FIA president and CEO Walt Lukken today made the following statement on the bank capital proposal announced by US regulators. “FIA is pleased that the US bank regulators have recognized our concerns about the potential impact of disproportionately high bank capital requirements on agriculture, energy and other end-users. These market participants rely on banks to provide clearing services for hedging risk, particularly during times of stress.“In 2024, FIA expressed strong opposition to the prior version of proposed changes. We warned that those changes would lead to a substantial increase in the amount of capital that banks would be required to hold for client clearing. FIA estimated that the six largest US banks that offer clearing would have to increase their capital requirements for client clearing by more than 80%. This would have materially hindered their clearing capacity.“We look forward to reviewing the revised proposals and providing detailed feedback.” 

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Major League Baseball today announced the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, the first of its kind between the CFTC and a professional sports league.  The MOU establishes a framework for the CFTC and MLB to discuss, cooperate, and exchange information concerning issues of common interest including protecting the integrity of professional baseball and the relating prediction markets.  The MOU provides a mechanism for the CFTC and MLB to exchange information in a manner consistent with applicable law, which will enable both parties to more swiftly respond to incidents and better anticipate emerging trends.  Pursuant to this landmark MOU, the CFTC and MLB confirm their commitment to working together to further their respective missions.    “The MOU is a collaborative step towards promoting the integrity and resilience of the prediction markets relating to professional baseball. Through this MOU, the CFTC is well-positioned to add additional tools to protect these markets and its participants from fraud, manipulation, and other abuses,” said CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig.  “I thank MLB and Commissioner Rob Manfred for partnering with the CFTC and taking a leading role in protecting the integrity of these growing markets.” RELATED LINKS MOU Between the CFTC and MLB

Summary Japan and the United Kingdom (UK) held the fourth meeting of the Financial Regulatory Forum on 18 March 2026, in Tokyo. In order to facilitate a deep and meaningful exchange across a broad set of economic, fiscal and financial regulatory discussion points, joint sessions with the seventh meeting of the Financial Dialogue were also held. Three joint sessions were held on the Macroeconomic/Fiscal Situation, Digital Finance and Sustainable and Climate Finance, followed by separate Financial Regulatory Forum sessions on Asset Management and Other Policy Developments, AI, Cyber and Operational Resilience, International Banking and NBFI, and Women in Finance. On the Japanese side, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) was led by Masaaki Iizuka, Deputy Commissioner for International Affairs. On the UK side, His Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) was led by Rohan Lee, Director for International Financial Services, the Bank of England (BoE) was led by Michael Hatchett and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) was led by Rob Ward. Digital Finance In the area of digital finance, participants updated on developments in crypto assets, stablecoins, and Central Bank Digital Currencies. The UK provided updates on recent legislation delivering the UK’s financial services regulatory regime for cryptoassets, the Wholesale Financial Markets Digital Strategy, the Digital Pound project, its work to renew retail payments infrastructure and the BoE’s evolving approach to systemic stablecoin regulation. Japan presented the FSA’s ongoing review of the regulatory frameworks for cryptoassets, as well as the current circulation status of stablecoins. Participants also acknowledged the importance of global cooperation and the role of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and IOSCO, in tackling remaining frictions in cross-border payments and information sharing and cooperation on supervisory and authorisation issues in supporting the development of a sound global digital assets market. Both countries exchanged views on how to harness digital finance to support open, efficient and resilient cross‑border payments. Sustainable and Climate Finance On sustainable and climate finance, Japan and the UK shared recent developments on transition finance as well as the evolution of regulatory frameworks on reporting, assurance and labelling. The FSA provided an overview of recent progress on transition finance and on the development of the roadmap for the sustainability-related financial disclosure and assurance. The FSA will mandate reporting based on the SSBJ (Sustainability Standards Board of Japan) Standards, which are functionally aligned with the ISSB Standards, as well as third-party assurance for listed companies through a phased-in approach. The FSA also highlighted recent progress on transition finance, including Japan’s work to strengthen the credibility and transparency of transition finance through key guidance and sector‑level tools. The UK provided updates on the finalisation of UK Sustainability Reporting Standards (UK SRS) including the FCA’s consultation, the introduction of a regime for ESG rating agencies, the successful implementation of Sustainability Disclosure Requirements, updated supervisory expectations for managing climate-related risks and various initiatives underway to support the scaling of transition finance. Participants discussed how Japan and the UK can coordinate efforts to increase interoperability between international sustainability reporting standards. Both countries recognised the value of deepening bilateral cooperation and coordinating their engagement in multilateral fora. Asset Management and Other Policy Developments Japan and the UK exchanged updates on recent reforms in asset management and retail investment, recognising the importance of the sector in supporting efficient capital allocation and enhancing the competitiveness of their respective financial centres. The FSA provided updates on the initiatives to strengthen Japan’s asset management sector and corporate governance reform, as well as ongoing work of developing a new comprehensive financial services strategy by summer 2026. The UK shared progress on the implementation of the Financial Services Growth and Competitiveness Strategy and highlighted work undertaken under the regulators’ Secondary Growth objective. Participants also shared views on opportunities for cross-border business in their respective asset management sectors and committed to continuing cooperation to encourage Japan-UK market entry. AI, Cyber and Operational Resilience Both sides discussed sector developments related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) and approaches to promoting innovation. The UK provided an update on the activities of the BoE’s and FCA’s joint AI consortium launched last year, whilst Japan shared developments on the FSA’s AI Discussion Paper and the AI Public‑Private Forum. The UK highlighted the FCA’s AI Lab, including AI Live Testing, which helps firms test AI in a safe and controlled environment. Participants also exchanged views on the evolving cyber and operational risk landscape. Japan provided updates on the country’s cybersecurity policy framework for the financial sector, and the UK shared perspectives on cyber and operational resilience initiatives affecting the financial sector and broader economy. Both countries also discussed risks associated with critical third‑party service providers. The UK presented progress on the implementation of the Critical Third Parties Regime, whilst Japan outlined its approach to managing third‑party risks and safeguarding financial stability. International Banking and NBFI Participants offered an overview of developments in their domestic banking systems and banking regulation. Japan shared its experience since implementing the Basel III framework, whilst the UK confirmed that it has legislated for its implementation and published its rules. Both sides reaffirmed the significance of strong prudential standards for banks and discussed the importance of full, timely and consistent implementation of the Basel III framework. Participants also discussed crisis management and banking resolution frameworks, reaffirming the importance of robust coordination mechanisms.  On Non-Bank Financial‑ Intermediation (NBFI), both sides exchanged views on recent policy developments and ongoing international initiatives, including work at the FSB and its implementation. Members emphasised the importance of measures to monitor and address potential systemic risk in the NBFI sector, advancing international discussions, and maintaining close bilateral and multilateral engagement. Women in Finance The UK provided an update on progress under the Women in Finance Charter and ongoing initiatives to promote gender balance across the financial services sector. Japan outlined current policies and initiatives aimed at improving gender balance in financial institutions, including industry-wide efforts to eliminate gender-based wage gaps. Participants exchanged views on approaches to improving gender balance in senior leadership positions. Conclusion Participants reaffirmed their commitment to continued close cooperation between Japan and the UK to support open, innovative and resilient financial systems. Members looked forward to the next meeting of the Financial Regulatory Forum in London.

The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee is responsible for making decisions about Bank Rate. Monetary Policy Summary, March 2026 At its meeting ending on 18 March 2026, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted unanimously to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%. Conflict in the Middle East has caused a significant increase in global energy and other commodity prices, which will affect households’ fuel and utility prices and have indirect effects via businesses’ costs. Prior to this, there had been continued disinflation in domestic prices and wages. CPI inflation will be higher in the near term as a result of the new shock to the economy. Monetary policy cannot influence global energy prices but aims to ensure that the economic adjustment to them occurs in a way that achieves the 2% target sustainably. The MPC is alert to the increased risk of domestic inflationary pressures through second-round effects in wage and price-setting, the risk of which will be greater the longer higher energy prices persist. The MPC is also assessing the implications for inflation of the weakening in economic activity that is likely to result from higher energy costs. The Committee will continue to monitor closely the situation in the Middle East and its impact on global energy supply and energy prices. It stands ready to act as necessary to ensure that CPI inflation remains on track to meet the 2% target in the medium term. Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting ending on 18 March 2026 1: Before turning to its immediate policy decision, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) discussed recent developments in global economic and financial conditions, the immediate implications for the UK economy, and how these developments could affect the medium-term outlook and the MPC’s strategy. Global economic and financial conditions 1: Since the Committee’s February meeting, the main development had been the outbreak of conflict between Israel and the United States, and Iran. The conflict had spread to other parts of the Middle East, with energy infrastructure targeted. Prior to the conflict, there had otherwise been limited news in the global economy since the February Monetary Policy Report. 2: Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which around one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supply flowed, had almost ground to a halt following some Iranian attacks on vessels attempting transit. The most significant economic impact of developments in the Strait had been a sharp rise in both the level and volatility of energy prices, alongside upward pressure on a range of other commodity prices, such as fertiliser and neon gas. 3: Oil prices had increased significantly since the previous MPC meeting. The Brent crude spot price in the run-up to the MPC meeting on 18 March had been over $100 per barrel. This was around 60% higher than at the time of the February Report and the highest level since 2022, when oil prices had last increased by a comparable magnitude. 4: The Dutch Title Transfer Facility spot price, a measure of European wholesale gas prices, in the run-up to the MPC meeting on 18 March had been over €50 per MWh. This was around 60% higher than its pre-conflict level earlier in the year. Prices of futures contracts for UK natural gas, which would feed into the next Ofgem price cap for July to September, had increased on average by 35 to 40%. While the recent increase in wholesale gas prices had been substantial, prices had remained well below the peaks they had eventually reached in the period following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 5: The negative impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on global oil supply would only be partially offset by the announcement of a coordinated release of strategic oil reserves by the member countries of the International Energy Agency. These reserves would likely be made available to the market over a period of several weeks and would take time to be transported to refineries. 6: It remained to be seen how long the conflict would last. The duration of the reduced supply of energy from the Middle East was therefore uncertain. Notwithstanding that uncertainty, intelligence from market participants suggested that their central expectation was for a relatively short-lived conflict. In that context, members noted upside risks to oil and gas prices looking ahead. Energy supply would take time to recover even if the conflict abated. Efforts to rebuild stocks, as well as greater awareness of vulnerabilities in the global energy network, could sustain higher oil and gas prices. Distributions implied by financial market options also suggested that upside risks to oil and gas prices had increased significantly, at least over the next few months. 7: The conflict had generally led to increased volatility and a deterioration in risk sentiment in financial markets relative to the Committee’s previous meeting. Equity prices across advanced economies had fallen back since the conflict began. UK equity prices were overall little changed since the February Report, having increased ahead of the outbreak of hostilities before declining thereafter. Spreads on investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds had widened since the conflict began. The sterling effective exchange rate index was little changed since the February Report, while the US dollar had strengthened somewhat. 8: The market-implied path for Bank Rate had increased significantly since the February Report. Alongside developments in other asset prices, this meant that overall financial conditions had tightened. A large majority of responses to the Bank’s latest Market Participants Survey, which had been submitted between 4 and 6 March, expected no change in Bank Rate at this meeting, similar to market pricing. Beyond the near term, the latest market-implied path for Bank Rate sloped slightly upwards over 2026. Market intelligence gathered by Bank staff emphasised that market participants were recalibrating the balance of risks to the path for Bank Rate in light of the rise in energy prices. In the run-up to this MPC meeting, the market-implied path for ECB policy rates had suggested some tightening this year. The path for US policy rates had suggested some loosening, albeit less so than prior to the outbreak of the conflict. 9: The US Supreme Court ruling in relation to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) had led the US administration to replace previously imposed IEEPA tariffs with a new temporary, uniform 10% tariff on all trade partners under alternative authority. While the direct macroeconomic implications for the UK of the lower US effective tariff rate appeared small, uncertainty around the medium-term outlook for US trade policy had increased somewhat, though remaining well below levels seen in 2025. UK current economic conditions 10: There had been only limited news in the near-term domestic outlook prior to the Middle East conflict. Twelve-month UK CPI inflation had fallen to 3.0% in January from 3.4% in December. This was 0.1 percentage points above the short-term forecast published in the February Report, largely due to a smaller-than-expected fall in services inflation. Services consumer price inflation had been 4.4% in January, 0.2 percentage points above the February Report forecast. Higher frequency measures of underlying services inflation had picked up a little. In light of this data news, CPI inflation was now expected to be a little over 3% in February. 11: Volatility in oil and gas prices had made the short-term outlook for inflation particularly uncertain, but recent increases in energy prices would delay the return of CPI inflation to the 2% target that had been expected at the time of the February Report. The immediate effect would be through higher fuel prices. Based on energy prices as of close of business on 16 March, CPI inflation was now expected to be close to 3½% in March, almost ½ percentage point higher than expected in the February Report. 12: CPI inflation had previously been projected to fall in 2026 Q2, as previous one-off price increases in April 2025 dropped out of the year-on-year comparison alongside the disinflationary effect of the 2025 Budget. Given higher fuel prices, the decline between Q1 and Q2 was now projected to be modest. CPI inflation was expected to be around 3% in Q2 rather than 2.1% in the February Report. 13: Higher wholesale gas prices would have minimal impact on household utility bills in the near term because the Ofgem price cap for April to June had already been determined. However, if current wholesale conditions persisted, they were likely to feed through mechanically into a higher price cap from July. Based on the oil and gas futures curves as of 16 March, Bank staff projections suggested that the direct contribution of energy prices to CPI inflation in 2026 Q3 would be around ¾ percentage points. 14: If they were to occur quickly, indirect effects from firms passing on higher energy costs to consumer prices could further push up CPI inflation by around ¼ percentage point in 2026 Q3. The eventual scale and timing of such indirect effects was uncertain. Taken together with the expected direct effects, and conditioned on energy prices in the run-up to this meeting, CPI inflation could increase to up to 3½% in Q3. 15: It was too early to judge how large any second-round effects from the new energy price shock would be through wage and price-setting. Prior to recent developments in energy prices, annual growth in private sector regular Average Weekly Earnings in the three months to January had been 3.3%, below the forecast in the February Report. An updated estimate by the Bank’s Agents suggested that basic private sector pay settlements were now expected to average 3.6% over 2026, 0.2 percentage points higher than the estimate that had been available at the time of the February Report. 16: There had been some declines in inflation expectations ahead of the Middle East conflict. The latest Bank/Ipsos and Citi measures of year-ahead expected inflation had both fallen. The Decision Maker Panel survey had reported that firms’ year-ahead own-price inflation expectations in the three months to February had edged down slightly. Timelier financial market-based measures of inflation compensation had increased since the conflict started, with near-term measures having increased markedly and by much more so than medium-term measures. 17: UK GDP had expanded by 0.1% in 2025 Q4, slightly below the 0.2% rate expected in the February Report. Notwithstanding some divergence in the signal from different business surveys, activity had remained subdued in 2026 Q1 with monthly GDP flat in January. Bank staff continued to estimate that underlying quarterly GDP growth for Q1 would be around 0.1 to 0.2%. 18: Labour demand had remained weak. The Labour Force Survey unemployment rate had been 5.2% in the three months to January, unchanged from December and close to the expectation in the February Report. Employment growth had remained subdued, while the vacancies-to-unemployment ratio had remained below the Bank staff estimate of its equilibrium rate. 19: It was too early to assess the full impact of recent developments in the Middle East on bank lending conditions in the United Kingdom. Term Overnight Indexed Swap rates had increased to levels previously seen in early 2025. Some mortgage lenders had increased the interest rates quoted on new mortgage products as a result. Despite a slowing in January, annual growth in the M4ex measure of broad money had remained robust at 3.6%. Overview and the Committee’s discussions 20: The recent conflict in the Middle East, and the consequent disruption to oil and gas supply, had led to a significant increase in wholesale energy prices since the MPC’s previous meeting. Monetary policy could not influence global energy prices but aimed to ensure that the economic adjustment to these prices occurred in a way that achieved the 2% inflation target sustainably. 21: Prior to these events, there had been continued disinflation in the UK. This partly reflected the restrictive stance of monetary policy, and was consistent with subdued economic growth and building slack in the labour market. 22: In light of the new, and potentially large, external supply shock, the Committee’s discussions at this meeting focused on: what was known at this stage and what was likely to be known in the near future; its approach to considering the risks around a new medium-term outlook; and the potential implications for monetary policy. 23: The near-term outlook for CPI inflation had risen relative to the February Report projection. Increased energy prices would impact near-term inflation directly via increased household fuel and utilities prices, and indirectly as business’ energy-related costs would also be affected. Preliminary staff estimates, based on energy price developments in the run-up to this meeting, indicated that CPI inflation was now likely to be between 3 and 3½% over the next couple of quarters. In the February Report, CPI had previously been expected to fall back to around the 2% target from April, partly owing to measures in Budget 2025. 24: The first-round impact on inflation from global factors would depend on the scale and duration of the conflict, and its impact on energy and other commodities markets. The Committee noted that even a short-lived conflict was likely to lead to a delay in restoring energy production back to normal levels, as well as the possibility of lingering instability, that could leave energy prices elevated for a period of time. A more protracted conflict could result in broader supply chain disruptions that could push up inflation further, for example owing to disrupted air and sea transport logistics, impacts on fertiliser supply, and trade disruption. 25: Taking into account the lags with which changes in Bank Rate were transmitted, the most important factor in setting policy would be how medium-term inflation was affected by this supply shock. The MPC was assessing a range of risks to medium-term inflation in both directions, although upside risks appeared to have increased most notably since February. 26: The MPC was alert to the increased risk of domestic inflationary pressures through second-round effects in wage and price-setting, the risk of which would be greater the longer higher energy prices persisted. Energy and food prices, which were expected to rise, were particularly salient for households’ formation of inflation expectations. And households and businesses could have a heightened sensitivity to any new inflationary shock, following successive negative supply shocks in recent times. This could lead to self-perpetuating behaviour in wage and price dynamics, which could embed domestic inflationary pressures. 27: The MPC was also assessing the implications for inflation from the weakening in economic activity that was likely to result from higher energy costs. In contrast to the energy price shock in 2022, this shock was occurring at a point when growth was below potential and the economy was operating with a margin of spare capacity. Increases in household fuel and utility costs, and other prices, would squeeze real incomes. Household and business confidence could deteriorate and precautionary saving could rise, further weighing on demand. This could result in a more rapid or larger rise in unemployment. These factors could widen the output gap somewhat, potentially constraining second-round effects. 28: Monetary policy had been judged to have been somewhat restrictive prior to the shock. The market-implied path for Bank Rate had shifted up significantly since the MPC’s previous meeting, and financial conditions had tightened. Against that backdrop, the Committee would continue to monitor and assess developments closely. 29: Members agreed that developments over the next six weeks could shed light on the likely scale and duration of the conflict, as well as providing some early evidence on the likely propagation of the shock. There was a range of possibilities for how monetary policy might need to respond to different developments and risks. A larger or more protracted shock, which risked greater second-round effects in wage and price setting, would require a more restrictive policy stance. Conversely, policy would need to be less restrictive if the shock was very short-lived, or if there were to be a larger opening up of slack in the economy that was expected to reduce medium-term inflationary pressures. The MPC would act as necessary to ensure the 2% target was met sustainably. The immediate policy decision 30: The Committee turned to its policy decision at this meeting. 31: All members preferred to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75% at this meeting. The Committee would have more information and analysis ahead of its next meeting on the evolution and impact of the conflict. The Committee would continue to monitor closely the situation in the Middle East and its impact on global energy supply and energy prices, and the UK inflation outlook. All members stood ready to act as necessary to ensure that CPI inflation remained on track to meet the 2% target in the medium term. 32: The Chair invited the Committee to vote on the proposition that: Bank Rate should be maintained at 3.75%. 33: The Committee voted unanimously in favour of the proposition. MPC members’ views 34: Members set out the rationale underpinning their individual votes on Bank Rate. Members are listed alphabetically. Votes to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75% Andrew Bailey: Large movements in energy prices have resulted from events in the Middle East and uncertainty over the duration of supply disruptions. Monetary policy cannot reverse this shock to supply. Its resolution depends on action taken at its source to restore the safe passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Monetary policy must, however, respond to the risk of a more persistent effect on UK CPI inflation. A prolonged disruption to the supply of oil, natural gas and other commodities such as fertiliser and neon gas increases the upside risk to inflation. The recent experience of high inflation may also make households and businesses more sensitive to a new inflationary shock. At the same time, the starting point for this shock is a real economy with limited pricing power. Holding Bank Rate at this meeting is appropriate. I will be monitoring developments extremely closely and stand ready to act as necessary to ensure that inflation remains on track to meet the 2% target in the medium term. Sarah Breeden: Conflict in the Middle East has significantly shifted the outlook for inflation. Absent this shock, the underlying disinflation process had continued broadly as I expected and, consistent with my vote in February, I would have expected to vote for a cut again in March. But the conflict will have a significant, though at this point highly uncertain, impact on inflation. I associate myself strongly with the MPC’s collective assessment and communications at this meeting. Monetary policy cannot influence global energy and commodity prices, but it can and it must aim to ensure that the economic adjustment to them occurs in a way that achieves the 2% target sustainably. How that adjustment occurs is hugely uncertain, with risks to both sides, and I vote to hold at this meeting. The Committee will learn more by its April meeting about the scale and duration of the shock, as well as its possible second-round effects, and so the implications for monetary policy. Swati Dhingra: The economic outlook is at a crossroads following hostilities in the Middle East. The UK economy will face higher energy prices, though how much higher and for how long makes all the difference. In one scenario, we could see a more modest increase in energy prices which probably slows rather than derails disinflation as limited scope exists for significant pass-through and second-round effects, given the state of the labour market and broader domestic demand environment. In another scenario, severe and longer-lasting constraints on oil and gas supply, alongside broader trade disruptions, could overwhelm orderly market adjustment. This could warrant a hold or increase in Bank Rate to stabilise price-setting dynamics albeit creating a difficult trade-off with activity following a prolonged period of weakness. If we see something resembling the lower-inflation scenario, I would expect to reduce Bank Rate, possibly quickly, over the rest of the year. For now, there is value in pausing to reassess the balance of risks to inflation from the terms-of-trade deterioration. Megan Greene: The risk of inflation persistence has risen, perhaps significantly, in light of the negative supply shock from the war in the Middle East. Pre-conflict data showed a mixed picture for the underlying disinflationary process: the Agents revised expected average pay settlements up to 3.6% in 2026; but households’ inflation expectations, while still elevated, had dropped significantly. With this new energy shock, preliminary Bank staff estimates suggest CPI inflation will rise above 3% for much of this year, above the threshold at which households are more sensitive to inflation outturns in their expectation setting. There could also be increases in fertiliser and food prices, and both energy and food prices are particularly salient for households’ inflation expectations. Inflation has been above target for the best part of five years, and households and businesses are likely to be more sensitive to upside surprises in inflation given successive negative supply shocks. I believe there may be a larger trade-off now than in 2022, but that the impact of this energy shock on inflation is paramount. It is appropriate to hold Bank Rate to learn more about the size and duration of the shock, and the extent of potential second-round effects. Clare Lombardelli: The conflict in the Middle East will be damaging for the UK economy, increasing inflation and reducing output. We are early in the process of assessment. The shock will have direct effects such as higher fuel and utility prices; indirect effects on business energy and transport costs; and broader second-round effects as the shock transmits through the economy impacting demand, supply, expectations of inflation, wage-setting and pricing behaviour. Policy coming into this shock may have been broadly neutral or mildly restrictive and there has since been some tightening of financial conditions. We will learn more in coming weeks about the shock itself and its effects. I am prepared to act as needed to address any persistent inflationary effects that may emerge. Catherine L Mann: Due to the conflict, the tension between rising inflation and softening activity – a configuration of data that had been relevant for my decisions earlier last year, but which had lessened sufficiently for me to consider monetary easing – has re-emerged and could easily worsen. Sustained pressure on energy prices could re-embed the inflation persistence of the last few years, through households’ salience to energy prices, firms’ state-dependent pricing, staggered wage contracts, and attentiveness thresholds. Significant volatility in oil and gas prices will increase volatility in other prices, putting systematic upward pressure on inflation. On the activity side, while the Ofgem price cap limits household exposure now, a further weakening in consumer sentiment and demand could result from an increase in their precautionary saving buffers. Financial conditions have tightened considerably in nominal terms, but relatively less so in real terms, complicating assessment of restrictiveness. The new forecast and high-frequency data arriving over the coming weeks will help inform my next decision. Since the conflict may yield a sustained inflation shock, I see the balance between inflation and activity to have shifted away from considering a cut towards considering a longer hold, or even a hike at some point to lean against inflation persistence. Huw Pill: Events in the Middle East have imparted an inflationary impulse to the UK economy via their impact on global energy prices. In the first instance, this impulse transmits through higher fuel and utilities prices (direct effects) and the pass-through of higher input costs into other consumer prices (indirect effects). Owing to lags in transmission, monetary policy can do little to dampen the resulting short-term volatility in inflation. But monetary policy must contain potential second-round effects that would otherwise exert a more lasting impact on CPI inflation. I continue to believe structural change in price and wage-setting behaviour over the past decade has made the propagation of inflationary impulses more persistent than in the past. This assessment has been reinforced by upward revisions to the Agents’ pay survey, with settlements in 2026 now expected at 3.6%. As such, the potential for second-round effects following recent events in the Middle East remains substantial, justifying caution in monetary policy setting. While financial conditions have tightened in recent weeks, whether this proves sufficient to contain potential upside risks to price stability stemming from energy prices is an open question. I remain alert to those risks and stand ready to act if they intensify. Dave Ramsden: The damaging economic shock resulting from the Middle East conflict has caused me to revisit my policy position. Data releases since the February Report have broadly been in line with my expectations, and suggested continuing disinflation, so I would have otherwise voted for a 25 basis point cut in Bank Rate at this meeting. The conflict has now led me to vote for a hold in Bank Rate. There is a high degree of uncertainty around the scale and duration of the conflict, as well as its economic impact and any subsequent second-round effects. However, I agree with our current collective assessment of the economic outlook, including the risks to inflation and to activity, as set out in the Monetary Policy Summary and minutes. I stand ready to act as necessary to ensure that CPI inflation remains on track to meet the 2% target in the medium term. Alan Taylor: I think it appropriate to see us pausing to take stock, but inappropriate to infer a directional shift from this meeting. Before events in the Middle East, the disinflation process was nearly complete. Slack was worsening, with inflation set to reach target, making the case for a cut. However, the energy shock perturbs the near-term environment, with uncertain consequences contingent on its magnitude and duration. In a benign scenario, we might look through a milder shock, as in 2011 when the MPC faced an energy shock against the backdrop of a weak labour market. In this scenario, inflation would be higher and then lower in the near term, but largely unchanged in the medium term (when monetary policy has traction) with activity weakening. This could imply faster and potentially deeper rate cuts, once inflation risks subside, to avoid being behind the curve. In a less benign scenario, where supply disruptions persist, the MPC faces a tougher policy trade-off between elevated inflation and even weaker activity. Given massive uncertainty around future energy prices, I currently see a high bar to hiking. I prefer to hold while we better gauge the shock. Policy can then be calibrated to deliver our 2% target, and we can take activist steps whenever needed. Operational considerations 35: On 18 March, the stock of UK government bonds held for monetary policy purposes was £528 billion. 36: The following members of the Committee were present: Andrew Bailey, Chair Sarah Breeden Swati Dhingra Megan Greene Clare Lombardelli Catherine L Mann Huw Pill Dave Ramsden Alan Taylor Brian Bell was present as the Treasury representative. David Roberts was present as an observer for the purpose of exercising oversight functions in his role as a member of the Bank’s Court of Directors. 37: Megan Greene declared to the Committee that she would be taking up a non-executive director role at Trastor Real Estate Investment Company, a Greek real estate investment company listed on the Athens stock exchange, focused on acquiring and managing commercial real estate assets in Greece. It was confirmed that Trastor has zero exposure to UK real estate. It was agreed that Megan Greene would recuse herself from any MPC papers or discussions concerning EU commercial real estate in the event that the topic was discussed by the Committee. The Bank of England Act 1998 gives the Bank of England operational responsibility for setting monetary policy to meet the Government’s inflation target. Operational decisions are taken by the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee. The minutes of the Committee meeting ending on 29 April will be published on 30 April 2026.

Dystopian. A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes. This old adage - incorrectly attributed to Mark Twain - highlights how misinformation can spread faster than the truth. And, in an era of information overload and accelerating tech deciphering the wheat from the chaff is certainly challenging. The same could apply to Artificial Intelligence (AI). Hardly a day passes without some other prognostication of about how AI will disrupt the world, peoples’ livelihoods and literally take us all over. AI threatens to put all job roles at risk. What happens then for people with diminished or little to no income? With the swirling tsunami of information on AI, governance, regulation and risk around it are all in the mix. There is clearly a massive dose of hype out there and some frothy valuations for companies in the sector. Some of the things will come to pass, while other postulations could well wide of the mark. But as AI scales output, without verification it scales misinformation and procedural error. In recent weeks heard talk of an AI tech bubble that could implode.  According early 2026 data the top five major so-called 'HyperScalers' (Microsoft, Alphabet, Meta, Amazon, Apple, often with Nvidia/Oracle) comprise over 20% of the S&P 500 index's total market capitalization. AI Use & Misuse Like everything else, AI used wisely can offer tremendous benefits. Used unwisely or misused one could come a cropper. Even small failures can lead to big consequences. Just take the recent embarrassing case in the UK with West Midlands police using AI to generate a report that justified imposing a ban on Maccabi Tel Aviv football team against Aston Villa last November using an AI tool (Microsoft Copilot). It wrongly referred to a game and therefor trouble that never took place. The upshot was the West Midland’s chief constable stepped down early from his job. Separately, I have anecdotal evidence an AI tool (again Microsoft Copilot) used at a care home to produce a report on an elderly resident suggested why not produce a eulogy on them even though the individual was still very much alive. It could be argued that these are not ‘AI mistakes’ but rather governance failures (no provenance, no accountability chain and no audit trail). Then an again, generative AI for anti-money laundering (AML) compliance has been hailed as a cure-all. AI-powered (AML) screening transforms compliance from reactive, rules-based systems to proactive, real-time detection. It leverages machine learning to analyse huge datasets, significantly reducing false positives, identifying complex, hidden, and novel money laundering patterns, and enhancing customer due diligence. What Damage Could AI Do? The latest variants of AI are threatening white-collar jobs as much as or even more than blue-collar ones. Some academics like Roman Yampolskiy, a Latvian computer science professor at the University of Louisville who is considered to have coined the term AI safety in 2011, has chillingly suggested that AI could eliminate 99% of jobs by 2030. There is an upshot of sorts - adults could have 60 to 80 hours of time freed up each week. There will no doubt be “winners and losers” as the former Swedish finance minister Anders Borg from 2006-2014, who I met at an AI conference near Wall Street hosted by IPsoft (now Amelia) a few years ago ventured to journalists. This was all between meeting model Lauren Hayes, the face behind IPSoft’s Amelia assistant, and Max Tegmark, a physics professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Serving at the time as a senior advisor to the firm, Borg argued that those individuals who adapted to this brave new AI world and trained up would thrive. Governments around the world would have a hard time dealing with the outcomes on the employment front.  That said, some have contended that job opportunities could outweigh job losses through AI deployment and evolution - though probably more so in the U.S. than in Europe, where there are more AI-focussed companies compared to Europe. So how do break this down? According to Ronny Boesing, a Danish entrepreneur behind various tech ventures and founder of ByteShares, a co-operative Web4 network focusing on integrating identity, work, and community: “We are living through an AI acceleration that is both unmistakably real and structurally incomplete.” Adding: “Real, because model capabilities have jumped from ‘useful’ to ‘strategic’ in a shockingly short time - across code, content, research, customer service, and internal operations. Incomplete, because capability alone does not produce a durable economic system.”  Denmark itself hasn't been a laggard on the AI front. Last summer the country’s government announced a move to clampdown on AI deepfakes by giving people copyright to their own features. And, in Odense, the third biggest city, Odense Robotics is part of a new European effort called AI-MATTERS that will establish test and experimentation facilities between 2023 and 2027. Boesing postulated in a recent paper that the next decade of AI will be “won by architecture - not models.” But it also needs to be all singing and dancing - and prove it can deliver and not make mistakes. AI Market & Investment But what of the AI market itself and all that froth? According to Stanford’s AI Index global private investment in AI was about $91.9 billion (bn) back in 2023, while investment specifically in generative AI zoomed to roughly $25.2bn. This is a signal that capital is concentrating around the most visible part of the stack.   Subsequently in 2024, the AI Index reported that generative AI investment rose again (c.$33.9bn), even as the ecosystem continues to wrestle with trust, accountability and deployment realities.  At the same time, McKinsey estimated that generative AI could add $2.6 trillion (trn) to $4.4trn annually across use cases. “That is if organizations build the conditions required to realize it (work redesign, governance, measurement, and adoption). And, that ‘if’ is the whole story,” Boesing argues. Money is pricing outcomes before the system can reliably produce them. Based on February 2026 reports, major U.S. technology companies are engaging in an unprecedented, record-breaking expansion of capital expenditure (Capex) to dominate the AI market, with a projected $650bn to be spent in 2026 by Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft - largely focused on constructing and powering massive AI data centers (a +c.60% year-on-year increase over 2025). Put in context that figure is larger than the nominal GDP of Sweden for 2025. AI Bubble… Indicative of the rush by investors to get involved and evidence that a bubble is currently underway, Google parent Alphabet’s launched of a £1bn 100-year sterling bond on the UK market (maturing in 2126 with a 6.125% per annum interest rate). It was specifically as part of its efforts to fund long-term AI infrastructure and data centres. Can one discern the truth amongst all the noise out there? Well, according to British-Venezuelan academic Carlota Perez’ work on technological revolutions financial bubbles often appear when financial narratives outrun the real system-building phase and value is assumed (but questionable) - until the infrastructure catches up and the technology becomes boring, trusted, and everywhere.  Perez’s book ‘Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages’ (2003) describes the connection between tech development and financial bubbles, showing repeated surges over the past three centuries. Examples cited include the age of steam and railways, mass production and the automobile and the current information/knowledge society. …Architecture beats Models… At the bottom of it there are some common threads. Boesing’s paper echoing Perez’s work puts forth that AI becomes a bubble when: (a) Value is priced before it is proven; (b) Governance is promised but not operational; (c) Identity is optional; (d) Audits are impossible; and, (e) The upside is narrative-driven.  As Dane Boesing puts it: “AI becomes a system when structure produces evidence: identity-bound participation, enforceable rules, measurable contribution, receipt-able reward, verifiable trust.” Rik Turner, Chief Analyst in the cybersecurity team at research house Omdia, who was previously on the firm’s financial services technology team, commenting says on hype versus reality noted: “Undoubtedly, the stratospheric valuations of the companies behind the foundation models (OpenAI, Anthropic, even xAI) are completely out of whack with where the development of AI currently stands.” He adds: “Indeed, one could see parallels with the valuations of companies that were putting in the plumbing for the Internet in the run-up to the dot-com crash, though in the 2026 version, the whole thing is on steroids.” There are certainly plenty of use cases emerging for AI, but Turner concurs that it is “very early in the evolution of the more advanced variants, particularly agentic AI.” Generative AI (GenAI), which all got started with ChatGPT (from OpenAI) launch in November 2022, is definitely being integrated into multiple areas of knowledge work, i.e. the white-collar stuff that folks use as it’s good for collecting and collating information, then coming up with suggestions/recommendations for the next steps to take. Or generating potential text that can be used for an email you need to send or the letter to the job candidate confirming their interview date. There is also a major use case in application development (what used to be called programming in the distant past), whereby you can input a natural language request for an app to process online orders and schedule deliveries (hence the 16,000 redundancies at Amazon announced this January), and it will spit out the application code, however good, bad, or unsafe it might be. What makes AI ‘System-Grade’ A practical way to separate hype from deployment is to ask whether the system can prove its own integrity.  And over the next decade it is not going to be decided by who has the flashiest model but rather determined by who builds the architecture that makes AI accountable, auditable, and economically repeatable. System-grade AI requires: identity-bound participation (so accountability has a subject); enforceable rules (so behaviour is not optional); measurable contributions (so value creation is legible); receipt-able rewards (so the economy can settle); and verifiable, repeatable trust (so the same process can be audited twice and yield the same truth). When those five conditions are met, AI stops being a narrative and becomes infrastructure. Equally with AI investment and applications being applied increasingly across sectors, I ponder whether alien intelligence will get in on the act. We are already hearing about AI bots chatting to each other. Take Moltbook, a platform like Reddit but for chatbots (numbering c.150,000) rather than humans.  Different AI bots have accounts and post, reply and engage in interactions with each other via Moltbook. Surely it won't to be too long before the aliens out there get a slice of the action. Fanciful?  Well, according to Professor Avi Loeb, a theoretical physicist and ex-Chair of Astronomy at Harvard University who founded the Black Hole Initiative in 2016, stated in a Medium post this February: “My recent experience with state-of-the-art AI makes it clear that humanity had already birthed a new lifeform with alien intelligence. Even though it speaks our language, this alien relies on silicon chips rather than biological neurons.” It’s life but not necessarily as we know it. Watch this space NOTE: For more information on Ronny Boesing, founder of ByteShares, a Danish cooperative blockchain initiative that combines digital identity, compliant token infrastructure, and AI City-style civic innovation to build member-owned digital and real-world economic systems, can be found via website byteshares.dk  For a background overview page see: byteshares.dk/om-byteshares

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) today published a Consultation Report on Good Practices concerning over-the-counter (OTC) Commodity Derivatives Markets. This report invites comments on proposed good practices intended to support the effective implementation of IOSCO’s Principles for the Regulation and Supervision of Commodity Derivatives Markets, with a particular focus on strengthening the implementation of Principles 12, 15, and 161 in the context of related OTC markets. Feedback received will inform the final report, which will provide guidance to support effective implementation of the principles and strengthen the integrity and stability of global commodity markets. Commodity market participants often hold positions across exchange-traded, OTC and physical markets. This interconnectedness can affect price formation, increase volatility, and heighten the risk of market abuse, particularly where Market Authorities lack visibility over large, concentrated positions. Effective oversight therefore depends on timely access to comprehensive information across related markets, timely intervention, and increased information sharing and cooperation between regulators. Building on IOSCO's Targeted Implementation Review on Principles for the Regulation and Supervision of Commodity Derivatives Markets, and informed by engagement with exchanges, market participants and trade associations, the report proposes a set of good practices to: Strengthen the implementation of Principles 12, 15, and 16 in relation to the collection and aggregation of OTC derivatives data, including beneficial ownership, to support effective surveillance, alongside enhanced information-sharing and cooperation between exchanges and regulators, and among regulators, particularly in times of stress. Set expectations about the timely regulatory intervention to prevent or address disorderly market conditions, particularly where risks in OTC markets may spill over into exchange-traded markets, supported by transparent intervention policies and improved information flows. Promote proportionate, risk-based, and market specific approaches to OTC data collection and intervention powers. “IOSCO is committed to promoting resilient and fair commodity derivatives markets globally. By consulting on these good practices, we are seeking to support consistent and effective implementation of the principles in a way that is proportionate to risk and adaptable to different market structures.” -   Jean-Paul Servais, IOSCO Board Chair “As commodity markets become more interconnected, regulators need the right tools and information to identify and respond to emerging risks. This consultation sets out practical good practices to support effective supervision of OTC markets and to safeguard market integrity.” -   Carol McGee, Chair of the IOSCO Committee on Derivatives Comments may be submitted using this form on or before 19 June 2026. If you require technical assistance on completing the survey, please contact itsupport@iosco.org. If you have questions about the report or the consultation, please contact CDWG.CR@iosco.org. Principle 12: Authority to Obtain Information; Principle 15: Intervention Powers in the Market; Principle 16: Unexpected Disruptions in the Market.

Simon McQuoid‑Mason joins to lead New Product Development, Market Structure and Business Development for the London Stock Exchange and Turquoise Tom Stenhouse appointed CEO of Turquoise, LSEG’s pan-European trading venue Two new hires at Turquoise Europe  LSEG today announces several senior leadership appointments across its European equities business, underscoring its commitment to long-term competitiveness, customer service and innovation across the region’s trading landscape. Following his appointment in December 2025, Simon McQuoid‑Mason will assume responsibility for Business Development in addition to leading New Product Development and Market Structure. With deep expertise in market structure and electronic trading, Simon brings a strong commercial focus to the role, ensuring LSEG continues to deliver solutions that enhance execution quality, deepen customer relationships, grow partnership opportunities, and reinforce the Group’s position as a competitive force in European equities. As part of these changes, Tom Stenhouse has been appointed CEO of Turquoise, LSEG’s pan-European trading venue*. In addition to his role as Head of Product, Tom will be responsible for the management of Turquoise Europe, ensuring secure operations whilst expanding the venue’s footprint across Europe and overseeing the growth of Turquoise’s European ecosystem. LSEG has also made a number of strategic appointments within Turquoise Europe, based in Amsterdam. Elian Matthijssen has been appointed as Director, Turquoise Europe, and will be responsible for leading operations of Turquoise Europe, expanding the venue’s footprint across Europe and overseeing the growth of Turquoise’s European ecosystem. Remko van Moll has been appointed Senior Business Development Manager, leading customer engagement and the expansion of Turquoise’s trading services in continental Europe. Charlie Walker, Deputy CEO, London Stock Exchange plc, said: “We are delighted to announce these senior appointments which reinforce our strategic ambition to operate competitive equities trading venues in Europe, including the London Stock Exchange and Turquoise. We remain committed to operating high quality markets that support our customers’ evolving capital raising and trading needs.”   *Subject to regulatory approval

Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) announces that Deutsche Digital Assets has listed their first Exchange Traded Products (ETPs) on Nasdaq Stockholm. The ETP named Safello Staked Bittensor ETP is a 100 percent physically backed Bittensor ETP. “We are proud to welcome Deutsche Digital Assets as a new ETP issuer on Nasdaq Stockholm. Their listing underscores our ongoing commitment to expanding transparent, innovative investment options for the Nordic market. By broadening the range of locally listed ETPs, we continue to support both retail and institutional investors with regulated, cost‑efficient access to digital assets,” says Helena Wedin, Head of ETF and ETP, Nasdaq European Markets. Deutsche Digital Assets (DDA) is a full‑service investment platform offering institutional‑grade access to crypto assets. The company provides a broad range of digital‑asset investment products and solutions—from passive to actively managed strategies—alongside white‑label financial product services for asset managers. ”The Nordics are an important and progressive market for crypto ETPs and Nasdaq Stockholm is the gateway. We are proud to list the Safello Bittensor Staked TAO ETP on Nasdaq Stockholm which marks an important milestone for DDA and shows our commitment to crypto investors in this region.” Said Dominik Poiger, Head of Product Management at DDA. Romain Bensoussan, Head of Sales at DDA added: “Sweden is one of Europe's most active markets for crypto ETPs, and institutional interest in the region is accelerating. Listing STAO on Nasdaq Stockholm gives investors access to a regulated, staking-enabled exposure to Bittensor, one of the most compelling AI infrastructure narratives in digital assets. This cross-listing reflects DDA's ambition to make best-in-class crypto ETPs accessible across every major European market.”

100% of open interest seamlessly migrated from Nasdaq to Euronext Nord Pool Power Futures market. Key milestone in the delivery of Euronext’s Innovate for Growth 2027 strategic plan. Launch contributes to Europe’s strategic autonomy in the energy sector. Euronext, the leading European capital market infrastructure, announces the successful launch of Euronext Nord Pool Power Futures in the Nordics and Baltics. This launch marks a significant step in the execution of Euronext’s Innovate for Growth 2027 strategic plan. The expansion of Euronext’s derivatives franchise is enabled by Euronext’s unique integrated European model and further strengthens its position in European energy markets. At a time where Europe needs to reinforce its energy independence, this launch strengthens Europe’s market infrastructure by providing companies with reliable tools to manage electricity price volatility. It reinforces Euronext’s long‑term commitment to the Nordic region, following the acquisitions of Euronext Oslo Børs, Euronext Securities Oslo, Euronext Securities Copenhagen, Nord Pool and Admincontrol. The market became fully operational on 16 March 2026, after the successful migration of 100% of open interest from Nasdaq Clearing to Euronext Clearing. All Nordic and Baltic contracts are now available for trading on Optiq®, Euronext’s trading platform, and cleared on Euronext Clearing. Developed in close collaboration with market participants, Euronext Nord Pool Power Futures offers efficient risk management tools and a resilient infrastructure for power futures trading. The market is designed to revitalise liquidity in Nordic and Baltic power futures through dedicated liquidity-provider initiatives that deepen market activity and support long-term trading capacity. Clearing efficiency is enhanced using Euronext Clearing’s Value-at-Risk (VaR) model, improving capital efficiency for participants. 173 TWh of open interest was seamlessly transferred to Eurone xt Clearing. 86 participants are now connected to this new market, and 16 clearing members offer the Euronext Nord Pool Power Futures. The creation of Euronext Nord Pool Power Futures establishes a unified, resilient and capital-efficient marketplace for Nordic and Baltic power futures, enabling clients to access both physical power markets and power futures through one marketplace. This contributes to a more integrated and efficient European energy system, supporting Europe’s strategic autonomy, cross‑border market functioning and sustainable, long-term market growth. Camille Beudin, Chair of the Nord Pool Board and Chief Diversification Officer at Euronext, said: “The successful launch of Nordic and Baltic power futures marks an important milestone in the delivery of our Innovate for Growth 2027 strategy. This initiative demonstrates Euronext’s ability to deliver solutions reinforcing Europe’s strategic autonomy in the energy sector. By combining Nord Pool’s trusted power benchmarks, strong energy knowledge and local presence with Euronext’s trading and clearing infrastructure, we are establishing a resilient and capital-efficient marketplace for Nordic and Baltic power futures. In an increasingly volatile energy environment, transparent and liquid hedging tools are essential for Europe’s energy market. Euronext Nord Pool Power Futures strengthens European energy market infrastructure, supports greater market integration across the continent, and helps ensure that energy price discovery and risk management remain anchored in Europe.”

London Stock Exchange Group plc (LSEG) announces today that it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each on the London Stock Exchange from Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc (Morgan Stanley) as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 26 February 2026: Ordinary Shares   Date of purchase: 18 March 2026 Number of ordinary shares purchased: 342,245 Highest price paid per share: 8,854.00p Lowest price paid per share: 8,648.00p Volume weighted average price per share: 8,765.64p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 500,729,962 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 500,729,962. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Market Abuse Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of the law of the United Kingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter) a full breakdown of the individual trades made by the Morgan Stanley on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/2105X_1-2026-3-18.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased: 342,245 Date of purchases: 18 March 2026 Investment firm: Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc   Aggregate Information: Venue Volume weighted average price Aggregated Volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share XLON 8,762.48p 316,953 8,648.00p 8,852.00p TRQX 8,805.20p 25,292 8,764.00p 8,854.00p

Hong Kong’s capital markets saw a strong finish to 2025, as a wave of strategic innovation drove breakthroughs for the listing and digital asset markets, according to the Securities and Futures Commission’s (SFC) Quarterly Report published today. On the IPO front, Hong Kong became the world’s top IPO venue last year, raising over $280 billion (Note 1). Notably, the new Technology Enterprises Channel (TECH), dedicated to technology listings, gave fresh momentum since its launch in May 2025, with a total of 119 IPO applications received from pre-profit biotech and specialist technology firms up to December. These consisted of 73 and 46 applications from pre-profit biotech and specialist technology companies, respectively. In the last quarter, the 10 IPOs of companies from these two sectors raised over $9 billion, up 800% year-on-year (YoY). To gatekeep listing applications and further solidify Hong Kong’s position as a trusted fund-raising hub, the SFC issued a circular to IPO sponsors in January to raise concerns about deficiencies in listing documents and sponsor misconduct (Note 2). It is now reviewing the sponsors' submissions as required by the circular and will commence thematic inspections of sponsors in the near term. On the digital asset front, Hong Kong’s emerging ecosystem continued to thrive. Newly introduced in 2025, SFC-authorised tokenised retail money market funds saw assets under management (AUM) grow steadily to $8.66 billion as of December, up 14% from a quarter ago (Note 3). For virtual asset (VA) spot exchange-traded funds (ETFs) – introduced in 2024 as Asia’s first – a total of 11 were listed in Hong Kong, with total market capitalisation surging 142% since launch to over $5.4 billion. The asset and wealth management market extended its vibrant growth in 2025, driven by a fast-expanding ETF segment including leveraged and inverse (L&I) products. The total market capitalisation of SFC-authorised ETFs and L&I products jumped 33.7% YoY to $618.7 billion as of December. They also saw net inflows of $9.2 billion last quarter, while their share of Hong Kong’s market turnover stood at 14%. In addition, Hong Kong-domiciled funds saw net inflows soar 118.5% YoY to $356.7 billion in 2025. As of December, their AUM surged 38.3% YoY to $2.28 trillion, and total number increased 9.1% YoY to 1,041. “2025 represents a year of high-quality growth for Hong Kong as a premier international financial centre, as strategic innovation propelled robust capital formation, an accelerating digital ecosystem and a thriving asset management sector,” said Ms Julia Leung, Chief Executive Officer of the SFC. “Looking ahead, the SFC remains committed to future-proofing Hong Kong’s markets by driving responsible innovation, enhancing resilience, and strengthening investor trust.” Other highlights: a)    For Mainland-Hong Kong Stock Connect, the average daily southbound trading increased 151% YoY to $121.1 billion last year. This accounted for 24.2% of market turnover in Hong Kong, up from 18.3% in 2024. As of end-December, cumulative southbound net inflows reached more than $5.1 trillion since launch in 2014. b)    In 2025, the SFC received 9,637 licence applications including 9,338 individuals and 299 corporations, a 17% increase from 2024 (Note 4). In the quarter, the SFC received 2,488 licence applications, up 27% YoY. c)    On investor protection, the SFC secured the first custodial sentence against an unlicensed finfluencer for providing paid investment advice on social media last quarter. d)    To further raise the public’s anti-scam awareness, the SFC broadened community outreach by hosting talks for university students and the elderly, as well as promotion at public estate shopping centres and the Police’s Anti-Crime Elite Games 2025 under its “Don’t be Sucker” (“咪做水魚” in Cantonese) campaign. Advertisements were also placed at high-traffic locations including MTR stations. The Quarterly Report is available on the SFC website. Notes: Unless otherwise specified, all figures are as of end-December 2025 and denominated in Hong Kong dollars. Please refer to the SFC’s press release dated 30 January 2026. These include the introduction of tokenised classes to existing SFC-authorised money market funds. Change from calendar year 2024 to 2025. This does not include applications for provisional licences.

On Wednesday, March 25, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent will preside over a meeting of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) at the Treasury Department. The meeting will consist of an executive session and an open session. The preliminary agenda for the executive session includes the Council’s quarterly financial stability monitor and an update on the work of the Council’s Household Resilience Working Group.* The preliminary agenda for the open session includes the Council’s proposed interpretive guidance on nonbank financial company designations and an update on banking supervision and regulatory reforms. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires the Council to convene no less than quarterly, but the Council has historically convened on a more frequent basis. The meetings bring Council members together to discuss and analyze emerging market developments and financial regulatory issues. The Council is committed to conducting its business as openly and transparently as practicable, given the confidential supervisory and sensitive information at the center of its work. Consistent with the Council's transparency policy, the Council opens its meetings to the public whenever possible. Open session Council meetings are made available to the public via live webcast and can also be viewed after they occur. Upcoming Council meeting dates and times are posted following the official notification to Council members of an upcoming meeting. Meeting minutes and readouts for past Council meetings are available below. Meeting minutes for the most recent Council meeting are generally approved at the next Council meeting and posted online soon afterwards. * In accordance with the Council’s Transparency Policy, which is available at www.fsoc.gov, this portion of the meeting will be held in a closed session to prevent the potential disclosure of information contained in or related to investigation, examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of, an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial markets or financial institutions; information which would lead to significant financial speculation, significantly endanger the stability of any financial market or financial institution, or significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action; information exempted from disclosure by statute or by regulation, or authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret; trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; and inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not otherwise be available by law.  WHO: Members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council WHAT: Open Session of the Financial Stability Oversight Council Meeting WHEN: 1:25 PM March 25. Please note that the start time is approximate, but it will not begin early. A live webcast of the open session will be available at:  https://home.treasury.gov/news/webcasts   

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (NYSE: ICE), one of the world’s leading providers of financial market technology and data powering global capital markets, will hold its 2026 Annual Meeting of Stockholders virtually on Friday, May 15, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time. Stockholders of record as of the close of business on Thursday, March 19, 2026 are entitled to participate in, vote and submit questions at the Annual Meeting. Stockholders will also be able to submit questions in advance of the meeting at proxyvote.com beginning on May 1, 2026. Additional information regarding the Annual Meeting, including how to participate, vote and submit questions, will be provided in the Company’s proxy statement, which will be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and will be available on the Company’s website at www.ir.theice.com in late March. A live audio webcast and replay of the Annual Meeting will be available on the Company’s investor relations website at www.ir.theice.com.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today released Treasury International Capital (TIC) data for January 2026.  The next release, which will report on data for February 2026, is scheduled for April 15, 2026.  The sum total in January of all net foreign acquisitions of long-term securities, short-term U.S. securities, and banking flows was a net TIC outflow of $25.0 billion.  Of this, net foreign private outflows were $76.1 billion, and net foreign official inflows were $51.1 billion. Foreign residents increased their holdings of long-term U.S. securities in January; their net purchases were $63.5 billion.  Net purchases by private foreign investors were $42.0 billion, and net purchases by foreign official institutions were $21.4 billion. U.S. residents increased their holdings of long-term foreign securities, with net purchases of $47.9 billion. After including adjustments, such as estimated foreign portfolio acquisitions of U.S. stocks through stock swaps, overall net foreign purchases of long-term securities are estimated to have been $15.5 billion in January. Foreign residents decreased their holdings of U.S. Treasury bills by $10.2 billion.  Foreign resident holdings of all dollar-denominated short-term U.S. securities and other custody liabilities increased by $17.8 billion. Banks’ own net dollar-denominated liabilities to foreign residents decreased by $58.3 billion. Complete data are available on the Treasury website here. ### About TIC Data The monthly data on holdings of long-term securities, as well as the monthly table on Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, reflect foreign holdings of U.S. securities collected primarily on the basis of custodial data.  These data help provide a window into foreign ownership of U.S. securities, but they cannot attribute holdings of U.S. securities with complete accuracy.  For example, if a U.S. Treasury security purchased by a foreign resident is held in a custodial account in a third country, the true ownership of the security will not be reflected in the data.  The custodial data will also not properly attribute U.S. Treasury securities managed by foreign private portfolio managers who invest on behalf of residents of other countries.  In addition, foreign countries may hold dollars and other U.S. assets that are not captured in the TIC data.  For these reasons, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from TIC data about changes in the foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets by individual countries. TIC Release for March       TIC Monthly Reports on Cross-Border Financial Flows       (Billions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted)                 12 Months Through                     2024 2025 Jan-25 Jan-26 Oct Nov Dec Jan     Foreigners' Acquisitions of Long-Term Securities                                             1     Gross U.S. Sales of Domestic U.S. Securities 70193.6 89320.1 71400.4 91676.5 8134.8 7814.6 9092.4 8543.1 2     Gross U.S. Purchases of Domestic U.S. Securities 69008.8 87708.7 70174.9 90003.5 8081.7 7597.3 8971.0 8479.6 3     Domestic Securities, net U.S. sales (line 1 less line 2) /1 1184.9 1611.4 1225.5 1673.0 53.1 217.3 121.4 63.5                             4       Private, net /2 1190.3 1601.5 1294.2 1582.8 63.2 153.1 114.2 42.0 5         Treasury Bonds & Notes, net 516.6 458.3 480.6 438.1 -33.1 45.2 -5.9 -0.7 6         Gov't Agency Bonds, net 127.2 112.9 120.7 122.7 20.4 -10.9 13.3 15.1 7         Corporate Bonds, net 264.3 347.6 277.9 332.8 23.0 47.5 17.2 10.6 8         Equities, net 282.2 682.7 415.1 689.2 53.0 71.4 89.6 17.0                             9       Official, net /3 -5.5 9.8 -68.7 90.2 -10.1 64.1 7.2 21.4 10         Treasury Bonds & Notes, net -26.8 -34.0 -48.2 40.9 -24.8 33.2 -21.1 50.6 11         Gov't Agency Bonds, net -44.2 -57.1 -49.4 -57.2 5.6 -2.6 -3.6 -5.2 12         Corporate Bonds, net 40.2 39.2 33.2 42.1 1.7 10.3 0.5 1.3 13         Equities, net 25.3 61.7 -4.4 64.4 7.3 23.2 31.4 -25.3                             14     Gross U.S. Sales of Foreign Securities 18304.9 23184.3 18608.7 24075.5 2137.6 2069.4 2244.6 2512.8 15     Gross U.S. Purchases of Foreign Securities 18713.7 23505.6 19038.0 24403.2 2158.8 2081.4 2269.5 2560.7 16     Foreign Securities, net U.S. sales (line 14 less line 15) /4 -408.8 -321.3 -429.3 -327.7 -21.2 -12.1 -24.9 -47.9 17         Foreign Bonds, net -260.3 -213.6 -272.9 -219.9 -36.6 -21.4 -19.7 -44.7 18         Foreign Equities, net -148.5 -107.7 -156.4 -107.8 15.4 9.3 -5.2 -3.3                             19     Net Long-Term Securities Transactions (lines 3 and 16): 776.1 1290.1 796.2 1345.3 31.9 205.2 96.5 15.5                             20     Other Acquisitions of Long-Term Securities, net /5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0                             21   Net Foreign Acquisition of Long-Term Securities                           (lines 19 and 20): 776.1 1290.1 796.2 1345.3 31.9 205.2 96.5 15.5                             22   Increase in Foreign Holdings of Dollar-Denominated Short-Term                           U.S. Securities and Other Custody Liabilities: /6 196.5 199.9 284.3 161.8 21.5 -0.5 12.2 17.8 23     U.S. Treasury Bills 222.3 142.3 283.2 99.0 21.8 0.3 9.7 -10.2 24       Private, net 165.3 60.7 160.0 64.8 7.0 1.0 6.8 -29.4 25       Official, net 57.0 81.6 123.1 34.2 14.8 -0.6 2.9 19.2 26     Other Negotiable Instruments                           and Selected Other Liabilities: /7 -25.8 57.6 1.1 62.7 -0.4 -0.8 2.5 27.9 27       Private, net -27.8 63.7 -1.1 69.6 -0.5 0.0 3.7 27.6 28       Official, net 1.9 -6.2 2.3 -6.9 0.1 -0.8 -1.2 0.4                             29   Change in Banks' Own Net Dollar-Denominated Liabilities 243.0 -69.5 190.4 -58.6 -73.0 -1.7 5.1 -58.3                             30 Monthly Net Dollar-Denominated Portfolio Inflows (lines 21, 22, and 29) /8 /9 1215.5 1420.4 1270.9 1448.5 -19.6 203.0 113.9 -25.0     of  which                   31     Private, net 1084.3 1388.6 1131.0 1393.7 -0.4 156.6 103.2 -76.1 32     Official, net 131.2 31.8 139.8 54.8 -19.2 46.4 10.7 51.1                                                         /1     Net U.S. sales = Net foreign purchases of U.S. securities (+).                 /2     Includes international and regional organizations.                 /3     The reported division of net U.S. sales of long-term securities between net sales to foreign official institutions and net sales               to other foreign investors is subject to a "transaction bias" described in Frequently Asked Questions 7 and 10.a.4 on the TIC website.   /4     Net transactions in foreign securities by U.S. residents. Foreign purchases of foreign securities = U.S. sales of foreign securities to foreigners.           Thus negative entries indicate net U.S. purchases of foreign securities, or an outflow of capital from the United States; positive entries           indicate net U.S. sales of foreign securities.                 /5     Minus estimated unrecorded principal repayments to foreigners on domestic corporate and agency asset-backed securities (zero after Jan. 2023) +          estimated foreign acquisitions of U.S. equity through stock swaps - estimated U.S. acquisitions of foreign equity through stock swaps +           increase in nonmarketable Treasury Bonds and Notes Issued to Official Institutions and Other Residents of Foreign Countries.      /6     These are primarily data on monthly changes in banks' and broker/dealers' custody liabilities. Data on custody claims are collected             quarterly and published in the TIC website.                 /7     "Selected Other Liabilities" are primarily the foreign liabilities of U.S. customers that are managed by U.S. banks or broker/dealers.     /8     TIC data cover most components of international financial flows, but do not include data on direct investment flows, which are collected           and published by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis. In addition to the monthly data summarized here, the           TIC collects quarterly data on some banking and nonbanking assets and liabilities. Frequently Asked Question 1 on the TIC website           describes the scope of TIC data collection.                 9/      Series break at February 2023 for lines 1-21 and the dependent lines 30-32; see TIC press releases of March 15 and April 15, 2023.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today released enforcement actions for March 2026. The OCC uses enforcement actions against an institution-affiliated party (IAP) to deter, encourage correction of, or prevent violations, unsafe or unsound practices, or breaches of fiduciary duty. Enforcement actions against IAPs reinforce the accountability of individuals for their conduct regarding the affairs of a bank. The term “institution-affiliated party,” or IAP, is defined in 12 USC 1813(u) and includes bank directors, officers, employees, and controlling shareholders. Orders of Prohibition prohibit an individual from any participation in the affairs of a bank or other institution as defined in 12 USC 1818(e)(7). The OCC has taken the following actions against IAPs: Order of Prohibition against Tabitha McCallister, former Client Service Representative at Old National Bank, Evansville, Indiana, for making unauthorized withdrawals from Bank customer accounts totaling over $19,000. (Docket No. AA-CE-2026-11) The OCC terminates enforcement actions when a bank has demonstrated compliance with all articles of an enforcement action; or when the OCC determines that articles deemed “not in compliance” have become outdated or irrelevant to the bank’s current circumstances; or when the OCC incorporates the articles deemed “not in compliance” into a new action. The termination actions are: Order Terminating the Consent Order against Heritage Bank, National Association, Spicer, Minnesota, dated April 2, 2024 (Docket No. AA-WE-2024-24). (Docket No. AA-WE-2026-10) Order Terminating the Formal Agreement with 1st National Bank, Lebanon, Ohio, dated July 25, 2024 (Docket No. AA-CE-2024-27). (Docket No. AA-CE-2026-1) Order Terminating the Formal Agreement with Slovenian S&LA of Franklin-Conemaugh, Conemaugh, Pennsylvania, dated July 26, 2024 (Docket No. AA-CE-2024-65). (Docket No. AA-CE-2026-13) Order Terminating the Formal Agreement with Touchmark National Bank, Alpharetta, Georgia, dated April 17, 2024 (Docket No. AA-SO-2024-25). (Docket No. AA-SO-2026-12) To receive alerts for news releases announcing public OCC enforcement actions, subscribe to OCC Email Updates. All OCC public enforcement actions taken since August 1989 are available for download by viewing the searchable enforcement actions database at https://apps.occ.gov/EASearch. Related Link Enforcement Action Types

The Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority recently finalized its Basel 3.1 framework for implementation at the start of 2027. David Bailey, executive director for prudential policy, talks to IQ about the importance of global consistency and the need to strike a balance in regulating fast-changing markets. Click on the attached PDF to read the interview. Documents (1)for IQ Interview with David Bailey ISDA IQ Interview with David Bailey Bank of England(pdf)

Please refer to the Regulatory Circulars listed below for the newly added adjusted symbols and the corresponding market for the underlying security used for openings on the MIAX Exchanges. The newly listed symbols will be available for trading on MIAX Options, MIAX Pearl Options, and MIAX Sapphire Options beginning Thursday, March 19, 2026. MIAX Options Regulatory Circular 2026-36 MIAX Pearl Options Regulatory Circular 2026-36 MIAX Sapphire Options Regulatory Circular 2026-37 Please direct questions to the Regulatory Department at Regulatory@miaxglobal.com or (609) 897-7309.

The market opened for three trading days this week as the Federal Government declared Thursday March 19 and Friday March 20, 2026, as Public Holidays to commemorate the Eid-el-Fitr Celebration. A total turnover of 8.761 billion shares worth ₦267.253 billion in 193,473 deals was traded this week by investors on the floor of the Exchange, in contrast to a total of 3.321 billion shares valued at ₦164.845 billion that exchanged hands last week in 318,907 deals. Click here for full details.

The attached tables and charts released on Wednesday summarize the economic projections made by Federal Open Market Committee participants in conjunction with the March 17-18 meeting. Projections (PDF) | Accessible Materials

Available indicators suggest that economic activity has been expanding at a solid pace. Job gains have remained low, and the unemployment rate has been little changed in recent months. Inflation remains somewhat elevated. The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. Uncertainty about the economic outlook remains elevated. The implications of developments in the Middle East for the U.S. economy are uncertain. The Committee is attentive to the risks to both sides of its dual mandate. In support of its goals, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 3‑1/2 to 3‑3/4 percent. In considering the extent and timing of additional adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks. The Committee is strongly committed to supporting maximum employment and returning inflation to its 2 percent objective. In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments. Voting for the monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle W. Bowman; Lisa D. Cook; Beth M. Hammack; Philip N. Jefferson; Neel Kashkari; Lorie K. Logan; Anna Paulson; and Christopher J. Waller. Voting against this action was Stephen I. Miran, who preferred to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point at this meeting. Implementation Note issued March 18, 2026