Thank you, Professor Metrick, for the kind introduction and the opportunity to return to Yale to speak to the Yale Program on Financial Stability today.1 I have long admired and been a grateful consumer of all the insightful work you have done here since its inception in 2013. I know that a number of the staff of the Board of Governors have been contributors to, and are avid consumers of, your work. I place a high priority on using novel sources of information to address data gaps. Given that, let me commend the effort to turn the information gathering and analysis the program conducted into a standardized, research-friendly platform. That impressive work includes a data set covering over 850 years of banking crises, which must have been a true labor of love on the parts of Andrew Metrick and Paul Schmelzing. These data-collection efforts provide a valuable public good to the finance and financial stability communities, as well as to the broader research community. This is my third trip to New Haven and my first since becoming a Governor on the Federal Reserve Board in 2022. One of the parts of my job that I find most intriguing is my work on the Board's Committee on Financial Stability. Indeed, financial stability is a long-standing research and policy interest of mine. Early in my career, I studied how underdevelopment in Russia's banking system hampered post-Soviet growth and how poor regulation fuels instability. Later, as an economist on the Council of Economic Advisers, I saw how financial system weaknesses contributed to instability in the euro area. Shortly after arriving at the Fed, I became a member of the committee and, since 2023, have had the honor of serving as chair. After four years of careful attention to this topic, it seems like an appropriate moment to reflect on and share lessons I have learned in this role. Today I will start by discussing the financial stability committee itself and then move to reflections on the Fed's Financial Stability Report (FSR) and scenario analysis, the analytical workhorse of financial stability analysis. I will then conclude with a few thoughts about the real-world complexity of making financial stability policy. Committee on Financial StabilityFollowing the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Board adopted a revised approach to financial stability. This approach emphasized bringing together insights and analyses from all parts of the Federal Reserve System—economists, market experts, bank supervisors, and payment system experts. This work, coordinated by the then-new Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research, focused on the connections across sectors and their implications for the macroeconomy. The Board and the Federal Open Market Committee began receiving periodic briefings on this work. As part of this evolution, the Board created the Committee on Financial Stability in 2014. The committee provides a venue to discuss financial stability issues. Let me take a moment to acknowledge the contributions of the committee's first chair, the late Stanley Fischer. He made seminal contributions to the literature on financial stability, as well as open-economy macroeconomics, and he was a dedicated public servant who took on several roles as a central banker. Specifically, he played key roles in managing financial crises—first as a senior official at the IMF through the turbulence of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and then as governor of the Bank of Israel through the GFC. As Vice Chair of the Board from 2014 to 2017, he recognized the value of having a dedicated forum where policymakers could learn the lessons of the GFC and other crises and discuss and evaluate financial stability issues. It is my great honor to continue in the tradition that Stan established. Many of the topics that Stan focused on and spoke about during his time at the Board remain highly relevant to policymakers a decade later. For instance, Stan pointed out in several speeches that while post-crisis regulatory measures had significantly bolstered bank resilience, certain activities were going to migrate to nonbank intermediaries that were not subject to the same regulatory safeguards.2 He noted in his aptly named speech "Financial Stability and Shadow Banks: What We Don't Know Could Hurt Us" that the data gaps and limited visibility into some of these activities were their own source of systemic risk.3 We are working to better understand these issues with an eye toward improving our financial stability monitoring, and I will continue to work with my Board colleagues to find concrete ways to do so. Stan also appreciated the value of giving policymakers a venue in which to discuss tail risks and longer-horizon questions related to the evolution of the financial system. These considerations do not always have immediate bearing on the near-term macro forecast, but you do not want to lose sight of them. That is why staff briefings to the financial stability committee explore the plausible range of severe shocks that could hit the economy and the ways in which such shocks could ramify through financial markets and institutions, with a view to understanding the ultimate effects on the macroeconomy. However, in response to a negative shock, financial conditions tighten. One way to see the work of financial stability is as the quest to understand how much, or how rapidly, that tightening would occur. Answering that question requires thinking about the plausible range of shocks that could hit the economy, as well as the resilience of key financial markets and institutions. While macroeconomics has made great strides in the past 15 years to incorporate the lessons of the financial crisis, it is fair to say that models cannot yet reflect the full institutional richness of the modern financial system. And the public's attention to these issues can fade because financial crises are, thankfully, rare. However, policymakers at the Fed remain vigilant. For families negatively affected by the financial crisis, we know the scars linger. In the spirit of an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, the financial stability committee is a place of consistent focus on this vital issue. This is the impetus for the Board's staff examining and Board members receiving periodic briefings and updates on a range of topics related to the financial system's behavior under stress. These updates occur even during the extended periods of relative calm we have seen over the past few years. Recently, among the issues we have discussed are hedge fund trading strategies, the rise of private credit arrangements, and the connections between banks and a range of nonbank financial entities. Some of this work appears in the Fed's twice-yearly assessment of vulnerabilities in the financial system. Financial Stability ReportWhen he introduced the first FSR in November 2018, Chair Powell noted that he hoped it would provide transparency into the set of indicators the Fed monitors for financial stability and that it would prompt feedback and engagement from the public. Thus, since its inception, the FSR was designed to act as a platform that policymakers build upon to develop their own views about the system's overall resilience rather than expressing a centralized view. The FSR carefully works through a long list of data series relevant to the four key vulnerabilities or amplification channels we track: asset valuations, borrowing by businesses and households, leverage in the financial sector, and funding risk. It comments on whether these vulnerabilities are high or low relative to history. This disciplined approach is helpful in coming to a view on the system's resilience. But, by itself, the approach is insufficient. Policymakers concerned with the system's ability to withstand shocks also need to take a view on the interaction among vulnerabilities and the most plausible shocks that might hit the system. Some policymakers might be more concerned about the consequences of a rapid decline in asset prices or view contractionary shocks as more likely than inflationary shocks. These perspectives would lead them to place different weights on the four vulnerabilities in forming their overall view of the system's resilience. The value in the FSR lies in the consistent attention to, and updating of, the underlying indicators of both the resilience and evolution of the financial system. Let me give you one example. Since its inception, the FSR has contained a chart based on the Board's data showing bank lending commitments to nonbank financial institutions. We affectionately refer to this graph as the "rainbow chart" because it comprises 10 separate colors, each reflecting a different type of nonbank borrower. This category of loans has been growing quite rapidly, much faster than overall lending to nonfinancial businesses—a category known as commercial and industrial (C&I) lending. During the past decade, large bank credit commitments to nonbank financial institutions have grown at an annualized rate of about 9 percent, roughly three times the pace of C&I lending. This growth is tracked in successive editions of the FSR. Observers would also see changes in the composition of the rainbow in the report. For example, that category that includes special purpose entities, collateralized loan obligations, and asset-backed securities has expanded in recent years. This work gives us deeper insights into the evolution of private credit and other important sectors, helping us better understand how stress in one area might affect other parts of the financial system. And even without real-world stress, getting refined and more precise estimates of the linkages between sectors proves useful in scenario analysis, my next topic. Scenario Analysis in Assessing Financial StabilityScenario analysis is the process of analyzing the implications of a sequence of shocks, or exogenous events. It has proven to be a powerful mechanism for assessing financial stability. Such inspection involves three forms of analysis: the vulnerabilities described in the FSR, an assessment of how sectors interact with each other, and a set of plausible shocks. Let me start by contrasting financial-stability scenario analysis with the well-known stress test exercise that those tasked with supervision at the Fed have undertaken since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. These stress tests feature a severe but plausible scenario based on the Great Recession and highly quantitative assessments of the first-round effects of such a shock on individual banks. The emphasis is on precision, with the published loss estimates having material consequences for the participating banks. I would characterize these exercises as excellent at addressing the "known unknowns" we face. In the realm of financial stability, by contrast, we start with scenarios that may never have happened. One could plausibly ask, for example, "What if AI disappoints?" Although tech booms and periods of technological progress have occurred in the past, it is difficult to know if any compares to the current situation. Therefore, any such scenario would not have an historical precedent. Nonetheless, the scenario must both feature a coherent narrative and be quantitatively specific. A good scenario is not path dependent and aids us in thinking about tail, not just modal, risks. That is, it helps us break free of the well-known human tendency to believe that tomorrow will be like today. The next stage is to assess the effect of the scenario on all the key markets and institutions in the system. This step is where our disciplined approach matters: the FSR starts each section with a table summarizing the most important markets and institutions for a given vulnerability. Fed analysts focus on those at the top of the tables. Further, estimating losses and liquidity drains from the scenario is inherently imprecise. For instance, we often lack microdata on key exposures and must make informed guesses, in some cases. This is another difference from the supervisory stress test exercises. We analyze the interactions across markets and institutions, or second-round effects. Institutions and investors will take losses or watch liquidity being drained in the scenario. They will respond in a given way—deleveraging, for example. Those responses, in turn, will have spillover effects. The question we ask in scenario analysis is, will those second-round effects meaningfully amplify the original shock? This is obviously a difficult question to answer precisely. Indeed, these effects are not modeled in supervisory bank stress tests at all. We maintain as much specificity and quantitative rigor as possible. For example, when leveraged intermediaries take losses, their leverage increases, and they might choose to, or be forced to, sell assets to deleverage. We aim to be as precise as possible about the plausible range of sales as outcomes. Then, we use several different approaches to measure the effects of these sales, such as direct measurement or comparing sales volumes to purchasing capacity at dealers. Another approach is using historical analogy: has the system handled similar volumes in the past? Finally, we recognize that our assessments are inherently uncertain. This posture prompts us to look for markers that, should the scenario actually come to pass, would confirm or falsify our assessment. Indeed, scenario analysis is a guide to the financial system's behavior under stress. We need signposts to understand whether the guide is proving valid or whether we missed a key amplification channel. If we have a valid guide, the work warns us which markets and institutions would come under pressure and whether their distress, in turn, would have severe repercussions. Sometimes, the most valuable part of these exercises is to familiarize us with the entities that could be most affected. Reflections on PolicymakingBefore I conclude, let me offer some thoughts on policymaking to support financial stability. I am not going to comment on any specific proposals or past actions. My purpose is to describe some of the lessons I have drawn from my years on the Board. If I could send a message to myself four years ago, here is what I would say. First, I cannot underscore enough how important it is to remain vigilant about obtaining high-quality data to guide financial stability analysis. The stability data challenge is distinct from that we face in our macro work, where we also sometimes have to grapple with measurement issues. In our financial stability work, we confront the evolving nature of the system, where new markets and institutions can rise suddenly. Data permit us to answer key questions. How large is the sector? What share of loans is associated with it? Do borrowers have alternative sources of credit? I have observed a synergy between scenario analysis and data collection. Sometimes when we run a scenario, the most important lesson we take away is the data we need to identify to truly understand how the system might evolve. You can see some of the fruits of that work in our FSR as we add new series or refine our estimates of existing series in response to findings from our scenario analyses. Second, the policy landscape reflects a long history of decisions that multiple state and federal agencies made in response to a complex mix of mandates and considerations. However, financial stability requires viewing the web of markets and institutions as an ecosystem ultimately designed to support the needs of businesses and households. This perspective is different from that taken by authorities who are accountable for a particular part of the financial system. If the system is hit with a bad shock, will it continue to function? Would the collapse of one part of the system present an opportunity for a different part to grow? Furthermore, the tools available to policymakers are typically able to build resilience or constrain activity in one segment of the ecosystem. This practice might make one corner safer, but would such an action lead to a "trophic cascade," or the unwanted growth of a different part of the ecosystem? Considering an example may be helpful. In the late 1990s, the Australian government undertook conservation efforts to eradicate the feral invasive cats plaguing native, rare birds on Macquarie Island. The effort helped preserve a critical breeding ground for several native, rare bird species, but it also led to an unforeseen consequence: the explosive growth of the rabbit population. Ultimately, after Herculean effort, the Australian government was able to control the rabbit population and that of other invasive rodent species. As a result, critical vegetation has regrown, and rare albatross are nesting on the island again. But even with the happy ending, the experience is a cautionary tale. Inaction itself can have dire consequences, but interventions will also have their effects—anticipated or otherwise. It is all well and good to remove the metaphorical feral cats, but policymakers should be prepared to manage the ensuing boom in rabbits, too. If you permit me to strain the ecology metaphor further, the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are a truly unique genus in our financial ecosystem. The diversity of the U.S. banking sector—with banks of many sizes and business models serving a variety of customers and communities—can help promote resilience of the overall system. But, for better or worse, G-SIBs are unique and highly interconnected, and the system depends on them for many services. These largest banks can be a source of stability that buffers the entire system in times of trouble. But their resilience is fundamental, because they are connected throughout the ecosystem by extensive networks shuttling resources among them as stress emerges. While I take comfort in the very high levels of resilience of the U.S. G-SIBs, vigilance in ensuring their continued resilience is critical. Third, we should embrace responsible changes that strengthen our financial system, not hinder them. The Committee on Financial Stability and the Board's staff monitor financial and technological innovations that are in early stages of development, including digital assets and the use of artificial intelligence. The fact that the U.S. financial system is the largest and deepest in the world is the result of decades of successive, and transformative, financial and technological innovations. As a corollary, we need to understand innovations at early stages to see the system's trajectory. We have also observed innovations that have brought unintended consequences, and we need to stay abreast of potential risks in order to better understand where guardrails and industry engagement might be helpful. And a final note, the tradeoffs between acting to prevent the worst near-term effects at the cost of a larger Fed footprint and moral hazard are real. We know that making policy during a stress event presents the highest degree of difficulty. The stakes are high, with significant real-world losses looming. Time and information are often in short supply. The available options are almost always suboptimal. That is why properly undertaking scenario analysis in advance is a high priority. This allows policymakers to have some familiarity with the key players and dynamics at play. It is much easier to follow Michel Camdessus's 1994 dictum that "in a crisis, you do not panic," if you have thought through options well in advance.4 As we have seen time and again, credible announcements by central banks can have dramatic calming effects. Indeed, a strong initial announcement can result in a smaller intervention than a series of ambiguous or insufficient announcements. But, as with all forms of central bank credibility, this effect is the result of a long history of deep analysis and a consistent track record of following through on previous announcements. The credibility that supports effective financial stability policy interventions is the product of careful, deliberate work, such as the work the FSR details. ConclusionThank you for allowing me to reflect upon my first four years on the financial stability committee. I hope I have made clear that while I, and the Fed, have learned much in recent years, financial stability is an exercise in continual study and improvement. Likewise, it is important to keep you and the public, more generally, informed of this work, which is why we regularly publish the FSR. I trust you are eager to review the next version, when we release the report later this spring. Consistent with the goal of keeping the public informed, I hope my discussion of scenario analysis and the complexities policymakers face when making financial stability policies added to your understanding. Thinking back to the financial crisis, we know the damaging effects of economic downturns on employment and household wealth. Americans depend on a stable financial system to start and support families, buy homes and vehicles, start businesses, and pay for their education. Ultimately, our efforts to maintain financial stability are a service to the American people. Thank you again to the Yale Program on Financial Stability for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to your questions. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. See Stanley Fischer (2015), "The Importance of the Nonbank Financial Sector," speech delivered at the "Debt and Financial Stability—Regulatory Challenges" conference, the Bundesbank and the German Ministry of Finance, Frankfurt, Germany, March 27; Stanley Fischer (2015), "Nonbank Financial Intermediation, Financial Stability, and the Road Forward," speech delivered at the "Central Banking in the Shadows: Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Postcrisis," 20th Annual Financial Markets Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Stone Mountain, Georgia, March 30; and Stanley Fischer (2015), "Macroprudential Policy in the U.S. Economy," speech delivered at the "Macroprudential Monetary Policy," 59th Economic Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, October 2.  3. See Stanley Fischer (2015), "Financial Stability and Shadow Banks: What We Don't Know Could Hurt Us," speech delivered at the "Financial Stability: Policy Analysis and Data Needs" 2015 Financial Stability Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the Office of Financial Research, Washington, December 3.  4. See Stanley Fischer (2011), "Central Bank Lessons from the Global Crisis (PDF)," dinner lecture delivered at the Bank of Israel conference on "Lessons of the Global Crisis," Jerusalem, Israel, March 31, page 11. 

We sympathise with former members of the British Steel Pension Scheme (BSPS) who lost money after they were given unsuitable advice from people they trusted. Complaints are a valuable source of feedback which help us improve and learn. There have also been 4 independent reports into the BSPS since 2018, which have helped us learn lessons. We have accepted several of their recommendations and implemented improvements, including those below. We now have much closer collaboration between the FCA, The Pensions Regulator, Pension Protection Fund, and the Money and Pensions Service. This has improved intelligence sharing, enabling us to identify defined benefit pension transfer risks more swiftly. We are also collecting more pension transfer data from advisory firms to proactively monitor trends. We created a tool so people can check if they may have had unsuitable defined benefit pension transfer advice and have banned contingent charging for defined benefit pension transfers to reduce conflicts of interest. Our latest evaluation shows these changes have helped reduce the scope for harm and shift the market away from advice models that put advisers’ interests ahead of consumers. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) levy and compensation amounts stand at a 10-year low, which is also one indicator of significant improvements in the system. Redress for BSPS members Together with the Financial Ombudsman Service and FSCS, we have helped more than 6,500 former members complain following extensive engagement with former members. At least £106m in redress has been offered to 1,870 former BSPS members to put them back in the position they would have been at retirement. We have also taken enforcement action against more than 20 individuals and firms where there was evidence of serious misconduct. Read our full response.

The periodic review for determining the eurobonds to be included in the BIST-KYD Corporate Eurobond Indices has been completed in accordance with the BIST-KYD Indices Methodology.  It has been decided to make the changes listed in the in the annex for the second quarter of 2026 (April 1, 2026 - June 30, 2026). Please click for the periodic changes in the BIST-KYD Corporate Eurobond Indices.

This European Union Finances Statement (EUFS) is the 45th in the series. The focus of this Statement is on the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA). Documents The European Union Finances Statement 2025 PDF, 268 KB, 20 pages This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology. Request an accessible format. If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use. Details This year’s edition is the fifth in the publication series to cover the UK as a non-Member State. It gives a breakdown of the invoices received from the EU, setting out payments made in 2025. Although mostly backward looking, the Statement also provides a forecasted estimate of the UK’s total outstanding liability.

The Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms (SCOOS) is a quarterly survey providing information about the availability and terms of credit in securities financing and over-the counter (OTC) derivatives markets. The SCOOS is modeled after the long-established Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, which provides qualitative information about changes in supply and demand for loans to households and businesses at commercial banks. The SCOOS collects qualitative information on credit terms and conditions in securities financing and OTC derivatives markets, which are important conduits for leverage in the financial system. The survey panel for the SCOOS began by including 20 dealers and over time has been expanded. These firms account for almost all of the dealer activity in dollar-denominated securities financing and OTC derivatives markets. The survey is directed to senior credit officers responsible for maintaining a consolidated perspective on the management of credit risks. The HTML links below include the full report; the PDF links include the summary only. 2026 March* HTML | PDF 2025 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2024 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2023 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2022 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2021 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2020 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2019 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2018 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2017 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2016 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2015 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2014 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2013 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2012 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2011 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2010 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF *Current Release

FTSE Russell, the global index provider, today announces the alignment of the minimum free float requirement for both UK incorporated and non-UK incorporated companies within the FTSE UK Index Series.  Taking effect from the June 2026 index review, both UK and non-UK incorporated companies with a minimum free float of 10% will be eligible for inclusion to the FTSE UK Index Series, subject to satisfying all other inclusion criteria. The current minimum free float requirement for non-UK incorporated companies is 25%. The rule change removes the distinction between UK and non-UK incorporated companies in relation to the minimum free float requirement. It is intended to make the indices more representative of the real economic exposure they are designed to measure, with the requirement aligning with the London Stock Exchange Main Market minimum free float requirement for all companies. David Sol, Global Head of Policy at FTSE Russell, comments: “We regularly review our index methodologies to ensure they continue to reflect the markets they are designed to track. Following a recent market consultation, we are aligning the minimum free float requirement for UK and non-UK incorporated companies. While we do not expect any immediate impact on index constituents, this change aims to strengthen how accurately the indices reflect the UK market.” This follows the March 2025 announcement of changes to the Sterling Denominated Price Requirement and Fast Entry Thresholds in the FTSE UK Index Series, which came into effect at the September 2025 index review. For more information, see the full technical notice.

The New York Stock Exchange, part of Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (NYSE: ICE), one of the world's leading providers of financial market technology and data powering global capital markets, today announced it listed the Global X NYSE® 100 ETF (NYSX), allowing investors to participate in the performance of the NYSE 100 Index. The NYSE 100 Index (NYSE100) is a rules-based, modified float-adjusted market capitalization-weighted equity benchmark designed to track the performance of U.S listed, actively traded securities of 100 highly capitalized technology and tech-enabled growth companies spanning multiple sectors. "A technology focused ETF with exposure across multiple sectors gives investors a way to participate in a more complete view of the innovation driving the American economy,” said Lynn Martin, President of NYSE Group. “We’re pleased to work with Global X as it introduces a new, inclusive ETF that seeks to truly track the performance that investors seek from actively traded and growth-focused tech companies.” As of March 23, 2026 and based on hypothetical, backtested levels prior to the index launch date of November 18, 2025, the NYSE 100 Index has risen 27.65% over the trailing year and delivered annualized growth of 30.15% over the trailing 3-year period, 15.06% over the trailing 5-year period, and 22.13% over the trailing 10-year period, all on a gross total return basis. Prior index performance is not indicative of future index performance. The NYSE 100 is administered by ICE Data Indices, LLC and was developed with input from asset management firm Global X, part of Mirae Asset Global Investments. "At Global X, we’re always looking for ways to capture market exposure and innovation," said Pedro Palandrani, Head of Product Research & Development at Global X. "The NYSE® 100 ETF focuses on exposure to core innovation, and it’s designed to capture the companies genuinely reshaping the economy across sectors." The NYSE 100 Index is part of the NYSE family of equity indices administered by ICE Data Indices, LLC. With over $2 trillion in assets under management benchmarked to ICE indices, ICE has deep expertise in administering and publishing indices that are used throughout global markets. Its broad offering includes more than 7,500 fixed income, equity, currency, commodity, and mortgage indices that are trusted by market participants around the world and backed by a nearly 60-year track record. For more information about the NYSE 100 Index / ICE Data Indices, please visit ICE’s Index Solutions. For more information about the Global X NYSE 100 ETF, please visit www.globalxetfs.com.

With Germany’s sweeping MiKaDiv reporting regime set to take effect from January 2027, financial institutions across Europe are facing a fundamental shift in how dividend withholding tax is reported, validated, and reclaimed. RAQUEST, German fintech and market leader in withholding tax technology for financial institutions, announces its plug-and-play MiKaDiv software solution, built around three role-specific modules designed to address the distinct responsibilities across the reporting chain. MiKaDiv introduces a fully digital reporting framework for dividend income, replacing paper-based tax certificates and requiring detailed, end-to-end transparency. The regime is aimed at strengthening compliance and preventing tax abuse, following high-profile Cum/Ex cases. “MiKaDiv is not just another reporting requirement – it reshapes how intermediaries manage compliance and data in withholding tax processing along the custody chain,” said Alexander Lerch, CEO and Co-Founder of RAQUEST. “Financial institutions need clarity on their role and a solution that reflects that complexity. That is why we structured our software into three role-specific modules, enabling organizations to implement targeted compliance.” Foreign Financial Institutions and Service Providers can create MiKaDiv-compliant reports, manage tax vouchers and UUIDs, and integrate with digital tax reclaim processes. German Financial Institutions and Paying Agents are supported with full reporting capabilities, including validation, aggregation, overclaiming controls, and submission to the German Tax Authority. International Custodians can validate and consolidate incoming data, manage risk, and ensure accurate transmission of reporting information along the custody chain. All modules are connected via RAQUEST’s secure data transfer infrastructure, enabling seamless exchange of information from investor level through to the German Tax Authority. The solution also integrates with RAQUEST’s broader withholding tax suite, including tax reclaim and relief at source. With MiKaDiv making accurate reporting a prerequisite for tax relief, organizations must ensure both data quality and operational readiness ahead of the 2027 deadline. RAQUEST’s modular approach allows financial institutions to implement targeted solutions based on their role while preparing for wider European initiatives such as the EU’s FASTER Directive.

Meeting date: 29 September 2025, 15:00-16:00 Location: Virtual meeting (via MS Teams) Attendees: HM Treasury (the Treasury): George Barnes (Chair), Henry Grigg, James Stillit, Naomi Lawrence, Precious Oladipo Bank of England: Nishi Shant, Ben Mitchell, Geoffrey Davies Financial Conduct Authority (FCA): Rob Mak Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA): Jonathan Sepanski Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Clear Europe: Charles Lindsay LCH, LSEG: Owen Taylor London Metal Exchange (LME): Chris Jones International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA): Ulrich Karl, Sarah Crowley Futures Industry Association: Doanh Le Ngoc City of London Law Society: Insolvency Law Committee: Peter Hughes Financial Markets Law Committee: Brian Gray R3 General Technical Committee: Mike Pink, David Mitchell Insolvency Service: Steven Chown Insolvency Lawyers Association’s Technical Committee: Gabrielle Ruiz 1. Introductions – agenda item 1 The Treasury explained that the Panel was being brought together to discuss a planned piece of secondary legislation, to further expand implementation of the resolution regime for central counterparties (CCPs) under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, in order to consider high-level views on the policy intent of this proposed legislation. 2. Update on the legislation – agenda item 2 The Treasury outlined that, further to establishing and operationalising the resolution regime, an additional piece of secondary legislation was now being developed to deliver on the commitment made following consultation on the regime in 2021 to fully implement the ‘No Creditor Worse Off’ (NCWO) safeguard. Responses to the consultation had asked for greater clarity over the safeguard. The Treasury noted that this legislation was specifically focused on establishing the framework for a post-resolution independent valuer to assess the treatment each relevant person (including clearing members) would have received under the hypothetical ‘counterfactual’ scenario (in which resolution action was not taken on the CCP) against the actual treatment that these persons received as a result of the resolution. This was explained as an essential step in order to calculate compensation due under any claim. The Treasury explained that the legislation would include a clear description of the counterfactual an independent valuer would need to consider when deciding on potential compensation claims. 3. High-level comments and discussion – agenda item 3 A number of technical policy points were raised in discussion which the authorities sought to address during the meeting and which they will reflect through their further work to prepare the legislation: One Panel member asked how compensation would be calculated if CCPs did not all have the same recovery and loss allocation arrangements in their rulebooks as compared to those available to the Bank in resolution. The Bank of England noted that, while UK CCPs have comprehensive recovery loss allocation arrangements for some scenarios, not all scenarios are covered comprehensively within the CCPs’ rules and so some losses would likely be allocated during a CCP’s insolvency. The proposed legislation was being designed to reflect this. One Panel member noted that a clear counterfactual would be important should the Bank of England intervene to take resolution action before a CCP had applied its full recovery arrangements, so that a valuer could clearly determine how the CCP would have crystallised its losses and how it would have deployed its rulebook tools to allocate these. The Bank of England noted that the proposed legislation would detail a set of assumptions for the independent valuer to follow, covering how the CCP’s recovery arrangements would have operated under the counterfactual scenario. Another Panel member noted that, under conditions of extreme market stress, a CCP may encounter difficulties in setting settlement prices that reflect fair market values for financial instruments it clears, which the Bank of England should be mindful of should it plan to perform a termination (‘tear-up’) of any of the CCP’s cleared book as part of its resolution of the CCP. The Bank of England acknowledged that determining tear-up prices may be challenging in periods of acute market stress but noted that CCPs typically have contingency arrangements in their settlement price determination procedures which are matched by the Bank’s processes for resolution.[footnote 1] The Bank of England further noted that it would be important when determining tear-up prices for the Bank of England to be mindful of the settlement prices the CCP would have been likely to establish under the counterfactual scenario. The Panel discussed how independence of a valuer would be determined, which the Treasury confirmed the legislation would clarify. One Panel member asked how the legislation would interact with the Bank of England’s exercise of the power to defer a clearing member’s obligations. The Bank of England noted that its intended approach in exercising this power would be for deferred obligations to be included in the calculation of the actual treatment in resolution (unless doing so would itself have generated a loss distribution under the actual treatment which would materially deviate from the loss distribution which would have been achieved under the counterfactual scenario). The Treasury noted that this valuation issue was complex and would likely be subject to further arrangements made by the Treasury when any compensation scheme was established following a resolution. One Panel member queried how realistic the counterfactual assumption was that an insolvency practitioner could liquidate all the CCP’s cleared instruments immediately, and at a single price at the point the CCP entered insolvency. The Bank of England noted that this assumed liquidation of positions would be recorded through the cancelling of the positions cleared by the CCP (rather than through trading), with the insolvency practitioner having discretion to determine the fair market price at which such book-entry terminations would have hypothetically occurred. Another Panel member queried the relationship between the pre- and post-resolution valuations, noting that considerable time may elapse between these two processes. The Treasury noted that the proposed legislation covered post-resolution valuation only – and that pre- and post-resolution valuations have different considerations. Nonetheless, the Treasury acknowledged that there is some overlap between them and that post-resolution independent valuers would accordingly ‘have regard’ to the pre-resolution valuation. Another Panel member asked if the UK’s NCWO valuation arrangements would follow equivalent EU legislation. The Treasury noted that the proposed UK approach had been developed through a ‘first principles’ approach, however, that there of course may be some similarities. 4. Next steps – agenda item 4 The Treasury requested Panel members provide written comments on the legislation’s policy intent by 10 October 2025. The Treasury confirmed that a draft statutory instrument alongside draft amendments to the CCP resolution code of practice would be provided to Panel members for review in due course. The Bank noted that it would meanwhile also test with CCPs some of the counterfactual assumptions made on insolvency rules. The Bank of England’s approach to determining commercially reasonable payments for contracts subject to a statutory tear up in CCP resolution: Bank of England ↩

ETFGI reports Actively Managed ETFs globally Hit New US$2.15 Trillion Record Amid 71 Straight Months of net Inflows at the end of February. During February the actively managed ETFs industry globally gathered net inflows of US$91.15 billion, bringing year-to-date net inflows to a record US$167.58 billion, according to ETFGI's February 2026 Active ETF industry landscape insights report, an annual paid-for research subscription service. ETFGI, is a 14 year old leading independent research and consultancy firm renowned for its expertise in subscription research, consulting services, 6 annual ETFGI Global ETFs Insights Summits, and ETF TV on global ETF industry trends. (All dollar values in USD unless otherwise noted.) Highlights• Global assets in actively managed ETFs climbed to a new record of $2.15 trillion at the end of February, surpassing the prior high of $2.04 trillion set in January 2026.• Assets are up 11.6% year‑to‑date, rising from $1.92 trillion at year‑end 2025.• Actively managed ETFs attracted $91.15 billion in net inflows during February.• YTD net inflows of $167.58 billion mark the highest on record, ahead of $103.29 billion in 2025 and the previous record of $46.07 billion in 2024.• February marked the 71st consecutive month of net inflows. “The S&P 500 declined by 0.76% in February and was up 0.68% year‑to‑date in 2026. Developed markets excluding the U.S. rose 6.03% during February and were up 12.55% year‑to‑date, with Korea (up 20.11%) and Luxembourg (up 16.61%) recording the strongest gains among developed markets for the month. Emerging markets increased by 2.47% in February and were up 8.11% year‑to‑date, led by Thailand (up 19.48%) and Taiwan (up 11.63%),” said Deborah Fuhr, Managing Partner, Founder, and Owner of ETFGI. Growth in assets in the actively managed ETFs industry as of end of February The actively managed ETFs industry globally has 4,864 ETFs, with 6,574 listings, assets of $2.15 Tn, from 682 providers listed on 47 exchanges in 37 countries at the end of February. Dimensional is the largest active provider in terms of assets with $286.31 Bn, reflecting 13.3% market share; JP Morgan Asset Management is second with $268.70 Bn and 12.5% market share, followed by iShares with $128.49 Bn and 6.0% market share. The top three providers, out of 682, account for 31.8% of Global Active ETF AUM, while the remaining 679 providers each have less than 6% market share. Net inflows Actively managed ETFs attracted $91.15 billion in net inflows during February. Equity-focused actively managed ETFs listed globally attracted $41.48 billion in net inflows during February, bringing year‑to‑date inflows to $84.29 billion—well above the $51.42 billion gathered by this point in 2025. Fixed income–focused actively managed ETFs saw $42.69 billion in net inflows in February, lifting YTD inflows to $71.19 billion, compared with $43.23 billion in net inflows at the same point in 2025. Substantial inflows can be attributed to the top 20 active ETFs/ETPs by net new assets, which collectively gathered$38.64 Bn during February. ProShares GENIUS Money Market ETF (IQMM US) gathered $18.25 Bn, the largest individual net inflow. Top 20 actively managed ETFs/ETPs by net new assets February 2026 Source: ETFGI data sourced from ETF/ETP sponsors, exchanges, regulatory filings, Thomson Reuters/Lipper, Bloomberg, publicly available sources and data generated in-house. Note: This report is based on the most recent data available at the time of publication. Asset and flow data may change slightly as additional data becomes available. Investors have tended to invest in Fixed Income actively managed ETFs/ETPs during February.

Heightened market volatility stemming from US tariff policies, combined with increasing demand for intelligence on AI-driven industry transformation, contributed to Data Vendors recording $49.2 billion in revenue in 2025, representing a 6.5% annual increase. The confluence of real-time risk evaluation requirements, heightened demand for specialized private market valuation data, and the proliferation of AI suggests that record revenue growth among data providers is likely to continue unabated. The financial market data industry posted another record year in 2025, with global spending climbing 6.5% to $49.2 billion, reflecting a broader shift away from static end-of-day reporting and toward real-time analytics, alternative data, and AI-powered intelligence. Although real-time trading and data spending accounted for the largest share of total revenues at over 35%, strong demand for Portfolio Management & Analytics and Pricing, Reference and Valuation data drove spending. Although News was the smallest product type, it did have the most significant YoY increase at 7.4%. Growth was primarily concentrated in Asia at 7.4%, with EMEA at 7.0% and the Americas at 5.8%. Market data spending in the Americas accounted for 50.30% of the global total, with EMEA at 31.5% and Asia at 18.2%. Bloomberg, LSEG, and S&P Global Market Intelligence maintained their position as the most prominent global market data vendors. SIX Financial reported the sharpest revenue growth rate in 2025, followed by Moody’s Analytics, Dow Jones, LSEG. Financial market data demand in 2025 was propelled by critical Artificial Intelligence integration needs and real-time risk evaluation amid heightened volatility. The focus has moved from static end-of-day reporting to real-time analytics and alternative data sources, increasingly powered by AI-driven insights. Surging demand, limited competition among data suppliers, and intricate licensing terms have made it difficult for financial institutions to control costs and maintain compliance with data usage requirements. Despite ongoing financial pressures on customers, the market data industry's robust 2025 performance signals continued growth ahead. Financial market data has proven largely inelastic - a fixture in company budgets that endures regardless of broader market conditions. Whether markets are rising or falling, demand for data shows no signs of slowing.

Three UK-listed companies currently have disclosed net short positions of more than 10%, compared with none at any point in 20251 20 UK-listed companies currently have disclosed net short positions of more than 5%, compared with just two at any point in 20252 Consumer sector is the most heavily shorted2 New analysis of publicly disclosed FCA net short positions by global law firm White & Case LLP reveals that short-selling has returned to the UK market with a vengeance. Three UK-listed companies have net short positions of more than 10%, as at 23 March 2026, compared with none at any point in 20251. Additionally, 20 UK-listed companies have net short positions of more than 5%, as at 23 March 20262, compared with just two at any point in 20253. Among these 20 companies, the consumer sector appears to be the most heavily shorted2. The analysis comes amid recent high-profile short-selling activity. Viceroy Research published a note on Close Brothers arguing that the specialist lender had not set aside enough money to cover potential liabilities from the car finance scandal, while Wizz Air was targeted by short-sellers after warning that it would be impacted by the Iran conflict. Commenting, Patrick Sarch, Head of UK Public M&A at global law firm White & Case LLP, said: “Only when the tide goes out do you discover who's not wearing shorts - and indeed who is being shorted. “We predicted at the end of 2025 that 2026 would see a significant increase in shorting shares in UK companies and this research vindicates that prediction. “The opportunities for short-sellers are more attractive now than they have been for many years. Global stock markets have experienced a relatively long decade-plus bull market with strengthening equity valuations, and although the UK remains more moderately priced relative to other markets, UK stocks had been at record highs until the recent geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and were not generally undervalued relative to each other. “However, markets are beginning to come off these highs following the recent reallocation out of AI-driven stocks and heightened macro uncertainty. As individual valuations come under pressure, investors are increasingly taking a closer look at those UK-listed companies whose equity stories appear too good to be true and whose fundamentals don’t support their valuations. “Despite this recent uptick in short-selling activity, short-selling has always played a healthy role in capital markets, supporting price discovery, liquidity, transparency, good governance and market discipline. Short-sellers are often sophisticated investors who produce extensive and well-researched theses on companies, and many have played a crucial role in exposing fraud at companies such as Wirecard and Home REIT.” What issuers should do White & Case is talking to a number of listed companies about what they can do to mitigate these risks – it does not act for short-sellers attacking UK listed companies. The best way to prevent becoming vulnerable is to be proactive and transparent. A number of potentially vulnerable companies have an internal investor engagement or audit committee that meets quarterly to review and assess vulnerabilities and risks, including accounting policies, revenue recognition, provisions, disclosure, related party issues and undisclosed vulnerabilities. The investor engagement function should serve as the harshest internal critic, regularly challenging Boards and management teams and relaying feedback from the market. Issuers should also demonstrate strong governance and transparency and seek investor and analyst views on strengths and weaknesses. It is often possible for us to anticipate issues which a short-seller may focus on. The most effective prevention is for the company to drive the narrative by consistently and proactively explaining its “equity story” or value proposition to investors, supported by objective evidence where possible, and to be honest and transparent about its weaknesses and risks. Where the market first hears about negative news or misunderstood liabilities from a bear attacker, the company is on the back foot and may be in trouble. Trust in management and the Board’s oversight is immediately lost and can be very hard to regain, while the share price is impacted and the stock is negatively rerated until there is a strong basis for rehabilitation. Companies should work with advisers to prepare a short-selling defence manual that includes key details of who responds, how, when and with what evidence, and scenario planning for the most foreseeable attacks. It is crucial to rehearse these defence plans so people know what to do in the first minute and hour in the event of an attack – which may be combined with other events, such as a cyber-attack, profit warning, C-suite succession issue or a relevant market disruption. Issuers should also be ready to commission independent reviews - accounting, legal and forensic – and engage regulators if manipulation is suspected. Regulatory irony: deregulation just as short-selling ramps up There’s an added irony to all this – just as shorting activity is surging in the UK, the FCA is finalising rule changes that would reduce market transparency by removing the requirement for short-sellers to disclose their identities and replacing this with an anonymised, aggregated issuer-level figure. This is intended to reduce inhibitions on short-selling. That may well be good for the market as a whole, but may make it hard for specific companies to respond and easier for short-sellers to make a negative impact on their share price. About the analysis This analysis is based on publicly disclosed FCA net short positions as at 23 March 2026 and historical disclosures available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/markets/short-selling/notification-disclosure-net-short-positions. FCA public disclosures exclude short positions below the 0.5% public disclosure threshold. 2026 figures are based on aggregate disclosed net short positions by issuer as at 23 March 2026. 2025 comparisons are based on the maximum aggregate disclosed net short position reached by each issuer at any point during 2025. Notes The three UK-listed companies with disclosed net short positions of more than 10% as at 23 March 2026 are: Wizz Air Holdings — 15.21% Greggs — 13.43% Ibstock — 13.21% The 20 UK-listed companies with disclosed net short positions of more than 5% as at 23 March 2026 a  Wizz Air Holdings — 15.21% Greggs — 13.43% Ibstock — 13.21% B&M European Value Retail — 8.49% WH Smith — 8.47% NCC Group — 8.01% Autotrader Group — 8.01% Future — 7.70% Ocado Group — 7.47% Land Securities — 6.81% Kingfisher — 6.67% Tate & Lyle — 6.59% Whitbread — 6.50% Domino’s Pizza Group — 6.29% WPP — 6.27% J Sainsbury — 6.02% easyJet — 5.91% GB Group — 5.67% Vistry Group – 5.64% Flutter Entertainment – 5.05% The only two UK-listed companies whose aggregate disclosed net short positions exceeded 5% at any point during 2025 were Indivior plc and Pennon Group plc.

Solactive is pleased to announce its continued collaboration with E Fund Management (Hong Kong) Co., Limited (“E Fund HK”) through the launch of the E Fund (HK) Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index ETF, which tracks the Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index. Following the recent launch of the E Fund (HK) Solactive Biopharma Select Index ETF, this new product further expands the collaboration between E Fund HK and Solactive in thematic equity strategies. The product is designed to reflect the performance of leading semiconductor companies across Hong Kong and East Asia, highlighting the importance of the semiconductor industry within the global technology ecosystem. Semiconductors play a critical role in enabling technological innovation across areas such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, advanced manufacturing, and next-generation mobility solutions. As demand for high-performance computing and digital infrastructure continues to increase, Asian markets remain central to global semiconductor production and supply chains. This environment underlines the relevance of thematic index solutions providing exposure to companies operating within these structural industry trends. The Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index aims to represent the performance of 30 companies primarily engaged in semiconductor manufacturing as well as semiconductor equipment and services across Hong Kong and other eligible East Asian markets. The index follows a transparent and rules-based methodology, selecting the top 15 eligible securities listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 15 securities from other eligible East Asian markets based on total market capitalization. Components are weighted according to free-float market capitalization, subject to a maximum weight of 10% per constituent, while maintaining a regional allocation of 65% to Hong Kong securities and 35% to other East Asian markets. The ETF was listed on March 26, 2026, on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange with the ticker code “3486.HK”. Timo Pfeiffer, Chief Markets Officer at Solactive, commented: "We are pleased to further strengthen our partnership with E Fund Management with the launch of the E Fund (HK) Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index ETF. The recent collaborations reflect our commitment to supporting our clients with index solutions designed to address evolving market segments and client requirements." Sharon Wang, Chief Executive Officer at E Fund HK, commented: "We are very pleased with the successful launch of the E Fund (HK) Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index ETF. Asia serves as the core hub of the global semiconductor supply chain, accounting for significant proportion of worldwide chip production capacity. This index provides one-stop access to Asia's leading semiconductor companies, with precise coverage of the main semiconductor production regions in Asia. The synergistic clustering of Asia's semiconductor industries — combining strengths and complementing each other's competitive advantages — positions the sector to remain a sustained beneficiary with a highly promising industry outlook."

Scope Prime, the award-winning institutional liquidity brand of Rostro Group, has completed the full institutional rollout of DIGIXAU, its 24/7 gold CFD product designed to give clients continuous exposure to gold price movements beyond traditional market hours.  Built to extend trading into evenings and weekends, DIGIXAU allows institutional clients to hedge positions, trade and adjust gold exposure, and manage risk in real time as macroeconomic and geopolitical events unfold 24/7.  Daniel Lawrance, Chief Executive Officer at Scope Prime, commented:  “Amid unprecedented global economic uncertainty, access to safe-haven assets has never been more important. DIGIXAU provides what traditional gold products cannot — the ability to trade and manage positions at any time, including weekends. As more market-moving events occur outside standard hours, uninterrupted access is increasingly critical. Recent enhancements to our crypto CFD liquidity, pricing and depth have enabled us to deliver this product across our full institutional client base.”  DIGIXAU is designed to give institutional clients continuous gold price exposure in a CFD format, addressing growing demand for access outside of the traditional weekly trading window. It complements Scope Prime’s existing gold offering by extending availability through weekends, enabling clients to respond immediately to market developments without waiting for markets to reopen. 

The Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) today announced the establishment of the ICM Innovation Lab (FIKRALab), a structured co-creation and applied R&D platform to develop new Islamic capital market (ICM) products and instruments.  The FIKRALab, an initiative under the Capital Market Masterplan 2026–2030, aims at advancing Malaysia’s ICM, anchored on Maqasid al-Shariah and guided by Halal-Toyyib.  Through the FIKRALab, the SC seeks to catalyse the development of Maqasid al-Shariahdriven ICM products and services that deliver ethical objectives, real economic value and broader social impact.  These innovations are intended to uphold the essentials of human well-being — faith, life, intellect, lineage and wealth — while aligning capital with productive economic activity and advancing shared, sustainable prosperity. The FIKRALab builds on the SC’s long-standing efforts to nurture ICM innovation. These efforts began with FIKRA, Malaysia’s Islamic fintech accelerator programme, and later enhanced through FIKRA ACE, a targeted facilitation, industry engagement and ecosystem connectivity focusing on fintech1.  The FIKRALab expands the ecosystem development beyond fintech-centric ICM innovation, enabling deeper collaboration and co-creation between the SC and the industry in ideation, research, product design and pilot testing. It focuses particularly in developing new instruments and solutions that align with Maqasid al-Shariah.   Expected outcomes of the FIKRALab include the development of new ICM use cases, products and infrastructure that demonstrate clear value-based outcomes, stronger industry-regulator engagement and enhanced market confidence in innovation, anchored by Maqasid and supported by the industry. A key feature of the FIKRALab is Maqasid al-Shariah Clinics, a structured approach  that includes curated engagement by the SC and a knowledge symposium with experts in identified domains to assess and enhance existing ICM products.  Through these clinics, the SC will work with industry players, Shariah advisers and other identified subject matter experts to strengthen the value propositions of current ICM instruments, reinforce real-economy linkages and deliver greater social and economic impact. The FIKRALab will be undertaken in phases, beginning with a pilot project currently conducted by the SC in collaboration with a financial institution. This pilot project seeks to develop an innovative instrument aimed at unlocking Shariah-derived income within mixed-activity groups.  The subsequent phase is anticipated to commence in Q4 2026, when applications for the first FIKRALab cohort will be opened. Cohort applications are expected to be conducted annually, with different focus areas for each cycle.  The focus areas for the first cohort will include new generation ICM products and services that offers entirely new value propositions, Islamic social finance and social capital, as well as sustainability and transition finance.  Innovators, financial institutions, technology providers, academia and ecosystem partners with ideas or proposals for ICM product innovation are invited to register their interest and engage with the SC via FIKRAlab@seccom.com.my from now until 30 September 2026.  Further details will be announced in due course. FIKRA was launched in 2021 as part of the SC’s initiative to enhance the ICM ecosystem. In continuation, the enhanced FIKRA ACE was launched in 2023 as a three-year initiative to facilitate the development of Islamic fintech through a structured approach.  

London Stock Exchange Group plc (LSEG) announces today that it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each on the London Stock Exchange from Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc (Morgan Stanley) as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 26 February 2026: Ordinary Shares Date of purchase: 25 March 2026 Number of ordinary shares purchased: 352,244 Highest price paid per share: 8,608.00p Lowest price paid per share: 8,398.00p Volume weighted average price per share: 8,516.81p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares.  Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 498,978,719 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 498,978,719. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Market Abuse Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of the law of the United Kingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter) a full breakdown of the individual trades made by the Morgan Stanley on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/1539Y_1-2026-3-25.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased: 352,244 Date of purchases: 25 March 2026 Investment firm: Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc                   Aggregate Information: Venue Volume weighted average price Aggregated Volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share XLON 8,512.89p 326,239 8,398.00p 8,608.00p TRQX 8,566.04p 26,005 8,480.00p 8,606.00p

Chairman Steil, Ranking Member Lynch, and other members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Federal Reserve Board's (Board) work on financial sector innovation within the Division of Supervision and Regulation. The Federal Reserve's Division of Supervision and Regulation is committed to facilitating innovation in the financial sector. Responsible innovation can improve the customer experience, expand product offerings, lower costs, increase credit availability, and enhance efficiencies for banks, businesses, and consumers alike while more generally supporting economic growth. Prudent innovation at banks also has the potential to enhance safety and soundness by enabling better risk detection and mitigation. Perhaps most importantly, responsible innovation can enable banks to better meet the evolving needs of their customers and deter the migration of financial activity into the less regulated nonbank sector. For those reasons, banks, regulators, and supervisors should be open-minded about innovation and emerging technologies. The deployment of new products, services, and technologies is not without risk, however, and the Federal Reserve is committed to its mission of identifying and encouraging firms to mitigate any risks that threaten their safety and soundness or the stability of the U.S. financial system. Our primary duty as supervisors is to identify significant threats to safety and soundness or financial stability as early as possible and to encourage or require prompt, proportional, and effective corrective action as early as possible. Examiners are like referees in a soccer match. Banks are generally free to choose their own business models and risk profiles. But when their activities threaten safety and soundness or financial stability, examiners raise a yellow or red card in the form of a supervisory observation, matter requiring attention, enforcement action, or other supervisory action, as illustrated by figure 1 in the appendix to this statement. Innovation that is properly regulated and supervised can lead to a more dynamic and ever-improving banking system that best serves all Americans. One way to strike the right balance between encouraging innovation and protecting the safety and soundness of the banking system is to be more transparent and encourage feedback from the public. We do this when we propose new rules because the Administrative Procedure Act requires us to provide public notice and seek public comment about proposed new rules. But most of our supervision is hidden from public view. To receive public feedback on our supervision, we need to voluntarily lift the curtain so that more of our supervision is visible to the public, subject to protecting competitively sensitive proprietary information, confidential supervisory information, and other information that should remain confidential. The Vice Chair for Supervision and I are deeply committed to making our supervision more transparent and publicly accountable. We demonstrated that commitment by releasing to the public in November our Statement of Supervisory Operating Principles.1 We demonstrated it again in January when we published the operating manuals for supervising the largest and most complex banking organizations, which had previously been non-public.2 We will continue to demonstrate this commitment by releasing to the public many other procedure manuals and instructions to staff that have previously been kept confidential. In this way, we will give the public more visibility into how we supervise banking organizations and solicit their feedback. While the exact promise and peril of new technology is, by definition, unknown, there are three emerging areas that I would like to focus on today: artificial intelligence, digital assets, and bank-fintech partnerships. These technologies will likely be the most impactful on the banking sector in the foreseeable future. Artificial IntelligenceArtificial intelligence (AI) has been around in various forms for some time, and Federal Reserve supervisory staff have continually monitored banks' use of it. Many variations of AI, like machine learning, have been in use for years and banks often deploy these mature, time-tested capabilities at their firms. For instance, some firms use machine learning tools in fraud detection and prevention. The use of AI has grown markedly over the past several years at supervised banks, which are deploying both in-house and vendor products. AI can improve operational efficiencies, enhance risk management capabilities, generate new content, and provide new analytical insights. More recently, the transformative power of newer AI technologies such as generative AI and agentic AI has driven exploration across the industry. Many financial institutions have begun implementing generative AI applications to test limited functionality in areas such as document summarization and coding assistance. While uptake of these newer technologies is generally limited to low-risk applications, we expect increased adoption rates as useful applications expand to more material areas and implementation challenges are resolved. While AI adoption promises many benefits, it is important to continually monitor risks. AI tools can present explainability, operational, model, and data challenges. The complexity and opacity of these systems can also raise bias and privacy considerations. While our supervised institutions typically have controls such as sound development practices, effective testing regimes, and human-in-the-loop systems in place to manage AI risks, financial institutions should proactively implement governance, risk management, and oversight policies as AI usage becomes more widespread. Understanding specific use cases and methodologies is particularly important. To facilitate the deployment of AI tools, Board and Reserve Bank supervisory staff are working to better understand the available and developing technologies. In addition to continuing to monitor banks' usage of AI, we are also exploring potential use cases to improve our own assessment and supervision of banking risk. In particular, AI tools might be useful for improving examiner training and preparation and processing large amounts of data from media, earnings calls, and public filings as part of our ongoing monitoring of financial institutions. That said, while we expect these tools to serve as a helpful and ultimately important input, judgment and decisionmaking will remain with subject matter experts. Digital AssetsThe second area I would like to highlight is digital assets. We have seen progress in the digital assets arena that could offer many benefits for both banks and their customers. For instance, payment stablecoins and tokenized deposits hold the potential to enable faster and cheaper payments. Tokenization can also potentially provide flexibility in settlement, enhanced recordkeeping and automation, and other efficiency gains. The Federal Reserve has taken a number of steps to better enable banks to engage with digital asset technologies. We recently ensured that assessment of digital asset risks would be part of the normal course of supervision and rescinded a number of crypto-related supervisory letters.3 In December 2025, we also replaced a policy statement that placed unnecessary restrictions on certain kinds of innovation with one designed to facilitate responsible innovation by Board-supervised banks.4 Along with our interagency colleagues, we have also clarified risk-management considerations around crypto-asset safekeeping.5 Looking ahead, we are considering how to provide additional clarity for banks engaged in digital asset activities. We recently clarified the capital treatment of tokenized securities, for instance.6 We are also coordinating with the other banking regulators as we develop regulations to implement the GENIUS Act. Third-Party RelationshipsThird, I would like to discuss our approach to third-party relationships. Bank-fintech partnerships can provide a channel for banks of all sizes to access new technologies. In particular, bank-fintech partnerships can promote a level playing field by allowing community banks to compete with larger banks that have more resources to invest in their own technology. These partnerships can also help banks quickly and cost-effectively deploy products or services into the market, along with providing banks access to new or expanded markets, revenue sources, and customers. Bank-fintech partnerships vary in terms of product offerings, making them potentially well-suited to a variety of use cases. For example, some partnerships offer traditional deposit services while others are payment or lending focused. These partnerships can, of course, present complicated risks that require commensurate risk management and supervision. It is therefore important that banks understand their risks and legal obligations, including with respect to consumer compliance, and that we properly supervise them. For our part, the Board will continue to explore additional options to ensure banks have regulatory and supervisory clarity in their engagements with third parties. Finally, to fully see the beneficial effects of innovation on economic growth and prosperity, innovators, banks, and regulators must develop a constructive dialogue to build trust and establish a solid working foundation. Public outreach by the Federal Reserve plays an important role in our understanding of the functions of new technologies as well as the risks they may present to banks, the public, and the broader financial system. In the past year, the Board hosted a number of public conferences that included discussions about innovation and how banks intend to use new technologies.7 Events like these facilitate useful and necessary interactions between stakeholders and help us refine our supervision and regulation. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. Appendix Figure 1: The supervisory action continuum Note: The figure displays potential supervisory actions that can be taken to remediate supervisory observations. The actions are ordered from left to right by severity. The arrow illustrates that supervisors have the discretion to escalate remediation actions from a lower to a higher level out of sequence based on probability or severity. Some of these actions, such as activating a recovery plan, only apply to the largest and most systemic banking organizations. Accessible version 1. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Supervision and Regulation, "Statement of Supervisory Operating Principles (PDF)," October 29, 2025.  2. See "Large Institution Supervisory Coordinating Committee (LISCC) Operating Manuals," January 2026.  3. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Federal Reserve Board Announces the Withdrawal of Guidance for Banks Related to their Crypto-asset and Dollar Token Activities and Related Changes to its Expectations for These Activities," press release, April 24, 2025, and "Federal Reserve Board Announces It Will Sunset Its Novel Activities Supervision Program and Return to Monitoring Banks' Novel Activities through the Normal Supervisory Process," press release, August 15, 2025.  4. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Federal Reserve Board Withdraws 2023 Policy Statement and Issues New Policy Statement Regarding the Treatment of Certain Board-Supervised Banks that Facilitates Responsible Innovation," press release, December 17, 2025.  5. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, "Agencies Issue Joint Statement on Risk-Management Considerations for Crypto-asset Safekeeping," press release, July 14, 2025.  6. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, "Agencies Clarify the Capital Treatment of Tokenized Securities," press release, March 5, 2026.  7. See, for example, the Federal Reserve Board's conferences: Unleashing a Financially Inclusive Future (July 15, 2025); Integrated Review of the Capital Framework for Large Banks (July 22, 2025); the Community Bank Conference (October 9, 2025); and the Payments Innovation Conference (October 21, 2025). 

Today, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott K. H. Bessent convened a meeting of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) in executive and open sessions at the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury).  During the executive session, the Council heard a briefing from Treasury staff on the Council’s quarterly financial stability monitor.  The update described key developments during the recent quarter in the banking sector, financial markets, household finances, and financial innovation.  The presentation also addressed geopolitical risks, the implications of increased investment in artificial intelligence, and recent developments in the private credit sector.  Council members noted the resilience of the financial system and discussed their agencies’ efforts to monitor market developments. The Council also received a presentation from Treasury staff on the development of tools to monitor household financial resilience, including an assessment of consumer credit conditions.  The presentation included an analysis of the impact of fraud on households and its implications for economic security and the broader financial system.   During the open session, the Council received a presentation from Treasury staff on the Council’s proposed interpretive guidance on nonbank financial company designations.  The presentation provided an overview of proposed revisions to the Council’s 2023 interpretive guidance.  The Council voted unanimously to publish the proposed interpretive guidance in the Federal Register.  The proposed interpretive guidance will be available for public comment for 45 days after publication in the Federal Register. The Council also received an update from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on banking supervision and regulatory reforms.  The agencies described their recently issued proposals to simplify and modernize regulatory capital standards and other ongoing efforts to enhance their regulatory and supervisory frameworks.  The Council also voted to approve the minutes of its previous meeting on December 11, 2025.  In attendance at the Council meeting at Treasury or virtually were the following members:   Scott K. H. Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury (Chairperson of the Council) Jerome H. Powell, Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Jonathan V. Gould, Comptroller of the Currency Geoffrey Gradler, Deputy Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (acting pursuant to delegated authority) Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission Travis Hill, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Michael S. Selig, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission William J. Pulte, Director, Federal Housing Finance Agency Kyle S. Hauptman, Chairman, National Credit Union Administration Steven Seitz, Director, Federal Insurance Office (non-voting member) Elizabeth K. Dwyer, Director, Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation (non-voting member) Lise Kruse, Commissioner, North Dakota Department of Financial Institutions (non-voting member) Melanie Lubin, Securities Commissioner, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Securities Division (non-voting member) Additional information regarding the Council, its work, the proposed interpretive guidance, and the Council’s meeting minutes is available at http://www.fsoc.gov.  

The Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) today voted unanimously to issue for public comment proposed interpretative guidance on nonbank financial company designations.  This proposed guidance would reinstitute a number of elements first introduced by the Council’s 2019 interpretive guidance and would add critical enhancements that reflect the Council’s current understanding of financial stability, underscoring the importance of economic growth and economic security.  “The Council has a vital mission – identifying and responding to potential threats to the stability of the financial system before they can translate into real economic harms,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent.  “Today’s proposed guidance would return the Council to prioritizing an activities-based approach where we focus first on risks that arise from specific activities and practices across markets, rather than single out individual firms.”  The proposed interpretive guidance approved by the Council today would: Incorporate economic growth and economic security into the Council’s analysis of risks to financial stability.  Economic growth provides the foundation for financial stability, and economic security, in turn, supports economic growth.  The proposal describes how the Council would consider impediments to economic growth and economic security when identifying potential risks to U.S. financial stability.   Prioritize identifying, assessing, and addressing risks through an activities-based approach.  Consistent with its statutory authorities, the Council would prioritize its efforts to identify, assess, and address potential risks to U.S. financial stability through an activities-based approach.  Under the proposal, the Council would pursue entity-specific designations only if a potential risk or threat cannot be, or is not, adequately addressed through an activities-based approach.  Prioritizing an activities-based approach would enhance the rigor of the Council’s activities and facilitate the Council’s efforts to consider impediments to economic growth and economic security when identifying potential risks to U.S. financial stability. Enhance analytical rigor by committing to performing a cost-benefit analysis before a designation decision.  In evaluating a potential designation, the Council would perform a cost-benefit analysis before designating a nonbank financial company, and make a designation only if the expected benefits justify the expected costs.  The Council would also assess the likelihood of the company’s material financial distress as part of its analysis of potential benefits and costs of a designation.  These commitments would ensure that the Council’s actions are expected to provide a net benefit to U.S. financial stability and are consistent with thoughtful decision-making. Provide a pre-designation “off-ramp” and promote greater transparency. The proposed guidance maintains strong procedural protections and includes a new pre-designation off-ramp. Under the guidance, the Council would identify steps a nonbank financial company or financial regulators could take to address a potential threat to U.S. financial stability based on the Council’s preliminary evaluation and allow time for the material risks to be addressed. Providing this opportunity to mitigate identified risks would enhance the transparency of the designation process and result in a more effective approach to addressing a potential threat to U.S. financial stability. The full text of the proposed nonbank financial company designation guidance is available here. The proposed guidance will be available for a 45-day public comment period following its publication in the Federal Register.

Today, SIFMA president and CEO Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr. testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services at a hearing entitled Tokenization and the Future of Securities: Modernizing Our Capital Markets. The testimony emphasizes SIFMA’s strong support for innovation in the securities markets and its belief that new technologies such as distributed ledger technology (DLT) and tokenization offer many potential benefits for U.S. investors, issuers and other market participants across the securities lifecycle. At the same time, Bentsen notes “the continued strength of the U.S. securities markets depends on preserving the investor protections and market integrity safeguards that provides the trust and confidence. That strength and efficiency provides for lower cost and greater availability of capital for issuers, broader access and liquidity for investors, and supports retirement savings, business investment, and economic growth. Indeed, our capital markets fund three-quarters of U.S. economic activity, making them essential to the ability of governments, businesses, and consumers to fund their activities – whether that be a company looking to invest in new plant and equipment, a local government seeking to raise funds for infrastructure projects, or a family taking out a mortgage to buy a home. Robust capital markets also provide American workers with opportunities to invest and prepare for retirement, directly and through investment vehicles like 401(k)s and pension funds.” Bentsen also notes, “our securities markets thrive because of, not despite, long-standing regulatory frameworks that protect investors and ensure market quality and integrity. The goal of policy makers should be to modernize markets in a way that builds on these strengths rather than bypassing them. Developing a durable approach that is built on existing regulatory frameworks will provide the necessary foundation for the growth and development of tokenized securities markets, enabling innovation to flourish and new operating models to develop while also protecting investors and ensuring that our markets remain the envy of the world.” The testimony highlights the following recommendations as a path forward to maintain U.S. leadership: First, tokenized securities are securities, technology does not change the underlying definition of the instrument. And like any securities, tokenized securities should be subject to the same robust investor-protection and market-integrity rules that have helped make the U.S. securities markets the deepest, most liquid, and most efficient in the world. Second, DLT and tokenization can deliver meaningful benefits across the securities lifecycle, but those benefits will be realized on a scalable and durable basis only through technology-neutral, functional regulation that protects investors and preserves market quality. Third, while there may be areas where the unique features on DLT create genuine “square peg – round hole” challenges in complying with established regulations, and carefully tailored exemptive relief may be necessary to allow innovation while maintaining the spirit of the regulations and the protections they offer such relief should be reserved for instances where the current regulatory framework is fundamentally incompatible with the technology, making existing requirements infeasible. Even then, bespoke exemptions must be narrow, transparent, time-bound, and aligned with the intent of the underlying regulations.They should never bypass notice-and-comment rulemaking or serve as a substitute for formal rulemakings, especially when investors and other market participants may not benefit from understanding how such exemptive relief could result in changing broader regulatory protections they rely upon today. In such cases, Congress and the Commission must ensure regulations are calibrated to actual risks, avoiding workarounds that might undermine investor protection or market integrity. Fourth, tokenization must be evaluated as part of a broader set of market-structure reforms that also includes extended-hours (23/5 and eventually 24/7) trading and the ongoing review of Rule 611 on trade through prohibitions and other areas of Regulation National Market System, and more. The testimony urges Congress to support “the responsible development of tokenized securities markets by reinforcing that tokenized securities are securities, and they should be integrated into the existing federal securities regulatory framework, not placed outside it.” The testimony concludes: “Tokenization offers real promise across the securities lifecycle, including in issuance, settlement design, collateral mobility, recordkeeping, transparency, and operational efficiency. But those benefits will only be realized if tokenization develops within a framework that preserves investor protection, market integrity, and confidence in fair and orderly markets – thereby building on, rather than undermining, the strength, depth, and efficiency of the U.S. securities markets that investors globally have trust and confidence in today.”