Today, ACER opens a public consultation on amendments to the gas network code on interoperability and data exchange. The aim is to assess the need to amend the network code to reflect recent regulatory and market developments. Why is this relevant? The Interoperability and Data Exchange Network Code establishes the framework for operating the EU gas network and exchanging information between network users. Since its adoption in 2015, European gas markets have changed, driven by: an evolving regulatory framework (2024 Gas and Hydrogen Regulation); the EU’s decarbonisation ambitions; and the introduction of a new European standard on gas quality (CEN EN 16726).    Why are we consulting? The European Commission invited ACER to assess whether the network code remains fit for purpose in light of these developments or if amendments are needed. This public consultation will support ACER in its assessment, ensuring that any amendment proposals are practical and aligned with market needs. Get involved! Interested stakeholders have until 20 May 2026 to submit their views. ACER will analyse the feedback received and evaluate the next steps for the network code review. Read more and share your views.

CCP Global has submitted a response to the European Commission's consultation on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector. To read the response, please follow this link.

All proposals to amend Chapter 15A of the Listing Rules and enhance the structured products listing framework received majority support The Key Product Requirements will come into effect on 1 May 2026, while the remaining Listing Rule amendments will come into effect on 1 July 2026 Existing issuers and guarantors will be provided with a 12-month transitional period to comply with the new issuer eligibility requirements The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the Exchange), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX), today (Monday) published the conclusions to its consultation on the Review of Chapter 15A – Structured Products (Consultation Conclusions)1. The Exchange received 28 responses from a broad range of respondents. All proposals received strong support from a majority of respondents. Having considered respondents’ views, the Exchange will adopt the consultation proposals, with some modifications and clarifications as set out in the Consultation Conclusions. HKEX Head of Listing, Katherine Ng, said: “Structured products play an integral role in Hong Kong’s securities market by enabling effective hedging and enriching market vibrancy. We are pleased to have received strong market support for our proposals. The updated listing framework will help ensure Hong Kong’s global competitiveness as the world’s leading structured product market, facilitate product innovation, and uphold robust standards of market quality and investor protection. Through these reforms, we aim to provide a more resilient and flexible framework to support market development, whilst further strengthening HKEX’s multi‑asset ecosystem.”  The Listing Rule amendments will be implemented as follows: the Listing Rule amendments relating to the following product requirements (Key Product Requirements) will come into effect on 1 May 2026: Minimum issue price – the minimum issue price of derivative warrants will be lowered to $0.15 from $0.25. The minimum issue price requirements for callable bull bear contracts will be removed; Minimum market capitalisation – the minimum market capitalisation at issuance for derivative warrants and callable bull bear contracts will be lowered to $6 million from $10 million; Emulation Issues – Emulation Issues must have product terms identical to existing issues other than issue price and issue size; and the remaining Listing Rule amendments will come into effect on 1 July 2026. Existing issuers and guarantors will be provided with a 12-month transitional period to comply with the new issuer eligibility requirements2. The Exchange will publish updated guidance to assist issuers’ compliance with the new requirements. The Consultation Conclusions and copies of the respondents’ submissions are available on the HKEX website. Notes: The consultation paper was published on 30 September 2025. The consultation period ended on 11 November 2025. Existing issuers and guarantors (i.e. those with either structured products listed on the Exchange, or a valid base listing document, as at 30 June 2026) will have until (and including) 30 June 2027 to comply with the new issuer eligibility requirements and the related disclosure requirements and ongoing obligations.

Nigerian Exchange Limited (NGX) announces the expansion of its trading hours from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (WAT), effective Monday, 27 April 2026, in a move designed to deepen market liquidity, enhance price discovery, and broaden investor access. Approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria, the expansion shifts the market opening earlier from 9:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and extends the close from 2:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., marking a significant evolution in the Exchange’s market structure. The extended trading window will provide greater flexibility for investors, improve responsiveness to market-moving information, and support broader participation across the market. The development builds on the momentum of Nigeria’s recent reclassification to Frontier Market status by FTSE Russell, reinforcing NGX’s global positioning and enhancing its attractiveness to a broader pool of domestic and international investors. This reform reflects strong regulatory collaboration and underscores the Securities and Exchange Commission’s continued commitment to advancing market development initiatives. Alongside Nigeria’s Frontier Market reclassification, it signals a deliberate shift towards a more accessible, liquid, and globally competitive market. The implementation follows extensive stakeholder engagement, ensuring alignment and operational readiness ahead of the go-live date. NGX Regulation Limited will continue to provide robust oversight to support a smooth and orderly transition, while maintaining high standards of transparency and investor protection. With this development, NGX reinforces its position as a leading multi-asset exchange, deepening liquidity, improving market access, and supporting efficient capital formation within Nigeria’s financial markets.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today, in coordination with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), issued updated model risk management guidance for OCC-supervised institutions. These actions build upon the OCC’s ongoing efforts to tailor its supervisory framework to reduce unnecessary burden and promote risk-based examination across institutions of all sizes. The updated guidance serves in part to rescind prior model risk management guidance and other issuances and to clarify that model risk management practices should be risk-based, tailored, and commensurate with a banking organization’s size, complexity, and extent of model use. The guidance does not set forth enforceable standards or prescriptive requirements, and non-compliance will not result in supervisory criticism. This guidance highlights sound principles for effective model risk management. In particular, the guidance discusses the factors that influence model risk and the features of effective model development and model use; model validation and monitoring; and governance and controls. The guidance also discusses considerations specific to vendor and other third-party products, including validation of these products. The updated guidance is expected to be most relevant to banking organizations with over $30 billion in total assets. However, the guidance may also be relevant to smaller institutions with significant model risk exposure due, for instance, to the prevalence and complexity of their models. In addition, generative AI and agentic AI models are novel and rapidly evolving. As such, they are not within the scope of this guidance. The OCC is rescinding prior model risk management issuances, including OCC Bulletin 2011-12, “Supervisory Guidance on Model Risk Management,” OCC Bulletin 2021-19, “Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering: Interagency Statement on Model Risk Management for Bank Systems Supporting BSA/AML Compliance and Request for Information,” and OCC Bulletin 1997-24, “Credit Scoring Models: Examination Guidance,” including the Appendix, “Safety and Soundness and Compliance Issues on Credit Scoring Models,” as well as the “Model Risk Management” booklet of the Comptroller’s Handbook. The OCC, Federal Reserve Board, and FDIC plan to issue in the near future a request for information that addresses model risk management generally and considers, in particular, banks’ use of AI, including generative AI and agentic AI and AI-based models. Related Link Bulletin 2026-13, “Model Risk Management: Revised Guidance”

Click here to download Malawi Stock Exchange's weekly summary Report.

The current reports for the week of April 14, 2026 are now available. Report data is also available in the CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE), which allows users to search, filter, customize and download report data. Additional information on Commitments of Traders (COT) | CFTC.gov Historical Viewable Historical Compressed COT Release Schedule CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE) PRE User Guide PRE Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Thank you, Joe, and thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.1 My subject, as it often is, is the outlook for the U.S. economy and the implications for monetary policy. My last outlook speech was at the end of February, which, I have to say, now feels like it was a year ago.2 Before I get to everything that has happened since, let me remind you of how things looked back then. The economic data indicated that, in the absence of the temporary effects of tariffs, inflation was running a bit above the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) 2 percent goal. The larger question was whether the labor market was substantially weakening, with the unemployment rate fairly steady but little job creation and other signs of a softening labor demand relative to supply. At that point, I was looking for a clearer picture of whether the risks to the FOMC's maximum employment goal called for a cut in our policy rate or if we should hold that rate steady to support continued progress toward 2 percent inflation. After that speech and before the FOMC's March meeting, two critical things occurred. The first was the start of the conflict with Iran, which quickly disrupted energy production and transportation in the Middle East and sent global energy prices soaring. While central bankers rightly tend to discount the effects of temporary oil supply shocks, it was apparent that a prolonged disruption in that region could have a lasting effect on inflation and U.S. economic growth, and that was a consideration going into the FOMC's March 17 and 18 meeting. The second development is what we have come to more fully recognize about the supply side of the labor market. Over the course of last year, we got the details of how net immigration, which was 2.3 million in 2024, fell to a minimal level in 2025 and is continuing at a very low level in 2026. This pattern has lowered population growth and, hence, the growth of the labor force. This change in immigration, combined with the continued aging of the population, means that very little or no net job creation is necessary to absorb new workers into employment.3 This development is unprecedented in recent history, and I believe it is a significant factor in understanding the economic outlook and what that means for monetary policy. Before I say more about these two important considerations for the outlook, I will start with how the economy looked ahead of the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East and then discuss how I think things will evolve if the cease-fire in place today holds and if there is progress toward reopening the Strait of Hormuz. But since that outcome is not assured, I will also discuss another scenario, where supply disruptions continue for an extended time. Beyond the length of these disruptions, with this economic shock coming on the heels of the boost to prices from import tariffs, I believe there is the possibility that this series of price shocks may lead to a more lasting increase in inflation, as we saw with the series of shocks during the pandemic. So far, there is limited data for March, which is when the conflict began, but what we do have indicates that real gross domestic product (GDP) was growing modestly in the first quarter of 2026, in the absence of a temporary boost from the rebound in activity after the end of the government shutdown in late 2025. A continued surge of business investment in the first two months of the year seems to have mostly offset the apparent softness in consumer spending to keep the economy growing. Data center construction and related spending on high-tech equipment are very strong, and these both have spillovers to investment in other capital goods. Meanwhile, surveys of purchasing managers for both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing businesses indicate that their companies expanded sales in March. And the consensus of respondents to the Blue Chip survey implies that real GDP grew at a 2.4 percent annual rate in the first quarter. Let's turn to the labor market. Any assessment has to take on board the supply-side considerations I mentioned earlier. One that has been a factor for some time is the aging of the population. Members of the "baby boom" generation associated with the surge in births in the 20 years after World War II began to reach retirement age around the year 2008. Since then, retirements have outpaced new entrants to the labor force, pushing down the labor force participation rate. The other big factor has been the decline in net immigration I mentioned, which was around 400,000 in 2025, much lower than in previous years, and is expected by some to be around zero in 2026. Together, these two forces are holding labor force growth at about zero. An important implication is a reduction in the number of new jobs needed to reflect a healthy labor market and keep the unemployment rate steady. In previous years, this number ranged between 50,000 and 150,000 per month, but with no growth in the labor force, it is now likely close to zero. In fact, over the second half of last year employers shed 50,000 jobs, an average of 10,000 per month, and the unemployment rate moved largely sideways. Low payroll growth means that there is a much greater likelihood of employment shrinking in any month, something that was a fairly unusual occurrence in the past during an economic expansion. And, in fact, payroll gains have alternated between positive and negative numbers for the past 10 months. Most recently, after closing the year with a loss of 17,000 jobs, payrolls grew 160,000 in January—the largest increase in more than a year—promptly fell 133,000 in February and bounced back to grow 178,000 last month. This head-snapping volatility has only made it harder to assess the state of the labor market and where things stand relative to the FOMC's maximum-employment goal. I am going to have to get used to payroll numbers that are lower than I am accustomed to seeing in a growing economy as well as the possibility that even several months of negative payrolls may not be the warning sign of a recession that it often has been in the past. Nevertheless, I want to explain why I continue to see weakness in the labor market that leaves it vulnerable, starting with data showing low numbers of both hires and people losing their jobs. This phenomenon is documented in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey data and is consistent with what business contacts have been telling me, as well as stories collected in the Federal Reserve's Beige Book survey of business conditions. On the one hand, employers are hesitant to shed workers, even in the face of softening demand, perhaps because of the difficulties they faced in finding workers in the tight labor market after the pandemic. On the other hand, employers are very hesitant to hire workers because of the considerable uncertainty over the outlook. My sense is that employers are walking a tightrope between their earlier challenges in finding qualified workers and where they think the economy is going, leaving them vulnerable to some economic shock that could tip them over and lead to significant job reductions. While the unemployment rate is fairly steady and close to FOMC participants' views of its longer-term, or natural, rate, data on job finding, availability, and openings are continuing to edge lower. The low job-finding rate means that workers are unemployed for longer, and behind the fairly stable count of unemployed people, a growing share are out of work for an extended time. Before I turn to how the conflict with Iran is affecting inflation, let's consider where it was through February. According to the FOMC's preferred inflation measure, personal consumption expenditures (PCE) prices were up 2.8 percent in February from a year before. Core prices, excluding volatile food and energy, are a better guide to ongoing inflation, and they were up 3 percent. Neither measure is close to the FOMC's 2 percent goal, both are just about where they were a year before, and it might seem we hadn't made progress. But this view doesn't consider the role of import tariffs that were first introduced a year ago, which have boosted prices for those goods. Being here at Auburn University and as a former professor, I don't want to miss an opportunity to impart a lesson on price levels versus inflation. When tariffs are passed along in consumer prices, they raise prices and push up inflation, which is the rate at which prices are rising. Once that tariff effect is in place, prices are at a new, higher level; it no longer raises inflation; and, over time, we see the effect on inflation fade. While tariffs boosted inflation considerably in 2025 and into this year, using research by the Federal Reserve staff on their estimated effect and taking that out of the published inflation numbers, we find that underlying inflation—by which I mean excluding tariff effects—is running close to 2 percent.4 So, through the end of February, I found that underlying inflation was making progress toward our goal and that it wasn't a significant concern for monetary policy. I was more concerned about the labor market, which showed signs of weakness and I felt was more vulnerable than it might otherwise be due to the low rates of hiring and layoffs. That was the picture on February 28, when the conflict with Iran began. Then we saw higher energy prices quickly feed through to headline inflation. Prices for gasoline have risen by more than one-third since the conflict started, with a national average of $4.10 per gallon as of Thursday. Using crude oil futures as a proxy for other energy prices, we find that Brent—the global benchmark—was $61 per barrel at the start of the year and has bounced around $95 per barrel in recent days. We have seen the effects of the increase in energy prices in March inflation data. The energy component of the consumer price index jumped 10.8 percent last month. This is a one-month change! Twelve-month headline inflation was boosted to 3.3 percent and core inflation to 2.6 percent. When we combine this information with producer price data, estimates suggest March PCE inflation will come in even higher, standing around 3.5 percent for headline and 3.2 percent for core. So what happens next? Let me stipulate that I believe economic forecasting is hard even in normal circumstances. I am tempted to say it is a bit like batting averages in baseball, where an excellent result is failing two-thirds of the time, but that wouldn't be fair to baseball—we forecasters have an even lower rate of success. Anyway, add a military conflict in the Middle East to the task of predicting the course of the economy, and things get very complicated. The first thing to do is establish a good baseline, which I hope I have done in the foregoing discussion of the outlook on the eve of the conflict's outbreak. Beyond that, when presented with a new development that could produce a range of economic outcomes, I have found it helpful to use stylized scenarios.5 Progress Is Made to Reopen the Strait of HormuzThe first scenario assumes progress to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and the return of energy markets and broader trade flows relatively quickly toward conditions that existed before the conflict started. I hope, and do still believe, that this scenario is a reasonable probability. Even after the failure of peace talks last week, futures prices have Brent falling to $82 per barrel by the end of 2026 and $75 per barrel by the end of 2028, consistent with the view that markets will return to something close to normal in a reasonable length of time. If this comes to pass, I expect that the boost to energy prices in headline inflation will fade over the medium term and that expectations of future inflation will remain anchored. The pass-through of higher energy prices to other goods and services should be limited. And despite the pain caused by higher energy prices, consumers and businesses will understand that the worst is past, energy prices should begin to recede, and this view will tend to support ongoing growth in spending, production, and hiring. This prospect probably represents a best-case scenario for the economy. The Strait of Hormuz Remains ClosedUnfortunately, to me, the oil futures prices I cited and securities markets in general seem to be undervaluing the risk that the conflict continues, the Strait remains closed, and disruptions to production and shipping keep energy prices high, which I consider a very possible scenario. Supporting this view is the fact that economic policy uncertainty indexes have risen to quite elevated levels in recent days.6 While futures prices in general seem too optimistic, I note that the tail of the distribution of oil prices at the end of this year is skewed toward the higher prices that I see as more likely than what markets are pricing in. For inflation, the risk is that the longer the conflict drags on and energy prices remain high, the more likely it is that these elevated prices will bleed into other prices, as businesses incorporate costly energy input costs in setting their prices. With continued constraints on shipping in the Strait, I would also expect supply chain constraints. Commodity inputs, including fertilizer and helium, are produced in the region, and these prices in turn could drive up farm prices globally. Meanwhile, if some regions of the world experience a slowdown in production due to energy shortages, this will introduce additional supply constraints. Then there is the issue of how the oil shock, piled onto the lingering effect from import tariffs, affects expectations of future inflation. The standard practice for policymakers is to look through shocks like this that temporarily elevate inflation.7 But what happens when there is a sequence of these shocks? In 2021 and 2022, the pandemic-induced demand and supply chain constraints were each considered one-off shocks that initially led me to look through their upward pressure on prices. But, ultimately, this series of shocks pushed up inflation to near 9 percent by one measure, longer-range inflation expectations started to move up, and the Federal Reserve took action.8 Learning from that experience, I will be cautious when faced with a sequence of transitory shocks. While intellectually it makes sense to look through each shock, with a sequence of shocks, policymakers need to be more vigilant. This is because if the shocks hit one after another, they will keep inflation elevated for quite some time. The standard "look through" can become problematic if businesses and households start to believe inflation is persistently high and it affects their price- and wage-setting behavior. One way I watch for this possibility is to look at readings on inflation expectations. While near-term inflation expectations have, naturally, risen, so far longer- term expectations have not. Inflation-adjusted Treasury securities in the range of 5 to 10 years are around 2.3 percent, a bit below their level at the end of 2025. While it is early, there is a risk that prolonged high energy prices and secondary effects that raise the price for other goods and services eventually do change the expectations of firms and consumers, who I note have seen inflation above 2 percent now for five years. Beyond inflation, there are other implications for the economy from a continuing conflict and high energy prices. Consumers may reduce spending because of higher prices, lower stock market wealth, and a drop in confidence. You may have heard that the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers last week reported its lowest-ever reading for consumer confidence. While that survey hasn't tracked closely with actual spending in recent years, I still find the signal from the data meaningful. Consumers seem to have mostly shrugged off the effect of import tariffs in their spending, and they may shrug off the latest shock, but then again, there may be a threshold crossed at which point they start to economize. If households respond with less spending, this shift will mean firms need to produce less, and that affects labor decisions. It might be the force that pushes employers off the tightrope that I invoked earlier in talking about their caution in hiring and layoffs. As we have seen often in past recessions, when the labor market weakens and unemployment starts rising, it can drive a cycle of reductions—herding behavior by firms that mimic each other's response to the shock—resulting in a significant decline in employment. The longer this conflict continues, the more closely I will be watching payroll numbers and the unemployment rate for signs of such a downward cycle in employment. Policy ResponseSo, what are the implications of recent events for monetary policy? It depends on how the conflict evolves and its effect on the economy, both highly uncertain. These will have a major influence on the path of policy. If the Strait of Hormuz opens and trade flows return somewhat to normal, then I can look through the effect of recent higher energy prices on inflation because I know it will unwind, and my focus will be on how the labor market evolves in the current no-hire, no-fire environment. Here, abstracting from the effects of tariffs and energy, I see a forecast in which underlying inflation would continue to move toward 2 percent, leaving me cautious about rate cuts now and more inclined toward cuts to support the labor market later this year when the outlook is more steady. But the longer energy prices remain elevated and the Strait is constrained, the greater the chances that higher inflation gets embedded across a wide variety of goods and services, various supply chain effects start to emerge, and real activity and employment start to slow. I will be particularly attentive to indications that this latest price shock, on top of the effects from tariffs, has moved up inflation expectations. A slower economy would restrain demand for goods and services, and perhaps soften the increase in prices, but I expect higher inflation than in the first scenario and that it would be elevated for some time. In this case, I also believe we would have a weaker labor market. High inflation and a weak labor market would be very complicated for a policymaker. If I face this situation, I'll have to balance the risks to the two sides of the Fed's dual mandate to determine the appropriate path of policy, and that may mean maintaining the policy rate at the current target range if the risks to inflation outweigh those to the labor market. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. See Christopher J. Waller (2026), "Labor Market Data: Signal or Noise?" speech delivered at "The Great Realignment: Navigating AI, Demographic and Geoeconomic Change," 42nd Annual NABE Economic Policy Conference, National Association for Business Economics, Washington, February 23.  3. For a full discussion of this issue, see Seth Murray and Ivan Vidangos (2026), "Labor Force Growth, Breakeven Employment, and Potential GDP Growth," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 2).  4. For a detailed discussion of the methodology to detect tariff effects on inflation, see Robert Minton, Madeleine Ray, and Mariano Somale (2026), "Detecting Tariff Effects on Consumer Prices in Real Time – Part II," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 8).  5. For two scenarios on the effects of import tariffs, see Christopher J. Waller (2025), "A Tale of Two Outlooks (PDF)," speech delivered at the Certified Financial Analysts Society of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, April 14.  6. This increase is true if one looks at indexes for just the U.S. or across the globe. See the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, available at https://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html.  7. For a review of the look-through approach, see the discussion by Edward Nelson (2025), "A Look Back at 'Look Through,' " Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2025-037 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May).  8. See Christopher J. Waller (2022), "Responding to High Inflation, with Some Thoughts on a Soft Landing," speech delivered at the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) Distinguished Lecture, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany, May 30. 

A total turnover of 3.588 billion shares worth ₦195.313 billion in 254,553 deals was traded this week by investors on the floor of the Exchange, in contrast to a total of 3.361 billion shares valued at ₦151.948 billion that exchanged hands last week in 229,442 deals. Click here for full details.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Risk Management Center at Kansas State University announced the return of the Agricultural Commodity Futures Conference, known as AgCon.  From October 22-23, the CFTC and KSU will jointly host the fourth AgCon, bringing government officials, agribusiness leaders, and academia together to discuss critical issues affecting America’s agricultural futures markets. The conference will be held at the Marriott Overland Park Hotel in Overland Park, Kansas. To register, please visit here. “The CFTC plays a critical role in ensuring American farmers and agribusinesses can effectively manage their risks utilizing the derivatives markets. This event, in partnership with KSU, will allow the agency to hear directly from agricultural leaders from across the country on how we can best serve the agriculture industry,” said CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig.  “Kansas State University is proud to host the agricultural commodity futures conference in partnership with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,” said Dan Moser, Eldon Gideon Dean, College of Agriculture, Kansas State University. “Since 2018, the K State Risk Management Center and the CFTC have worked collaboratively to convene this unique forum focused on issues critical to producers, end users, market participants, and policymakers. AgCon2026 serves an essential role at a pivotal moment for American agriculture, helping ensure that robust, effective price risk management tools remain available to support informed decision making across the agricultural sector.” 

Sarah Breeden Deputy Governor, Financial Stability Sarah reflects on the financial stability landscape in an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable world. Post-crisis reforms have built proven resilience in the banking sector, but familiar vulnerabilities have re-emerged elsewhere and history teaches us that crises often occur when multiple vulnerabilities crystallise at once. She sets out what we are doing to address these risks with an aim of ensuring this time is different. Speech It is no understatement to say that we have been living through extraordinary times.  And it’s not obvious there is a calmer outlook ahead of us. What might that mean for financial stability? History has taught us that crises do not arrive without warning. In the run up, optimism overrides caution, resilience is reduced, leverage and complexity build up, risk migrates to opaque and hidden corners. When a shock hits, we see rapid deleveraging, contagion and crisis. As the Bank of England’s Deputy Governor for Financial Stability, my focus is on making sure we learn the lessons from the past. So will this time be different? Let me start with some good news. The global financial system has proved resilient in the face of extraordinary shocks. In the space of the last six years we have experienced six big shocks – a pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the failure of a number of overseas banks including a global systemically important one, severe stress in the UK gilt market following the mini-budget in 2022, repeated disruptions to world trade, and the worst energy shock in my living memory. Conflict in the Middle East continues to add to uncertainty and unpredictability, with sharp movements in energy prices and bond yields. Yet, through all of this, the system has largely absorbed shocks rather than amplified them. It has continued to provide essential services to households and businesses. That resilience matters – and it is not an accident. It reflects the hard‑won lessons of the global financial crisis. Banks now hold significantly more, and higher‑quality, capital and liquidity, and we are much better prepared for a failure (Ramsden, 2026). Macroprudential tools – from countercyclical capital buffers to housing measures – lean against the build‑up of risk, so that debt is less likely to magnify downturns. So it’s natural to ask: is this time different? Or is there more we need to do? Today I will look at the lessons from history, assess where vulnerabilities now sit, and explain how recent events affect the odds that those vulnerabilities will crystallise at scale. And I will finish by setting out what we are doing – at home and internationally – to reduce the likelihood of that happening. Lessons from history History rarely repeats itself precisely – but it does tend to rhyme. Across financial crises, a common pattern emerges. Optimism slowly outruns realism. Confidence replaces caution. And risk migrates, via complex routes, to the least visible, least regulated, and least well‑understood corners of the system. Galbraith’s The Great Crash 1929footnote[1] describes a period convinced that innovation had rewritten the rules. Equities were treated as a one‑way bet. Investment trusts promised diversification while quietly amplifying leveragefootnote[2]. Warnings were not absent – but they were discounted. Accounts of the global financial crisis, like Andrew Sorkin’s Too Big To Failfootnote[3], tell a strikingly similar story. Complexity provided reassurance. Models offered comfort. Risk was judged to be small and dispersed – and therefore contained. The point is not that equities in the 1920s were the same as sub‑prime mortgages in the 2000s. Each era invents its own instruments. Innovation changes the packaging; human behaviour supplies the content. The question to ask is not whether history will repeat itself—but whether we can hear its echoes and whether we act in time. There are real reasons to think the system is considerably stronger than in the past. First, the banking system. Banks are far better capitalised and more liquid than before the global financial crisis. UK bank stress tests show that the banking system can continue to lend through severe but plausible scenarios, including sharp increases in commodity and energy prices and major supply‑chain disruptions – a scenario that feels somewhat familiarfootnote[4]. A credible resolution regime further reduces the risk that an individual bank failure becomes systemic. Second, households and businesses. Corporate balance sheets today appear more resilient than in the mid‑2000s and vulnerability indicators are well below past peaks. Household indebtedness is close to its lowest level since the early 2000s, arrears are low, and debt‑servicing burdens remain manageable. Risks have not disappeared – they have shifted But resilience in parts of the system does not guarantee the resilience of the whole. Activity has increasingly migrated from banks to market‑based finance, which now accounts for around half of UK and global financial‑sector assets. That shift brings benefits. It diversifies funding and moves risk from entities with fixed nominal liabilities – such as bank deposits – to investors who should expect and are better placed to absorb losses. But losses, and the behaviours they trigger, can still amplify shocks – particularly when leverage, liquidity mismatch and complexity are involved. At the same time, risk has shifted towards sovereign balance sheets. Before the global financial crisis, vulnerabilities were concentrated in households and firms. Since then, governments have borrowed extensively – first to stabilise the system after the GFC, and later to support businesses and households through the economic effects of the pandemic and war in Ukraine. Sovereigns have long horizons and the greatest capacity to manage risk. But public debt in advanced economies is now close to post‑war highs. That reduces fiscal space, limiting governments’ ability to respond to future shocks, and can increase sensitivity to shifts in market confidence. When government bond yields rise sharply, financing conditions tighten across the economy. Sovereign bond markets anchor pricing for mortgages and corporate credit and provide core collateral for repo and derivatives markets – the plumbing of the financial system. When that plumbing fails, stress can propagate quickly, as the UK experienced in autumn 2022. Against that backdrop, I wanted to highlight three vulnerabilities that are salient today. Risk one: the growing importance of private markets. Private markets play an important role in financing productive investment. They broaden the financing landscape and can allocate risk to investors best placed to bear it. Growth has been rapid. Global private‑market assets under management are estimated to have risen around six‑fold since the low‑rate era began in 2008/9, to roughly $18 trillion by 2025. They have not yet been tested, at that scale and complexity, by a broad‑based macroeconomic shock in a higher‑rate environmentfootnote[5]. The Financial Policy Committee has long highlighted vulnerabilities in risky credit markets, notably private credit (Benjamin, 2024). Transparency is more limited. Valuations may lag reality. Underwriting standards have weakened. Leverage is a layer cake – at the borrower, fund and sponsor level – making it hard to measure. Loans are sometimes sliced and diced into CLOs and often held or distributed on the basis of ratings agency assessments. And complex connections to the rest of the financial system, including banks, insurers and reinsurers, create an ecosystem where losses that are already hard to size become even harder to trace. Recent events have sharpened attention on this sector. Investor sentiment towards riskier credit has weakened, reflecting concerns about asset quality, valuation discipline and liquidity. A series of defaults – MFS, Tricolor, First Brands Group – has reinforced concerns. Redemption pressures have also risen in a number of international retail private‑credit funds, largely distributed through wealth management channels. Retail involvement remains small in aggregate. But as history shows, stress often emerges first at the margins – and then spreads. A broad-based credit crunch in private markets could tighten financing conditions for the UK real economy. If valuations or rating assessments are challenged – through defaults, markdowns or discovery that risk models have been mis-calibrated – lenders may pull back. Akerlof’s “lemons” problem may then apply. When investors struggle to distinguish between good and bad risks – as well they might given opacity and complexity – they price the worst case. In that environment, sound borrowers can end up paying “bad‑firm” prices simply because, under stress, it’s hard to differentiate. And limited incentives to do that differentiation can further tighten lending conditions. Risk two: leverage in government bond markets. Hedge funds have become increasingly important players in government bond markets. And their use of leveraged strategies has been a key driver in the recent growth of leverage in UK cash gilt markets. In early 2026, net gilt repo positioning reached its highest level since data collection began in 2017, with borrowing concentrated among a relatively small number of firms pursuing similar strategies. These strategies support liquidity in normal times. But as price‑sensitive, leveraged investors, hedge funds can amplify shocks and cause jumps to illiquidityfootnote[6]. This risk is not unique to the UK, with similar developments notable across many advanced economy bond markets. And many hedge funds operate across jurisdictions and multiple asset classes, increasing the risk that stress in one market spills into others through shared exposures or correlated deleveraging. Our first system-wide stress exercise (SWES) showed how hedge fund activity can amplify stress in gilt markets if the costs of repo financing increase sharply or banks limit funding. The extent of this pull back from banks was often greater than expected by their counterparts. The discretionary deleveraging of concentrated positions can also amplify market moves, as we saw in UK short rates when hedge funds unwound commonly held positions after the onset of the Iran conflict. Markets effectively absorbed the high volatility and volumes. But if market interest rates move by more than they would have done otherwise, we might see an additional tightening in financing conditions. Risk three: stretched asset valuations. A third vulnerability lies in asset valuations. Despite a materially uncertain macroeconomic outlook, global risk premia remain compressed, close to levels last seen before the global financial crisis. Valuations in parts of the US technology sector – particularly firms closely linked to artificial intelligence – appear especially stretched even as the path to monetisation of this new general purpose technology remains unclear. At the same time, investment by AI firms is increasing materially – estimated at over $5trn over the next five years. To date, much of this investment has been financed by equity and cash. But debt financing – across public markets, leveraged finance and private credit – has risen rapidly and is expected to increase furtherfootnote[7]. While we have already this year seen some adjustment in market valuations in AI‑related sectors, they remain elevated. A reassessment of the future earnings potential could lead to abrupt price declines and raise questions over how debt will be repaid. Any broader stress across credit markets could affect UK borrowers and investors. Echoes of the past Across all three of these risks you can hear echoes of the past. The combination of leverage, complexity, concentrations and opacity rhyme with the vulnerabilities brought about by the rise of CDOs in 2007 and, more distantly, the development of investment trusts in 1920s. All at a time when the disconnect between high risky asset prices and real economy uncertainty seems marked. I am not predicting the next crisis. But history suggests that when these conditions coincide, the system becomes more fragile. The conflict in the Middle East raises the odds that one or more of these vulnerabilities could crystallise at the same time. Shocks to growth, inflation and interest rates hit all borrowers simultaneously. Because the system is interconnected, stress in one area can amplify behaviour in others. The global financial crisis taught us that crises often involve multiple vulnerabilities crystallising together. Almost all of the vulnerabilities highlighted in our pre-GFC Financial Stability Reports crystalised at the same timefootnote[8]. In such a scenario, correlations and losses might shift outside of historic norms. So, firms and regulators alike need to be responsive and flexible in our risk management and stress testing now, with a focus on overlapping shocks and the likelihood of many shoes dropping at the same time. What we are doing differently Let me finish with what we are doing about current risks – and why the institutional framework today gives us greater confidence than in the past. A standing macro-prudential framework that focuses on identifying systemic risks has been the key driving force behind the increased resilience we have seen. I want to highlight three priorities as we look ahead. First, a shift towards genuinely system‑wide surveillance. As the system becomes more complex, interconnected and opaque, surveillance must follow interconnections, not institutional boundaries (Breeden, 2024). Our first SWES – an international first – examined how stress could propagate across core UK markets (Bank of England, 2024). This year we will conduct our second SWES focused on private markets, bringing together alternative asset managers, large banks and institutional investors such as insurers and pension funds (Bank of England, 2025). The objective is simple: to understand how market participants behave in stress; what that means for markets as a whole; and how shocks might transmit to the real economy. And since capital markets are global, our system-wide analysis must not stop at national borders. Already, other jurisdictions are running SWES-type exercises. Improved transparency and international coordination, including through the work of the FSB’s Non‑bank Data Task Force, are essential. Second, building greater ex‑ante resilience in market‑based finance. Surveillance alone is not enough. Where effective and practical, vulnerabilities should be addressed directly to build ex ante resilience – just as bank capital requirements have done for the banking system. A priority area is gilt‑repo resilience. Our reforms following the 2022 stress have strengthened LDI funds (Breeden, 2023), which have remained resilient through recent volatility. But results from our first SWES suggests more needs to be done. Last year we published a discussion paper on a range of proposals, including greater central clearing for repo and minimum haircuts for non‑centrally cleared repo trades (Bank of England, 2025). We will work with firms and authorities on next steps and provide a comprehensive update in early 2027. Again since these markets are global, progress also depends on international collaboration. The Financial Stability Board’s work on non‑bank leverage is an important foundation, and our analysis continues to build on it (FSB, 2025Opens in a new window ). Third, the development of new ex‑post tools. We cannot anticipate every crisis. And it would be neither feasible nor desirable to build ex‑ante resilience for every possible state of the world. We have a number of market-wide and contingent facilities that enable us to deliver liquidity when needed. While, central banks have long acted as lender of last resort to banks, friction in the system means liquidity does not always reach the areas where it is most needed in stress. And so most recently, we have developed the Contingent NBFI Repo Facility—a tool that can be activated to address severe gilt‑market disruption, lending cash against gilt collateral to participating insurance companies, pension funds and liability-driven investment funds where financial stability is threatened (Ramsden, 2024). It is precisely because of the ex-ante resilience that these firms have that we are able to provide them with such support ex post. And the same principle applies as we design our regulatory regime for systemic stablecoins (Bank of England, 2025). The ex-ante resilience delivered by our regime supports our ability to provide a standing liquidity facility that backstops their ability to monetise their backing assets in a stress. Conclusion Recent events are a reminder that large, correlated shocks can arrive with little warning. The global financial system has been resilient so far, reflecting deep structural improvements since the global financial crisis – especially in our banking system. So is this time different? The vulnerabilities that have preceded past crises have not disappeared. They have re-emerged elsewhere. Across private markets, government bond markets, and in stretched valuations, you can hear the familiar echoes of leverage, complexity, concentration and opacity. If some of these crystallise simultaneously, we may be in for a rocky ride. But what is different is our more resilient banking system and our focus. We look at the system as a whole. We invest in surveillance, build resilience where possible, and have targeted tools in case stress emerges. History suggests that the most dangerous moments are not simply those when risks are high – but those when they are too easily dismissed. Our task is to ensure that they are not. I’d like to thank Nickie Shadbolt for her assistance in drafting these remarks. I would also like to thank Martin Arrowsmith, Andrew Bailey, Lee Foulger, Grellan McGrath, Liz Oakes, Andrea Rosen, Tom Smith and Michael Yoganayagam for their helpful input and comments. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) or Financial Policy Committee (FPC). Galbraith (1955), ‘The Great Crash 1929’. Investment trusts in the 1920s were closed-end funds that pooled investor capital to hold diversified portfolios of securities. Their structure invited leverage at every level: the trusts themselves would issue bonds and preferred shares, in addition to equities, to finance their portfolios. Investors would often buy shares in investment trusts on margin, borrowing to acquire their stake. And a trust might hold shares in other investment trusts, creating chains of leverage. Sorkin (2009) , ‘Too big to fail’ The Results from the 2025 BCST indicated that the major UK banks had the capacity to continue to support the economy through a severe but plausible stress scenario involving a severe global supply shock. The scenario featured an escalation of geopolitical tensions that led to a sharp increase in commodity and energy prices, and a fragmentation of global trading relationships that led to severe supply chain disruptions. It involved high-advanced economy-inflation, higher global interest rates, deep and simultaneous recessions in the UK and global economies, with materially higher unemployment and sharp falls in asset prices. See Box E of the July 2025 Financial Stability Report for more detail on the implications of the growth in private markets for financial stability and real economy financing. See Box C of the July 2025 Financial Stability Report for more detail on the use of NBFI leverage in UK core markets. See Box C of the December 2025 Financial Stability Report for more detail on the financial stability risks from the impact of AI development on financial markets. See Box A of the April 2007 Financial Stability Report for the “Key sources of vulnerability for the UK financial system” highlighted at the time.

Introduction The global economy is navigating turbulent waters. Competing forces affecting economic growth are intersecting in a complex and uncertain environment. Global growth has been supported by rising investments related to artificial intelligence and fiscal policy across major economies. At the same time, geopolitical and trade tensions are a headwind and a major source of risks. The adverse effects on the global economy from the war in the Middle East primarily stem from the sharp increase in energy prices. Together with tighter financial conditions and heightened uncertainty, the war is having a negative impact on global growth, while posing upside risks to inflation. Other geopolitical tensions, in particular Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine, remain a major source of uncertainty. Protectionist policies are also weighing on global trade and fuelling uncertainty, while triggering a reconfiguration of global trade flows. Additional frictions in international trade could disrupt supply chains, reduce exports and weaken consumption and investment. A predictable and open international economic order remains essential to sustain global trade, investment and shared prosperity. Economic activity For the euro area, the medium-term implications of the Middle East war will depend on the intensity and duration of the conflict, as well as on how the associated shocks propagate through the economy. Reducing the share of the EU’s energy that is imported and accelerating the energy transition are essential to increase energy security, competitiveness and sustainability. The euro area economy entered this period of heightened uncertainty from a relatively solid position. Economic activity expanded by 1.4% in 2025, supported by rising real incomes, low unemployment and solid domestic demand. Construction and housing renovation strengthened, and firms increased their investment, particularly in digital technologies. Net exports began to stabilise towards the end of the year, despite the challenging global environment marked by volatile global trade policies. The latest ECB staff projections incorporate this heightened uncertainty and include alternative scenarios alongside the baseline. The baseline foresees real GDP growth of 0.9% this year, rising to 1.3% in 2027 and 1.4% in 2028. These projections rely on technical assumptions that envisaged a relatively contained conflict. At the same time, low unemployment, solid private sector balance sheets and higher spending on defence and infrastructure should continue to underpin growth. Under an adverse scenario, which assumes that energy supply disruptions persist until the third quarter of 2026, with a rapid adjustment afterwards, real GDP growth would be lower in 2026, before gradually converging to the baseline path thereafter. Under a severe scenario, which assumes a more intense and prolonged disruption continuing until late 2026, growth would be significantly reduced this year and next. Risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside, especially in the near term. The war in the Middle East is a downside risk to the euro area economy, adding to the volatile global policy environment. Additional risks arise from tighter global financial conditions, trade frictions and other geopolitical tensions, including Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine. Conversely, growth could turn out to be stronger if the economic repercussions of these wars prove to be more short‑lived than expected or if investment, reforms and new technologies lift productivity by more than expected. The current economic environment highlights the urgent need to strengthen the euro area economy while maintaining sound public finances. Any fiscal responses to the energy price shock should be temporary, targeted and tailored. The current energy crisis underscores the need to further reduce the economy’s dependence on fossil fuels. In this respect, the green and digital transitions would be supported by the completion of the EU’s Single Market and the savings and investments union. More generally, progress in those areas is key to funding innovation and will help European firms grow faster. Inflation Headline inflation rose to 2.6% in March from 1.9% in February due to an increase in energy inflation. Core inflation, which excludes energy and food, eased slightly to 2.3%. Food inflation also eased slightly to 2.4%. Indicators of underlying inflation remain consistent with our 2% medium-term target. Nominal wage growth slowed to 3.7% in the fourth quarter of 2025, from 4.0% in the third quarter. Negotiated wage growth and forward-looking indicators, such as the ECB’s wage tracker and surveys on wage expectations, suggest that labour costs will ease further in the course of 2026. The March ECB staff projections see headline inflation averaging 2.6% in 2026, 2.0% in 2027 and 2.1% in 2028. Inflation has been revised up compared with the December projections, especially for 2026. This is because energy prices are expected to be higher owing to the war in the Middle East. Core inflation is expected to moderate from 2.3% in 2026 to 2.2% in 2027 and 2.1% in 2028. This is also higher than the path in the December projections and was driven up by energy cost pressures, although easing labour costs, the euro’s earlier appreciation, and higher imports from China cushion the impact. The two alternative scenarios in the March projections help gauge a wide range of possible inflation outcomes, given the risk of more persistent or more intense energy market disruptions. Under both scenarios, the analysis suggests that a prolonged disruption in the supply of oil and gas would result in inflation being above the baseline projections. Compared with the baseline, the scenarios incorporate a stronger pass‑through to prices and more pronounced second‑round effects, reflecting the assumption of a larger and more persistent energy shock. The implications for medium-term inflation depend crucially on the magnitude of these indirect and second-round effects. The uncertainty surrounding the outlook for euro area inflation has increased significantly following the outbreak of the war in the Middle East. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the upside, especially in the near term while the medium-term implications will depend on the intensity and duration of the war. Inflation could turn out higher than the baseline, in particular if inflation expectations and wage growth were to rise in response more than expected. By contrast, inflation could turn out to be lower if the economic repercussions of the war in the Middle East fade more quickly, if indirect and second-round effects proved to be weaker than currently expected or if countries with overcapacity increased further their exports to the euro area. Monetary policy In March the Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises at our 2% target in the medium term. The war in the Middle East has made the outlook significantly more uncertain, creating upside risks for inflation and downside risks for economic growth. It will have a material impact on near-term inflation through higher energy prices. Its medium-term implications will depend both on the intensity and duration of the conflict and on how energy prices affect consumer prices and the economy. We are closely monitoring the situation, and the incoming information in the period ahead will help us assess the impact of the war on the inflation outlook and the surrounding risks. We will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, our interest rate decisions will be based on the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path. The Governing Council also decided to enhance the Eurosystem repo facility for central banks (EUREP) in February. EUREP provides backstop euro liquidity to non-euro area central banks against high-quality euro-denominated collateral, with appropriate risk mitigants. The updated framework, effective as of the third quarter of 2026, introduces standing access, in principle, for all central banks, unless excluded on the grounds of, in particular, money laundering, terrorist financing or international sanctions. The enhanced EUREP facility will also speed up the provision of liquidity. The decision reflects the more uncertain and potentially more volatile global environment, in which more frequent financial disruptions and possible knock-on effects on euro area financial markets may occur, with the potential to hamper the smooth transmission of monetary policy. Financial stability The outlook for euro area financial stability continues to be shaped by elevated geopolitical tensions and global macro-financial uncertainty. The war in the Middle East heightened the risks of energy disruptions, renewed inflationary pressures and financial market volatility. Market functioning has remained broadly orderly so far, but vulnerabilities linked to the euro area’s deep integration in global value chains – particularly in energy, critical raw materials and digital services – leave the region’s markets exposed to further abrupt repricing and tighter financial conditions. The banking system has proven resilient to recent geopolitical shocks, supported by strong capital, liquidity and profitability positions. However, rising credit risk among tariff-sensitive and energy-intensive firms and firms within global supply chains could strain asset quality across banks and non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs). NBFIs with concentrated exposures to high valuations and relatively illiquid assets, including private credit, may amplify shocks through forced asset sales and cross-asset contagion. Additionally, private market exposures and cross-border linkages could further exacerbate stress in non-bank financial intermediation. Meanwhile, interlinkages with non-banks might expose banks to market, funding and liquidity risks. Maintaining resilience and preserving a level playing field are key prerequisites for a strong financial system. Regulatory modernisation initiatives should not result in deregulation. Continued efforts to strengthen the policy framework for NBFIs – including by implementing internationally agreed reforms, improving data availability and sharing, and enhancing international cooperation – remain essential. In an environment of heightened uncertainty, well-capitalised banks help the real economy to mitigate the potential amplifying effects from an economic downturn. Therefore, banking sector resilience and compliance with the international regulatory framework play an important role in safeguarding financial stability. Payment systems The Eurosystem has recently published its comprehensive payments strategy, which outlines a holistic and forward-looking approach to wholesale, business-to-business, retail and cross-border payments amid rapid technological change. This new strategy brings together all major Eurosystem initiatives under a comprehensive framework to ensure that central bank money adapts to the digital age while supporting private sector initiatives. Making central bank money fit for the digital age covers both its use as a settlement asset between financial institutions and its use as a means of payment for European citizens and businesses. The digital euro will provide a digital means of payment that is universally accepted throughout the euro area. It will also support competition and innovation in the payments ecosystem. It is thus essential to swiftly adopt the Regulation on the establishment of the digital euro. The continued coexistence of public and private solutions establishes a mutually beneficial collaboration that will strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy in the retail payments market. The Eurosystem’s Pontes and Appia projects will bring central bank money to wholesale financial markets that are built on distributed ledger technology. By providing a safe, trusted and scalable settlement asset, tokenised central bank money supports the development of a robust, integrated European digital assets ecosystem. It also connects otherwise siloed private tokenisation initiatives, including stablecoins and tokenised deposits. This will enable such initiatives to complement central bank money, provided that they are EU-governed, euro-denominated and properly designed and regulated. Overall, the Pontes and Appia projects support efforts to develop a savings and investments union, while ensuring that the euro remains the trusted anchor of Europe’s digital economy. International cooperation Amid significant economic and financial challenges, increased uncertainty and downside risks, coming together to share views and find common solutions remains as crucial as ever. Therefore, we continue to rely on well-functioning multilateral institutions and international fora. We support the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its key mission to ensure macroeconomic and financial stability. This includes its analytical work on global imbalances and its efforts to improve the methodology for the assessment of external balances. We welcome its ongoing reviews of surveillance and conditionality and the financial sector assessment program. We value the IMF’s continuing work in the field of financial innovation and payments, including its support for sound regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions, and on macro-critical risks in surveillance and lending.

The European Banking Authority (EBA) has today published its response to the European Commission’s consultation on strengthening the competitiveness of the EU banking sector. In its response, the EBA underlines the importance of completing the Single Market for financial services, as a key driver of banking competitiveness. Drawing on its robust analytical work, the EBA provides evidence-based insights on banking competitiveness, the Single Market and the Banking Union, as well as on the complexity and effectiveness of the regulatory framework. These insights aim to support the European Commission’s report on the EU banking competitiveness. The EBA highlights the resilience of EU banks, strengthened by the post financial crisis reforms, while also pointing to the complex challenges facing the sector, including geopolitical risks, exposures to non-bank financial institutions, and digital transformation. The response also builds on the EBA’s October 2025 Report on the efficiency of the regulatory and supervisory framework (the Task Force on Efficiency – TFE - Report), which put forward 21 recommendations to simplify the banking rulebook. In line with these findings, the EBA emphasises that competitiveness can be enhanced through targeted simplification, while respecting the following principles: maintaining resilience and credibility by staying committed to Basel III standards; enabling banks to fully benefit from the Single Market; preserving and deepening the Single Market and the Banking Union; and ensuring an EU level playing field, with appropriate proportionality adjustments that avoid fragmentation of the rulebook. The EBA will continue working closely with the European Commission to support a competitive, resilient and stable banking sector. Background Over the past decade, the EU built up its regulatory and supervisory framework, increasing complexity and administrative burdens for institutions and authorities in some areas. In response, the EBA has launched a structured programme to promote simplification, proportionality and efficiency, while safeguarding financial stability and resilience. A key milestone was the publication, in October 2025, of the Report on the Efficiency of the Regulatory and Supervisory Framework, which sets out targeted recommendations to streamline regulatory products, reduce reporting burden, strengthen the EBA’s contribution to the EU prudential framework and improve internal working arrangements.   Summary of the EBA's response to the European Commission's consultation on banking competitiveness   Documents EBA response to European Commission's consultation banking competitiveness (827.71 KB - PDF) Related content Topic Simplification and efficiency of the Regulatory and Supervisory Framework Link Commission launches public consultation on EU banking

This Notice provides an update on the timelines for the London Metal Exchange’s (LME) market structure modernisation initiatives relating to enhancing liquidity on LMEselect. Download notice

CUSIP Global Services (CGS) today announced the release of its CUSIP Issuance Trends Report for March 2026. The report, which tracks the issuance of new security identifiers as an early indicator of debt and capital markets activity over the next quarter, found a monthly increase in request volume for new corporate and municipal identifiers. North American corporate CUSIP requests totaled 8,220 in March, which represents an 11.7% increase on a monthly basis. On an annualized basis, North American corporate requests were up 9.8% over March 2025 totals. Requests for new U.S. corporate equity identifiers rose 3.9% and requests for new U.S. corporate debt identifiers climbed 9.4% for the month of March. The aggregate total of identifier requests for new municipal securities – including municipal bonds, long-term and short-term notes, and commercial paper – rose 8.7% versus February totals. On a year-over-year basis, overall municipal volumes were up 1.3% through the end of March. Texas led state-level municipal request volume with a total of 97 new CUSIP requests in March, followed by California (96) and New York (92). “We’ve seen steady increases in CUSIP request volume across several major asset classes through the first quarter of 2026,” said Gerard Faulkner, Director of Operations for CGS. “This heightened pre-market activity, particularly in equity markets, suggests issuers are gearing up to access capital markets in a significant way over the course of this year.” Requests for international equity CUSIPs rose 11.0% in March and international debt CUSIP requests were flat. On an annualized basis, international equity CUSIP requests were up 13.6% and international debt CUSIP requests were up 16.6%. To view the full CUSIP Issuance Trends report for March, please click here. Following is a breakdown of new CUSIP Identifier requests by asset class year-to-date through March 2026: Asset Class 2026 YTD 2025 YTD YOY Change Private Placement Securities   1,444 1,123 28.6% Long-Term Municipal Notes 117 100 17.0% International Debt 2,091 1,793 16.6% U.S. Corporate Equity  3,632 3,115 16.6% International Equity 493 434 13.6% Short-Term Municipal Notes 201 192 4.7% CDs < 1-year Maturity  2,308 2,216 4.2% Syndicated Loans 716 700 2.3% CDs > 1-year Maturity 1,768 1,803 -1.9% Municipal Bonds  2,175 2,258 -3.7% U.S. Corporate Debt  7,432 8,518 -12.7% Canada Corporate Debt & Equity  1,353 1,693 -20.1%

DFM conducts a lineup of meetings with institutional investors and market participants during its Hong Kong visit.  Participation reinforces Dubai’s role as a gateway for capital into the GCC.  Dubai Financial Market (DFM) has concluded a visit to Hong Kong during the HSBC Global Investment Summit, held from April 14 to 16, as part of its efforts to expand international investor engagement. The visit drew significant interest from institutional investors, particularly from Asia, highlighting Dubai’s increasing role in global capital allocation. During the programme, DFM and its listed companies held a series of meetings with institutional investors, intermediaries, and market participants from key global markets. Discussions focused on market access, sector opportunities, and Dubai’s positioning within international portfolios. DFM’s participation underscores the strong financial links between Dubai and Hong Kong, two globally connected financial centres that play a key role in facilitating capital flows between the Middle East and Asia. The summit brought together leading global asset managers and exchange leaders, providing a platform to discuss evolving market dynamics, including shifts in capital flows and the growing importance of cross-market connectivity—areas closely aligned with DFM’s strategic priorities. Commenting on the visit, Hamed Ali, CEO of DFM and Nasdaq Dubai, said: “International investor participation remains central to our market, and engagement at global platforms such as the HSBC Global Investment Summit supports continued momentum. We are seeing increasing focus on markets that offer liquidity, accessibility, and a consistent pipeline of opportunities. Dubai is well positioned in this environment, and our priority is to translate engagement into sustained capital flows while supporting our listed companies in broadening their international investor base.” DFM’s participation aligns with the Dubai Economic Agenda (D33), which aims to position Dubai among the world’s leading financial centres by increasing market liquidity, attracting foreign investment, and strengthening economic partnerships across key international corridors. In the first quarter of 2026, total trading value reached AED 61 billion, a 48% year-on-year increase, with foreign investors accounting for 54% of trading.

The Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) recently undertook a visit to China, to further the ambitions of the new Capital Market Masterplan 2026-2030 (CMP) with regards to seeking more diverse investors and to create more opportunities for Malaysian investors. Conducted alongside representatives from Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) and Bursa Malaysia Bhd, the visit reflects a coordinated national effort under the fourth pillar of the CMP to deepen international connectivity, broaden investor participation and position Malaysia as a preferred investment destination. The engagements focused on accelerating capital market linkages between Malaysia and China, with an emphasis on unlocking new investment flows, strengthening institutional partnerships and expanding avenues for cross-border capital raising. High-level meetings were held with key Chinese regulators, including the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), underscoring a shared commitment to advancing regulatory cooperation and market connectivity.   The delegation also engaged leading Chinese institutional investors, including the China Investment Corporation, as well as major fund management firms such as China Asset Management Company, E Fund Management, Harvest Fund Management, Yinhua AMC and China Southern Asset Management.  These engagements are expected to catalyse greater investor interest in Malaysia’s capital market and facilitate more sustained participation from one of the world’s largest pools of institutional capital. Building long-standing institutional ties, discussions also advanced cooperation in key areas such as enforcement, investigation and market surveillance, towards a more integrated and resilient cross-border investment ecosystem. Participants further explored opportunities in product innovation and market development, including enhanced Chinese participation in cross-border exchange-traded funds (ETFs), potential dual listings and the expansion of Islamic capital market offerings such as sukuk. These initiatives are aimed at broadening the range of investment channels available to global investors while reinforcing Malaysia’s leadership in sustainable and Islamic finance. The Malaysian delegation was led by SC Chairman Dato’ Mohammad Faiz Azmi, BNM Beijing Office Chief Representative Faizal Fathil, Bursa Malaysia Chief Executive Officer Datuk Fad'l Mohamed and SC Capital Market Advisory Committee member Tan Sri Andrew Sheng. China was selected as the first destination for CMP-related regional engagements, reflecting the depth of bilateral economic ties and the significant opportunities to further scale investment connectivity between the two markets.   This engagement marks a proactive step towards mobilising global capital, enhancing investor access and positioning Malaysia at the forefront of regional capital market integration, and strengthening its role as a gateway for investment into Asean and beyond.  

HKEX proposes changes to various cash market processes to support the transition to T+1 settlement cycle Market participants should review their internal readiness and plan for an indicative implementation timeline of Q4 2027 The consultation period will last four weeks until Monday, 18 May 2026 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) published today (Friday) a Consultation Paper on Accelerated Settlement for the Hong Kong cash market (Consultation Paper). The paper outlines the proposed operational model to shorten the settlement cycle for Hong Kong’s cash market to T+1 from the current T+2, and seeks public comment. The Consultation Paper follows HKEX’s Discussion Paper published in July 2025 that initiated a market wide dialogue on accelerated settlement. Feedback received from a broad range of stakeholders indicated overall support for Hong Kong’s cash market to move to T+1, as key markets around the world continue to transition to shorter settlement cycles. HKEX Chief Executive Officer, Bonnie Y Chan, said: "HKEX is fully committed to futureproofing Hong Kong’s market infrastructure and ensuring that our standards continue to align with global developments and best practice. We are delighted to be consulting the market on our proposed operational model for a T+1 settlement framework. Our sincere thanks to all stakeholders for responding to our Discussion Paper in support of accelerated settlement. Their feedback and insights have been crucial in helping us shape the proposed T+1 settlement framework, as we progress closer towards implementation.” Ms Chan added: “Moving to T+1 is a key step forward as we further elevate the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s markets — making transactions safer, faster, and more robust, whilst laying the foundation for more infrastructure enhancements and innovations. We invite the industry to share their feedback and start preparing for this important transition, joining us to build a stronger, more vibrant marketplace, together.” Proposed T+1 settlement model HKEX has proposed certain amendments to the existing operating model covering the cash market trade lifecycle, while trade execution arrangements would remain unchanged. Diagram: Proposed T+1 Settlement Cycle   The proposals aim to facilitate earlier completion of post trade activities on the trade execution date (T), so that market participants can better prepare for settlement on the following business day (T+1). These measures include adjustments to the timing of clearing procedures, as well as settlement-related processing to facilitate timely and orderly settlement under a shortened cycle. However, the existing delivery versus payment framework and batch settlement structure will remain unchanged. Due to the accelerated post trade operation timeline, HKEX also proposes to extend service windows for settlement-related activities such as settlement instruction input and matching, providing participants with greater flexibility to complete their post trade processing ahead of settlement. The existing clearing risk management framework would continue to apply, with certain timelines adjusted to reflect the shorter settlement cycle. Based on feedback from the Discussion Paper, HKEX will consider developing a tool that enhances operational efficiency for institutional market stakeholders, including investment managers, custodians and brokers, under the T+1 settlement model. Scope and other considerations The proposed T+1 settlement cycle would apply to secondary market exchange trades, including equities, exchange-traded products, structured products and debt securities, as well as the physical settlement of equities arising from stock options exercise and assignment. Initial public offerings and Stock Connect Northbound trading would continue to operate based on their existing settlement timetables. A shorter settlement cycle will require adjustments across various downstream processes and related market activities. HKEX is also seeking market views on how these processes can be adjusted. In addition, HKEX encourages market participants to review their securities- and money-side activities, such as securities borrowing and lending, funding and foreign exchange arrangements, in order to support the proposed T+1 settlement cycle. Implementation HKEX will publish technical specifications to help market participants make necessary system enhancements, as required, in due course. Subject to market readiness and regulatory approval, the transition to a T+1 settlement cycle in the cash market is intended to take place in the fourth quarter of 2027. Given this indicative timeline, HKEX encourages market participants to begin assessing their operational readiness, systems and processes as soon as practicable. Upon finalising the T+1 framework, HKEX will also make subsequent amendments to its Exchange Rules, Clearing House Rules and Listing Rules. More details will be announced in due course. The consultation period will close on Monday, 18 May 2026. Interested parties are invited to respond to the Consultation Paper by filling out and submitting a questionnaire on the HKEX website.  

Today, Centiel SA (“Centiel”), a Swiss-based technology group that designs, manufactures and supplies advanced uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems for mission-critical applications, started trading on SIX Swiss Exchange under the ticker symbol CNTL. Based on an opening price of CHF 3.20 per share, the company’s market capitalization stood at approximately CHF 261 million. Tomas Kindler (Global Head Exchanges, SIX), Gerardo Lecuona (CEO & Member of the Board, Centiel) (from left) Centiel listed on SIX Swiss Exchange via a reverse merger with HT5 AG (“HT5”), a company originating from the former HOCHDORF Group. In this context, HT5 issued and allocated 61,274,508 fully paid-in registered shares to the shareholders of Centiel, of which 11,501,225 were sold to the public, alongside 3,885,763 newly issued shares as part of an ordinary capital increase. In total, 15,386,988 shares were placed at the offer price of CHF 2.04 per share, corresponding to a placement volume of approximately CHF 31 million. Following the transaction, the issued share capital of Centiel comprises 81,601,028 registered shares with a nominal value of CHF 0.01 each. Centiel will be included in the in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) family. The listing of Centiel marks an important milestone for SIX Swiss Exchange, further strengthening its position as a leading venue for innovative and fast growing Swiss companies. It also reflects Switzerland’s appeal as a listing location for technology firms, offering access to global investors, competitive liquidity, and a supportive environment for sustainable post-IPO growth. Gerardo Lecuona, Centiel's co-founder, Board member and CEO, comments: “This milestone marks a new chapter for Centiel. As global reliance on uninterrupted power grows, we are well positioned to scale our technology and support critical infrastructure. We take the trust placed in us seriously and are fully committed to delivering on our ambitions as a public company.” Filippo Marbach, Centiel’s co-founder and Board member, says: “Taking Centiel public reflects the strength of what we have built over the years and gives us a powerful platform to expand internationally, deepen partnerships, and continue shaping the future of resilient power solutions.” Tomas Kindler, Global Head Exchanges, SIX, says: “We are delighted to welcome Centiel to SIX Swiss Exchange. In a difficult market environment, Centiel’s decision to go public evidences trust in its business model as well as in the Swiss marketplace. This underscores a firm strategic posture and warrants recognition. We look forward to accompanying Centiel through its next stage of development as a listed company.” More information about Centiel: www.centiel.com/

With BISON Select, Boerse Stuttgart Group is introducing a premium program for investors with larger investment goals. The aim of the new customer program is to offer additional services, personalized conditions, a dedicated trader community, and useful tools, such as the holding period tracker. BISON, the crypto trading platform for retail investors of Boerse Stuttgart Group, is responding to its growing number of engaged users and launching BISON Select, a new customer program for active traders. For the first time, the platform is offering an expanded set of features for investors with larger investment goals, bringing together additional tools, services, and community offerings within the app. Members benefit from a range of exclusive advantages, including crypto cashback of up to €500 per year, commission-free stock trades, personal account managers, and access to further features such as the holding period tracker, which helps users identify potential tax benefits.   "With BISON Select, we are creating a compelling offering for active investors who value quality, security, and personal service," explains Dr. Ulli Spankowski, CEO and Co-Founder of BISON. "We have a loyal base of top customers, and we aim to further strengthen these valuable relationships while also supporting those looking to intensify their trading activities and pursue their investment goals. In doing so, BISON positions itself as a trusted partner, with transparency, reliability, and personalized service as top priorities."   Higher activity leads to more additional services The program is aimed at traders with a crypto trading volume of €40,000 or more within the last 12 months and is divided into Silver, Gold, and Platinum levels. The benefits at each level scale with trading volume. "BISON Select is our response to the needs of active traders," says Spankowski. "In addition to improved conditions, BISON Select gives members the opportunity to be part of a community that offers expert insights and a network of engaged investors."   BISON Select offers the following benefits in addition to the existing offering:   Holding Period Tracker: BISON app shows when the 1-year holding period for crypto investments is reached and helps users identify potential tax benefits. Crypto Cashback: Select members receive cashback in Bitcoin of up to €500 per year for every crypto trade. Commission-Free Stock Trades: BISON waives the order fee for stock trading. Select members at the Platinum level trade completely commission-free. Personal Account Manager: BISON Select offers prioritized support for all inquiries, as well as a personal account manager with a callback service. Unlimited Deposits: Select members can top up their balance beyond the standard limits. Premium Referral Bonus: For every successful referral, Select members receive an increased bonus of €50 in Ethereum (ETH). Exclusive Events: BISON also hosts curated events for personal networking within the Select community, including exclusive expert talks and special programs. Blockpit Discount: With BISON Select, tax reports can be created together with Blockpit at discounted rates.   Multi-award-winning platform with exchange expertiseBISON was launched in 2019 as the crypto trading platform of Boerse Stuttgart Group, making it the first crypto offering by a traditional stock exchange. Most recently, BISON won the “Goldener Bulle” in the category “Crypto Provider of the Year.” BISON combines the security and reliability of an established exchange group with helpful trading features and has received multiple awards in Germany. BISON Select now expands this offering with a premium tier that provides additional benefits for active traders.   For more information about BISON Select, please visit bisonapp.com. Press photos can be downloaded here. (Photo credit: © BISON App)