersection of financial regulation, government relations and strategic communications. "In today's rapidly changing environment, staying connected with our stakeholders has never been more vital. Chris Rosello and Chris Spina are outstanding leaders who bring deep experience and strong relationships across the regulatory and business communities. They have a proven ability to build meaningful connections and work through complex challenges. I am confident they will help us strengthen our partnerships and better communicate how FINRA protects investors and keeps our markets fair and trustworthy. We are thrilled to welcome them to the team,” said Asquith. Chris Rosello has more than 25 years of experience in corporate government relations and public service. Most recently, he served as Vice President and Head of Federal Government Relations at MetLife, where he led the company's engagement with U.S. government regulators and elected officials on various policy initiatives and strategic priorities. His career includes key positions at HSBC Bank USA and Wells Fargo, where he advocated on regulatory and legislative matters. He also has substantial government experience, having served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, where he played a significant role in legislative strategy for the Troubled Asset Relief Program and as Senior Advisor for Congressional Affairs at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. He spent eight years in the U.S. House of Representatives, including as Legislative Director and as professional staff on the House Financial Services Committee. He is a graduate of Albany State University and Johns Hopkins University. Chris Spina brings nearly 25 years of experience in strategic communications, media relations and government affairs across some of the nation's most complex and highly regulated organizations. Most recently, he served as Vice President of Corporate Communications at Freddie Mac, where he led the company’s communications and government and industry relations functions. In that role, he developed integrated communications strategies to engage key stakeholders, including policymakers, trade associations and industry influencers. Prior to Freddie Mac, he held significant roles at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, where he served as Senior Advisor for Public Affairs to the agency chairman, developing public affairs strategies on a host of complex regulatory issues, including oversight of the derivatives markets. He also served as Communications Director for the House Committee on Financial Services, where he directed communications for the committee's ranking member and managed media relations on issues ranging from broker-dealer oversight and mortgage finance to capital markets rules and derivatives. He holds a J.D. from Catholic University's Columbus School of Law and a B.A. in Political Science from Providence College.

Today, the Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) (collectively, “Commissions”) proposed amendments to eliminate certain Form PF filing and reporting obligations and to streamline others. My thanks to the hardworking staff in the Division of Investment Management, Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, and Office of the General Counsel and to the CFTC for their work on this proposal. I support this proposal and hope to receive robust feedback from investors, investment advisers, private funds, and other interested parties. I have been hearing calls to fix Form PF since I started as a commissioner. Form PF generates a lot of data at great expense that does not present a useful window into private fund activity. To date, the Commissions’ response to these pleas has been to make the form more—rather than less—onerous. The granular data required by the 2024 amendments, for example, made an already problematic form worse, as commenters warned would happen.[1] The fundamental problem with Form PF is that it has wandered from its core purpose: generating information to assist FSOC in identifying and monitoring risks to the financial stability of the United States.[2] Many of today’s proposed amendments acknowledge and address the concerns we have heard. If adopted, these amendments should help to restore Form PF to its intended purpose. I urge commenters to look closely at both the proposed changes and what is not changing so that you can tell us whether additional or alternative changes would better restore the form to its intended role. I would welcome feedback on, among other questions, the following: The filing threshold for private fund advisers and the reporting threshold for large private fund advisers have not changed since the thresholds were adopted in 2011. Yet, as noted in the proposing release, the aggregated private fund gross asset value has more than tripled since 2013.[3] In addition, when we adopted the  large private fund adviser reporting thresholds we noted that they were designed so that the group of large private fund advisers (including large hedge fund advisers) filing Form PF would be relatively small in number but represent a substantial portion of the assets of their respective industries.[4] The number of overall private fund adviser filers and the number of large private fund advisers have grown because the thresholds have not changed since they were adopted.  The proposed amendments include an increase to the filing threshold for Form PF filers and the reporting threshold for large hedge fund advisers. Should we update other Form PF thresholds as well? Should we adopt amendments to require that these thresholds be updated periodically to account for inflation and industry changes? The Commissions are proposing to pare back some of the 2024 amendments and other information currently required by Form PF. Do these changes align Form PF with its systemic risk purpose? Are other changes necessary? Should we, for example, eliminate questions 42 and 43 rather than slimming them down? What information required by Form PF is useful in monitoring systemic risk and, conversely, what information is not? For information that is or might be useful, do the benefits to FSOC and the Commissions of having that information outweigh the costs incurred by funds and advisers in compiling and reporting that information?                      Now is the time to tell the Commissions what we got right and where we have gone astray. [1] See, e.g., Comment Letter of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 11, 2022) at 4 (“The amendments under consideration represent a significant rewrite of Form PF and would require funds to provide extensive new streams of data unrelated to systemic risk.”), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-22/s72222-20145434-310656.pdf. [2] See Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was amended to require that  an adviser must maintain records and reports for each private fund it advises, that include a description of the following: (1) the amount of assets under management and use of leverage, including off-balance-sheet leverage; (2) counterparty credit risk exposure; (3) trading and investment positions; (4) valuation policies and practices of the fund; (5) types of assets held; (6) side arrangements or side letters, whereby certain investors in a fund obtain more favorable rights or entitlements than other investors; (7) trading practices. The statute also allows the Commissions to require the disclosure of other information, including for investor protection purposes, but the statute’s primary objective is to inform the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which—as its name suggests—has a systemic risk monitoring and mitigation mandate. [3] Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 6959 (Apr. 20, 2026) at 15, available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/proposed/2026/ia-6959.pdf. [4] Id. at 22.

The Autorité des marchés financiers in Québec (AMF Québec), the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and the Autorité des Marchés Financiers in France (AMF France) entered into an agreement intended to support the initial cross-listing of securities on an exchange, by way of prospectus, in Canada and France by establishing a new collaborative procedure that will facilitate dialogue and information sharing between securities regulators in the two countries. “Canada’s capital markets are navigating a period of rapid change shaped by global economic uncertainty,” said Yves Ouellet, President and CEO of the AMF Québec. “In this context, the AMF Québec and OSC continue supporting the competitiveness of Canada’s capital markets, keeping with the commitment taken by the Canadian Securities Administrators in April 2025 This link will open in a new window.” “Co-operation and information sharing across global jurisdictions is important to facilitate the regulation of cross-listed issuers,” said Grant Vingoe, CEO of the OSC. “This agreement is another way we can support Canadian issuers by opening up new possibilities.” “In recent years, the AMF France has demonstrated its ability to support the attractiveness of the French capital markets, which is one of our key strategic priorities” said Marie-Anne Barbat-Layani, Chair of the AMF France. “We pursue this ambition by promoting the French vision of a financial system that is robust, resilient, innovative and competitive, attentive to investor protection and geared towards financing the economy. This agreement is of great importance and confirms both the competitiveness of the Paris financial centre and the excellent relationships we maintain with our Canadian counterparts at AMF Québec and the OSC.” Under the agreement, Canadian and French companies seeking to cross-list their securities in France and Canada by way of a prospectus will have to comply with the regulatory requirements of both countries and applicable exchange requirements. The agreement does not provide regulatory relief. However, Canadian and French companies will benefit from increased support and assistance from the AMF Québec, OSC and AMF France throughout the prospectus review process.

LSEG announces it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each from Goldman Sachs International ("GSI") on the London Stock Exchange as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 09 April 2026 Date of Purchase Number of ordinary shares purchased Highest price paid per share Lowest price paid per share Volume weighted price paid per share 2026-04-13 159,022 £91.8000 £89.3400 £90.7553 2026-04-14 217,628 £93.1000 £91.5800 £92.2058 2026-04-15 218,574 £92.9200 £92.0400 £92.4926 2026-04-16 216,216 £95.1400 £91.5000 £94.0812 2026-04-17 210,305 £96.7400 £94.1800 £95.8666   LSEG intends to cancel the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 495,279,915 ordinary shares of 679/86pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 495,279,915. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation) (as such legislation forms part of retained EU law as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter), a full breakdown of the individual purchases by GSI on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: ttp://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/1793B_1-2026-4-20.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction.

The General Manager of the BIS, Pablo Hernández de Cos, made the following statement today on the announcement that Hyun Song Shin has been appointed to serve as Governor of the Bank of Korea.    I want to warmly congratulate Hyun as he takes on the role of Governor of the Bank of Korea. Since he joined the BIS in 2014, Hyun has provided intellectual leadership and strategic direction to the work of the BIS, advancing our research and analytical work to support the central banking community, and has been a key member of the management of the Bank as part of our Executive Committee team.   Pablo Hernández de Cos, General Manager of the BIS Background It was previously announced that Hyun Song Shin will be succeeded by Hélène Rey, effective September 2026. In the interim, the Monetary and Economic Department will be led by Frank Smets as Acting Head of the Monetary and Economic Department. 

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission today jointly proposed amendments to reduce reporting burdens for private funds.  The agencies proposed to amend Form PF, the confidential reporting form for certain SEC-registered investment advisers to private funds, including those that also are registered with the CFTC as a commodity pool operator or a commodity trading advisor. Form PF collects information designed to facilitate the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s monitoring of systemic risk in the private fund industry. The CFTC and SEC may use the information collected on Form PF in their regulatory programs, including examinations, investigations, and investor protection efforts relating to private fund advisers.  “By raising the filing threshold and streamlining Form PF, we are taking steps to reduce the burdens associated with filing the form,” said CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig. “I look forward to reading the public comments to ensure we get these changes right so that we eliminate unnecessary costs and burdens for filers.” “A key pillar of my agenda is restoring balance to disclosure obligations and reducing the cost of compliance wherever possible,” said SEC Chairman Paul S. Atkins. “Prior amendments to Form PF have led to overly burdensome disclosure requirements for advisers, distracting them from their core investment functions, often without a commensurate benefit to regulators’ use of the collected data. These proposed changes would help to rationalize the scope of Form PF requirements to support its purpose and bring our overall disclosure regime back into alignment.” The proposed amendments would eliminate filing requirements for smaller advisers, who represent almost half of the advisers that currently must file Form PF. The proposal would raise the filing threshold for all filers from $150 million in private fund assets under management to $1 billion. Form PF would continue to obtain information on over 90% of private fund gross assets.  The proposed amendments also would eliminate quarterly and current reporting requirements for smaller hedge fund advisers and substantially reduce other reporting requirements for these advisers, significantly reducing burdens for almost two-thirds of the advisers that currently must file Form PF quarterly, and are subject to current reporting and these other reporting requirements. The proposal would raise the reporting threshold for large hedge fund advisers from $1.5 billion in hedge fund assets under management to $10 billion. Form PF would continue to obtain information quarterly on over 80% of hedge fund gross assets.  In addition to amending these thresholds, the proposal would eliminate or streamline many Form PF requirements. The proposal requests comments on all the proposed amendments.  The proposing release for the amendments will be published in the Federal Register, and the public comment period will remain open until 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. RELATED LINKS Federal Register (Form PF)

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) jointly proposed amendments to reduce private fund reporting burdens while enabling the continued collection of necessary and appropriate information. The agencies proposed to amend Form PF, the confidential reporting form for certain SEC-registered investment advisers to private funds, including those that also are registered with the CFTC as commodity pool operators or commodity trading advisors. Form PF collects information designed to facilitate the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC) monitoring of systemic risk in the financial markets. The SEC and CFTC use the information collected on Form PF in their investor protection efforts.  “A key pillar of my agenda is restoring balance to disclosure obligations and reducing the cost of compliance wherever possible,” said SEC Chairman Paul S. Atkins. “Prior amendments to Form PF have led to overly burdensome disclosure requirements for advisers, distracting them from their core investment functions, often without a commensurate benefit to regulators’ use of the collected data. These proposed changes would help to rationalize the scope of Form PF requirements to support its purpose and bring our overall disclosure regime back into alignment.” “By raising the filing threshold and streamlining Form PF, we are taking steps to reduce the burdens associated with filing the form,” said CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig. “I look forward to reading the public comments to ensure we get these changes right so that we eliminate unnecessary costs and burdens for filers.” The proposed amendments would eliminate filing requirements for smaller advisers, who represent almost half of the advisers currently required to file Form PF, by raising the filing threshold from $150 million in private fund assets under management to $1 billion. The proposal would also raise the exposure reporting threshold for “large” hedge fund advisers from $1.5 billion in hedge fund assets under management to $10 billion. Form PF would continue to obtain information on over 90 percent of private fund gross assets and require detailed exposure information for funds managed by large hedge fund managers. In addition, the proposed amendments to Form PF would enable a method to identify funds that are active in the private credit market. In addition to amending these thresholds, the proposal would eliminate or streamline many Form PF requirements, significantly reducing burdens for advisers required to file Form PF. The proposal requests comments on all the proposed amendments. The proposing release for the amendments will be published in the Federal Register, and the public comment period will remain open until 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. Resources SEC Rule Fact Sheet Submit Public Comment

The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20 met on Wednesday, April 16, in Washington, D.C., and discussed a range of issues, including the economic impacts of the conflict in the Middle East, including on agriculture markets, value chains, and fertilizer. Many members raised the importance of efforts to keep food and fertilizer supply chains functioning, particularly for low-income and vulnerable countries, by not imposing export prohibitions or restrictions on fertilizers. Many members welcomed efforts by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group to coordinate in order to maximize their institutions’ responses to the economic impacts. Many members committed to staying agile and flexible in their macroeconomic policy responses and cooperation, and discussed the potential for coordinated action to promote food security and support market stability. Many members emphasized the importance of diversified fertilizer production to buffer the poorest from disruptions in food trade supply chains. The United States G20 Presidency commits to hosting further discussions on the subject of food and fertilizer in the coming weeks.

Fiserv, Inc. (NASDAQ: FISV), a leading global provider of payments and financial services technology solutions, will announce its first quarter financial results before the market opens on Tuesday, May 5, 2026. The company will discuss its results in a live webcast at 7 a.m. CT (8 a.m. ET) on May 5, 2026. The webcast, along with supplemental financial information, can be accessed on the investor relations section of the Fiserv website at investors.fiserv.com. A replay will be available approximately one hour after the conclusion of the live webcast. Additionally, Fiserv will host its previously announced 2026 Investor Day on Thursday, May 14, 2026, in New York City. The Investor Day will cover additional details of the company's business strategy, medium-term outlook, and presentations from its leadership team responsible for executing the strategy. The program will also be available through a live webcast beginning at 8 a.m. CT (9 a.m. ET) on May 14, 2026. The webcast can be accessed on the investor relations section of the Fiserv website at investors.fiserv.com.

Trading Technologies International, Inc. (TT), a global capital markets technology platform services provider, announced that Nick Garrow, who has been serving as Chief Revenue Officer (CRO), has assumed the role of Chief Strategy Officer (CSO) – a new position within the firm – and Josh Monroe has joined TT as Chief Revenue Officer (CRO). Both executives have decades of experience in capital markets and technology leadership. TT CEO Justin Llewellyn-Jones said: "Nick has done a truly fantastic job of driving the firm's move into new asset classes, broadening our appeal to new segments, and leading our sales and marketing team through a period of exceptional revenue growth. He is ideally suited to the role of CSO, and his strategic thinking, vision and passion will continue to shape our future. Josh is a highly accomplished executive, who brings incredible experience and a great track record as a growth-focused CRO for capital markets fintech organizations. His drive and energy will be critical to our success, and I am absolutely delighted to welcome him to the team in this important leadership role." As CSO, Garrow will assume responsibility for driving accelerated sustainable growth across TT's existing lines of business as well as identifying and evaluating new markets and product opportunities, ensuring TT's strategy remains highly aligned with the rapidly changing landscape that is global capital markets. The role will include identifying and leveraging acquisition and partnership opportunities that support TT's goals. Monroe, based in New York, assumes responsibility for TT's global sales, marketing and revenue operations activities. He previously served as CRO at Duco, a leading provider of AI-powered data automation to global financial institutions; and as CRO at Xceptor, a data automation platform for financial institutions. Previously, he served as Managing Director, Head of Americas for Itiviti, now part of Broadridge, with responsibility for revenue growth, client relationships and regional strategy. He also held multiple roles at SunGard and later FIS after its acquisition of the firm, ultimately as SVP & Head of Sales for Trading and Risk Solutions, Americas. Monroe earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Finance, Summa Cum Laude, from the University at Albany.

  Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (NYSE: BR), a global Fintech leader, today announced a strategic partnership and minority investment in CENTRL, a leading provider of AI-powered due diligence solutions for financial institutions. The partnership enhances Broadridge’s data and analytics solutions for the asset management and retirement advisory industries with leading due diligence technology and expands its AI-enabled capabilities, helping modernize counterparty due diligence and RFP processes through data-driven, innovative technology.   “This partnership represents an important step in expanding our AI-enabled capabilities and delivering greater value for clients across our platform,” said Dan Cwenar, President, Data-Driven Fund Solutions at Broadridge. “By combining Broadridge’s deep industry relationships and data assets with CENTRL’s purpose-built AI technology, we are helping clients modernize due diligence and RFP response workflows, improve operational efficiency and better manage risk, and accumulate more assets.”   The financial services industry continues to face increasing regulatory scrutiny, fragmented counterparty oversight processes and a growing volume of manual and duplicative due diligence requests. By integrating Broadridge’s trusted data and market infrastructure capabilities with CENTRL’s AI-driven due diligence platform, firms can reduce manual touchpoints, eliminate redundant data gathering, improve accuracy and consistency, and strengthen regulatory audit trails.   “Broadridge is a trusted partner to many of the world’s leading financial institutions,” said Sanjeev Dheer, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of CENTRL. “Together, we are bringing AI-driven intelligent automation to some of the industry’s most complex and resource-intensive processes. By embedding AI directly into due diligence, research, and DDQ/RFP response and communication workflows, we can help firms move from manual, fragmented processes to streamlined, data-driven operations.”   Through the partnership, Broadridge will integrate CENTRL’s AI-powered workflow and automation capabilities across solutions serving asset managers, retirement recordkeepers, and retirement advisors. The collaboration includes modernizing Broadridge’s Fi360 RFP Director, embedding Broadridge data into CENTRL’s workflows, and expanding access to AI-driven tools that automate due diligence, RFP responses, and counterparty oversight processes.   Broadridge’s data and analytics business is focused on transforming complex data into actionable insights across the asset management lifecycle—from distribution and investor behavior to operational performance. The integration of CENTRL’s AI-powered due diligence capabilities extends this strategy, connecting data, workflows and automation to help clients streamline counterparty oversight and RFP processes. Together, Broadridge and CENTRL deliver a more unified, data-driven solution that improves efficiency, enhances decision-making and supports asset managers in scaling their businesses.   Additionally, Broadridge clients will now have access to CENTRL’s leading due diligence management and response platforms, including deeper integration with Broadridge’s leading distribution data and analytics, enabling asset managers to improve and scale due diligence, fund and counterparty oversight, and RFP response workflows.  

Today, ACER opens a public consultation on amendments to the gas network code on interoperability and data exchange. The aim is to assess the need to amend the network code to reflect recent regulatory and market developments. Why is this relevant? The Interoperability and Data Exchange Network Code establishes the framework for operating the EU gas network and exchanging information between network users. Since its adoption in 2015, European gas markets have changed, driven by: an evolving regulatory framework (2024 Gas and Hydrogen Regulation); the EU’s decarbonisation ambitions; and the introduction of a new European standard on gas quality (CEN EN 16726).    Why are we consulting? The European Commission invited ACER to assess whether the network code remains fit for purpose in light of these developments or if amendments are needed. This public consultation will support ACER in its assessment, ensuring that any amendment proposals are practical and aligned with market needs. Get involved! Interested stakeholders have until 20 May 2026 to submit their views. ACER will analyse the feedback received and evaluate the next steps for the network code review. Read more and share your views.

CCP Global has submitted a response to the European Commission's consultation on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector. To read the response, please follow this link.

All proposals to amend Chapter 15A of the Listing Rules and enhance the structured products listing framework received majority support The Key Product Requirements will come into effect on 1 May 2026, while the remaining Listing Rule amendments will come into effect on 1 July 2026 Existing issuers and guarantors will be provided with a 12-month transitional period to comply with the new issuer eligibility requirements The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the Exchange), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX), today (Monday) published the conclusions to its consultation on the Review of Chapter 15A – Structured Products (Consultation Conclusions)1. The Exchange received 28 responses from a broad range of respondents. All proposals received strong support from a majority of respondents. Having considered respondents’ views, the Exchange will adopt the consultation proposals, with some modifications and clarifications as set out in the Consultation Conclusions. HKEX Head of Listing, Katherine Ng, said: “Structured products play an integral role in Hong Kong’s securities market by enabling effective hedging and enriching market vibrancy. We are pleased to have received strong market support for our proposals. The updated listing framework will help ensure Hong Kong’s global competitiveness as the world’s leading structured product market, facilitate product innovation, and uphold robust standards of market quality and investor protection. Through these reforms, we aim to provide a more resilient and flexible framework to support market development, whilst further strengthening HKEX’s multi‑asset ecosystem.”  The Listing Rule amendments will be implemented as follows: the Listing Rule amendments relating to the following product requirements (Key Product Requirements) will come into effect on 1 May 2026: Minimum issue price – the minimum issue price of derivative warrants will be lowered to $0.15 from $0.25. The minimum issue price requirements for callable bull bear contracts will be removed; Minimum market capitalisation – the minimum market capitalisation at issuance for derivative warrants and callable bull bear contracts will be lowered to $6 million from $10 million; Emulation Issues – Emulation Issues must have product terms identical to existing issues other than issue price and issue size; and the remaining Listing Rule amendments will come into effect on 1 July 2026. Existing issuers and guarantors will be provided with a 12-month transitional period to comply with the new issuer eligibility requirements2. The Exchange will publish updated guidance to assist issuers’ compliance with the new requirements. The Consultation Conclusions and copies of the respondents’ submissions are available on the HKEX website. Notes: The consultation paper was published on 30 September 2025. The consultation period ended on 11 November 2025. Existing issuers and guarantors (i.e. those with either structured products listed on the Exchange, or a valid base listing document, as at 30 June 2026) will have until (and including) 30 June 2027 to comply with the new issuer eligibility requirements and the related disclosure requirements and ongoing obligations.

Nigerian Exchange Limited (NGX) announces the expansion of its trading hours from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (WAT), effective Monday, 27 April 2026, in a move designed to deepen market liquidity, enhance price discovery, and broaden investor access. Approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria, the expansion shifts the market opening earlier from 9:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and extends the close from 2:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., marking a significant evolution in the Exchange’s market structure. The extended trading window will provide greater flexibility for investors, improve responsiveness to market-moving information, and support broader participation across the market. The development builds on the momentum of Nigeria’s recent reclassification to Frontier Market status by FTSE Russell, reinforcing NGX’s global positioning and enhancing its attractiveness to a broader pool of domestic and international investors. This reform reflects strong regulatory collaboration and underscores the Securities and Exchange Commission’s continued commitment to advancing market development initiatives. Alongside Nigeria’s Frontier Market reclassification, it signals a deliberate shift towards a more accessible, liquid, and globally competitive market. The implementation follows extensive stakeholder engagement, ensuring alignment and operational readiness ahead of the go-live date. NGX Regulation Limited will continue to provide robust oversight to support a smooth and orderly transition, while maintaining high standards of transparency and investor protection. With this development, NGX reinforces its position as a leading multi-asset exchange, deepening liquidity, improving market access, and supporting efficient capital formation within Nigeria’s financial markets.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today, in coordination with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), issued updated model risk management guidance for OCC-supervised institutions. These actions build upon the OCC’s ongoing efforts to tailor its supervisory framework to reduce unnecessary burden and promote risk-based examination across institutions of all sizes. The updated guidance serves in part to rescind prior model risk management guidance and other issuances and to clarify that model risk management practices should be risk-based, tailored, and commensurate with a banking organization’s size, complexity, and extent of model use. The guidance does not set forth enforceable standards or prescriptive requirements, and non-compliance will not result in supervisory criticism. This guidance highlights sound principles for effective model risk management. In particular, the guidance discusses the factors that influence model risk and the features of effective model development and model use; model validation and monitoring; and governance and controls. The guidance also discusses considerations specific to vendor and other third-party products, including validation of these products. The updated guidance is expected to be most relevant to banking organizations with over $30 billion in total assets. However, the guidance may also be relevant to smaller institutions with significant model risk exposure due, for instance, to the prevalence and complexity of their models. In addition, generative AI and agentic AI models are novel and rapidly evolving. As such, they are not within the scope of this guidance. The OCC is rescinding prior model risk management issuances, including OCC Bulletin 2011-12, “Supervisory Guidance on Model Risk Management,” OCC Bulletin 2021-19, “Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering: Interagency Statement on Model Risk Management for Bank Systems Supporting BSA/AML Compliance and Request for Information,” and OCC Bulletin 1997-24, “Credit Scoring Models: Examination Guidance,” including the Appendix, “Safety and Soundness and Compliance Issues on Credit Scoring Models,” as well as the “Model Risk Management” booklet of the Comptroller’s Handbook. The OCC, Federal Reserve Board, and FDIC plan to issue in the near future a request for information that addresses model risk management generally and considers, in particular, banks’ use of AI, including generative AI and agentic AI and AI-based models. Related Link Bulletin 2026-13, “Model Risk Management: Revised Guidance”

Click here to download Malawi Stock Exchange's weekly summary Report.

The current reports for the week of April 14, 2026 are now available. Report data is also available in the CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE), which allows users to search, filter, customize and download report data. Additional information on Commitments of Traders (COT) | CFTC.gov Historical Viewable Historical Compressed COT Release Schedule CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE) PRE User Guide PRE Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Thank you, Joe, and thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.1 My subject, as it often is, is the outlook for the U.S. economy and the implications for monetary policy. My last outlook speech was at the end of February, which, I have to say, now feels like it was a year ago.2 Before I get to everything that has happened since, let me remind you of how things looked back then. The economic data indicated that, in the absence of the temporary effects of tariffs, inflation was running a bit above the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) 2 percent goal. The larger question was whether the labor market was substantially weakening, with the unemployment rate fairly steady but little job creation and other signs of a softening labor demand relative to supply. At that point, I was looking for a clearer picture of whether the risks to the FOMC's maximum employment goal called for a cut in our policy rate or if we should hold that rate steady to support continued progress toward 2 percent inflation. After that speech and before the FOMC's March meeting, two critical things occurred. The first was the start of the conflict with Iran, which quickly disrupted energy production and transportation in the Middle East and sent global energy prices soaring. While central bankers rightly tend to discount the effects of temporary oil supply shocks, it was apparent that a prolonged disruption in that region could have a lasting effect on inflation and U.S. economic growth, and that was a consideration going into the FOMC's March 17 and 18 meeting. The second development is what we have come to more fully recognize about the supply side of the labor market. Over the course of last year, we got the details of how net immigration, which was 2.3 million in 2024, fell to a minimal level in 2025 and is continuing at a very low level in 2026. This pattern has lowered population growth and, hence, the growth of the labor force. This change in immigration, combined with the continued aging of the population, means that very little or no net job creation is necessary to absorb new workers into employment.3 This development is unprecedented in recent history, and I believe it is a significant factor in understanding the economic outlook and what that means for monetary policy. Before I say more about these two important considerations for the outlook, I will start with how the economy looked ahead of the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East and then discuss how I think things will evolve if the cease-fire in place today holds and if there is progress toward reopening the Strait of Hormuz. But since that outcome is not assured, I will also discuss another scenario, where supply disruptions continue for an extended time. Beyond the length of these disruptions, with this economic shock coming on the heels of the boost to prices from import tariffs, I believe there is the possibility that this series of price shocks may lead to a more lasting increase in inflation, as we saw with the series of shocks during the pandemic. So far, there is limited data for March, which is when the conflict began, but what we do have indicates that real gross domestic product (GDP) was growing modestly in the first quarter of 2026, in the absence of a temporary boost from the rebound in activity after the end of the government shutdown in late 2025. A continued surge of business investment in the first two months of the year seems to have mostly offset the apparent softness in consumer spending to keep the economy growing. Data center construction and related spending on high-tech equipment are very strong, and these both have spillovers to investment in other capital goods. Meanwhile, surveys of purchasing managers for both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing businesses indicate that their companies expanded sales in March. And the consensus of respondents to the Blue Chip survey implies that real GDP grew at a 2.4 percent annual rate in the first quarter. Let's turn to the labor market. Any assessment has to take on board the supply-side considerations I mentioned earlier. One that has been a factor for some time is the aging of the population. Members of the "baby boom" generation associated with the surge in births in the 20 years after World War II began to reach retirement age around the year 2008. Since then, retirements have outpaced new entrants to the labor force, pushing down the labor force participation rate. The other big factor has been the decline in net immigration I mentioned, which was around 400,000 in 2025, much lower than in previous years, and is expected by some to be around zero in 2026. Together, these two forces are holding labor force growth at about zero. An important implication is a reduction in the number of new jobs needed to reflect a healthy labor market and keep the unemployment rate steady. In previous years, this number ranged between 50,000 and 150,000 per month, but with no growth in the labor force, it is now likely close to zero. In fact, over the second half of last year employers shed 50,000 jobs, an average of 10,000 per month, and the unemployment rate moved largely sideways. Low payroll growth means that there is a much greater likelihood of employment shrinking in any month, something that was a fairly unusual occurrence in the past during an economic expansion. And, in fact, payroll gains have alternated between positive and negative numbers for the past 10 months. Most recently, after closing the year with a loss of 17,000 jobs, payrolls grew 160,000 in January—the largest increase in more than a year—promptly fell 133,000 in February and bounced back to grow 178,000 last month. This head-snapping volatility has only made it harder to assess the state of the labor market and where things stand relative to the FOMC's maximum-employment goal. I am going to have to get used to payroll numbers that are lower than I am accustomed to seeing in a growing economy as well as the possibility that even several months of negative payrolls may not be the warning sign of a recession that it often has been in the past. Nevertheless, I want to explain why I continue to see weakness in the labor market that leaves it vulnerable, starting with data showing low numbers of both hires and people losing their jobs. This phenomenon is documented in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey data and is consistent with what business contacts have been telling me, as well as stories collected in the Federal Reserve's Beige Book survey of business conditions. On the one hand, employers are hesitant to shed workers, even in the face of softening demand, perhaps because of the difficulties they faced in finding workers in the tight labor market after the pandemic. On the other hand, employers are very hesitant to hire workers because of the considerable uncertainty over the outlook. My sense is that employers are walking a tightrope between their earlier challenges in finding qualified workers and where they think the economy is going, leaving them vulnerable to some economic shock that could tip them over and lead to significant job reductions. While the unemployment rate is fairly steady and close to FOMC participants' views of its longer-term, or natural, rate, data on job finding, availability, and openings are continuing to edge lower. The low job-finding rate means that workers are unemployed for longer, and behind the fairly stable count of unemployed people, a growing share are out of work for an extended time. Before I turn to how the conflict with Iran is affecting inflation, let's consider where it was through February. According to the FOMC's preferred inflation measure, personal consumption expenditures (PCE) prices were up 2.8 percent in February from a year before. Core prices, excluding volatile food and energy, are a better guide to ongoing inflation, and they were up 3 percent. Neither measure is close to the FOMC's 2 percent goal, both are just about where they were a year before, and it might seem we hadn't made progress. But this view doesn't consider the role of import tariffs that were first introduced a year ago, which have boosted prices for those goods. Being here at Auburn University and as a former professor, I don't want to miss an opportunity to impart a lesson on price levels versus inflation. When tariffs are passed along in consumer prices, they raise prices and push up inflation, which is the rate at which prices are rising. Once that tariff effect is in place, prices are at a new, higher level; it no longer raises inflation; and, over time, we see the effect on inflation fade. While tariffs boosted inflation considerably in 2025 and into this year, using research by the Federal Reserve staff on their estimated effect and taking that out of the published inflation numbers, we find that underlying inflation—by which I mean excluding tariff effects—is running close to 2 percent.4 So, through the end of February, I found that underlying inflation was making progress toward our goal and that it wasn't a significant concern for monetary policy. I was more concerned about the labor market, which showed signs of weakness and I felt was more vulnerable than it might otherwise be due to the low rates of hiring and layoffs. That was the picture on February 28, when the conflict with Iran began. Then we saw higher energy prices quickly feed through to headline inflation. Prices for gasoline have risen by more than one-third since the conflict started, with a national average of $4.10 per gallon as of Thursday. Using crude oil futures as a proxy for other energy prices, we find that Brent—the global benchmark—was $61 per barrel at the start of the year and has bounced around $95 per barrel in recent days. We have seen the effects of the increase in energy prices in March inflation data. The energy component of the consumer price index jumped 10.8 percent last month. This is a one-month change! Twelve-month headline inflation was boosted to 3.3 percent and core inflation to 2.6 percent. When we combine this information with producer price data, estimates suggest March PCE inflation will come in even higher, standing around 3.5 percent for headline and 3.2 percent for core. So what happens next? Let me stipulate that I believe economic forecasting is hard even in normal circumstances. I am tempted to say it is a bit like batting averages in baseball, where an excellent result is failing two-thirds of the time, but that wouldn't be fair to baseball—we forecasters have an even lower rate of success. Anyway, add a military conflict in the Middle East to the task of predicting the course of the economy, and things get very complicated. The first thing to do is establish a good baseline, which I hope I have done in the foregoing discussion of the outlook on the eve of the conflict's outbreak. Beyond that, when presented with a new development that could produce a range of economic outcomes, I have found it helpful to use stylized scenarios.5 Progress Is Made to Reopen the Strait of HormuzThe first scenario assumes progress to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and the return of energy markets and broader trade flows relatively quickly toward conditions that existed before the conflict started. I hope, and do still believe, that this scenario is a reasonable probability. Even after the failure of peace talks last week, futures prices have Brent falling to $82 per barrel by the end of 2026 and $75 per barrel by the end of 2028, consistent with the view that markets will return to something close to normal in a reasonable length of time. If this comes to pass, I expect that the boost to energy prices in headline inflation will fade over the medium term and that expectations of future inflation will remain anchored. The pass-through of higher energy prices to other goods and services should be limited. And despite the pain caused by higher energy prices, consumers and businesses will understand that the worst is past, energy prices should begin to recede, and this view will tend to support ongoing growth in spending, production, and hiring. This prospect probably represents a best-case scenario for the economy. The Strait of Hormuz Remains ClosedUnfortunately, to me, the oil futures prices I cited and securities markets in general seem to be undervaluing the risk that the conflict continues, the Strait remains closed, and disruptions to production and shipping keep energy prices high, which I consider a very possible scenario. Supporting this view is the fact that economic policy uncertainty indexes have risen to quite elevated levels in recent days.6 While futures prices in general seem too optimistic, I note that the tail of the distribution of oil prices at the end of this year is skewed toward the higher prices that I see as more likely than what markets are pricing in. For inflation, the risk is that the longer the conflict drags on and energy prices remain high, the more likely it is that these elevated prices will bleed into other prices, as businesses incorporate costly energy input costs in setting their prices. With continued constraints on shipping in the Strait, I would also expect supply chain constraints. Commodity inputs, including fertilizer and helium, are produced in the region, and these prices in turn could drive up farm prices globally. Meanwhile, if some regions of the world experience a slowdown in production due to energy shortages, this will introduce additional supply constraints. Then there is the issue of how the oil shock, piled onto the lingering effect from import tariffs, affects expectations of future inflation. The standard practice for policymakers is to look through shocks like this that temporarily elevate inflation.7 But what happens when there is a sequence of these shocks? In 2021 and 2022, the pandemic-induced demand and supply chain constraints were each considered one-off shocks that initially led me to look through their upward pressure on prices. But, ultimately, this series of shocks pushed up inflation to near 9 percent by one measure, longer-range inflation expectations started to move up, and the Federal Reserve took action.8 Learning from that experience, I will be cautious when faced with a sequence of transitory shocks. While intellectually it makes sense to look through each shock, with a sequence of shocks, policymakers need to be more vigilant. This is because if the shocks hit one after another, they will keep inflation elevated for quite some time. The standard "look through" can become problematic if businesses and households start to believe inflation is persistently high and it affects their price- and wage-setting behavior. One way I watch for this possibility is to look at readings on inflation expectations. While near-term inflation expectations have, naturally, risen, so far longer- term expectations have not. Inflation-adjusted Treasury securities in the range of 5 to 10 years are around 2.3 percent, a bit below their level at the end of 2025. While it is early, there is a risk that prolonged high energy prices and secondary effects that raise the price for other goods and services eventually do change the expectations of firms and consumers, who I note have seen inflation above 2 percent now for five years. Beyond inflation, there are other implications for the economy from a continuing conflict and high energy prices. Consumers may reduce spending because of higher prices, lower stock market wealth, and a drop in confidence. You may have heard that the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers last week reported its lowest-ever reading for consumer confidence. While that survey hasn't tracked closely with actual spending in recent years, I still find the signal from the data meaningful. Consumers seem to have mostly shrugged off the effect of import tariffs in their spending, and they may shrug off the latest shock, but then again, there may be a threshold crossed at which point they start to economize. If households respond with less spending, this shift will mean firms need to produce less, and that affects labor decisions. It might be the force that pushes employers off the tightrope that I invoked earlier in talking about their caution in hiring and layoffs. As we have seen often in past recessions, when the labor market weakens and unemployment starts rising, it can drive a cycle of reductions—herding behavior by firms that mimic each other's response to the shock—resulting in a significant decline in employment. The longer this conflict continues, the more closely I will be watching payroll numbers and the unemployment rate for signs of such a downward cycle in employment. Policy ResponseSo, what are the implications of recent events for monetary policy? It depends on how the conflict evolves and its effect on the economy, both highly uncertain. These will have a major influence on the path of policy. If the Strait of Hormuz opens and trade flows return somewhat to normal, then I can look through the effect of recent higher energy prices on inflation because I know it will unwind, and my focus will be on how the labor market evolves in the current no-hire, no-fire environment. Here, abstracting from the effects of tariffs and energy, I see a forecast in which underlying inflation would continue to move toward 2 percent, leaving me cautious about rate cuts now and more inclined toward cuts to support the labor market later this year when the outlook is more steady. But the longer energy prices remain elevated and the Strait is constrained, the greater the chances that higher inflation gets embedded across a wide variety of goods and services, various supply chain effects start to emerge, and real activity and employment start to slow. I will be particularly attentive to indications that this latest price shock, on top of the effects from tariffs, has moved up inflation expectations. A slower economy would restrain demand for goods and services, and perhaps soften the increase in prices, but I expect higher inflation than in the first scenario and that it would be elevated for some time. In this case, I also believe we would have a weaker labor market. High inflation and a weak labor market would be very complicated for a policymaker. If I face this situation, I'll have to balance the risks to the two sides of the Fed's dual mandate to determine the appropriate path of policy, and that may mean maintaining the policy rate at the current target range if the risks to inflation outweigh those to the labor market. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. See Christopher J. Waller (2026), "Labor Market Data: Signal or Noise?" speech delivered at "The Great Realignment: Navigating AI, Demographic and Geoeconomic Change," 42nd Annual NABE Economic Policy Conference, National Association for Business Economics, Washington, February 23.  3. For a full discussion of this issue, see Seth Murray and Ivan Vidangos (2026), "Labor Force Growth, Breakeven Employment, and Potential GDP Growth," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 2).  4. For a detailed discussion of the methodology to detect tariff effects on inflation, see Robert Minton, Madeleine Ray, and Mariano Somale (2026), "Detecting Tariff Effects on Consumer Prices in Real Time – Part II," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 8).  5. For two scenarios on the effects of import tariffs, see Christopher J. Waller (2025), "A Tale of Two Outlooks (PDF)," speech delivered at the Certified Financial Analysts Society of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, April 14.  6. This increase is true if one looks at indexes for just the U.S. or across the globe. See the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, available at https://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html.  7. For a review of the look-through approach, see the discussion by Edward Nelson (2025), "A Look Back at 'Look Through,' " Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2025-037 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May).  8. See Christopher J. Waller (2022), "Responding to High Inflation, with Some Thoughts on a Soft Landing," speech delivered at the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) Distinguished Lecture, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany, May 30.