CME Group, the world's leading derivatives marketplace, today announced plans to expand its leading suite of regulated Cryptocurrency derivatives with the launch of Cardano (ADA), Chainlink (LINK) and Stellar (Lumens) futures on February 9, pending regulatory review. Market participants will have the choice to trade both micro-sized and larger-sized contracts: ADA futures (100,000 ADA) and Micro ADA futures (10,000 ADA) LINK futures (5,000 LINK) and Micro LINK futures (250 LINK) Lumens futures (250,000 Lumens) and Micro Lumens futures (12,500 Lumens) "Given crypto's record growth over the last year, clients are looking for trusted, regulated products to manage price risk as well as additional tools to gain exposure to this dynamic market," said Giovanni Vicioso, CME Group Global Head of Cryptocurrency Products. "With these new micro- and larger-size Cardano, Chainlink and Stellar futures contracts, market participants will now have greater choice with enhanced flexibility and more capital-efficiencies." "Wedbush recognizes the continued maturing of regulated crypto futures contract listings," said Bob Fitzsimmons, Executive Vice President, Wedbush Securities Inc. "We are happy to continue supporting CME Group's expansion of its product list, both for retail and institutional clients." "Digital assets are reaching a global inflection point as they become increasingly mainstream and more deeply integrated into investors' portfolios," said Martin Franchi, CEO of NinjaTrader. "Today's announcement from CME Group marks a watershed moment for the futures industry, creating more innovative and accessible on-ramps for traders seeking crypto exposure. As futures trading continues to grow in popularity among retail investors, we're excited to be part of this shift and to help provide traders with greater choice and flexibility. With demand for these products continuing to rise, we're thrilled to be part of this new frontier." "CME Group has yet again set the standard in innovation with their expansion into these offerings," said Justin Young, CEO and Co-Founder of Volatility Shares. "As one of the world's largest traders of crypto futures, Volatility Shares is excited to see more regulated financial products available for trading and risk management." Cardano, Chainlink and Stellar futures will join the company's rapidly expanding Cryptocurrency product suite, which includes Bitcoin, Ether, XRP and Solana futures and options on futures. 2025 trading highlights include: Record futures and options average daily volume (ADV) of 278,300 contracts ($12 billion notional) and record average open interest (OI) of 313,900 contracts ($26.4 billion notional) Record futures ADV of 272,200 contracts ($11.7 billion notional) and record average OI of 253,600 contracts ($21.4 billion notional) Record options ADV of 4,100 contracts ($231 million notional) and average OI of 60,400 contracts ($5 billion notional) For more information on these products, please visit: www.cmegroup.com/cryptolaunch.

Lingfeng Capital today announced the forthcoming launch of the Digital Venture Fund (DVF). DVF delivers a regulated, multi-chain tokenised venture fund providing institutional-level access to early-stage fintech and digital infrastructure opportunities. The fund will be launched on LSEG’s Digital Markets Infrastructure (DMI) platform during a London Stock Exchange market opening ceremony in March.  Designed as a next-generation venture product, DVF combines Lingfeng Capital’s established investment capability with LSEG’s digital markets infrastructure and Archax’s digital exchange and custody framework. Together, this creates an environment where traditional and digital-native investors can participate in the same venture strategy through modernised access rails enabled by distributed ledger technology. “DVF exists to prove that high-quality venture investing can be expanded by tokenised access,” said Brian McNulty, Partner, DVF at Lingfeng Capital. “Investors want diversification, they want innovation and they want regulated structures they can trust. We are now able to offer a product that stays firmly institutional while opening the door to new forms of participation and liquidity. This collaboration is an important milestone in connecting global capital to digital markets infrastructure.” “LSEG is pleased that Lingfeng Capital and DVF has chosen to use LSEG’s Digital Markets Infrastructure” said Darko Hajdukovic, Head of Digital Markets Infrastructure. "We’re excited to be working with such an innovative firm, offering professional investors access to exciting new investment opportunities through LSEG’s independent, trusted and scaled network.” Archax will provide regulated digital issuance, secondary-market connectivity and custody services, enabling DVF to offer optional token-based access while remaining fully compliant with institutional standards. “As the first FCA-regulated digital securities exchange, broker and custodian, we are uniquely positioned to provide compliant token issuance, secondary trading and custody within a single regulated environment. DVF showcases how real-world assets and digital rails can operate together to open new markets for investors without sacrificing oversight or trust.” said Graham Rodford, CEO and co-founder of Archax. DVF invests in fintech and digital-infrastructure companies through a traditional venture strategy, with the tokenised structure enabling modern distribution, improved efficiency and offers optional future liquidity. Digital-native investors will also be able to diversify into a fundamentals-driven venture fund through traditional channels. DVF represents the first institutional-grade venture product designed for cross-participation between traditional investors, digital-asset holders and blockchain foundations, with future phases enabling deeper network integration and expanded investor access.

Transaction Network Services (TNS) has expanded its global market data and infrastructure footprint in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region by adding connectivity to the Japan Alternative Market (JAX). This new connection provides TNS customers with direct, managed access to JAX’s market data feeds, delivered across TNS’ extensive global network.JAX began operations in December 2024, adding a new trading venue to Japan’s equities market. Through TNS’ connectivity, global firms can access JAX market data and incorporate it into their trading and analytics workflows.“The rise of alternative trading venues like JAX represents a significant shift in the Asian financial landscape,” said Jeff Mezger, Vice President of Product Management, TNS. “JAX is a compelling success story, and by making its market data available to our global customer base, we are helping to lower the barriers to entry for firms looking to capitalize on this competitive shift.”While Asian exchanges often require bespoke broker connections for order routing and clearing, TNS simplifies market data access. Firms can leverage TNS’ expansive extranet, consisting of over 5,000 endpoints for local broker access, and can view JAX market data alongside other major exchanges via TNS’ low latency managed global network.“Partnering with TNS provides JAX with a direct link to a broad, international community of market participants,” said a JAX spokesperson. “Their global infrastructure and deep experience in market connectivity supports JAX’s continued growth as we build a more competitive trading environment in Japan.”The JAX integration reinforces TNS’ continued investment in expanding its APAC footprint and delivering reliable, low-latency market data to customers worldwide. TNS’ Japanese exchange portfolio also includes Japannext, Tokyo Financial Exchange (TFX) and the Japan Exchange Group (JPX), which encompasses the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), Osaka Exchange (OSE), and Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM).

Agentic commerce is accelerating rapidly, reshaping how consumers discover, decide, and buy products and services online. Industry leaders forecast that a significant share of digital commerce will soon be agent-assisted: McKinsey projects that by 2030, agentic commerce could see between $3 trillion and $5 trillion in global retail value. As agentic commerce evolves, it faces a key challenge: securely integrating AI with complex payment systems simply.  New assets to power agentic commerce Worldline’s Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers on the Global Collect platform address this by acting as a secure bridge and translation layer between LLMs and Worldline’s APIs, enabling AI agents to initiate payment actions via natural language. For merchants, the MCP server unlocks innovation avenues and supports agent-initiated actions such as payment creation, refunds, status checks, and payment captures. It also enables AI-driven shopping by allowing agents to share secure payment links while maintaining security and compliance. The second capability is ConnectAI, a dedicated hub on its Documentation Site for developers and merchants to explore, build, test, and prepare for agentic commerce. ConnectAI brings together tools, documentation, and guidance for emerging agentic payment protocols. Stijn Gasthuys, Head of Global Commerce at Worldline, commented: “Agentic commerce will unlock new waves of innovation, helping merchants deliver better customer experiences. Our investments in this area position Worldline to capture a growing global market for AI-powered transactions, delivering secure, scalable infrastructure that empowers merchants and developers to innovate with confidence.” Gertjan Dewaele, VP of Product & Technology at Worldline, commented: “The shift to agentic commerce is underway, and MCP servers are the first building block for moving merchants from experimentation to real-world deployment. By providing secure, simple access to Worldline’s payment capabilities for AI agents, we enable the next generation of agentic commerce and streamline internal operations.” Worldline is actively shaping the future of agentic commerce by collaborating across the broader ecosystem with networks, tech leaders, AI platforms, and partners, laying the groundwork for secure, scalable agent-initiated payments. This includes active support for emerging standards such as Google’s Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) and Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP), with a strong focus on European regulatory and trusted requirements.

LSEG today announces the launch of a new digital settlement service, Digital Settlement House (LSEG DiSH), an open-access platform which enables programmatic and instantaneous settlement between independent payment networks, both on and off chain. Through commercial bank deposits held on the DiSH ledger (DiSH Cash), the service will enable the 24/7 instantaneous movement of commercial bank money in multiple currencies and jurisdictions, PVP and DVP, providing a real cash leg for FX and digital asset transactions and settlements. With LSEG DiSH, market participants will be able to conduct PvP or DvP and settlements using any asset, orchestrating payments on any connected network, digital and traditional. DiSH Cash, LSEG DiSH's ledger enabled commercial bank money solution, will operate accounts at commercial banks, providing members with instant ownership of a commercial bank deposit at any bank within the LSEG DiSH network, and a mechanism for the 24/7 movement of commercial bank money. LSEG DiSH can facilitate settlement on its own ledger, or act as notary to facilitate settlement in other networks and assets. By using LSEG DiSH, users can unlock trapped assets, enabling instantaneous use of cash, securities and digital assets 24/7. They will also be able to optimise liquidity through new tools that enable intraday borrowing and lending to better manage assets and obligations. The service also enables users to reduce settlement risk through reduced settlement timelines, synchronised settlement, and increased collateral availability. The launch follows a successful Proof of Concept (PoC) in collaboration with Digital Asset and a consortium of leading financial institutions, completing transactions on the Canton Network. Executed across multiple assets and currencies, the transactions leveraged commercial bank deposits at leading commercial banks, with ownership recorded on the LSEG DiSH ledger, enabling the PoC participants to instantaneously transfer commercial bank deposits. The deposits were tokenised on the Canton Network for use as a true cash leg of the transactions.  LSEG DiSH will operate through LSEG’s Post Trade Solutions business, utilising a trusted rulebook framework and account structure, supporting a broad network of members across multiple commercial banks and currencies. Instantaneous settlement of cash means that LSEG DiSH can offer dynamic management of intraday liquidity and funding, as well as 24/7 management of settlements and margin.  Daniel Maguire, Group Head, LSEG Markets and CEO, LCH Group, said: “LSEG DiSH expands the tokenised cash and cash like solutions available to the market, and for the first time, offers a real cash solution tokenised on the blockchain utilising cash in multiple currencies held at commercial banks. This innovative service will enable users to reduce settlement risk, and integrate existing cash, securities and digital assets across new and existing market infrastructure. We look forward to developing this service in partnership with the market.” 

Kristi Tange appointed as Group Chief Risk Officer Clare Weaver MBA, becomes Chief Legal Officer ClearToken, the digital financial market infrastructure firm, today announces two senior appointments to enhance its Senior Leadership Team and further strengthen its legal and risk functions. Kristi Tange has been appointed Group Chief Risk Officer, to lead governance, risk, and strategic oversight, including compliance, communications, and regulatory relations. She brings nearly three decades of experience at Goldman Sachs across operations, risk, and finance in the US, UK, and Japan. Most recently, Kristi served as Global Head of Operational Risk and Resilience at Goldman Sachs, where she led a strategic uplift of operational risk and UK resilience programmes. Previously, she headed Recovery and Resolution Planning, successfully filing two US Title I resolution plans. Her experience also includes enterprise risk, where she led risk identification, and senior leadership roles in operations across liquidity and collateral, client onboarding (including financial crimes), client assets, data, regulatory reporting, tax, derivatives, and treasury. Clare Weaver, MBA, has become Chief Legal Officer, where she will lead the Legal & Regulatory function for the Group, providing strategic legal and regulatory advisory support to the CEO and Boards and managing the Group’s legal affairs. Clare has been ClearToken’s legal counsel and Head of Legal & Regulatory and Company Secretary since inception in 2023. Clare brings over 20 years of experience across specialist Corporate, Commercial, M&A, fintech, and financial regulatory matters both in private practice and in industry, for more than 15 years deeply covering “general counsel” roles spanning all legal matters (including employment, commercial, corporate and finance). Clare previously established the Nomura Digital Office legal function and was founding interim CLO of Laser Digital (part of Nomura), before joining ClearToken in 2023. Maintaining developmental momentum These recent appointments are the latest milestones in ClearToken’s growth, as the company seeks to unlock the full potential of 24/7 digital markets by offering horizontal post-trade services with the legal certainty offered by a regulated financial market infrastructure (FMI). They are also important steps towards the company’s ambition to provide clearing and settlement services across digital asset markets for securities, derivatives and financing transactions. In 2025, ClearToken achieved FCA Authorisation to launch its delivery-versus-payment (DvP) settlement platform, selected Nasdaq as its technology partner, and launched CT Settle, its DvP settlement platform for digital assets. ClearToken is now proceeding with its formal application for authorisation from the Bank of England as a Central Counterparty (CCP). Benjamin Santos-Stephens, CEO of ClearToken, said: “We are delighted to welcome Kristi to ClearToken and congratulate Clare on her new role with us. These appointments build on the momentum we achieved in 2025 and are important milestones for us as we continue to build for the future. Such high calibre appointments bring with them a wealth of relevant experience and expertise and are welcome enhancements to our senior leadership team, as we continue with our strategy to create the world’s first clearing house and settlement depository for both tokenised traditional and digitally native assets.” Kristi Tange, Chief Risk Officer of ClearToken, commented: “It is a very exciting time to join ClearToken, which is well positioned to unify the traditional finance and digital assets worlds and unlock the massive potential of tokenisation. I am looking forward to working with the energetic and visionary team here to build the financial market infrastructure which will underpin the future of global, 24/7 markets.” Clare Weaver, Chief Legal Officer at ClearToken said: “Having worked with ClearToken well before joining full time in 2023, I’m extremely proud of what we have achieved together so far. As the legislative landscape, and therefore opportunities, for digital assets continues to develop across the globe, I look forward to helping our strong, diverse team deliver on our growth ambitions in 2026 and beyond, and at the same time ensuring that legal certainty and compliance remains at the core of what we do.”

LSEG announces it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each from Citigroup Global Markets Limited ("Citi") on the London Stock Exchange as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 04 November 2025. Date of purchase: 14 January 2026 Aggregate number of ordinary shares purchased: 111,092 Lowest price paid per share: 8,924.00p Highest price paid per share: 9,066.00p Average price paid per share: 9,001.67p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 509,388,609 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 509,388,609. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation) (as such legislation forms part of retained EU law as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter), a full breakdown of the individual purchases by Citi on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/9566O_1-2026-1-14.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased:       111,092 (ISIN: GB00B0SWJX34) Date of purchases:      14 January 2026 Investment firm:         Citi Aggregate information: Venue Volume-weighted average price Aggregated volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share London Stock Exchange 9,001.67 111,092 8,924.00 9,066.00 Turquoise        

MarketAxess Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: MKTX), the operator of a leading electronic trading platform for fixed-income securities, will issue a press release announcing its fourth quarter and full year 2025 financial results on Friday, February 6, 2026, before the market opens. Chris Concannon, Chief Executive Officer, and Ilene Fiszel Bieler, Chief Financial Officer, will host a conference call to provide a strategic update and discuss the Company’s financial results and outlook on Friday, February 6, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. ET. To access the conference call, please dial +1-800-715-9871 (U.S.) or +1-646-307-1963 (International) and use the ID 1832176. The Company will also host a live audio Webcast of the conference call on the Investor Relations section of the Company's website at http://investor.marketaxess.com. The Webcast will also be archived on http://investor.marketaxess.com for 90 days following the announcement.

Notice Type: Exchange Notice ID: 1881.011426 2026 Nadex will observe the following modified holiday schedule for the 2026 MLK Day Holiday: Monday, January 19, 2026: The Exchange will open at its regular time at 6:00pm ET on Sunday evening for trade date Monday, January 19th, 2026. The Exchange will list a limited offering of contracts and will close at 5:00pm ET. Contracts will be listed as follows: No Binary contracts will be listed for US indices or commodities on this trade date. They will resume listing at 6PM ET (Monday) for the trade date of Tuesday, January 20, 2026. No Binary contracts will be listed for the following FX currency pairs: AUD/USD, EUR/USD, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY. They will resume listing at 6PM ET (Monday) for the trade date of Tuesday, January 20, 2026. Cryptos will observe their regular schedule. Industry Event - Live Presentations - NAICS 711 will observe their regular schedule. The Exchange will list Crypto currency related products during Monday's trade date and they observe their regular schedule. All other non-Crypto Currency or Industry Event - Live Presentations - NAICS 711 related products will NOT be listed during Monday's trade date. Tuesday, January 20, 2026: The Exchange will observe normal business hours. Wednesday, January 21, 2026: The Exchange will observe normal business hours. Thursday, January 22, 2026: The Exchange will observe normal business hours. Friday, January 23, 2026: The Exchange will observe normal business hours. Additionally, please note, Nadex’s Market Maker Agreement previously identified the following products and time periods as Illiquid Markets: All Intraday 5-Minute, Intraday 2-Hour, Daily, and Weekly, Foreign Currency Binary contracts available for trading, at times the Exchange is open, between the hours of 2:00pm ET and 3:00am ET. Nadex is extending the Illiquid Markets coverage to Cryptocurrency products for trade date January 19, 2026. As such, Nadex authorized Market Makers operating pursuant to a Market Maker Agreement will be relieved of their quoting obligations relating to size on trade date January 19, 2026, from 6:00pm ET on calendar date January 18, 2026, to 5:00pm ET on calendar date January 19, 2026. A Market Maker(s) that elects to quote in any Crypto Currency market during this period will be required to comply with the spread obligations set forth in its Market Maker Agreement. Please refer to the Holiday Product Schedule Guidelines for specific product trading hours. Should you have any questions or require further information, please contact the Compliance Department.

The Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) confirms that as a result of a sophisticated phishing attack, first disclosed in August 2025, approximately 750,000 Canadian investors have been impacted. We deeply regret this occurred and apologize for any inconvenience or concern. CIRO is reaching out to affected investors to alert them of the incident and offering credit monitoring as an added precaution. “We are intent on doing right by those who are personally affected,” said Andrew Kriegler President and Chief Executive Officer of CIRO. “We take our public interest role very seriously. Matters of privacy and security are extremely important to us, as are our guiding organizational values of transparency and accountability. That’s why we remain committed to further strengthening our own cybersecurity defences and data security practices and supporting the ongoing efforts of the broader investment industry.” The following information may have been impacted: dates of birth, phone numbers, annual income, social insurance numbers, government issued ID numbers, investment account numbers and account statements. CIRO does not collect account login detail, such as passwords, security questions and PINs and therefore that information was not at risk. CIRO received this information in the normal course of carrying out its regulatory mandate to protect investors from improper investment conduct and practices, and through its investigative, compliance assessment and market regulation work. Protecting Canadian Investors CIRO quickly contained the incident and took immediate steps to secure our systems and protect the information in our care. We notified law enforcement and all relevant authorities, including privacy commissioners. A leading third-party forensic IT investigator was retained to determine what information was impacted. CIRO launched a thorough investigation with the support of external cybersecurity experts. Our preliminary investigation revealed that registration information for member firms and registered individuals had been affected. We immediately shared those findings publicly and directly with our members and impacted registrants. At that time, we noted the investigation was ongoing, and we committed to sharing the final findings of the e-discovery process once the review was complete. After more than 9,000 hours of examination, we can now confirm the full extent of the incident. There is currently no evidence that the information has been misused. We continue to monitor for malicious activity and have not identified any threat activity or exposure on the dark web. As a precaution and in order to help detect possible misuse of information, CIRO is providing affected investors two-years of credit monitoring and identity theft protection with both of the major credit agencies. Step by step instructions detailing how to activate protection services will be communicated to those impacted, directly. Additional Information Only some clients or former clients of CIRO dealer members were impacted by the cybersecurity breach. Clients impacted by the cyber incident will be sent a notification letter by CIRO starting on January 14, 2026. If you did not receive a notification letter from CIRO but want to confirm whether you were impacted and should have received a notification letter, you can request this information from CIRO in writing using the contact form available in the cyber incident section of CIRO’s website (ciro.ca).

In this speech Dave Ramsden sets out how a credible, proportionate and responsive UK resolution regime for banks supports sustainable growth and looks at how the resolution regime may need to evolve, alongside the Bank’s other responsibilities and wider developments in the financial system.   Dave Ramsden Deputy Governor, Markets and Banking Speech Good afternoon. I am delighted to be here and thank you to the Money Macro and Finance Society and King’s College London, two bodies I have a close affiliation with, for hosting me today. Click here for full details.

With the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) transitioning to a Monday–Friday trading week - aligning with global markets and recognizing the importance of liquidity for international investors - TASE continues to streamline the capital market and adapt it to international standards. The Exchange is announcing an expansion of its programs to encourage trading and liquidity in the derivatives market, specifically focusing on Futures on leading stock indices. Strategy and Vision Following the September 2024 launch of futures trading on leading indices, TASE is now broadening its liquidity incentive program. This expansion includes significant resource allocation, the addition of market makers, and the launch of new products. The development of a dynamic and diverse capital market is a core pillar of TASE's strategic plan. As futures are a globally recognized tool for exposure and risk management, TASE is committed to meeting international standards and making these products accessible and liquid for all market participants. Key Highlights of the New Program The new program is designed to bolster existing liquidity through market-making expansion, financial incentives, and new product offerings, with a primary focus on TA-35 Index Futures. Expanded Market Making: Adding more market makers and encouraging competition to better serve a wider client base. New Product Launch: Introduction of futures contracts on the TA-125 Index. Financial Incentives: Allocation of an annual budget for market maker compensation, alongside a separate Volume Rebate program for TA-35 index futures. Competitive Selection: Market makers will be selected through a competitive process to ensure the highest quality proposals. Rewards for Compliance: Market makers meeting quoting requirements will be eligible for fee rebates and a fixed monthly stipend.  Call for Proposals TASE invites capital market participants to take part in the development of Israel’s derivatives market. For further details regarding the program and the submission process, please contact Alon Dangot at the Trading, Derivatives, and Indices Department: Phone: +972-76-8160356 Email: tradingmethods@tase.co.il  Additional Information: Encouraging Liquidity in Futures Contracts

On 15 January 2026, the following updated constituents list for OFZ Zero Coupon Yield Curve will come into force. № Наименование Номер государственной регистрации 1 OFZ 26245 SU26245RMFS9 2 OFZ 26219 SU26219RMFS4 3 OFZ 26226 SU26226RMFS9 4 OFZ 26207 SU26207RMFS9 5 OFZ 26232 SU26232RMFS7 6 OFZ 26212 SU26212RMFS9 7 OFZ 26242 SU26242RMFS6 8 OFZ 26228 SU26228RMFS5 9 OFZ 26218 SU26218RMFS6 10 OFZ 26241 SU26241RMFS8 11 OFZ 26221 SU26221RMFS0 12 OFZ 26244 SU26244RMFS2 13 OFZ 26225 SU26225RMFS1 14 OFZ 26233 SU26233RMFS5 15 OFZ 26240 SU26240RMFS0 16 OFZ 26243 SU26243RMFS4 17 OFZ 26230 SU26230RMFS1 18 OFZ 26238 SU26238RMFS4 19 OFZ 26239 SU26239RMFS2 20 OFZ 26247 SU26247RMFS5 21 OFZ 26236 SU26236RMFS8 22 OFZ 26237 SU26237RMFS6 23 OFZ 26248 SU26248RMFS3 24 OFZ 26235 SU26235RMFS0 25 OFZ 26224 SU26224RMFS4 26 OFZ 26246 SU26246RMFS7 27 OFZ 26249 SU26249RMFS1 28 OFZ 26250 SU26250RMFS9 29 OFZ 26252 SU26252RMFS5 30 OFZ 26251 SU26251RMFS7 31 OFZ 26253 SU26253RMFS3 32 OFZ 26254 SU26254RMFS1  

Thank you, Madame Ambassador, for the introduction and the opportunity to speak today. My topic is the implications of deregulation for monetary policy, an appropriate one for this setting.1 Greece's recovery from the crisis that began in 2009 was only possible after the Greek people implemented substantial and painful reforms, including alleviating suffocating over-regulation in many sectors. In addition to the other reforms embraced by Greece, deregulation freed businesses to compete domestically and internationally, and promoted individuals' access to the economy. The range of reforms has included liberalizing product and service markets, easing licensing and administrative burdens, opening previously restricted professions, and increasing labor market flexibility. The government liberalized electricity and gas utilities; privatized airports, ports, and utilities; and reformed bankruptcy procedures and other business laws. While it is challenging to quantify how these deregulatory actions have affected the economy, there is little doubt that these reforms have supported a remarkable return to economic growth and higher living standards. Macroeconomic stability has returned to Greece. Unemployment has fallen to its lowest level since the Global Financial Crisis, and investment and exports have rebounded. Product and labor market reforms helped restore competitiveness, reduce unit labor costs, and encourage firm entry. By easing the ability of supply to respond to prices, these reforms have improved the transmission of monetary policy. While monetary policy is set by the ECB, its transmission varies in part with how national governments manage their economies. Long-term Greek borrowing rates narrowed their spread to Germany's, below 1 percent, compared with 6 percent a decade ago. Greece has a come a long way, impressing the whole world with its recovery. Regulation and the Economy's Supply SideFor all the conversation around Mario Draghi's report,2 Greece shows that well-targeted deregulatory reforms can help lay the foundation for more sustained and robust economic growth by expanding the productive capacity of the economy, known as the supply side. Such sustainable increases in actual and potential growth have different implications for monetary policy than purely cyclical growth spurts, which boost growth in the near term without raising economic potential. These jolts can create substantial inflation, undermining growth in the medium term by forcing central banks to raise interest rates, and also in the long term by causing a misallocation of resources. Recent experiences have reinforced the need for central bankers to fully consider the broad range of nonmonetary factors that could affect the appropriate stance of monetary policy. One such factor that is especially important at this juncture is the regulatory burden borne by businesses and individuals, which has begun to recede in the past year.3 I believe that the sweeping deregulation underway in the United States will significantly boost competition, productivity, and potential growth, allowing faster economic growth without putting upward pressure on inflation. This would support continued easing of restrictive monetary policy, but ignoring these effects would result in monetary policy that is needlessly contractionary. One challenge for central bankers in fully incorporating deregulation into their economic outlooks is that it is difficult to measure in aggregate. Economists are inclined to study things when there are quantitative data to illuminate their work—a version of the famous "lamppost problem" of only looking where the lamppost shines. This may have contributed to a tendency to give short shrift to regulation in judging the economic outlook. Quantitatively measuring regulations is more difficult than taxes, subsidies, or interest rates. Regulations that businesses face can vary enormously based on the sector, size, and sometimes even the age of a company. Some regulations ban activities altogether. Some regulations impose fixed or variable costs for complying. Some regulations affect consumption decisions and some affect production. Regulations can vary enormously across jurisdictions and sometimes within jurisdictions. Additionally, enforcement determines how binding regulations are in practice, and enforcement can be even harder to measure than the effects of regulations themselves. These measurement challenges are evident in the abundance of economic studies on specific regulations but the much smaller volume of work that tries to comprehensively measure the aggregate effects of the accumulation of regulations on the macroeconomy.4 From the perspective of an individual firm, it may be easy to adjust behavior in response to one regulation, known as a "margin of adjustment," but compounding regulations can constrain the ability to shift costs by hitting multiple margins of adjustment.5 One pebble doesn't stop a stream, water can flow around it; but enough pebbles will. A common approach to quantifying the effects of regulations is to count the number of pages of new regulations, though this does not account for varying economic significance across pages. Another approach is to count the number of work hours required to comply, as reported under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). However, there is wide variation in how different regulatory agencies produce these costs estimates, even sometimes variation within agencies, and more importantly, the counting of work hours related to the PRA does not capture the full opportunity cost of the regulations—that is, how that lost hour of work could have been used more productively—or the firms and industries that don't exist because of the regulation.6 If a firm needs to hire a person to comply with some new regulation and can't hire a sales associate who could generate new business or can't engage in a productive activity at all, then the foregone opportunity can be significantly larger than the wage for compliance hours.7 There has been some progress in measuring regulation through advances in natural language processing and artificial intelligence, and I expect more of this to come. For instance, Patrick McLaughlin's QuantGov project at Stanford University's Hoover Institution uses computational tools to move beyond regulation page counts toward counting restrictions and obligations imposed by the text and quantifying regulations by industry.8 In other work, Joseph Kalmenovitz uses machine learning methods to count and separate regulations that are relevant for a firm's core businesses from those that are not relevant.9 These measures show a substantial drop in the number of rules in 2025.10 Among other deregulatory efforts is the current U.S. Administration's "one-in-ten-out policy" revoking 10 old regulations for every new one adopted.11 Based on the pace of the Administration's deregulatory efforts in the first part of 2025, I estimate that 30 percent of the regulatory restrictions in the Code of Federal Regulations will be eliminated by 2030, though this may prove an underestimate.12 Regulations can have far larger consequences for the supply side than, for example, taxes, because they can amount to outright prohibitions and thus function as infinite taxes. Quantity controls are usually far more damaging than those that directly affect prices.13 Consider agglomeration, when a group of firms in the same general industry benefit from proximity, such as R&D labs and production plants, or clients and customers. An auto parts producer benefits from being close to an automaker. Environmental or other restrictions that restrict co-location can affect the entire economy's supply side by preventing the agglomeration necessary for an industry to be profitable. Take one piece of an industrial ecosystem away because of a regulation and the rest become harder to sustain. Supply chain ecosystems exist—or don't—because of regulations determining what activity can take place and where. I think it is hard to argue that, say, the excess burden of going from a 30 percent to a 33 percent marginal tax rate has the same effect as a regulation preventing an entire industry from existing domestically. Regulations, particularly those that affect physical production, can force the economy from high-productivity sectors to low-productivity sectors by encouraging capital-intensive production to move to less regulated places, such as China. Research on the effects of regulation on the supply side of the economy has developed along two major lines of inquiry. The first studies regulation's effect on total factor productivity (TFP) and growth by making production more expensive.14 If regulations make, say, electricity or manufactured goods more expensive to produce, they lower TFP.15 Regulations can also distort investment decisions across sectors or impede innovation, leading to an economy-wide misallocation of resources with commensurate effects on aggregate productivity levels.16 An alternative way of modeling regulation is via its effects on free entry and markups. Regulatory costs that appear marginal from an industry perspective often originate as fixed costs from a firm perspective. An existing homebuilder building one more house may be marginal, but for a new entrant to build it, they would have to invest in vast compliance infrastructure. In many jurisdictions, they'd have to learn how to measure carbon emissions, decipher labor regulations, pass various inspections at different stages, and pay other fixed costs. The barriers to building a house have become so burdensome that many builders exit entire markets, leaving numerous large metro areas without desperately needed supply. As such, regulations often serve as barriers to entry, with all the attendant consequences: reduced competition, artificially high returns to scale, higher markups, reduced innovation, and reduced productivity growth. Let's call these "markup regulations."17 There is abundant evidence both within and across countries that increased regulation causes reduced firm entry, decreased competition, and lower investment, all consistent with elevated fixed costs.18 Decreased firm entry, competition, and innovation lead to a malaise familiar to many: Formerly dynamic industries calcify, flagship businesses choose to move elsewhere or shutter completely, and communities feel cheated out of their way of life. Implications for Monetary PolicyNow let me discuss the implications of regulation and deregulation for monetary policy. Most theory and research suggest that increasing the regulatory burden reduces productivity and thus puts upward pressure on prices. This is intuitive: Regulations impede production, and deregulation removes those impediments. More production means lower prices, and vice versa. But gauging the magnitudes of these effects is more difficult. Work by Dustin Chambers, Courtney A. Collins, and Alan Krause found that a 1 percent increase in U.S. federal regulations in a particular industry is associated with a roughly 10 basis point increase in consumer prices in that industry, and that is only in the near term.19 Longer-term effects and effects from more substantial changes in regulations are, in my view, likely to be substantially larger, since firm entry and the effects of increased competition develop over time. Supply chain ecosystems can take years to rise or fall. I'd also expect cross-industry spillovers to boost aggregate effects above this level. But even these modest within-industry, short-term effects would be substantial in the context of the potential 30 percent decline in the regulatory code that I projected earlier. This implies a cumulative drag of roughly 3 percent on the consumer price level through 2030, a little over half a percent per year.20 What happens in the short term depends on various factors—the types of regulations involved, the way these regulations affect firms and households, and the manner of enforcement. On balance, I believe the substantial deregulation that has occurred in 2025 will continue over at least the next three years and be a large positive shock to productivity that will put downward pressure on prices. On net, this supports a more accommodative stance of monetary policy. As I have argued, I think the primary effects of deregulation are on the supply side of the economy and have the effect of increasing potential output more than they increase actual output. For example, if the number of goods I can produce is effectively limited by regulation, and that cap is removed, this means I can produce more. If demand increases and production is limited by regulation or some other factor, then prices increase. If demand rises and these shackles have been removed, then output grows and pressure on prices is much smaller. While I think of regulation as primarily a supply-side factor, it can also affect demand. For instance, the news of planned deregulatory action can stimulate investment now for future production, increasing aggregate demand and prices in the short run, before prices adjust to the lower level that would prevail over the longer run. However, I see little reason to expect the short-run effect on demand will exceed potential. In my earlier speech, I assumed that deregulation immediately increases actual output half as much as potential output, and then the two converge over a few years. While some approaches assume TFP shocks increase actual and potential output by the same amount, work by Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Mauricio Ulate shows that a structural approach to modeling the supply-side results in potential output overshooting actual output in response to a TFP shock. 21 Of course, this matters because the output gap is a primary input into calculating the appropriate setting for monetary policy. If actual output falls below potential output, there is slack in the economy that could be accommodated by looser monetary policy. If deregulation boosts potential output above actual, the correct response is to cut rates. At the same time, by increasing the marginal product of capital, deregulation may raise the so-called neutral rate of interest at which monetary policy is neither accommodative nor restrictive. I addressed this in my first speech as a member of the Federal Reserve Board.22 Turning to markups, the second channel for the effects of regulation on the supply side, models indicate that if monetary policy ignores the deflationary effects of deregulation, then we risk causing an unnecessary contraction in the economy. That is the implication of an important 2014 paper by Gauti Eggertsson, Andrea Ferrero, and Andrea Raffo, which models deregulation as a reduction in markups—increased competition—in a standard New Keynesian model.23 They find that the appropriate response of monetary policy is to reduce interest rates in response to this type of deregulation shock and offset its consequent deflation. If for some reason monetary policy fails to do so, then deflation and economic contraction needlessly result. This model implies that, if the Federal Reserve fails to reduce policy rates in response to deregulation, there will be adverse consequences. Greece's experience testifies to this. Had the ECB not implemented exceptionally loose monetary policy and effectively accommodated Greece's structural reforms, the outcome could have been quite different. I believe that central bankers should be paying close attention to the effects of regulation on productivity, output, and prices. In recent quarters, policy has been tighter than it should have been to reflect significant deregulation lifting potential growth and reducing inflation. Going forward, I expect that the ambitious deregulation underway in the United States will boost growth without boosting inflation and be one factor supporting a further easing of monetary policy. In this regard, Greece and the ECB have lit the path. I have raised this point with my Federal Open Market Committee colleagues and expect to continue to do so in our deliberations. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. I am deeply indebted to Casey Mulligan for many conversations about the economics of regulation, but again, the ideas here reflect only my own views.  2. Mario Draghi (2024), The Future of European Competitiveness, September 9.  3. In this speech, I am focusing on general economic regulations, not regulations on the banking sector, which are implemented by the Federal Reserve in conjunction with other regulatory agencies. For more on banking regulations, see Stephen I. Miran (2025), "Regulatory Dominance of the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet," speech delivered at the Bank Policy Institute and Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council, Washington, November 19.  4. For example, lots of papers show very clear implications for productivity and "dynamism" of regulations that inhibit labor adjustment (see Steven J. Davis and John Haltiwanger (2014), "Labor Market Fluidity and Economic Performance," paper presented at "Re-Evaluating Labor Market Dynamics," a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, held in Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 22; and David H. Autor, William R. Kerr, and Adriana D. Kugler (2007), "Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence from US States," The Economic Journal, vol. 117 (June), pp. F189–217). For a theory approach, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) is a classic—a tax on firing is a tax on hiring (see Hugo Hopenhayn and Richard Rogerson (1993), "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 101 (5). For land use regulation literature, see Leonardo D'Amico, Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, William R. Kerr, and Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto (2024), "Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation," NBER Working Paper Series 33188 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, November).  5. For example, a regulation that raises input costs might incent a firm to cut costs by reducing headcount, but the firm may find that response problematic as well because of other regulations.  6. For instance, the Small Business Administration and General Services Administration measure PRA paperwork burdens in dollars, whereas other agencies like FinCEN and parts of the Department of Agriculture measure these burdens in hours. Variation within agencies is usually across units, like the Food and Drug Administration relative to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services within the Department of Health and Human Services.  7. Standard economics would suggest that, if the compliance associate is seen as a fixed cost but a new salesperson is seen as a variable cost, the optimality condition would ignore the fixed cost and have the firm hire the sales associate anyway. This is well and good for large firms that generate abundant cashflow or have easy access to liquidity, but many smaller firms face more binding cashflow and liquidity constraints and will be unable to hire that salesperson. Moreover, even for large firms, the compliance associate may be a variable cost for expanding an existing line of business, or he or she may be a fixed cost that impedes the firm's expansion into a new line of business or market. See the discussion that follows of "markup regulations" and competition.  8. Quantgov (2025), "What is Quantgov," webpage.  9. Joseph Kalmenovitz (2023), "Regulatory Intensity and Firm-Specific Exposure," The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 36 (August), pp. 3311–47.  10. See footnote 12 for McLaughlin's analysis. Kalmenovitz's analysis is available on his website, https://www.jkalmenovitz.com/, accessed January 5, 2025.  11. Executive Office of the President (2025), "Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, Executive Order 14192," Federal Register, vol. 90 (February 6), pp.9065–67.  12. McLaughlin (2025) estimates 2,404 deregulatory actions from the Spring 2025 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. If the average deregulatory action removes 25.6 restrictions from the CFR, which was the average through July 1 of this year, then 61,542 restrictions will be removed per year. Five years at this rate will remove 28 percent of a total of 1.1 million restrictions. I rounded up to 30 percent because I expect the pace of deregulation to accelerate with the accelerated pace of Senate confirmations due to the Senate's recent adoption of en bloc confirmation; with more personnel, deregulation will be much quicker than it was in the first few months of a fresh administration. Indeed, I think 30 percent will ultimately prove to be an underestimate. As McLaughlin notes, we will soon get the Fall 2025 Unified Agenda, which will allow me to update this calculation. I used McLaughlin's analysis rather than Kalmenovitz's for this exercise because, as of January 5, Kalmenovitz's measure showed a nearly 25 percent reduction in overall federal regulatory burden over the course of 2025, and as optimistic as I am regarding the coming deregulatory trend, that magnitude seems aggressive to me at present. Moreover, Kalmenovitz's measure is prone to revision. See Patrick McLaughlin (2025), "Early Data on Deregulatory Push in Washington," Third Order, October 28, https://thirdorder.substack.com/p/early-data-on-the-deregulatory-push.  13. Discussion of conditions for the social optimality of taxes over regulations can be found in Alberto Alesina and Francesco Passarelli (2014), "Regulation Versus Taxation," Journal of Public Economics, vol. 110, pp. 147–56.  14. The effects of regulation on TFP were one point I made in my first speech as a Federal Reserve Board member; see Stephen I. Miran (2025) "Nonmonetary Forces and Appropriate Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York, New York, September 22.  15. For evidence of the relationship between regulation and TFP, see John W. Dawson and John J. Seater (2013), "Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 18 (June), pp. 137–77. For a rigorous theoretical model of productivity enhancements in a Schumpeterian model, see Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin, Pietro Peretto (2020), "The Cumulative Cost of Regulations," Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 38 (October), pp. 1–21.  16. Alberto Alesina, Michele Battisti, and Joseph Zeira (2018), "Technology and Labor Regulations: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 23 (March), pp. 41–78.  17. Of course, antitrust regulations are designed to increase and not decrease competition; but these are a small portion of the overall regulatory code, and I am focused here on regulations outside of antitrust.  18. Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Fabio Schiantarelli (2005), "Regulation and Investment," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 3 (4), pp. 791–825; James B. Bailey and Diana W. Thomas (2017), "Regulating Away Competition: The Effect of Regulation on Entrepreneurship and Employment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 52, pp. 237–54; Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon (2017), "Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S.," NBER Working Paper Series 23583 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July); and Dustin Chambers, Patrick A. McLaughlin, and Tyler Richards (2022), "Regulation, Entrepreneurship, and Firm Size," Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 61, pp. 108–34.  19. Dustin Chambers, Courtney A. Collins, and Alan Krause (2017), "How Do Federal Regulations Affect Consumer Prices? An Analysis of the Regressive Effects of Regulation," Public Choice, vol. 180, pp. 57–90.  20. Of course, this predicted decline is relative to what consumer prices would have done in the absence of the deregulatory actions and not a prediction about an absolute change.  21. See Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Mauricio Ulate (2018), "The Cyclical Sensitivity in Estimates of Potential Output," (PDF) Brookings Paper on Econonomic Activity, Fall, pp. 343–441. Coibion et al. show that in a Blanchard-Quah (BQ) approach to estimating potential output, TFP shocks increase potential output much more rapidly than actual output (figure 12). The BQ approach relies on the uncontroversial theoretical assumption that supply-side shocks affecting potential output are those which have permanent effects on the level of output while demand shocks are restricted to having no permanent effects. It provides a more structural economic grounding for estimating potential output than various filter-based approaches. The case for actual and potential output moving up the same amount in response to a TFP shock seems more plausible if the TFP shock is driven by a new technology, which requires investment to implement. But not all TFP shocks are the same, and regulations are quite different. If today a regulation limits the amount of carbon a factory can emit, but tomorrow the factory can emit more carbon, it does not require the same amount of new investment as would be required to, say, implement new computer technologies. Letting an existing smokestack run for 24 instead of 8 hours is quite different from having to buy graphical processing units to develop a large language model. In other words, it may be appropriate to consider regulatory TFP shocks as having different consequences for output gaps than technological TFP shocks have. See also Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2011), who observe that the response of actual output to a TFP shock depends crucially on the monetary response, underlining that it is crucial for the Fed to stay abreast of TFP shocks in formulating the appropriate stance of policy (Jean Boivin, Michael Kiley, and Frederic Mishkin (2011), "How Has the Monetary Transmission Mechanism Evolved Over Time?" in Benjmain M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, Vol. 3. (Amsterdam: Elsevier), pp. 369–422).  22. In that speech, I included a boost to neutral rates from deregulation (which was offset by reductions in neutral rates from other sources like reduced population growth and smaller fiscal deficits). I also included a wider output gap because of potential growth increasing faster than actual growth as a result of deregulation. In that speech, I did not model an explicit deregulation-driven reduction in prices, either from a TFP boost or a reduction in markups, an oversight partially addressed here.  23. Gauti Eggertsson, Andrea Ferrero, and Andrea Raffo (2014), "Can Structural Reforms Help Europe?" Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 61, pp. 2–22. 

Michelle Hillery, Managing Director, Head of Repository & Derivatives Services at DTCC, commented on the recent approval from the FCA for the formal public registration of DTCC’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive/Regulation (MiFID/R) UK ARM license: “The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) recently approved the formal public registration of DTCC’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive/Regulation (MiFID/R) UK ARM license, marking a significant milestone in the evolution of transaction reporting for UK financial markets. The service, set to launch in Q2 2026, offers market participants a unified, industry-owned solution that empowers clients to consolidate derivatives trade reporting alongside equities & fixed income securities & bonds reporting, elevate data quality and take advantage of resilient infrastructure for end-to-end regulatory reporting. DTCC has been supporting regulators globally in their supervisory duties to monitor systemic risk under various regulations, including EMIR, SFTR, MAS, HKMA, ASIC, JFSA, CAD and more. The launch of the UK MiFID ARM service supports fulfilment of regulatory supervisory mandate by delivering enhanced transparency and robust monitoring against market abuse. As regulatory requirements continue to evolve, DTCC will deliver robust solutions that enable firms to streamline their transaction reporting obligations while achieving a harmonized global framework and cost saving benefits. UK MiFID ARM service will provide real-time visibility, advanced exception management, and comprehensive analytics—all while minimizing operational risk and promoting compliance. DTCC continues to serve as a trusted partner and key liaison - engaging regulators and advocating for clients to find mutually beneficial solutions, committed to supporting firms during regulatory reporting shifts by offering advanced trade reporting analytics and user testing solutions that are designed to facilitate effective data management as well as improve data accuracy.”

Exegy, a global leader in high-performance market data and trading technology, today announced it has acquired NovaSparks Inc. (NovaSparks), a provider of real-time market data normalization and distribution solutions, specializing in Field Programmable Gate Array (“FPGA”) enabled products. This strategic acquisition further strengthens Exegy’s ability to meet the most demanding speed and scale requirements of modern electronic trading platforms used by elite capital markets businesses. “We are thrilled to welcome the NovaSparks customers to Exegy. We have a strong track record of blending the strengths of talented teams and proven products to elevate the user experience and deliver greater value to our clients, and we are excited to continue this strategy with NovaSparks,” said David Taylor, CEO of Exegy, “Following our acquisitions of Vela Trading Systems and Enyx, the addition of NovaSparks is the latest milestone in our mission to be the leading capital markets technology provider, delivering nanosecond speeds, global scale, and broad market coverage.” NovaSparks clients immediately benefit from Exegy’s global scale and stability, as well as its managed services organization, which provides 24/7 follow-the-sun support and deployment management. This includes existing NovaSparks partnerships and integrations with third-party trading platforms. Luc Burgun, CEO of NovaSparks, added: “Joining forces with Exegy allows us to improve our innovation and customer support capabilities. Our clients will continue to receive the ultra-low latency performance they rely on, but now with the backing of Exegy’s global presence and services infrastructure.” Exegy is committed to maintaining existing NovaSparks products and investing to develop new solutions that combine the best performance and capabilities from both product and intellectual property portfolios.

Professor Alan Taylor External member of the Monetary Policy Committee Have we reached ‘peak trade’ and is globalisation now facing a downswing? What are the implications for monetary policy? Alan Taylor discusses the evolution of world trade, drawing on historical perspectives from the first age of globalisation in the 1800s up to the present.  Driving over the peak, or a false summit? - speech by Alan TaylorOpens in a new window

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the EU’s financial markets regulator and supervisor, published today a second thematic note on sustainability-related claims, focusing on ESG strategies. The note concentrates on ESG integration and ESG exclusions, as references to these strategies are often made by market participants and widely referenced in marketing communications directed to retail investors.  ESG integration and ESG exclusions can mean different things to different market participants. Lack of transparency when using these terms poses a notable greenwashing risk to investors. The aim of the note is not to define these strategies, but to call on market participants to be clear about what they mean when referencing them. Similarly to the first thematic note on ESG credentials, this publication offers practical do’s and don’ts for making sustainability claims. These are illustrated through concrete examples of good and poor practices that are based on observed market practices. Related Documents DateReferenceTitleDownloadSelect 14/01/2026 ESMA36-429234738-165 Thematic notes on clear, fair and not misleading sustainability-related claims: ESG strategies

The European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA – the ESAs) have today signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Bank of England (BoE), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). This agreement enhances the cooperation between the authorities to oversee critical ICT third-party service providers (CTPPs) as required by the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). The MoU establishes clear principles and procedures for cooperation, information sharing and coordination of oversight activities between the relevant authorities responsible for EU CTPPs/UK CTPs oversight. The MoU aims at enhancing third-party risk management and contributing to the overall operational resilience of the financial sector in the EU and UK through strong cross-border cooperation.  ​​Legal basis and background The MoU has been prepared in accordance with DORA Articles 36, 44, and 49, which cover the ESAs’ oversight powers, international cooperation, and financial cross-sector exercises, communication and cooperation. ​To exchange information with a third-country authority, the ESAs must ensure that the confidentiality and professional secrecy regime in the third country is equivalent to that in the EU. Therefore, before signing this MoU, the ESAs conducted an assessment that confirmed the UK confidentiality and professional secrecy regime’s equivalence with that in DORA. Related Documents DateReferenceTitleDownloadSelect 14/01/2026 MoU DORA oversight ICT CTPPs Memorandum of Understanding between the ESAs and the UK Financial Authorities on the oversight activities of critical ICT third-party service providers 14/01/2026 DORA Art.55 ESAs targeted equivalence assessment of DORA confidentiality and professional secrecy regimes

The FCA, Bank of England and Prudential Regulation Authority have together signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European Supervisory Authorities to enhance cooperation and oversight of critical third parties (CTPs) that fall under the UK’s CTP regime. The MoU establishes a framework for coordinating and sharing information on the oversight of CTPs under the UK regime and critical third party providers (CTPPs) under the EU’s Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), including during incidents such as power outages or cyber-attacks. The MoU aims to manage potential risks to financial stability and market confidence, as well as strengthen international cooperation. It will also help reduce duplication and regulatory burden on CTPs and CTPPs. The UK’s CTP regime complements similar international standards and is designed to be compatible with DORA. The agreement demonstrates UK regulators’ commitment to cross-border cooperation and strengthening operational resilience to support growth and promote market stability. Background In 2024, UK regulators introduced new rules to bolster the resilience of critical third parties providing key services to the financial sector. These rules came into effect on 1 January 2025 and apply once a CTP is designated by the Treasury. The Treasury is responsible for deciding which third party service providers should fall under the new CTP regime. The rules will require designated CTPs to provide regular assurance, undertake resilience testing and report major incidents. The designation process has begun and the regulators will continue to work with the Treasury throughout the designation process. The regime does not reduce the responsibility of financial firms and Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) to manage their own operational resilience and third-party risks in line with existing outsourcing rules.