Good morning and thank you for the invitation to join you today.1 It is a pleasure to be with you here in Boston at the New England Economic Forum to share my outlook on the economy and monetary policy, and I would like to thank Kathleen Murphy, the CEO of the Massachusetts Bankers Association, for inviting me to speak at your first economic forum. I am also grateful for the kind introduction from Susan Collins. I greatly value her perspective, and I appreciate the opportunity to work closely with her as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and as a fellow member of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). It is good to see so many bank and business leaders from across the Northeast here at Gillette Stadium. Throughout my time at the Federal Reserve—and earlier in my career as a community banker—I have made it a priority to engage directly with bankers and business leaders to better understand how economic conditions affect local communities. These conversations provide important context for my views on the economy and monetary policy. With the FOMC having concluded its final meeting of 2025 a little over a month ago, and with our next meeting at the end of this month, today I will share my perspective on recent policy decisions, discuss how my assessment of the economy evolved over the past year, review current economic conditions, and then outline my outlook for the economy and monetary policy. As we enter 2026, the economy has continued to grow, and I see inflation moving closer to our goal. But beneath the surface, the labor market has become more fragile. My focus today is why that fragility poses the greater risk and what that means for the path of policy. Update on Recent Monetary Policy DecisionsAt our September meeting last year, the Committee resumed the process of gradually removing policy restraint and bringing the federal funds rate closer to its neutral level. At that meeting, and again at our meetings in October and December, the Committee voted to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points, bringing the range to 3-1/2 to 3-3/4 percent. These decisions were intended to proactively limit the risk of greater and more persistent damage to the labor market, while inflation continued to show signs that it is on a sustained downward trajectory toward our 2 percent objective. The policy rate now reflects a total of 75 basis points of cuts since September and is closer to my estimate of its neutral level. I voted in favor of each of these actions in light of the weakening in labor market conditions and my expectation that inflation, excluding the effects of tariffs, would soon be within close range of our 2 percent goal. Looking ahead, as we gather additional evidence on economic activity, labor market conditions, and inflation, it will be important to continue assessing the appropriate path of policy and the timing of further adjustments. How My Views on the Economy Evolved over the Past YearBefore turning to current economic conditions, I would like to spend a few minutes explaining how my views on the economy and monetary policy evolved over the past year. I believe this context is important, particularly at a time when the balance of risks around our dual mandate has been shifting. At the December 2024 FOMC meeting, my projections for 2025 anticipated that real gross domestic product (GDP) would rise in the mid–2 percent range, that core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation would slow by a bit less than one-half percentage point, and that the unemployment rate would increase moderately to about its longer-run level. Those projections also included three quarter-point reductions in the federal funds rate over the course of 2025. In hindsight, the economy seems to have evolved largely in line with those expectations, especially if we consider inflation excluding the estimated effect of tariffs. Throughout much of last year, I reserved judgment on the effects of new policy initiatives and instead maintained an overall optimistic view of the economy. In particular, I did not assume that changes in trade or immigration policy would necessarily lead to persistent inflationary pressures or large negative effects on economic activity. I also considered the potential for positive supply-side effects from other policy developments, including regulatory changes, tax policy, and a business-friendly approach. With respect to trade policy, I expected that initial tariff proposals would likely be scaled back over time, that there would be little retaliation from trade partners, and that foreign producers, importers, and consumers would adjust in ways that would help limit pass-through to inflation. Substitution across goods and suppliers appeared to play an important role in moderating the effects of tariffs on both economic activity and prices. On immigration, I anticipated that a reduced inflow of new immigrants would restrain demand for rental and affordable housing and ease upward pressure on housing inflation in the near term. While changes in population affect both supply and demand, I viewed the near-term demand effects as particularly relevant for inflation dynamics. I also expected relatively small effects on GDP growth from lower immigration, despite reduced labor supply and employment growth, as these new immigrants tend to have lower income and be less productive than the overall U.S. workforce. Although inflation remained a concern for me early in the year, my assessment shifted as I began to see clearer signs of slowing economic growth and increasing fragility in the labor market. I became more confident that the inflationary effects of tariffs would largely be one-off, as I observed growing evidence that businesses were less able to pass through higher costs to consumers. I saw this as a sign of weakness in demand and consistent with the cooling labor market. These developments led me to place increasing weight on risks to employment and to signal a shift in my balance of risks in June, after which I dissented at the July meeting favoring a 25-basis point reduction to reflect this shift.2 Economic activity seems to have been supported by a surge in equity prices and investment activity related to artificial intelligence (AI). Although stock market valuations may appear stretched, expected earnings growth for AI-related companies has been high, and, so far, a substantial part of the investment has been self-financed. I am concerned that disappointing news on AI investment returns could lead to a sharp correction in equity prices, but the economy continues to show elevated productivity growth likely due, in part, to increased adoption of AI technologies. Higher productivity gains have helped ease inflationary pressures and encouraged me to support cutting the policy rate last year, especially since we have not seen consistent signs that the labor market is stabilizing. Current Economic ConditionsTurning to current economic conditions, the U.S. economy has been resilient and has continued to expand at a solid pace, but I remain concerned about signs of fragility in the labor market. I am also increasingly confident that inflation will come down toward 2 percent as tariff effects on goods inflation continue to wane in coming months. Real GDP growth appears to have exceeded 2 percent last year. Although growth was somewhat volatile, it still averaged close to its pace in 2024 despite the drag from lower immigration, especially if we consider the effects of the government shutdown. Growth was supported by strength in business investment, including data center projects and a surge in high-tech AI investment. These types of projects tend to be relatively insensitive to interest rates and have the potential to significantly raise productivity. At the same time, other areas of demand softened last year. Consumer spending and residential investment weakened, as slower growth in real disposable income and house prices weighed on demand. The weakness in housing activity and prices over the past year likely reflected some pullback in housing demand. Elevated mortgage rates may have exerted a more persistent drag as income growth expectations declined and house prices remained high relative to rents. Given very low housing affordability, existing home sales have remained depressed since 2023 and at levels only comparable with the early 2010s following the financial crisis. But the recent firming in house prices and home sales seems encouraging, suggesting less restraint on housing demand following the decline in mortgage rates since the middle of last year. The latest data releases show that GDP significantly increased in the third quarter, as consumer spending accelerated, but likely slowed in the fourth quarter, reflecting a drag from the government shutdown and softer momentum in retail sales through November, consistent with recent weakness in personal income. Disappointingly, residential investment seems on track to decline again in the fourth quarter. Although home sales are rising in response to lower mortgage rates, residential improvements and new construction activity have remained slow. Labor Market ConditionsOver the past year, as unemployment rose and payroll employment flattened out, we saw labor market conditions gradually weaken. During that time, the unemployment rate increased substantially to 4.4 percent in December, reflecting a decline in hiring rather than a sharp increase in layoffs, as many firms appeared focused on retaining workers rather than expanding payrolls. Payroll employment growth slowed significantly, and job gains became increasingly concentrated in a relatively small number of nonbusiness service industries. Private job gains averaged only about 30,000 per month in the fourth quarter, well below what is needed to keep the unemployment rate from rising, with job gains more than accounted for by the health-care and social services industries, suggesting that labor demand has continued to gradually soften since early last year. Wage growth has slowed to a pace consistent with 2 percent inflation, reflecting both easing labor demand and strong productivity growth, and the labor market is no longer a significant source of inflationary pressure. Although the labor market is still near full employment, it has become increasingly more fragile and could continue to deteriorate in the coming months. The rise in unemployment has been experienced mostly by demographic groups that tend to be more affected by the business cycle. The share of those working part time for economic reasons, meaning not by choice, has increased considerably over the past two months. This has coincided with a rise in the share of multiple job holders, suggesting that an increasing number of workers struggle to make ends meet. Job gains have been concentrated in just a few services industries that tend to be less affected by the business cycle. The share of industries with positive job growth over the past six months has been hovering around historically low levels. Private payroll employment may have started to fall in recent months, as the sizable upward bias in the published data implied by the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages seems to have persisted at least through the second quarter. Although initial claims for unemployment insurance have remained low, there are signs that layoffs may have increased as Challenger private job cut announcements have reached their highest 12‑month level since 2010, outside of the pandemic. We could see layoffs rise quickly since job openings have softened and hiring rates are already low. The share of long-term unemployed workers reached 26 percent in December, the highest since early 2022, reflecting a less dynamic, low-hiring, low-firing labor market that some have said is giving rise to a jobless expansion. All of these indicators point to growing labor market fragility, and this configuration of the labor market raises the risk that conditions could deteriorate further if demand does not strengthen. With hiring rates already low, layoffs could rise more quickly if firms begin to reassess their staffing needs in response to weaker activity. Inflation DevelopmentsOn inflation, we have seen considerable progress in lowering the underlying trend, considering that still-elevated inflation mostly reflects tariff effects that I expect will fade this year. When those effects are taken into account, core PCE inflation appears to be much closer to 2 percent. Based on the latest consumer and producer price reports, 12‑month core PCE inflation likely stood at 2.9 percent in December. However, after removing estimated tariff effects, core PCE inflation would have hovered close to 2 percent in recent months, well below the 3 percent reading at the end of 2024. This progress in the underlying trend of inflation reflects a considerable slowing in core services inflation, consistent with the easing in labor market pressures and housing inflation given the weakness in market rents. The underlying trend in core PCE inflation appears to be moving much closer to our 2 percent target than is currently showing in the data. Core services inflation is already roughly consistent with our target, and only core goods inflation remains elevated, but I expect it to start moving down in coming months as the effects of earlier price increases and one-time tariff-related adjustments fade. Economic Outlook and RisksLooking ahead, my baseline expectation is that economic activity will continue to expand at a solid pace and the labor market will stabilize near full employment as monetary policy becomes less restrictive. Less restrictive regulations, lower business taxes, and a more favorable business environment will continue to boost supply—largely due to higher productivity—and more than offset any negative effects on economic activity and inflation from tariffs. As the tariff effects continue to wane, these supply-side policies, along with strength in AI-related investment, will continue to boost productivity gains and help ensure that inflation remains on a downward path. That said, the outlook is subject to risks on both sides of our mandate, and those risks are not symmetric. On the inflation side, potential upside risks include renewed pressures in services prices, a change in firms' pricing behavior, or disruptions to global supply chains stemming from trade or geopolitical developments. This could include changes to oil prices based on reactions to recent events in Venezuela and in the Middle East. While the risks merit close monitoring, I currently view them as less likely to materialize in a sustained way. First, there has been willingness to negotiate trade policy, and supply chains have largely been unaffected thus far. Second, foreign suppliers and importers have been adjusting to the new tariffs, and there are many anecdotes of businesses being unwilling to raise prices because of higher consumer price sensitivity, especially among low-income consumers. Reduced immigration will also continue to lessen demand, especially for housing, and will be a drag on inflation. On the employment side, I continue to see downside risks. Continued softness in hiring, combined with already low hiring rates, means that even a small decline in demand could translate into a larger increase in unemployment. Once firms begin to shift from slowing hiring to reducing head count, labor market conditions could quickly deteriorate. Memories of pandemic worker shortages are still fresh, and, so far, businesses have mostly maintained, rather than reduced, their workforce. They also seem to be more willing to compress profit margins, since consumers are less willing to accept higher prices. Without a broad improvement in demand conditions, businesses may need to begin to lay off workers, recognizing that it will not be as difficult to rehire given the shift in labor market conditions. The Path Forward for Monetary PolicyWith inflation on a sustained trajectory toward 2 percent and signs of fragility in the labor market, my view is that we should continue to focus on risks to our employment mandate and preemptively stabilize and support labor market conditions. Over the second half of last year, I frequently pointed to a shift in economic conditions and in the balance of risks to our employment and inflation goals. I also noted the signs of weakening labor market conditions shown in the flattening of payroll employment gains and the rise in the unemployment rate. But with a rising unemployment rate and inflation remaining slightly above target, our maximum-employment and price-stability goals have been in tension. With our goals in tension, our framework calls for a balanced approach—taking into account not only the size of deviations from our goals, but also the likelihood that those deviations could become persistent.3 In considering the appropriate path for monetary policy, my approach remains intentionally proactive and forward looking. It takes time to see the full effects of monetary policy on the economy. Placing too much weight on the most recent data can result in an inherently backward-looking assessment of economic conditions. In my view, that approach increases the risk of falling behind the curve and ultimately requiring more abrupt and larger policy adjustments than would otherwise be necessary. Instead, we should rely on forecasts that are informed by a broad set of indicators and by ongoing engagement with businesses and communities across the country. In my view, this approach is more likely to capture how the economy will evolve over time. Acting in a timely and measured way, based on how we expect the economy to evolve, can help support employment and price stability while limiting the risk of unnecessary volatility. With inflation pressures easing—after excluding one-off tariff effects—and with the risk that labor market conditions could weaken further, I see policy as moderately restrictive. The labor market can appear to be stable right up until it doesn't. Absent a clear and sustained improvement in labor market conditions, we should remain ready to adjust policy to bring it closer to neutral. We should also avoid signaling that we will pause without identifying that conditions have changed. Doing so will indicate that we are not attentive or responsive to the recent and expected path of the labor market. At the same time, I want to emphasize that monetary policy is not on a preset course. At each FOMC meeting, my colleagues and I will evaluate incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks to our dual-mandated goals of maximum employment and price stability. I will also continue to meet with a broad range of contacts to inform my assessment of economic conditions and the appropriate stance of policy. Supervisory and Regulatory PrioritiesBefore I conclude my remarks today, I would like to briefly touch on the Federal Reserve's supervisory and regulatory agenda, which I know is of particular interest to many of you here today. While monetary policy often takes center stage, effective supervision and regulation are essential to maintaining a safe, sound, and resilient banking system—one that supports economic growth and serves communities across the country. Since the President appointed me as Vice Chair for Supervision last June, we have made meaningful progress on several priorities that will improve transparency, efficiency, and focus within our supervisory and regulatory framework. My objective is to ensure that supervision and regulation are appropriately tailored, risk focused, and grounded in our statutory responsibilities. Congress has also taken several steps in this regard. The passage of the GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act), along with ongoing consideration of banking and other digital assets legislation, underscores the importance of regulatory clarity as innovation enables the banking and financial systems to continue to evolve. We are actively working to implement the Federal Reserve's responsibilities under this new law. Last week, I shared my agenda and provided an update on our work to modernize bank supervision and regulation.4 I will highlight a few of these and the concrete steps we have taken since last June to enhance supervision and regulation. We have finalized changes to rationalize the large financial institution ratings framework, to better reflect a firm's condition based on material financial risks finalized revisions to the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio, returning it to its traditional role as a capital backstop and helping to reduce the risk of market disruptions proposed recalibration of the community bank leverage ratio to the statutory minimum, providing greater flexibility for eligible community banks removed reputational risk from the examination toolkit, allowing examiners to focus on material financial risks issued, for the first time, a set of supervisory operating principles to enhance transparency, accountability, and consistency in examinations—to benefit both examination staff and the banks we supervise published a request for information on payments fraud to support a more coordinated and effective response proposed improvements to reduce volatility in supervisory stress tests and enhance the transparency and public accountability of the stress testing framework withdrawn climate-related supervisory guidance that diverted supervisory resources away from risks that are material to the safety and soundness of banks issued a new policy statement to facilitate responsible innovation by Board-supervised banks initiated a review of regulatory reporting requirements to ensure the data we collect are useful and necessary for supervisory and regulatory purposes While we have made progress, there is more work ahead. We will continue to focus on improving the mergers and acquisitions review process, assessing the appropriateness of capital requirements across the banking system, addressing payments and check fraud, and strengthening examiner training and development. ClosingAs the economy continues to evolve, policy must evolve with it. My focus will remain on acting early enough to preserve both price stability and a strong labor market. Thank you again for the invitation to share my views with you today. It is a pleasure to join you for this forum. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. See Michelle W. Bowman (2025), "Unintended Policy Shifts and Unexpected Consequences," (PDF) remarks delivered at "Assessing the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy during and after the COVID-19 Pandemic," a research conference sponsored by the International Journal of Central Banking and the Czech National Bank, Prague, Czech Republic, June 23.  3. The FOMC's revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf.  4. See Michelle W. Bowman (2026), "Modernizing Supervision and Regulation: 2025 and the Path Ahead," (PDF) remarks delivered at the California Bankers Association Bank Presidents Seminar, Laguna Beach, Calif., January 7. 

A total turnover of 4.607 billion shares worth N130.636 billion in 263,439 deals was traded this week by investors on the floor of the Exchange, in contrast to a total of 4.164 billion shares valued at N94.026 billion that exchanged hands last week in 248,254 deals. Click here for full details.

Sivan, thank you for that generous introduction. Chairman Zinger, Governor Yaron, and Itai, I am honored to stand alongside each of you this morning and to bring greetings from Washington. Before I share a few reflections, I should like to begin by noting that this marks my first visit to Israel, and that I have been struck both by the beauty of your culture and the strength of your people. Thank you all for the warmth with which you have welcomed me. Today, we commemorate a new trading week whose benefits, I believe, could be transformative. By moving to Monday through Friday trading, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange has brought Israel’s capital markets into closer alignment with those of its global counterparts. And that alignment, I suspect, will enhance liquidity, encourage greater investment, and send a clear signal to the world that Israel is open for business. Yet even as you take this step to further conform with international markets, I encourage you to preserve the spirit that distinguishes your own. A spirit that has astonishingly produced GDP growth in the middle of a war. Since its establishment, the State of Israel has punched far above its weight in ways that defy easy explanation. A country with fewer residents than my native state of North Carolina, Israel is short on natural resources, surrounded by uncertainty, yet remarkably rich in resilience and resolve. Home to more startups per capita than anywhere around the world. Second globally in venture capital raised per capita. Among the most companies listed on Nasdaq after the United States. Birthplace of breakthroughs like the USB and drip irrigation. Yours is a nation that has never waited for ideal conditions to pursue prosperity. Which of course brings us to the broader context in which we assemble today. In recent years especially, Israelis have lived with a level of strain that few societies are asked to endure. While children learned to adapt to the wail of sirens; while reservists fled their desks at work and dinner tables at home; while each of you bore the weight of Israel’s longest war, your spirit did not dim. You did not close your markets, permit innovation to pause, nor investment to retreat. In short, you did not allow fear to dictate your future. Instead, Israeli indices soared to new highs. The shekel strengthened against major global currencies. Growth rebounded with force. And projections point to continued investment over the coming year. Crisis seems only to have catalyzed the very progress that it could have constrained. Of course, this kind of resilience has a name: Hatikvah. Hope. After all, it is hope that has helped to make a barren desert bloom. To turn an ancient land into a hub of high-tech. To bend adversity toward prosperity. It is precisely this ethos that has also made our partnership so strong, for the United States and Israel have long shared more than diplomatic ties and billions in bilateral trade. We are bound by a deep and abiding belief in free enterprise; by the conviction that fair and efficient markets are a force for human flourishing. I am confident that cooperation between our two countries will only deepen in the years ahead because the partnership between our markets and our people only makes both stronger. So thank you for welcoming me so warmly on my first visit to Israel. Thank you for your leadership, your friendship, and resolve. And congratulations once again on attaining this important milestone. As Israel aligns more closely with the world, may you continue to transform it. Thank you.

In his address at the Opening Bell Ceremony, Korkmaz Ergun, the CEO of Borsa İstanbul A.Ş., stated the following:  “Distinguished Guests, Today, I welcome you all to the Opening Bell Ceremony hosted by our Exchange as we celebrate the listing of Z Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı (Real Estate Investment Trust - REIT) at Borsa İstanbul. The transition of our valued companies, operating in the real estate sector – a key contributor to our national economy – into Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and their subsequent listing on our Exchange is crucial for the sustainable growth of each of these companies, each of which represents a national asset. By starting to be traded on Borsa İstanbul today, Z Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) will proceed with a strengthened financial structure, underpinned by institutionalization, transparency, and a sense of responsibility. Thus, by completing its ongoing investments and developing new projects, it will continue to grow and generate value, empowered by the confidence and investment of its new stakeholders. On this occasion, I would like to thank everyone who contributed to this IPO. I hope this IPO will be auspicious to our capital markets, and I welcome Z Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı to Borsa İstanbul family.”

In his speech Andrew Bailey emphasises the need for robust international cooperation, supported by multilateral institutions, and why they need to be supported by an international rules-based system. He sets out some of the conditions that help make this system work and what challenges they might face. Andrew Bailey Governor, Bank of England Speech Can I start by extending my welcome to all participants in the Bellagio Group, and congratulate the organisers on a timely and highly relevant choice of subject. My role today is some scene setting. I am going to cover three points. First, a reminder of the benefits of open economies and why they need to be supported by an international rules-based system which gives important roles to multilateral institutions. Second, I will set out some of the conditions that help to make this system work. And, finally I will highlight a number of the specific big challenges we face today and must take on. The benefits of trade and openness in terms of specialisation and larger markets are very well known. So, too, is the need to have rules of the game and some form of commitment and co-ordination device to put these rules into effect and protect legitimate national interests. This may sound reasonable enough, but defining exactly such national interests has been hard, not least because their precise nature and force can change over time. Bretton Woods was a defining moment in terms of institution creation, but it was, of course, context specific – in the context of beggar my neighbour policies in the inter-war period when the institutional fabric of the gold standard broke down, and then a global war. The effectiveness of the international rules-based system has a number of key general dependencies. First, it depends on domestic national support and license – it cannot operate in isolation. The goals of international co-operation must sit alongside domestic national policy objectives, but there also must be scope for the international goals to shape those domestic objectives. It cannot be a one-way street and this principle must apply to all participants. It follows that there is a natural tension between economic globalisation and domestic objectives and economic welfare. We cannot assume this away. Take the case of global imbalances. Our shared objective should be to tackle persistent and excessive imbalances. Effective cooperation should focus on policies that are demonstrably welfare‑improving at home and that, in turn, help to rebalance the global economy. We may not reach the first‑best global outcome (the rarely attainable ‘global planner’s optimum’), but this approach should bring us materially closer to a mutually beneficial result. Second, the system must be robust to all states of the world. I will come back to this later in some thoughts on the current context. This requires a considerable degree of flexibility in the design and operation of the institutions and thus the system. In fact, the IFIs I would argue have been pretty good at inventing and re-inventing themselves. This flexibility of re-invention depends critically on the collective leadership of member countries – which takes us back to the inbuilt national versus international tension. And, today, we face the challenge of re-invention in a multi-polar world, and one where the nature of the poles is shifting with the revealed tensions. One of the lessons of economic history, going back at least to the nineteenth century and probably further, is that such shifts in polarity invariably strain the operation of the system. My third point here is that the focus of attention, and tensions, has shifted over time. The outcome of Bretton Woods was more designed around international monetary relations, and that was the focus of the initial decades1. I don’t want to trivialise the importance of monetary relations today, but the focus of disagreement is now much more on trade. Trade I would argue is more susceptible to domestic pressures than international monetary relations. Why? It raises issues of fairness and equality in domestic political economy much more directly, and thus there is likewise a much more direct link to domestic well-being and domestic interest groups. Trade is more directly blameable – for instance for changes in relative wages between groups in national economies. So, I take three points from this opening description of the international system: it depends on domestic license; it must be robust to changing states of the world, and we are seeing change happening; and it is for the moment more about trade, though as a central bank governor I can’t wash my hands and say “trade doesn’t affect my world”, it does. I will now turn to the second theme, namely a number of important conditions which shape the operation of the international system, and how they look in the current setting. I will focus on four such conditions. The first is that – put simply – it is easier to operate the international system during conditions of strong growth in a critical number of the member countries, and more so strong productivity growth which feeds directly living standards. It is easier to liberalise trade and resist protectionism in conditions of more rapid growth, and where that growth acts to alleviate redistributive tensions – in other words, the growth is inclusive. Broadly speaking, this assisted the relative success of the GATT system of trade agreementspost-war. Today, slower growth, and headwinds to that growth, complicate achieving domestic consensus to support international co-operation and free trade. While it is true that openness supports growth and has reduced global poverty, it can have, and has had, distributional consequences in economies, and there has been an undermining of social capital so-called and domestic cohesion. And, in turn, this creates opposition to openness. I mentioned headwinds which operate to restrict growth. Today, I see four such headwinds, which is a high number and thus a strong counter–current to growth. The first is that in terms of productivity cycles – and to borrow Schumpeter’s phraseology –industrial development involves changes that “occurs in discrete rushes” separated from each other by spans of comparative quiet2. Today, in terms of technology, we have been between such discrete rushes for around the last 15 years. My assumption is that AI and robotics will be the next “rush”. The second headwind is that most countries are facing populations that are on average ageing, and this contributes to lower growth and increased demands on fiscal resources. The third headwind is that for many countries the demands for defence expenditure are increasing. This can contribute to growth, but also adds to fiscal pressures. And, the fourth headwind comes from Climate-related economic shocks and the consequences of the policies chosen to tackle these shocks. Taken together, these headwinds to growth are a powerful force to complicate the operation of the international system. The second contextual issue for the operation of the international system concerns domestic industrial policies. Industrial policy went out of favour in the 1980s, or at least so did the form that was tagged as picking winners and thus anti-competitive. That was then as it were. Industrial policy is now back with us as an issue – it has grown in use. But it has – at least in some of its more modern forms – also changed in nature. As an example, it can be a response to the headwinds I discussed earlier. Industrial policy has become a focus of dispute as a potential driver of persistent global imbalances. Preliminary Bank of England Staff work suggests that macro factors remain the dominant drivers, but that industrial policy applied at scale over an extended period – particularly alongside a relatively closed capital account – can have material short-to-medium-term effects. Staff are also developing a theoretical framework to clarify the channels through which these effects can arise: industrial policy expands what a country produces, but if domestic absorption is simultaneously suppressed, the excess flows abroad as a current account surplus. Meanwhile, absorbing countries see employment drawn away from tradables into lower-productivity sectors. In sum, we have to accept that in our assessment of imbalances and their causes, we need to embed both macro and microeconomic perspectives. Surveillance has to keep pace with these changes. The Bank Staff work which we plan to publish this spring, represents an important, if modest, first step in this direction, and we hope it will serve as a call for more empirical analysis on this issue. This brings me to the third contextual issue. The tension around the assessment and surveillance of imbalances is running high – that’s a statement of the obvious, but has to be said nonetheless. The assessment has to be without fear or favour, and thus has to be objective, and seen to be so. Seeking truth from facts sounds easier than it is in practice. Theory alone will not get us there. Practice is necessary for achievement, and that practice has to be backed up by our support. Part of the purpose of international agencies is that from time to time they have to tell us what we don’t want to hear, let alone act upon. Of course, they have to be accountable for the accuracy and quality of the assessment. But, accepting that, we have to call out messenger shooting. This brings me to the fourth and final contextual issue. The rise of so-called populism makes the whole task harder. Three features of populism stand out in this respect. First, a tendency to emphasise domestic production and wealth distribution as in opposition to international openness rather than as complementary. Second, a tendency to attribute unfavourable conditions to outside forces, rather than to point to shared challenges. And, third, encouraging a decline in trust such that institutions – domestic and international – are viewed as distant, unresponsive and acting for the benefit of powerful and uncontrollable interests. For those of us who are institutionalised, the answer is that we have to challenge back, in deeds more than just words. But, we have to ensure our houses are in order too. This brings me to the end – all that is left is to point to four things that we have to assert and demonstrate continually. First, to emphasise the benefits of robust economic openness for growth and well-being. Now is not the time to close the world to the benefits of trade. But to do this, we have to be realistic and assertive in defining and achieving robust openness. Second, recognise the importance of, and invest in the broadest sense, in the multilateral institutions. We should not pretend that all has been perfect, and we must be prepared to make changes where they are called for, as was done in the past. But we must be clear and agreed that a world without effective institutions is unlikely to be stable. Third, we should seek to enable the next major contribution to global productivity growth – the next discrete rush – likely to be AI and robotics – but to do so in a way that is sensitive to managing the consequences, and particularly invest in developing skills. Fourth, I am going take a free shot because I also chair an international organisation, the Financial Stability Board. Financial Stability is a condition of growth. Acceptance of this, and interpretation of and agreement on what it means, is not as well grounded as it needs to be. But that would be another speech, or alternatively I can recommend the 88 page assessment of bank capital requirements that the Bank of England published in December. Thank you. I would like to thank Sarah Breeden, Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Dan Christen, Peter Denton, Mark Joy, Karen Jude, Clare Lombardelli, Martin Seneca, James Talbot and Matt Trott for their comments and help in the preparation of these remarks. That was not so much the original intention, but there was no agreement at Bretton Woods to create the intended international trade organisation. Joseph. A. Schumpeter, ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”. 3rd Edition, Harper Perennial, 2008, P83.

It is the first company to join BME’s growth markets in 2026 BME Growth today welcomed Treelogic. The traditional bell ringing ceremony held at the Madrid Stock Exchange was led by Enrique Berdayes Álvarez, COO, Ignacio Morate del Fresno, CHRO and Pablo Piñera Álvarez, CFO of the company, who was accompanied by Juan Flames, CEO of BME, and Jesús González, managing director of BME Growth. The company, which is the first to debut on BME’s growth markets so far this year, took a reference price of 2.50 euros per share, implying a total valuation of the company of 15 million euros. "We are starting the year in the best possible way, with a new addition to our growth markets. It is essential that more companies use these markets as a lever to grow, consolidate and give greater visibility to their projects and initiatives. Furthermore, this case is particularly significant, as Treelogic is a company that supports others in their processes and projects, which will contribute even more significantly to the industrial development of our country," added Juan Flames.  “Joining BME Growth marks the beginning of a new phase for Treelogic. It is a natural step in our evolution as a technology company, which will enable us to gain visibility, strengthen our corporate structure, and continue to develop high value-added projects,” said Marcelino Cortina, CEO of Treelogic. “Joining BME Growth marks the beginning of a new phase for Treelogic. It is a natural step in our evolution as a technology company, which will enable us to gain visibility, strengthen our corporate structure and continue to develop high value-added projects,” said Marcelino Cortina, CEO of Treelogic. The company has begun trading under the code “TRTK” The company's Registered Advisor is DCM Asesores, while LINK SECURITIES S.V. S.A. will act as Liquidity Provider. Photos of Treelogic's bell ringing ceremony are available on Flickr. BME’s growth markets (BME Growth and BME Scaleup) are aimed at small and medium-sized enterprises. In 2025, these markets welcomed 14 new companies and now have more than 150 listed firms, which raised 605 million euros last year through 105 capital increases. BME offers alternatives for every type of company—from those in their early formation stages, via preparatory steps in the Pre-Market Environment, to growth markets and the main stock exchange for large corporations. Among the advantages of accessing capital markets for small and medium-sized enterprises are financing, enhanced reputation, greater visibility, support for inorganic growth, and an improved ability to attract and retain talent. 

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The FCA has fined Russel Gerrity £309,843 for using inside information to net himself £128,765. As a consultant, Mr Gerrity had access to information about whether oil and gas had been discovered during the drilling of wells. Between October 2018 and January 2022, he took advantage of this and used inside information to buy shares in Chariot Oil & Gas Limited and Eco (Atlantic) Oil and Gas Plc ahead of announcements that increased their price.   On another occasion, he used inside information to avoid a loss. He sold shares that he already owned ahead of an announcement that no oil or gas had been found, which then resulted in a price fall.     The FCA was initially notified of some of Mr Gerrity’s trading through Suspicious Transaction and Order Reports (STORs) submitted by a firm, showing the vital role of industry in uncovering market abuse.   During its subsequent investigation, the FCA’s systems detected further suspicious trades placed by Mr Gerrity, over multiple accounts with different brokers, while he was based outside of the UK.     Steve Smart, executive director of enforcement and market oversight at the FCA, said: 'Mr Gerrity abused his position to line his own pockets. We will take action against those who damage the integrity of our markets, and seek to recover any ill-gotten gains.’  Background Final Notice 2025: Russel Gerrity (PDF). Mr Gerrity engaged in insider dealing in breach of Article 14(a) of the UK Market Abuse Regulations.   Mr Gerrity agreed to solve this matter and qualified for a 30% (stage 1) discount under the FCA’s settlement procedures. Were it not for this discount, the FCA would have imposed a financial penalty of £387,448. Tackling financial crime is a priority under the FCA's 5-year strategy. The FCA enables a fair and thriving financial services market for the good of consumers and the economy. Find out more about the FCA.

LSEG announces it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each from Citigroup Global Markets Limited ("Citi") on the London Stock Exchange as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 04 November 2025. Date of purchase: 15 January 2026 Aggregate number of ordinary shares purchased: 110,373 Lowest price paid per share: 8,968.00p Highest price paid per share: 9,112.00p Average price paid per share: 9,060.20p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 509,278,236 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 509,278,236. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation) (as such legislation forms part of retained EU law as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter), a full breakdown of the individual purchases by Citi on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/1354P_1-2026-1-15.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased:       110,373 (ISIN: GB00B0SWJX34) Date of purchases:      15 January 2026 Investment firm:         Citi Aggregate information: Venue Volume-weighted average price Aggregated volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share London Stock Exchange 9,060.20 110,373 8,968.00 9,112.00 Turquoise        

Mr Chee Hong Tat, Minister for National Development and Deputy Chairman of MASMr Yeoh Oon Jin, Chairman of SIDBoard chairs from SGX-listed companiesDistinguished guestsLadies and Gentlemen 1.    Good morning, and thank you for joining us at the SGX IPO Arena. 2.    This venue is where many entrepreneurs have struck the gong to mark their companies’ entry into the public markets. 3.    But as we all know, the IPO is not the finish line; it is the starting point of a much longer journey. Why the Guild Matters 4.    Today, as we launch the SID Chairpersons’ Guild, we recognise that listed companies exist not just for their controlling shareholders, but for their entire investor base. 5.    These investors expect companies to create sustainable value, and that requires strong leadership at the very top. 6.    As the CEO of a listed company, I can attest to the difference that wise counsel makes. 7.    At SGX, I have been fortunate to learn from three very distinguished chairmen – Mr Chew Choon Seng, Mr Kwa Chong Seng and our current chairman, Mr Koh Boon Hwee, all of whom have provided invaluable perspectives to my management team and me. 8.    But not every board or CEO has access to such guidance. That is why this Guild matters: it creates a trusted space for chairs to share insights, exchange ideas, and mentor one another, so that every company can benefit from leadership excellence. Connecting to the National Agenda 9.    This initiative aligns closely with the broader Value Unlock agenda that Minister Chee announced in November. 10.    This is a national effort to strengthen governance, sharpen strategy, and enhance investor confidence. The Guild is a cornerstone of this vision. 11.    By uplifting board leadership, we reinforce Singapore’s reputation for trusted, forward-looking companies. Looking Ahead 12.    Through the Guild’s forums and peer-learning opportunities, chairs will be able to engage with global experts, regulators and investors – building the capabilities needed to navigate complexity and unlock long-term value. 13.    This is how we move from compliance to true competitiveness, from meeting expectations to shaping the future. Closing 14.    On this note, I congratulate SID for driving this initiative and thank all of you for being part of this journey. 15.    Together, let’s make the Chairpersons’ Guild not just a network, but a force for excellence – one that complements national efforts and sets new benchmarks for governance and value creation. 16.    Thank you.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today released Treasury International Capital (TIC) data for November 2025.  The next release, which will report on data for December 2025, is scheduled for February 18, 2026.  The sum total in November of all net foreign acquisitions of long-term securities, short-term U.S. securities, and banking flows was a net TIC inflow of $212.0 billion.  Of this, net foreign private inflows were $167.2 billion, and net foreign official inflows were $44.9 billion. Foreign residents increased their holdings of long-term U.S. securities in November; their net purchases were $221.8 billion.  Net purchases by private foreign investors were $157.8 billion, and net purchases by foreign official institutions were $64.0 billion. U.S. residents increased their holdings of long-term foreign securities, with net purchases of $1.6 billion. After including adjustments, such as estimated foreign portfolio acquisitions of U.S. stocks through stock swaps, overall net foreign purchases of long-term securities are estimated to have been $220.2 billion in November. Foreign residents increased their holdings of U.S. Treasury bills by $0.4 billion.  Foreign resident holdings of all dollar-denominated short-term U.S. securities and other custody liabilities decreased by $6.5 billion. Banks’ own net dollar-denominated liabilities to foreign residents decreased by $1.7 billion. Complete data are available on the Treasury website here.  ###   About TIC Data The monthly data on holdings of long-term securities, as well as the monthly table on Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, reflect foreign holdings of U.S. securities collected primarily on the basis of custodial data.  These data help provide a window into foreign ownership of U.S. securities, but they cannot attribute holdings of U.S. securities with complete accuracy.  For example, if a U.S. Treasury security purchased by a foreign resident is held in a custodial account in a third country, the true ownership of the security will not be reflected in the data.  The custodial data will also not properly attribute U.S. Treasury securities managed by foreign private portfolio managers who invest on behalf of residents of other countries.  In addition, foreign countries may hold dollars and other U.S. assets that are not captured in the TIC data.  For these reasons, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from TIC data about changes in the foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets by individual countries. TIC Release for January       TIC Monthly Reports on Cross-Border Financial Flows       (Billions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted)                 12 Months Through                     2023 2024 Nov-24 Nov-25 Aug Sep Oct Nov     Foreigners' Acquisitions of Long-Term Securities                                             1     Gross U.S. Sales of Domestic U.S. Securities 52720.3 70193.6 68814.6 86425.9 6932.8 7768.4 8105.6 7846.2 2     Gross U.S. Purchases of Domestic U.S. Securities 51631.2 69008.8 67663.0 84856.7 6752.4 7563.4 8053.1 7624.3 3     Domestic Securities, net U.S. sales (line 1 less line 2) /1 1089.1 1184.9 1151.5 1569.2 180.4 205.0 52.6 221.8                             4       Private, net /2 955.5 1190.3 1077.6 1613.0 195.8 207.2 62.7 157.8 5         Treasury Bonds & Notes, net 544.5 516.6 503.0 475.0 57.1 43.7 -35.3 52.4 6         Gov't Agency Bonds, net 169.3 127.2 122.4 115.2 21.6 15.1 20.4 -10.9 7         Corporate Bonds, net 269.5 264.3 246.8 359.2 25.9 32.4 24.6 47.2 8         Equities, net -27.9 282.2 205.4 663.6 91.2 115.9 53.1 69.1                             9       Official, net /3 133.6 -5.5 73.9 -43.8 -15.4 -2.1 -10.1 64.0 10         Treasury Bonds & Notes, net 53.0 -26.8 37.0 -52.9 -8.7 -16.3 -24.8 33.2 11         Gov't Agency Bonds, net 40.0 -44.2 -42.9 -55.8 -7.6 -5.5 5.6 -2.6 12         Corporate Bonds, net 23.8 40.2 42.0 39.7 3.5 2.8 1.7 10.3 13         Equities, net 16.8 25.3 37.8 25.2 -2.6 16.9 7.3 23.1                             14     Gross U.S. Sales of Foreign Securities 13799.3 18304.9 17872.7 22560.9 1817.5 2144.2 2137.6 2044.5 15     Gross U.S. Purchases of Foreign Securities 13883.7 18713.7 18264.5 22859.0 1865.0 2171.7 2159.2 2046.1 16     Foreign Securities, net U.S. sales (line 14 less line 15) /4 -84.4 -408.8 -391.9 -298.1 -47.5 -27.5 -21.6 -1.6 17         Foreign Bonds, net -89.0 -260.3 -245.3 -208.4 -14.9 -11.7 -37.1 -11.3 18         Foreign Equities, net 4.6 -148.5 -146.6 -89.7 -32.7 -15.8 15.4 9.7                             19     Net Long-Term Securities Transactions (lines 3 and 16): 1004.7 776.1 759.7 1271.1 132.8 177.5 30.9 220.2                             20     Other Acquisitions of Long-Term Securities, net /5 -9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0                             21   Net Foreign Acquisition of Long-Term Securities                           (lines 19 and 20): 995.5 776.1 759.7 1271.1 132.8 177.5 30.9 220.2                             22   Increase in Foreign Holdings of Dollar-Denominated Short-Term                           U.S. Securities and Other Custody Liabilities: /6 -104.3 196.5 145.6 230.4 12.1 -8.3 21.5 -6.5 23     U.S. Treasury Bills 133.1 222.3 201.2 171.8 24.8 -21.3 21.8 0.4 24       Private, net 121.8 165.3 142.5 90.8 23.1 18.6 7.0 1.0 25       Official, net 11.3 57.0 58.7 80.9 1.7 -40.0 14.8 -0.6 26     Other Negotiable Instruments                           and Selected Other Liabilities: /7 -237.4 -25.8 -55.6 58.6 -12.7 13.0 -0.4 -6.8 27       Private, net -221.0 -27.8 -61.2 64.9 -10.6 14.9 -0.5 -6.0 28       Official, net -16.4 1.9 5.6 -6.2 -2.2 -1.9 0.1 -0.8                             29   Change in Banks' Own Net Dollar-Denominated Liabilities -51.4 245.8 230.0 -83.7 27.2 9.0 -74.8 -1.7                             30 Monthly Net Dollar-Denominated Portfolio Inflows (lines 21, 22, and 29) /8 /9 839.8 1218.4 1135.3 1417.9 172.1 178.2 -22.5 212.0     of  which                   31     Private, net 667.9 1087.1 894.7 1469.3 210.1 201.7 -3.2 167.2 32     Official, net 171.9 131.2 240.6 -51.4 -38.0 -23.5 -19.2 44.9                                                         /1     Net U.S. sales = Net foreign purchases of U.S. securities (+).                 /2     Includes international and regional organizations.                 /3     The reported division of net U.S. sales of long-term securities between net sales to foreign official institutions and net sales               to other foreign investors is subject to a "transaction bias" described in Frequently Asked Questions 7 and 10.a.4 on the TIC website.   /4     Net transactions in foreign securities by U.S. residents. Foreign purchases of foreign securities = U.S. sales of foreign securities to foreigners.           Thus negative entries indicate net U.S. purchases of foreign securities, or an outflow of capital from the United States; positive entries           indicate net U.S. sales of foreign securities.                 /5     Minus estimated unrecorded principal repayments to foreigners on domestic corporate and agency asset-backed securities (zero after Jan. 2023) +          estimated foreign acquisitions of U.S. equity through stock swaps - estimated U.S. acquisitions of foreign equity through stock swaps +           increase in nonmarketable Treasury Bonds and Notes Issued to Official Institutions and Other Residents of Foreign Countries.      /6     These are primarily data on monthly changes in banks' and broker/dealers' custody liabilities. Data on custody claims are collected             quarterly and published in the TIC website.                 /7     "Selected Other Liabilities" are primarily the foreign liabilities of U.S. customers that are managed by U.S. banks or broker/dealers.     /8     TIC data cover most components of international financial flows, but do not include data on direct investment flows, which are collected           and published by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis. In addition to the monthly data summarized here, the           TIC collects quarterly data on some banking and nonbanking assets and liabilities. Frequently Asked Question 1 on the TIC website           describes the scope of TIC data collection.                 9/      Series break at February 2023 for lines 1-21 and the dependent lines 30-32; see TIC press releases of March 15 and April 15, 2023.

Investors may be eligible to file a claim with respect to $300,000 recovered from David Cartu, carrying on business as UKTVM Ltd. and Greymountain Management Limited (Collectively, the Cartu Corporations). All claims must be filed on or before March 6, 2026. Under a Settlement Agreement >with the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), dated May 18, 2021, David Cartu admitted that he contravened Ontario securities law by permitting the Cartu Corporations to indirectly facilitate trading by Ontario investors in binary options. David Cartu agreed to pay the OSC an administrative penalty of $300,000. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice made an order appointing BDO Canada Limited (BDO) as receiver (Receiver) of these funds and authorized the Receiver to implement a claims process for persons residing in Ontario who made payments to the Cartu Corporations to trade in binary options. What investors need to know Who is eligible to make a claim: Persons residing in Ontario who made payments to the Cartu Corporations between approximately July 2013 and April 2017 to trade in binary options. How to make a claim: Any eligible investor who has not already received a Notice of Claim from the Receiver, please visit BDO's website. Deadline to file a claim: Eligible investors must file their claim by 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) on March 6, 2026. Claims that are not received on or before March 6, 2026 will not be permitted. Questions: Investors who have questions should visit BDO’s website or contact Jessie Hue or Tony Montesano of the Receiver’s office by telephone at (647) 577-4366 or (416) 775-7821, respectively, or by email at greymountaininvestors@bdo.ca. To maximize recovery for investors, the costs of this receivership are being funded by an allocation from sanction and settlement funds held by the OSC. The mandate of the OSC is to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices, to foster fair, efficient and competitive capital markets and confidence in the capital markets, to foster capital formation, and to contribute to the stability of the financial system and the reduction of systemic risk. Investors are urged to check the registration of any persons or company offering an investment opportunity and to review the OSC investor materials available at http://www.osc.ca.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today released enforcement actions for January 2026. The OCC uses enforcement actions against an institution-affiliated party (IAP) to deter, encourage correction of, or prevent violations, unsafe or unsound practices, or breaches of fiduciary duty. Enforcement actions against IAPs reinforce the accountability of individuals for their conduct regarding the affairs of a bank. The term “institution-affiliated party,” or IAP, is defined in 12 USC 1813(u) and includes bank directors, officers, employees, and controlling shareholders. Orders of Prohibition prohibit an individual from any participation in the affairs of a bank or other institution as defined in 12 USC 1818(e)(7). The OCC has taken the following actions against IAPs: Order of Prohibition against Tamim Haidar, Branch Operations Associate Manager at a Union City, California, branch of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for embezzling over $800,000 in bank funds and falsifying bank records. (Docket No. AA-ENF-2024-80) The OCC terminates enforcement actions when a bank has demonstrated compliance with all articles of an enforcement action; or when the OCC determines that articles deemed “not in compliance” have become outdated or irrelevant to the bank’s current circumstances; or when the OCC incorporates the articles deemed “not in compliance” into a new action. Termination actions include: Order Terminating the Cease and Desist Order against Clear Fork Bank, N.A., Albany, Texas, dated October 8, 2024 (Docket No. AA-ENF-2024-82). (Docket No. AA-SO-2025-66) Order Terminating the Formal Agreement with Dearborn FSB, Dearborn, Michigan, dated January 16, 2025 (Docket No. AA-CE-2025-02). (Docket No. AA-CE-2025-67) Order Terminating the Formal Agreement with The Fairfield National Bank, Fairfield, Illinois, dated November 12, 2024 (Docket No. AA-CE-2024-90). (Docket No. AA-CE-2025-68) Order Terminating the Cease and Desist Order against Mission National Bank, San Francisco, California, dated April 14, 2020 (Docket No. AA-WE-2020-16). (Docket No. AA-WE-2025-55). Order Terminating the Cease and Desist Order against The Upstate National Bank, Ogdensburg, New York, dated November 16, 2023 (Docket No. AA-NE-2023-59). (Docket No. AA-NE-2025-65) To receive alerts for news releases announcing public OCC enforcement actions, subscribe to OCC Email Updates. All OCC public enforcement actions taken since August 1989 are available for download by viewing the searchable enforcement actions database at https://apps.occ.gov/EASearch. Related Link Enforcement Action Types

The California Public Employees’ Retirement System announced Monday that it has hired Shari Slate as its new Chief Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer. Slate, a Sacramento area resident, has spent nearly two decades helping large companies work toward a purpose-driven culture that considers the needs and experiences of all employees, customers, and other stakeholders. Most recently, she served as Senior Vice President and Chief Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Officer at CVS Health, whose businesses include not only CVS drugstores but also pharmacy benefits management and Aetna health insurance. Prior to joining CVS, Slate was Chief Inclusion and Collaboration Officer and Senior Vice President at Silicon Valley giant Cisco Systems Inc., where she helped launch the Office of Inclusion and Collaboration in 2015. During Slate’s tenure at Cisco, she helped the company build a pipeline of talent across the full spectrum of diversity. Fortune Magazine recognized Cisco as No. 1 of the “World’s 25 Best Places to Work” in 2019 and 2020 and Fortune's 100 Best Companies to Work For® in the U.S. for three consecutive years: 2021, 2022, and 2023. At CalPERS, Slate will drive the ongoing effort to integrate diversity, equity, and inclusion across the organization and beyond with suppliers, contractors, and investment partners. She will be a member of the Executive Team and report directly to CEO Marcie Frost. “Shari brings the kind of leadership this moment calls for – connecting diversity, inclusion, and equity to trust, governance and our core values,” Frost said. “She will help CalPERS continue to lead with our purpose, which is to deliver the best outcomes for the millions of people who depend on us for their retirement and health care benefits.” Slate said she joined CalPERS because of “its clarity of purpose and the responsibility it carries.” “CalPERS shows up for people at one of the most important moments of their lives, when work ends and trust matters most,” she said. “I hope to ensure that CalPERS works for all the people it was built to serve – beginning with our people and extending to every member who depends on this system.” A graduate of Mills College, Slate began her career in sales and was an award-winning manager for Xerox Corp. before being hired at Sun Microsystems as one of the youngest diversity officers at a Fortune 500 company. She has served on numerous boards and councils, including the California State University Foundation Board of Governors and the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Systemic Inequalities and Social Cohesion. Slate represented Cisco on the Business Roundtable’s Diversity & Inclusion Working Group after 181 CEOs redefined the purpose of a corporation to serve all stakeholders. She contributed to shaping the group’s view of DEI not as a standalone goal, but the connective tissue linking employee well-being, business performance, customer trust, supplier inclusion, and community impact.

Chris Mills has been promoted to Chief Commercial Officer (CCO) at Sage Capital Management. Chris joined the rapidly growing firm as Head of Digital Assets in May 2025, after an 18-year career at the Bank of England and over two years at JB Drax Honore. Since joining Sage Capital Management, Chris has worked closely with CEO, Nathan Sage across strategy, product development, liquidity distribution, and trade execution, playing a pivotal role in the firm’s continued expansion. In his new role as CCO, Chris will assume broader responsibility for sales, marketing, and business development, with Sage Capital Management’s newly appointed Sales Director, Jason Keogh reporting directly to him. Nathan Sage, CEO, Sage Capital Management said, “Chris has proved to be an exceptional hire. His depth of industry knowledge, strategic insight, and drive have resulted in huge strides for our business since he joined our team in May. Chris will play a key role in shaping our commercial strategy and driving our next growth phase as we continue to push boundaries and deliver value to every hedge fund, asset manager, trading firm and brokerage that chooses to work with us.” Chris Mills, CCO, Sage Capital Management added, “Joining Sage Capital Management has been incredibly rewarding. The business is fast-moving, entrepreneurial, and dynamic, with a highly talented team and a very clear vision to provide institutional clients with safe, secure, efficient and simple access to digital assets. I am looking forward to taking on this expanded role as we continue to evolve the business and scale our global offering.”

A summary of Deutsche Börse Group's business indicators for December 2025 is now available on the Deutsche Börse  website: Trading Statistics There you can also find the Excel file 'Major business figures' containing historic business indicators for the respective reporting segments.

The Bank for International Settlements has reviewed the content of the FX Global Code and acknowledges that the Code represents a set of principles generally recognised as good practice in the wholesale foreign exchange (FX) market. The BIS confirms that it acts as a market participant as defined by the Code, and is committed to conducting its FX market activities in a manner consistent with the principles of the Code. To this end, the BIS has taken appropriate steps, based on the size and complexity of its activities, and the nature of its engagement in the FX market, to align its activities with the principles of the Code. Related information FX Global Code

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that J. Russell “Rusty” McGranahan has been named SEC General Counsel. As the SEC’s chief legal officer, Mr. McGranahan will oversee the provision of legal expertise and advice to the Office of the Chairman, Commissioners, and agency staff. Jeffrey Finnell, who has served as Acting General Counsel, remains at the Commission as Deputy General Counsel. “I have known Rusty for many years and am excited to have recruited someone of his caliber and experience to my senior team. In addition to being a seasoned securities and M&A lawyer, he has served as both a public company and government agency general counsel. I expect Rusty to deploy these skills immediately across a wide range of priorities, including our initiatives to strengthen the capital markets and deliver on a robust rulemaking agenda,” said SEC Chairman Paul S. Atkins. “I thank Jeff for his service as Acting General Counsel,” Chairman Atkins continued. “I am pleased that he will continue serving at the Commission as Deputy General Counsel. His sound judgment and deep expertise in the securities laws are invaluable to the SEC.” Mr. McGranahan said, “It is an honor to have the opportunity to join the SEC and the Chairman’s senior team during this period of rapid technological and financial innovation. I look forward to working with my new SEC colleagues to embrace developments in a manner that responsibly fosters and maintains America’s preeminence in financial services and capital formation.” Mr. McGranahan’s career spans 30 years at a number of top companies and firms. He was recently the General Counsel of the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), setting the course for a number of key initiatives during the first 10 months of this Administration. Prior to GSA, Mr. McGranahan was the General Counsel of Focus Financial Partners, a wealth management firm. He was with Focus Financial for nine years, leading the legal function through an explosive period of growth, including its IPO in 2018 and going private transaction in 2023. Before Focus Financial, Mr. McGranahan spent nine years with BlackRock, serving as Managing Director, M&A Counsel, and Corporate Secretary. Mr. McGranahan began his career at Skadden, Arps and at White & Case, and for three years was based in Eastern Europe where he worked on some of the first public offerings from the region. Mr. McGranahan earned his J.D. from Yale Law School and his B.A., summa cum laude, in Economics and Politics from the Catholic University of America. Mr. McGranahan has also earned the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation.

The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) has today published its supervisory priorities for 2026, outlining in a letter its sector-specific priorities for the coming year to all banks, building societies, insurers and other PRA-regulated firms. These include important plans to streamline the supervisory process by moving some supervisory activity, including Periodic Summary Meetings (PSMs), to a two-year cycle. These meetings are an internal, formal review led by the PRA to consider potential risks posed by a regulated firm to the PRA’s objectives, and to set the supervisory strategy for the coming period. Over recent years, the PRA has transitioned some firms to biennial review cycles, reflecting the longer-term nature of supervisory workplans and allowing firms and supervisors to focus resources more efficiently on identifying and remediating key risks. From 1 March larger firms will begin to move to this two-year cycle, while maintaining a regular cadence for discussion of important matters, alongside ad hoc supervisory meetings. This will result in firms having a more proportionate and efficient set of engagements with the PRA. The Priorities letters are designed to help firms understand the main areas of supervisory focus over the next year, addressing key risks in each sector while setting out the PRA’s priorities to support competition, competitiveness and growth. Other streamlining measures include: Accelerating timelines for reviewing senior manager applications, new firm authorisations and internal ratings-based model change pre-approval applications; Developing the new UK captive regime for insurers, through a summer 2026 consultation with a view to launch the new regime in 2027; And streamlining and modernising reporting requirements through the Future Banking Data project. Sam Woods, Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer of the PRA, said: 'As we set out our priorities for 2026, we are also updating our approach by moving from an annual to a two-year supervisory cycle for firms. This will allow us to make our operations more efficient and help streamline firms’ interactions with the PRA.' These priorities build on the PRA’s extensive work to maintain stability and promote growth and competitiveness in the financial sector. Recent changes include: The removal of the Building Societies Sourcebook alongside new measures to support the growth of the mutuals sector; Simplifying capital requirements for smaller firms through Strong and Simple, while simultaneously introducing Basel 3.1 for larger firms; Supporting increased and rapid investment by insurance firms through the Matching Adjustment Investment Accelerator; And the introduction of Solvency UK, significantly cutting red tape for insurance firms. Background The UK Deposit Takers annual supervisory letter The ARTIS annual supervisory letter for international banks and investment firms The Insurance annual supervisory letter Further information on the PRA’s Approach to Supervision Supervisors will engage individually with firms in due course on what this means for the timing of each firm’s next PSM. The PSM process typically involves the PRA internally setting out the forward-looking supervisory strategy for individual firms, before a letter is shared with the firm’s board and management to outline its assessment of key risks, as well as any areas of focus, and request mitigating actions be taken where necessary.

TMX Group (TSX:X) Chief Executive Officer John McKenzie will present at the 2026 UBS Financial Services Conference on Monday, February 9, 2026, at 3:30p.m. - 4:10 p.m. ET. Mr. McKenzie will also present at the Bank of America Financial Services Conference on Tuesday, February 10, 2026, at 12:10 p.m. - 12:50 p.m. ET. A link to both webcasts will be available and archived in TMX's shareholder events section.