The European Banking Authority (EBA) today launched three public consultations on Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) and Guidelines (GL) on third-country branches under the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) concerning booking arrangements, capital endowment and supervisory colleges. These regulatory products aim at ensuring a harmonised and consistent implementation of the new EU framework for third-country branches, enhancing comparability across Member States, and fostering effective supervisory cooperation. The three consultations run until 10 October 2025.  The draft RTS specifying the booking arrangements lay down the methodology to identify and record assets and liabilities booked or originated by the third-country branch, as well as off-balance sheet items. They also outline the minimum content of the registry book and information on risks to be maintained. The RTS aim to ensure convergence of third-country branches’ practices regarding the implementation of booking arrangements and the maintenance of the registry book.  The draft GLs on instruments for the capital endowment include the list of instruments that third-country branches can use - in addition to cash and debt securities issued by central governments or central banks of Member States - to meet their capital endowment requirement and specify minimum operational conditions that third-country branches should respect in order to ensure that the capital endowment instruments serve their purpose.   The draft RTS on cooperation between competent authorities supervising third-country branches aim to facilitate and support competent authorities in cooperating and exchanging information relating to third-country branches in going concern and emergency situations. They also provide practical modalities for organising colleges of supervisors for third-country branches to ensure that all activities of the third-country group in the Union are subject to comprehensive supervision.   Consultation process  Comments on the three consultations can be sent to the EBA by clicking on the “send your comments” button on the respective consultation pages. Please note that the deadline for the submission of comments is 10 October 2025. All contributions received will be published after the consultation closes, unless requested otherwise.   A public hearing on all three regulatory products will take place on 3 September from 10:00 to 12:00 CEST. The deadline for registration is the 1 September 2025, 12:00 CEST.  Legal basis  The EBA has developed the draft RTS on booking arrangements in accordance with Article 48h of Directive 2013/36/EU, pursuant to which TCBs should maintain a registry book to track and keep a record of the assets and liabilities associated with their activities.   The draft GL on instruments for the capital endowment have been developed in accordance with Article 48e of Directive 2013/36/EU, requiring TCBs to maintain, at all times, a minimum capital endowment deposited in an escrow account, which shall be available in the case of resolution or winding-up of the TCB.   The draft RTS on cooperation between competent authorities supervising TCBs have been developed in accordance with Article 48p(7) of Directive 2013/36/EU to specify the effective cooperation and exchange of information between competent authorities supervising institutions and branches of the same third-country group and the conditions for the functioning of colleges of supervisors for class 1 TCBs.   Background and next steps  Directive (EU) 2024/1619, amending Directive 2013/36/EU, introduces a new regime applicable to branches in the EU of third country credit institutions (third country branches or TCBs). It lays down a minimum harmonisation framework covering authorisation, prudential requirements – including booking arrangements, capital endowment, liquidity, internal governance, common reporting requirements - and supervisory practices.   The updated Guidelines on internal governance and those on supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) for credit institutions will include a separate section on third-country branches related aspects.    Documents Consultation paper on draft RTS specifying the booking arrangements that third-country branches (431.5 KB - PDF) Consultation paper on draft Guidelines on third country branches capital endowment requirement (355.95 KB - PDF) Consultation Paper on draft Regulatory Technical Standards on cooperation and colleges of supervisors for third-country branches (605.23 KB - PDF) Related content Draft Regulatory Technical StandardsUnder consultation Regulatory Technical Standards specifying the booking arrangements that third-country branches GuidelinesUnder consultation Guidelines on third country branches capital endowment requirement Draft Regulatory Technical StandardsUnder consultation Regulatory Technical Standards on cooperation and colleges of supervisors for third-country branches Consultation10 OCTOBER 2025 Consultation on Regulatory Technical Standards specifying the booking arrangements that third-country branches Consultation10 OCTOBER 2025 Consultation on Guidelines on third country branches capital endowment requirement Consultation10 OCTOBER 2025 Consultation on Regulatory Technical Standards on cooperation and colleges of supervisors for third-country branches

The following is the weekly trading summary for DFM Regulated Short Sell Transactions for the abovementioned period. Symbol Security Name Short Sell Trade Volume Short Sell Trade Value (AED) PARKIN Parkin Company P J S C 500 3,165.00           For further information on RSS, please check the DFM Market Rules Module Three Membership, Trading, And Derivatives Rules & Operational Model and Procedures for Implementation of Regulated Short Selling available at  http://www.dfm.ae/the-exchange/regulation/market-rules This Dubai Financial Market Announcement will be available on the website at  https://www.dfm.ae/the-exchange/news-disclosures/market-announcements

Following the successful launch of the Women in Clearing Network, in March 2024 the EACH’s Women in Clearing Series was inaugurated. This is an initiative with the objective of featuring a key female leader on a regular basis to inspire other professionals in the industry.  This month’s inspiration comes from Babett Pavlics, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), KELER CCP. Babett spent the first 20 years of her carrier in the banking sector. She worked all together 10 – 10 years for Raiffeisen Group and UniCredit. Her expertise in banking covers securities services, transactional banking, investment products and client segment management in Financial Institutional clientele. She became the CEO of KELER CCP in March 2020. Within EACH she is a co-chair of the Energy Clearing Working Group. Babett has volunteered to share with us her personal and professional journey by responding to three questions: What was the aspect of yourself that you had to work on the most to get to where you are now? When I reflect on my journey to where I am today, the most significant aspect I had to learn was the courage to truly recognise my own strengths and competitive skills. Early in my career, like many women, I believed that exceptional results would speak for themselves. My focus was always on delivering, pushing harder in the background, and trusting that my capabilities would naturally lead to recognition and promotion. However, I soon realized that in leadership, it's not enough to simply produce. You must also actively participate, share your vision, and proudly put your achievements in the spotlight. So learning to confidently 'sit in the middle of the table' and proudly share my impact was the first thing to learn. Another crucial internal barrier I had to overstep was social pressure, or perhaps some internal belief, that having a family might mean compromising my career aspirations. I'm very proud to say that I've built a fulfilling career while raising two wonderful children. This journey taught me that success isn't about choosing one over the other, but about redefining what 'having it all' means for you. This leads to the third, and perhaps most important lesson: the absolute necessity of building strong, supportive teams, not just professionally but personally. I learned to get rid of the idea that I had to do everything myself. Embracing the power of true partnership – whether it's empowering my colleagues or having a robust support system at home – has been transformative. What key tip would you give for professionals to successfully develop in their careers? For professionals looking to truly succeed, my key tip is two-fold. Firstly, recognise your firm's critical moments and be ready to deliver beyond expectations. Promotions aren't just about meeting targets; they're earned by going that 'extra mile' when something extraordinary is happening. Be proactive, offer solutions, and ensure your unique contribution is visible when it truly matters. Secondly, embrace Jim Collins' advice: 'get the right people on the bus.' It is not only about management. In every project and collaborative task, actively identify, empower, and build teams with the best individuals. Your ability to surround yourself with excellence and building on collective strengths will be the most powerful accelerator for your own career. How do you see the future of clearing in 10 years? The last decade was Looking ahead 10 years, I see the future of clearing, particularly in CEE, as one of deepened integration, increased sophistication, and continued resilience, with technology as a key enabler. I believe that both in capital and energy market the relevance of clearing houses will only grow. The drive for energy market coupling across Europe means that the efficient and secure clearing of physical and financial energy products will be inevitable. I anticipate: §  Enhanced Connectivity: Clearing houses will become even more interconnected, supporting seamless cross-border trading and netting efficiencies across the CEE region and with Western Europe. §  Broader Product Scope: I anticipate an expansion into clearing a wider list of energy-related products, including those emerging from the green transition like guarantees of origin or capacity products. §  Technological Advancement: AI, blockchain, and advanced analytics will further automate processes, enhance risk modelling, and enable real-time insights, making clearing even more robust and efficient. This also includes improved data sharing and regulatory reporting. §  Resilience and Stability: Post-crisis lessons emphasize the need for robust risk management. CCPs will remain central to maintaining financial stability, acting as critical shock absorbers in an increasingly volatile capital and energy landscape  You could hear more about Babett by clicking on this video link or by reading the attached document and using this link. We are immensely grateful to Babett for her enlightening and enriching contribution and we look forward to continuing the EACH’s Women in Clearing Series by hosting many skilled women leaders to inspire other professionals in the clearing sector! The Women in Clearing network takes the form of a LinkedIn group that participants may use to connect with each other.

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The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the EU’s financial markets regulator and supervisor, issued today a public statement warning investors of the ‘halo effect’ that can lead to overlooking risk when authorised crypto-asset service providers (CASP’s) offer both regulated and unregulated products and/or services. The statement also reminds CASPs of the issues that they should consider when providing unregulated products and services, recommending that they should be particularly vigilant about avoiding any client confusion regarding the protections attached to unregulated products and/or services.  To avoid any misunderstanding CASPs should clearly communicate the regulatory status of each product or service in all client interactions and at every stage of the sales process.  In addition, ESMA reminds crypto-assets entities of their obligation to act fairly, professionally and in the best interests of their clients, ensuring that all information, including marketing communications, is fair, clear and not misleading. Related Documents DateReferenceTitleDownloadSelect 11/07/2025 ESMA35-1872330276-2329 Statement on Avoiding Misperceptions: Guidance for Crypto-Asset Service Providers Offering Unregulated Services

A summary of Deutsche Börse Group's business indicators for June 2025 is now available on the Deutsche Börse website: Trading Statistics There you can also find the Excel file 'Major business figures' containing historic business indicators for the respective reporting segments.

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the EU’s financial markets regulator and supervisor, has published today the guidelines specifying the criteria for assessing the knowledge and competence of staff at crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) who provide information or advice on crypto-assets and services under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA). Concretely, the document:  provides guidance on the minimum level of knowledge and competence of staff through examples (including on professional qualification and appropriate experience for the provision of information or advice); and addresses specific features and risks of crypto-assets markets and services (e.g. high volatility of crypto-assets and cyber security risks) through the criteria for the assessment of the relevant staff’s knowledge and competence.  The guidelines will help CASPs to meet their obligations and act in the best interest of their clients. They also support competent authorities in adequately assessing how CASPs meet these obligations. The objective is to enhance investor protection and trust in the crypto-asset markets. ESMA conducted a public consultation on these guidelines to gather the views of stakeholders, including the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG). The final report includes feedback to the comments received during the consultation.  Next steps The guidelines will be translated into all EU languages and published on ESMA’s website. They will start applying six months after that publication.  Within two months of the date of publication of the guidelines on ESMA’s website in all EU official languages, competent authorities to which these guidelines apply must notify ESMA whether they comply, do not comply, but intend to comply, or do not comply and do not intend to comply with the guidelines. Related Documents DateReferenceTitleDownloadSelect 11/07/2025 ESMA35-1872330276-2380 Final Report on the Guidelines for the criteria on the assessment of knowledge and competence under the MiCA

AuditBoard, the leading AI-powered global platform for connected risk transforming audit, risk, and compliance, today announced the appointment of Raul Villar Jr., former Chief Executive Officer of Paycor, as its new CEO. Villar brings a proven track record of driving significant growth and innovation in the SaaS industry, making him an ideal leader to guide AuditBoard through its next phase of expansion and market leadership. +Villar joins AuditBoard following a highly successful tenure as CEO of Paycor, a prominent human capital management software company. At Paycor, Villar was instrumental in accelerating product innovation to better deliver for customers and scaling operations. This ultimately led to a significant increase in market share, culminating in its sale to Paychex for $4.1 billion in April 2025. His deep expertise in B2B SaaS and enterprise software makes him an excellent fit for the AuditBoard team.“I am incredibly excited to join AuditBoard, a company that has already established itself as a clear leader in the connected risk space with its innovative AI-driven platform and unwavering customer focus,” said Raul Villar Jr. “The opportunity to build upon this foundation and further expand AuditBoard’s impact on how global enterprises navigate complex risk environments is immense. I look forward to working with the talented team at AuditBoard to drive continued innovation, deliver exceptional value to our customers, and achieve new levels of growth.”Villar’s appointment comes at a pivotal time for AuditBoard, which has consistently been recognised for its industry-leading platform and rapid growth, and recently extended its international presence to Germany. The company's AI-powered connected risk platform helps internal audit, risk, and compliance teams streamline workflows, collaborate effectively, and gain holistic insights into their organisation's risk landscape. With Villar at the helm, AuditBoard is poised to accelerate its strategic initiatives, enhance its product offerings, and solidify its position as the global go-to solution for modern risk management.“We are thrilled to welcome Raul Villar Jr. as AuditBoard’s new CEO,” said Jonathan Wulkan, Partner at Hg Capital. “Raul’s extensive experience leading high-growth SaaS companies and his deep understanding of enterprise software will be invaluable as we continue to scale and innovate. His visionary leadership and passion for customer success will undoubtedly propel AuditBoard to new heights, further empowering our customers to transform their risk and compliance programs.”

The total value of transactions during the month in re view reached € 8,78 million, with an average of € 0,44 million per trading session. The Financials sector contrib uted 81,83% to the total value traded which was the high est among all other sectors. Investors primarily focused their interest on the shares of “Bank of Cyprus Holdings Plc” and also on shares of “Demetra Holdings Plc” with 67,13% and 13,77% of the total value respectively. Click here for full details.

‘Overwhelming’ majority of European firms moving to CSA-funded research budgets 87% of respondents predict that at least half of all research budgets will become client-funded within the next two years 83% said that new FCA rules will create an opportunity for regulatory alignment between the US/EU/UK (vs. 45% previously) Substantive Research, the research and market data discovery and spend analytics provider, today releases the results of a survey of the largest asset management firms’ reactions to the latest FCA Policy Statement on investment research unbundling and the new “joint payments” freedoms.  Background – FCA’s efforts to stimulate the research market post-MiFID II In July 2024 the FCA released new rules within COBS2 covering segregated mandates, making it easier for asset managers to pass their external research costs back onto end investors, as they did pre-MiFID II. However, it became clear that for this “joint payments” option to be broadly taken up in the UK, any new freedoms would need to be extended to include pooled funds. In November 2024 the FCA Consultation Paper (CP24/21) covering Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) and Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) markets, clashed with the previous COBS2 rules by requiring research budgeting at a fund level, which as Substantive’s January survey showed, would have been a ‘dealbreaker’ for many firms.  Asset managers have now had eight weeks to digest the FCA’s final Policy Statement (CP24/9) that shows that the FCA has listened to the buy side’s concerns, and allowed for both strategy or firm-level budgeting for research.  Substantive Research’s latest survey shows clearly how the asset management community will respond to this optionality. 87% of respondents predict that at least half of all research budgets will become client-funded within the next two years  52% said that within two years the majority of research budgets would move to client-funded (vs. 7% previously), with another 35% expecting half of budgets to have moved by then 71% of respondents were supportive of the new joint payments freedoms (vs. 16% supportive in the previous survey in January) 97% of respondents said that the new requirements were workable (vs. 40% previously) 94% of respondents said that the separate EU requirements (similar to the FCA’s but less onerous) were workable (vs. 74% previously) Finally, 83% said that the new rules will create an opportunity for regulatory alignment between the US/EU/UK (vs. 45% previously) Mike Carrodus, CEO of Substantive Research said: “87% of respondents are now saying that within two years, either the majority or half of budgets in Europe will be client-funded, which is an enormous shift. Asset managers increasingly perceive that the benefits to their investment process and cost structures now far outweigh any previous barriers to change. While concerns remain regarding the fair treatment of clients (TCF, as defined by the FCA), higher comfort levels from global firms with experience of CSA models in other regions, are feeding through to the domestic players.” He added: “The removal of requirements around fund-level research budgeting has been transformational to sentiment on the buy side. Coupled with renewed determination from global firms to benefit from a single global research process, it is now clear that CSA-funded research will be ‘the new norm’ by the end of 2026.”   Universe of firms covered by the research: 40 of the largest asset managers surveyed AUM: $13 Trillion  Geographic split: 20% N. America, 20% EU, 60% UK

Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) today announced the appointment of Christian Sjöberg as President of Nasdaq Clearing AB, with an expanded role that include added responsibility as Head of Post-Trade Strategy in Europe. In this role, Christian will lead Nasdaq’s central counterparty clearing house (CCP) and oversee the strategic development of post-trade services across Europe. Nasdaq Clearing AB is a leading European central counterparty (CCP), providing clearing services across derivatives, fixed income, and commodities markets. With a strong foundation in the Nordic region, it plays a vital role in safeguarding financial stability by managing counterparty risk and ensuring the integrity of cleared markets. “Christian brings extensive experience in financial infrastructure and risk management, and his leadership will be instrumental in advancing Nasdaq Clearing’s strategic goals and operational excellence,” said Roland Chai, President of European Market Services. “The expanded focus on post-trade is critical as we continue to enhance the resilience and efficiency of our infrastructure, support regulatory developments, and meet the evolving needs of market participants across the Nordic and Baltic regions.” Christian Sjöberg brings over two decades of international experience in post-trade infrastructure, clearing, and financial market operations. He has held senior leadership roles across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, with a strong track record in building and transforming market infrastructure organizations. He joined Nasdaq in 2022 as Head of Business Development & Portfolio Strategy for Post Trade, where he has driven strategic initiatives supporting exchanges, CCPs, and CSDs globally. Prior to Nasdaq, Christian held senior roles at major market infrastructure organizations including HKEX, SIX x-clear, and Oslo Clearing, with a focus on clearing, risk management, and operational transformation.  Recently Christian has been part of the FinTech Product Strategy and Development team and will transfer to the Stockholm office as part of his new role leading Nasdaq’s CCP operations and report into Roland Chai, President of European Market Services, Nasdaq. Christian will assume his new role 1 of September 2025. The appointment is subject to approval by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (SFSA)

Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) has announced updated listing requirements for underlying crypto assets, expanding the eligible currencies for Exchange Traded Products (ETPs) with crypto assets as underlying assets. “We continue to see a growing demand to invest in ETPs with crypto assets as underlying assets and in our efforts to modernize our markets we are happy to now be able to enable issuers to issue more currencies through the new guidelines,” says Helena Wedin, Head of ETF and ETP, Nasdaq European Markets. ETPs with crypto assets as underlying assets must comply with the relevant Nasdaq Main Market Exchange Trades Notes Rulebook as well as the Nasdaq Nordic Crypto Guidelines. The guidelines complement the rulebooks and outline specific requirements that must be met to admit an ETP with crypto assets as underlying assets. One of the requirements has been that the underlying crypto asset must be included in the Nasdaq Crypto Index. This has now been revised to also include requirements on, among other, pricing, liquidity and trading availability of the underlying crypto asset, – opening for more crypto assets to be included. The revised guidelines are based on the existing requirements of the Nasdaq Crypto Index methodology and market practice.

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that it filed charges seeking an asset freeze and other emergency relief against Newnan, Georgia-based First Liberty Building & Loan, LLC and its founder and owner Edwin Brant Frost IV in connection with a Ponzi scheme that defrauded approximately 300 investors of at least $140 million. According to the SEC’s complaint, from approximately 2014 through June 2025, First Liberty and Frost offered and sold to retail investors promissory notes and loan participation agreements that offered returns of up to 18% by representing that investor funds would be used to make short-term bridge loans to businesses at relatively high interest rates. The defendants allegedly told investors that very few of these loans had defaulted and that they would be repaid by borrowers via Small Business Administration or other commercial loans. The complaint also alleges that, while some investor funds were used to make bridge loans, those loans did not perform as represented, and most loans ultimately defaulted and ceased making interest payments. Since at least 2021, First Liberty operated as a Ponzi scheme by using new investor funds to make principal and interest payments to existing investors, according to the complaint. The complaint further alleges that Frost misappropriated investor funds for personal use, including by using investor funds to make over $2.4 million in credit card payments, paying more than $335,000 to a rare coin dealer, and spending $230,000 on family vacations. “The promise of a high rate of return on an investment is a red flag that should make all potential investors think twice or maybe even three times before investing their money,” said Justin C. Jeffries, Associate Director of Enforcement for the SEC’s Atlanta Regional Office. “Unfortunately, we’ve seen this movie before - bad actors luring investors with promises of seemingly over-generous returns – and it does not end well.” The SEC’s complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, charges First Liberty and Frost with violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and names five entities that Frost controlled as relief defendants. The SEC seeks emergency relief, including an order freezing assets, appointing a receiver over the entities, and granting an accounting and expedited discovery. The SEC also seeks permanent injunctions and civil penalties against the defendants, a conduct-based injunction against Frost, and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest against the defendants and relief defendants. Without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, the defendants and relief defendants consented to the SEC’s requested emergency and permanent relief, with monetary remedies to be determined by the court at a later date. The SEC's investigation was conducted by Justin Delfino and Tiffany Kunkle and supervised by Peter Diskin and Mr. Jeffries. The litigation is being led by Kristin Murnahan and Graham Loomis. Resources SEC Complaint

At the end of the settlement date of June 30, 2025, short interest in 3,257 Nasdaq Global MarketSM securities totaled 14,138,758,851 shares compared with 13,689,191,607 shares in 3,207 Global Market issues reported for the prior settlement date of June 13, 2025. The mid-June short interest represents 2.59 days compared with 2.32 days for the prior reporting period. Short interest in 1,636 securities on The Nasdaq Capital MarketSM totaled 2,790,159,938 shares at the end of the settlement date of June 30, 2025, compared with 2,687,331,325 shares in 1,642 securities for the previous reporting period. This represents a 1.00 day average daily volume; the previous reporting period’s figure was 1.00. In summary, short interest in all 4,893 Nasdaq® securities totaled 16,928,918,789 shares at the June 30, 2025 settlement date, compared with 4,849 issues and 16,376,522,932 shares at the end of the previous reporting period. This is 1.72 days average daily volume, compared with an average of 1.72 days for the prior reporting period. The open short interest positions reported for each Nasdaq security reflect the total number of shares sold short by all broker/dealers regardless of their exchange affiliations. A short sale is generally understood to mean the sale of a security that the seller does not own or any sale that is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by or for the account of the seller. For more information on Nasdaq Short interest positions, including publication dates, visithttp://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/short-interest.aspxor http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/asp/short_interest.asp.      

NYSE today reported short interest as of the close of business on the settlement date of June 30, 2025. SETTLEMENT DATE EXCHANGE TOTAL CURRENTSHORT INTEREST TOTAL PREVIOUSSHORT INTEREST(Revised) NUMBER ofSECURITIES with aSHORT POSITION NUMBER of SECURITIESwith a POSITION >=5,000 SHARES 06/30/2025 NYSE 15,821,341,811 15,373,120,882 2,863 2,622 06/30/2025 NYSE ARCA 2,126,994,808 2,268,100,808 2,348 1,562 06/30/2025 NYSE AMERICAN 768,322,620 793,206,363 307 252 06/30/2025 NYSE GROUP 18,716,659,239 18,434,428,053 5,518 4,436 *NYSE Group includes NYSE, NYSE American and NYSE Arca           Reports will be archived here.

Thank you, Lorie. Let me start by expressing my deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of those harmed by the flooding in the Hill Country. I cannot imagine the pain and anguish they are feeling. My prayers go out to all those affected. Turning to my remarks for today, thank you also for the opportunity to speak to you about the Fed's balance sheet, one of the more complex, and, I believe, misunderstood aspects of the Federal Reserve's role as a central bank.1 To level set the conversation, let me start with some simple facts. In August of 2007 our balance sheet was around $870 billion, equal to approximately 6 percent of nominal gross domestic product (GDP). Today it is around $6.7 trillion, with a t, which is about 22 percent of GDP. This is down significantly from its maximum size of nearly $9 trillion in early 2022 but still quite large. Since nominal GDP has essentially doubled since 2007, if our balance sheet had grown at the same rate, it would be around $1.7 trillion today—not $6.7 trillion. An obvious question is why our balance sheet is so much larger than economic growth would have predicted. As an aside, let me point out that there is no consensus among economists about how large a central bank balance sheet should be, but it is logical to ask: if monetary policy worked when the balance sheet was 6 percent of GDP, why is it, and perhaps needs to be, proportionally so much larger now? A major reason is that the Federal Reserve embarked on two major balance sheet policy initiatives over the past twenty years to respond to urgent problems in the economy. First, we engaged in quantitative easing, or QE, to provide support to the economy after the advent of the Global Financial Crisis and then again with the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, we consciously changed our implementation framework for providing liquidity to the banking system by moving from a scarce-reserves system to an ample-reserves system. This change was necessary because there were shortcomings with the scarce-reserves approach—short-term rates were harder to control and required daily interventions in the markets by the Fed, and these problems were made worse when rates were at or near zero. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) explicitly stated its commitment to ample reserves in 2019, when we were gradually shrinking our balance sheet, concluding that this approach would be used over the longer-run, and it soon proved very useful when the pandemic again brought rates to zero.2 Although these are two fundamentally different reasons for changing the size of our balance sheet, we did them more or less at the same time. This has caused confusion, with some people thinking that the Fed is choosing to keep the balance sheet larger than it needs to be. This confusion is amplified by the fact that there are external forces that have boosted the size of our balance sheet that are not under the control of the Federal Reserve. My goal today in this speech is to disentangle each of these forces and try to demystify the role of our balance sheet in conducting monetary policy. I also want to clarify issues that are currently being discussed in the public domain. I agree that the balance sheet needs to shrink but, as I will show, not by as much as some believe it should. I will also explain why the composition of the balance sheet matters as much as its size and how changes are needed there as well. I know from teaching this topic over the years to my undergraduate students that unless you are an accountant or a banker, you would probably rather go to the dentist than listen to a speech about the Fed's balance sheet. I hope to explain it clearly enough that you can leave here and engage in the public debate with a better understanding of the issues. To do so, the approach I want to take is the following. Suppose the Fed had never used quantitative easing and simply decided to move to an ample-reserves system from a scarce-reserves system. How would the liability and asset sides of our balance sheet change in response to this one policy decision? After addressing this question, I will then discuss how QE affects our balance sheet and also some difficult tradeoffs that arise when engaging in QE. The Big Three LiabilitiesFor any balance sheet, we start with the asset and liability entries. Assets are things that are owned, and liabilities are things that are owed to others at a given point in time. I will start by listing the big three liabilities on the Fed's balance sheet and the characteristics of those liabilities. There are other types of liabilities (and capital) that must be accounted for, but they are too small to matter for the policy matters I want to discuss, so I will ignore them. After discussing these "big three" liabilities, we can consider what assets should be held to match those liabilities. The first big liability of the Federal Reserve is currency outstanding. The Fed supplies U.S. dollars elastically to the public, based on demand, distributing dollars through banks.3 That demand, which is not controlled by the Fed, is basically determined by how fast the economy—and thus the need for cash—is growing. At the end of 2024, the amount of dollars in circulation was $2.3 trillion. That is up considerably from around $800 billion in 2007 after which the overall balance sheet began growing sharply. Even in terms of GDP, currency has increased, from 5.5 percent of GDP in 2007 to almost 8 percent today. So, an important point that many do not realize is that the Fed's balance sheet has expanded, especially in nominal terms, from increased demand for U.S. currency.4 What are the characteristics of currency as a liability? First, it is non-interest bearing. Second, it never "matures" as other debt obligations do. Let's just say that currency is different from other liabilities—it pays no interest, and you never get back your initial payment for acquiring it. If you come to the Fed and ask us to redeem a dollar bill, we will simply give you another dollar bill. The second big liability is the Treasury General Account, or TGA. The Federal Reserve is the fiscal agent of the U.S. Treasury, which means that we are the bank for the U.S. government and the TGA is the Treasury's checking account. What are the characteristics of the TGA? First, it is a short-term liability that moves up and down as cash flows in and out of the account as the Treasury receives tax and other payments and pays its bills. Second, we do not pay interest to the Treasury on its account balances. Finally, given the asynchronous timing of payments and receipts, the TGA can vary significantly, especially when the debt ceiling is binding. During 2024, it generally fluctuated between about $650 billion and $950 billion, briefly peaking at around $960 billion during the April tax season. Due to this year's debt ceiling constraint, the TGA fell from its 2024 average of $780 billion to about $325 billion recently, and with the debt ceiling just increased, there will be a quick rebuild in the coming weeks. So, it is not unusual for the TGA to fluctuate by several hundred billion dollars. This situation is very different than the one in 2007 when the TGA was deliberately held steady at $5 billion each day. This change reflects both how much federal spending has grown in that time and also a shift in accounting in 2015 to holding an estimated week's worth of federal payments in the TGA—a decision made by the Treasury to better manage its cash flow. An important point that applies to both currency and the TGA is that the Federal Reserve does not have control over the size of these liabilities and hasn't been responsible for their sharp increases. Together, they represent about $3 trillion of our $6.7 trillion balance sheet, or roughly 10 percent of nominal gross domestic product. So, the size of the Fed's balance sheet, which is now about 22 percent of nominal GDP, is nearly half accounted for by these two liabilities that are not under the Fed's control. Those who argue that the Fed could go back to 2007, when its total balance sheet was 6 percent of GDP, fail to recognize that these two factors make it impossible. The third big liability on the Fed's balance sheet is reserves, which are the funds that depository institutions hold in accounts at the Fed. In effect, these are the checking account balances of the banking system that are held at the Federal Reserve. What is the characteristic of reserves held by banks? First, much like the TGA, they are short term in nature and very liquid—in effect like digital cash. They are the safest and most liquid asset in the financial system and used to conduct payments between banks. The reserve balances that an individual bank holds can increase or decrease, depending on the flow of payments between banks. Much like the TGA, an individual bank's reserve holdings can be volatile. But these payments do not change the total amount of reserves in the banking system—they simply transfer them from one bank to another. So, while reserve balances of individual banks can move around, total reserves are more stable, and the total amount of reserves in the system is directly controlled by the Federal Reserve. Second, in October 2008, Congress authorized the Federal Reserve to pay interest on these liabilities. Besides ending the implicit tax on banks for holding reserves, it was a step aimed at helping the Fed conduct monetary policy effectively, which it does, but it is sometimes inaccurately criticized as a giveaway to banks. I will address this point a little later. But I mention it here because the amount of reserves in the system affects the total payment flow the Fed must make to banks at the current interest rate on reserves. Assets Backing These LiabilitiesBy the definition of a balance sheet, these liabilities must be matched by assets held by the Federal Reserve. Let's consider matching assets to our currency liability. As I said earlier, currency pays no interest and never matures. So, we can hold assets of any maturity length to offset our liability for currency. Since currency pays no interest, any interest earned off these assets is pure profit. Given that longer-maturity assets generally pay higher interest rates and are less volatile, it seems reasonable to hold longer maturity assets against our currency liability. Now consider the TGA liability. We also pay no interest on the TGA. But, unlike currency, a problem with the TGA is that it can vary substantially, which makes total reserves in the system more volatile. This link to reserves is because when tax payments are made to the Treasury, we debit the payer's bank reserves and credit the Treasury's TGA account. When the Treasury makes a payment, we debit the TGA and credit the recipient bank's reserve account. Thus, volatile movements in the TGA affect the Fed's reserve management policy. There are two ways to deal with this situation: hold a buffer of reserves to ensure movements in the TGA do not affect market liquidity or hold short-maturity assets that we can expand or contract to sterilize movements in the TGA such that total reserves in the banking system are unchanged.5 The first strategy suggests the buffer stock of assets could take the form of somewhat longer maturity, while the second strategy could require holding short-term assets that can easily be bought and sold with little interest rate risk. That brings us to reserves. As I mentioned, reserves are a short-maturity liability which pay interest, which suggests that the Fed should consider holding short maturity assets against this liability. Treasury bills and short-maturity Treasury notes are the safest and most liquid assets, so it would make sense to hold them against reserves. If the interest rate earned on our short maturity Treasury assets is very close to the interest we pay on reserves, then our interest earnings from the Treasury are simply passed through to the banks. In this sense, our balance sheet is just another way to transfer interest payments on Treasury securities from the Treasury to the banks.6 Because of the minimal spread between these two short-term interest rates, banks are largely indifferent to either holding reserves or the short-term Treasury securities we hold—both are highly liquid and pay roughly the same rate of return. But layer on top of this the fact that reserves are a bit more liquid than Treasury securities because banks don't have to buy or sell the Treasury securities to get reserves, and banks are willing to hold a lot of reserves. Since the Fed supplies these reserves, one might ask what it costs taxpayers to supply a large amount of reserves. From the Treasury's point of view, its interest expense is the same regardless of who holds the short-term Treasury securities. So, the Fed can provide all the liquidity that banks need at zero marginal cost, which makes me wonder why some want to make reserves scarce. I often use the following analogy to drive this point home: If governments could provide clean, safe drinking water for citizens at zero cost, why would they make it scarce? Now, one could ask why pay interest on reserves at all? Why not keep the interest income generated on the assets we hold to back reserves and remit it back to the Treasury? This seems like a no brainer! But there are a few reasons that interest on reserves makes sense, including the following. First, paying interest on reserves that is commensurate to the rate paid on short-term Treasury securities makes reserves attractive to banks, and holding reserves improves the functioning of the financial system by giving banks more liquidity and greater scope to settle payments in an orderly way. In contrast, if reserves bear no interest, then commercial banks will have strong incentives to avoid holding a lot of reserves, and instead hold short-term, interest-bearing assets like Treasury bills. If banks managed their liquidity only by buying and selling Treasury securities, several banks selling Treasury securities at the same time could flood the market and put undesirable upward pressure on interest rates across the economy. An ample-reserves regime where we pay interest on reserves ensures that there are enough reserves in the banking system to avoid this kind of sell off in Treasury securities, helping to stabilize the financial system without any harm to banks or their customers. The second part of the case for interest on reserves is that it isn't costing taxpayers any money. As I noted earlier, whether the Fed or banks hold the Treasury securities, the Treasury is paying interest on its debt. And, if the Fed is holding the reserves, then the interest payment from the Treasury to the Fed on the Treasury bills is matched with an interest payment from the Fed to banks on their reserves. So, paying interest on reserves is not creating any additional expense to the Treasury. But what is the appropriate level of ample reserves the Fed is trying to get to? There is no clear answer to this question and that is what we are trying to discern. We want to provide the amount of liquidity necessary, but we don't want to provide excessive liquidity that banks do not want or need. One reason for increased demand for reserves is that since the Global Financial Crisis changes in banking regulations led to a large shift in demand for high-quality liquid assets. For example, bank liquidity regulations, such as the liquidity coverage ratio, encouraged banks to hold high quality liquid assets. As these regulations came into play, banks' demand for high-quality liquid assets, including reserves, increased tremendously relative to 2007. I think of ample reserves as the threshold below which banks would need to scramble to find safe, liquid funding, something that would drive up the federal funds rate and money market interest rates across the economy. We have some experience with testing the level of ample reserves during an episode of stress in the financial system that occurred in 2019. At the start of that year, reserves stood at about 8 percent of nominal GDP, and we were continuing to reduce our balance sheet with no apparent stress among banks or otherwise in the financial system. In September 2019, reserves fell below 7 percent of nominal GDP, and stresses appeared in the financial system, requiring the Fed to step in and take action to add reserves. So, I start from the view that problems emerged when reserves fell below 8 percent of GDP. One might argue that banks are now larger relative to GDP, so they may desire a bit more reserves. Furthermore, there is also a genuine concern that it is not only the total amount of reserves that matters but also the distribution of reserves across the banking system. So, I would add a buffer to the 8 percent of GDP that I cited earlier and assume 9 percent is the threshold below which reserves would not be ample. That would mean, as of today, that $2.7 trillion of reserves is roughly ample—it could be more or less in practice, but let me use it as a benchmark. So, putting the pieces of this hypothetical minimum balance sheet together, we have an estimated $2.7 trillion in reserve balances, $2.3 trillion in currency, and an average of $780 billion in TGA liabilities. This combined means the Fed should be operating with a balance sheet that is roughly $5.8 trillion dollars or 19 percent of GDP. Close to half of this proportional increase from 2007, as I noted, comes from currency and TGA growth outside the Fed's control, and the rest from a transition to an ample reserves regime that has been a necessary, efficient and more effective way of managing monetary policy. In summary, if we had simply adopted an ample reserves system and backed these liabilities as I suggested without engaging in quantitative easing, there are three key takeaways: (1) we would be earning a net profit off of the assets backing currency and the TGA, (2) the assets backing ample reserves would simply be a way to transfer interest payments to the banks, and (3) we would hold short to medium term assets that could be bought or sold to neutralize large movements in the TGA to keep total reserves stable. With this balance sheet, the Federal Reserve would never run losses, the banks would have ample liquidity for market functioning, and the Fed would not face serious interest rate risk on its asset holdings. Today's Balance Sheet and Where We Are HeadingAt this point there are going to be people somewhere shaking their fists and yelling that what I have said is simply false because the Federal Reserve is currently losing money on its balance sheet. Our interest expense on reserves is now exceeding our interest income on our asset holdings. This is all true. But this outcome is because of engaging in QE for many years since 2007, not because we are running an ample reserves system. Remember, what I have described so far is what an optimally designed balance sheet would look like if we had never engaged in QE and simply moved to an ample-reserves system. Let me now do the following. Assume we have a balance sheet that corresponds to an ample-reserves system, but now the Fed engages in QE as a means of conducting monetary policy to support the economy. The Federal Reserve engaged in QE programs when the policy rate was driven down to zero because of severe shocks to the economy after the Global Financial Crisis and then because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Once the policy rate is at zero, the Federal Reserve is constrained in its ability to use its traditional tools to provide further support for the economy. The idea of QE is to buy longer-duration securities as opposed to short-duration assets. By increasing the demand for long-dated securities, the Fed drives up the price and drives down the yield on those securities. By lowering longer-term yields the Fed is able to loosen financing conditions to stimulate aggregate demand. The Fed typically buys longer-dated Treasury securities during QE, but it also bought agency mortgage-backed securities that have the implicit backing of the U.S. Treasury and are issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government-sponsored enterprises. QE affects our balance sheet in material ways that differ from what happens if one is simply constructing the balance sheet to support ample reserves, currency, and the TGA. First, it increases the duration of our balance sheet beyond what we would hold just for currency. Longer-duration assets are more prone to interest rate risk, and the lower the interest rates on those assets, the lower interest income the Fed will receive far into the future. If interest rates rise suddenly or over time as the economy recovers, those assets lose value (in substantial amounts), which lowers the unrealized value of our portfolio. Second, we use short-term reserves to buy the longer duration assets which leads to a maturity mismatch between our assets and our liabilities. So, the additional reserves that are injected from QE may not be costless when short-term rates rise, as they did in 2022, meaning that interest paid on those additional reserves will exceed what is earned on the long-term assets that were purchased with them. This effect highlights the fact that engaging in QE involves a tradeoff for the Federal Reserve—trying to support the economy in serious economic downturns at the zero lower bound while creating a maturity mismatch between our assets and liabilities that brings interest rate risk onto our balance sheet. This tradeoff does not happen if we simply structure our balance sheet to support an ample-reserves system. The decision to engage in QE requires the Federal Reserve to weigh the benefits and costs from this action. Those benefits and costs are often difficult to quantify at the time QE is undertaken. It is only with hindsight that we can fully assess them, which is one of the challenges of making policy in real time. Where do we stand today? The Federal Reserve is operating with an abundant, or more than ample, level of reserves, and our securities holdings are tilted toward longer-dated maturities. We are shrinking the balance sheet to get back to a size consistent with an ample reserves system. As of last month, banks had nearly $3.4 trillion of reserves with the Fed, accounting for about 11 percent of nominal GDP.7 Given my rough estimate of the level of reserves needed to be ample, I believe we can likely continue to let a share of maturing and prepaying securities roll off our balance sheet for some time, reducing reserve balances. Of course, we will continue to carefully monitor financial markets as we go. For me, the bigger problem with our balance sheet is that the maturity structure of our assets to support an ample-reserves system is not well matched. We have far too many long-term assets on our balance sheet relative to my arguments for how to structure the balance sheet. I argued that long-term assets should only be held against currency liabilities, which are $2.3 trillion. But we hold about $2.3 trillion in agency mortgage-backed securities alone! So the duration of our asset portfolio is far too long for the liabilities we need to hold for an ample-reserves system. If the Fed moved forward with a maturity-matching strategy as I suggest, it would hold about half of its Treasury securities in shorter-dated bills. There have been some advocates who support moving toward the Federal Reserve having a Treasury securities portfolio whose composition mimics the breakdown, or "universe," of total Treasury securities outstanding. This would mean having about 20 percent of our current balance sheet in bills. The argument for this maturity structure is that with this approach, the Fed's holdings would not be putting pressure on any one segment of the yield curve. This is a valid argument, but it would put more duration on our balance sheet and expose the Fed to potential income losses, as we have witnessed the past few years. Maybe that is a tradeoff we should make to avoid distorting our demand for Treasury securities relative to the market's demand. In the end, I support continuing the conversation about what the ultimate composition should be. My objective today was to try to clarify what an ample-reserves balance sheet should look like as a starting point for this conversation. In the years ahead, moving our portfolio toward shorter-duration securities will be a slow process unless we were to take the dramatic step of selling existing securities to replace them with Treasury bills. When reserves hit their desired ample level and we need to increase securities holdings in line with growth in autonomous factors, like currency and the TGA, we can actively accumulate bills, if we do not take other actions sooner. I hope that taking a deep dive into a few line items on the Fed's balance sheet has helped to see some issues that lie ahead. Though the FOMC has not finalized its desired efficient and effective size and composition of the balance sheet, it seems apparent that today's portfolio should be adjusted. And there are obvious steps to take. We are reducing the size of the balance sheet slowly and need to consider shifting it toward more bills. As we do so, we should do it gradually and predictably, so the markets and public are fully aware of our actions. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. In January 2019 the FOMC released the Statement Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation and Balance Sheet Normalization, which is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190130c.htm.  3. The Federal Reserve supplies currency on demand to ensure that commercial bank money trades one for one with currency. This creates certainty that a customer's demand to transform one unit of commercial bank money into a unit of currency will be met.  4. Judson (2024) estimates that a significant share of demand for U.S. currency comes from abroad, especially in the $100 denomination; see Ruth Judson (2024), "Demand for U.S Banknotes at Home and Abroad: A Post-Covid Update," International Finance Discussion Papers 1387 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March).  5. For a discussion of the short-maturity assets approach, please see Annette Vissing-Jorgenson (forthcoming), "Fluctuations in the Treasury General Account and the Fed's Balance Sheet," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).  6. For accounting purposes, our net interest income on these assets backing reserve balances would be near zero.  7. As I noted, there will be a replenishing of the TGA in coming weeks. This action will reduce reserves commensurately. 

The Federal Reserve Board on Thursday requested comment on a targeted proposal to revise its supervisory rating framework for large bank holding companies to address the "well managed" status of these firms. The revisions would better align the supervisory rating framework with and more accurately reflect the strength of bank holding companies and the banking system as a whole. The proposal would also better align the framework with the supervisory rating systems used for other banking organizations. The Board's large bank supervisory rating framework, issued in 2018, evaluates whether these banks have sufficient financial and operational strength and resilience to maintain safe-and-sound operations and comply with laws and regulations through a range of conditions. The framework includes three components: capital, liquidity, and governance and controls. Each component has four potential ratings: broadly meets expectations, conditionally meets expectations, deficient-1, or deficient-2. The proposal would amend the framework by considering a bank with no more than one "deficient-1" rating to be "well managed." Firms that do not meet this standard would be deemed not well managed and would face limitations on certain activities. Consistent with the current framework, a bank with a deficient-2 rating for any component would continue to be considered not well managed. The Board is also proposing to make similar changes to its supervisory rating framework for insurers regulated by the Board. The Board will evaluate additional comprehensive changes, including options to consider adding composite ratings to both frameworks, as well as changes to other supervisory rating systems. Comments on today's proposal are due 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. Federal Register notice: Revisions to the Large Financial Institution Rating System and Framework for the Supervision of Insurance Organizations (PDF) Board memo (PDF) Statement from Vice Chair for Supervision Bowman Statement from Governor Barr Statement from Governor Cook Statement from Governor Kugler Related Content Board Votes

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) announces that Mr. Usman Asif has been charged with fraud, contrary to s. 126.1(1)(b) of the Securities Act, as well as breaching a cease trade order. The charges announced relate to Lendle Corporation where Mr. Asif was a director. The OSC alleges that Mr. Asif, through his company, Lendle Corporation, issued a security in the form of a promissory note to All Ships Investors Incorporated (“All Ships”) while subject to a cease trade order. The OSC alleges that the transaction was part of a fraudulent scheme to issue and securitize consumer loans through an online lending platform. It is further alleged that Mr. Asif repeatedly deceived All Ships before and after accepting a $315,000 investment from them, which he spent primarily on personal expenses, including a Lamborghini. On November 1, 2023, the OSC Tribunal found that Mr. Asif and his companies, Lendle Corporation and Mughal Asset Management Corporation, committed fraud. The Capital Markets Tribunal also determined that Asif lied to OSC staff during the investigation, shared confidential OSC information, and interfered with the OSC’s investigation. Mr. Asif was permanently banned from trading in June 2024. Prior to that he was bound by a temporary cease trade order  issued in December 2021. This case was investigated by the OSC’s Criminal Investigations & Prosecutions team, which is part of the Enforcement Division of the OSC. They investigate securities-related frauds, market manipulation, and related misconduct, including the investigation of repeat offenders and those who breach Capital Markets Tribunal or court orders and bans. Their primary objective is to protect investors and further enhance confidence in the Canadian capital markets through effective enforcement. To do this, they often partner and collaborate with other law enforcement agencies and police forces. The mandate of the OSC is to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices, to foster fair, efficient and competitive capital markets and confidence in the capital markets, to foster capital formation, and to contribute to the stability of the financial system and the reduction of systemic risk. Investors are urged to check the registration of any persons or company offering an investment opportunity and to review the OSC investor materials available at http://www.osc.ca.

The Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) has issued a white paper that offers regulatory and technological solutions to improve account transfers, a major source of frustration for investors. The financial system in Canada faces significant inefficiencies in account transfers, largely due to outdated processes, inconsistent standards, and fragmented communication. Delays in account transfers can disrupt financial planning and lead to adverse financial consequences for investors, including missed investment opportunities. Account transfers are also a persistent operational frustration for financial institutions as well. Addressing these delays is critical for enhancing the Canadian capital markets system and improving investor outcomes. “Account transfers are consistently a top complaint that CIRO hears from investors and Member firms alike,” said Alexandra Williams, Senior Vice-President, Strategy, Innovation, and Stakeholder Protection at CIRO. “Modernizing the account transfer system is an important way by which CIRO can improve investor outcomes and reduce frustration, but also enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the industry – both key commitments of our strategic plan.” Modernizing account transfers will require a multi-faceted approach that includes automation of systems, standardization of transfer procedures, and harmonization of regulations. CIRO’s work to support this effort takes a two-phased approach: Phase 1: Defining the Problem & Laying the Groundwork for Change Phase 2: Implementing Solutions & Driving Industry-Wide Adoption The Phase 1 white paper, released today, examines the root causes of account transfer issues and presents both immediate and long-term solutions, including rule amendments and recommendations to enhance firm transfer operations. Also released today are proposed rule amendments which, if adopted, will require all CIRO Dealer Members to use automated systems for eligible transfers and clarify that electronic communications must be used where available. They also stipulate the timeline for the receiving dealer to inform the client of transfer impediments and set a standard settlement period of 10 clearing days for account transfers (including for transfers with impediments). In addition, the Phase 1 white paper also offers a vision for an industry-wide technology solution, designed through a collaborative effort by institutions across the financial and investment industry, that would digitize the account transfer process and allow for real-time processing and standardized data formats. This new system promises to be open, interoperable, and transparent and would ensure a seamless data exchange across Canada’s financial system. CIRO is inviting: comments on its proposed rule amendments proposals from interested firms seeking to develop the technology solution. Phase 2 of the white paper, which is expected in 2026, will provide updates on the progress, implementation strategies, and more wide-spread adoption of the regulatory standards and technology tool across the financial system. The Phase 1 white paper and the proposed rule amendments are now available on CIRO’s website.

The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) today published in final form amendments to Multilateral Instrument 13-102 System Fees (MI 13-102).The CSA is increasing system fees for SEDAR+ and the National Registration Database (NRD) over a five-year period starting on November 28, 2025. These system fee increases are necessary to ensure sufficient funding to operate the CSA’s national systems over those five years. Under the amendments the total dollar amount of system fees collected by the CSA will increase and no new system fees will be introduced. To maintain a fair and transparent cost recovery approach, the CSA uses a flat per-filing system fee model, where fees increase proportionally based on system use. The CSA published proposed amendments on November 21, 2024, and outlined changes that would better align system fee revenues with projected national systems operating costs. After carefully considering the comments received, the CSA has not made any substantive revisions to the materials that were published for comment. However, since amendments to introduce an expedited shelf prospectus regime for well-known seasoned issuers (WKSIs) are scheduled to come into force at the same time as the MI 13-102 amendments, the WKSI-related system fees have been added to the MI 13-102 amendments. Provided all required approvals are obtained, the amendments will come into force on November 28, 2025, in all participating CSA jurisdictions.The CSA, the council of the securities regulators of Canada’s provinces and territories, coordinates and harmonizes regulation for the Canadian capital markets. For investor inquiries, please contact your local securities regulator.