A former B.C. resident and his company have agreed to pay almost $4.2 million to the BC Securities Commission (BCSC) for fraudulently misusing funds from investors, making misrepresentations to shareholders and illegally distributing securities. William Brent Meikle and Hit TV Brands Inc. will pay about $3.7 million, representing the amount obtained from their misconduct. Investors can make a claim to those funds after the BCSC receives the money. Meikle must also pay $500,000 to the BCSC as part of the settlement. Meikle was the founder, president, CEO and director of the Alberta-based company, which claimed to market and sell various products like batteries and a spray-on lubricant. Between February 2018 and December 2019, Hit TV fraudulently used approximately $1 million in investor funds for Meikle’s personal expenses. The company also made a series of misrepresentations to shareholders about imminent revenue prospects, as well as an imminent public offering and equity financing. It also made prohibited representations to investors that they would be reimbursed for their invested funds and would keep their shares. During the same time period, Hit TV illegally distributed its securities 128 times without filing a prospectus – a formal document providing details of an investment – and without an exemption from the prospectus requirement. Meikle, by authorizing, permitting or acquiescing in each of Hit TV’s contraventions, committed the same contraventions. In addition to the financial payment, Meikle and Hit TV are permanently banned from participating in the investment market, including from being a registrant or promoter, engaging in investor relations, holding any management role in the investment market or trading securities, except Meikle may do so in his own account through a registered dealer. Meikle is also prohibited from being a director or officer of any issuer. 

This report summarizes the Federal Reserve Board’s framework for assessing the resilience of the U.S. financial system and presents the Board’s current assessment. By publishing this report, the Board intends to promote public understanding and increase transparency and accountability for the Federal Reserve’s views on this topic.   2025 November: PDF April: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2024 November: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions April: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2023 October: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions May: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2022 November: HTML | PDF | Statement by Vice Chair Brainard | Chart Data and Descriptions May: HTML | PDF | Statement by Governor Brainard | Chart Data and Descriptions 2021 November: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions May:  HTML | PDF | Statement by Governor Brainard | Chart Data and Descriptions 2020 November: HTML | PDF | Statement by Governor Brainard | Chart Data and Descriptions May: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2019 November: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions May: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2018 November: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions

Fiserv, Inc. (NYSE: FI), a leading global provider of payments and financial services technology, today announced its participation in the following investor conferences. Mike Lyons, CEO, and Paul Todd, CFO, will participate in the following conferences: KBW Fintech Payments Conference 12:25 p.m. ET on November 12 UBS Global Technology and AI Conference 1:35 p.m. ET on December 1 Live webcasts and archived replays will be available on the investor relations section of the Fiserv website at investors.fiserv.com.

Thank you, I really appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today.1 I am excited to be discussing stablecoins. This innovation has been unfairly treated as a pariah by some, but stablecoins are now an established and fast-growing part of the financial landscape. Putatively, stablecoins were originally intended to facilitate holding and trading cryptocurrency. But their proliferation has been aided by providing users with a stable store of value, a means of payment, and the ability to move capital quickly, irrespective of territorial borders. Demand for dollars continues to be strong, so it's no surprise that a more efficient means of accessing dollars has become increasingly popular. With the passage this year of the GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act), there is now a clear regulatory pathway in the U.S. for stablecoin issuers to broaden their reach and solidify stablecoins as a core part of the payment system. I believe economic research has some catching up to do. Economists meticulously study demand for dollar assets and consider how monetary policy may be affected, and the rapid growth of stablecoins affects the supply of loanable funds in the U.S. economy. I am encouraged that the Federal Reserve is taking steps to recognize the importance of stablecoins for the payment system; greater transparency and rising adoption should help us consider their effect on monetary policy as well.2 Stablecoins and DollarsEssentially all stablecoins are denominated in dollars, and their success is at least partly due to the U.S. dollar's enduring status as the world's preferred currency.3 Stablecoins are also contributing to the dollar's dominance by allowing an ever-growing share of people around the globe to hold assets and conduct transactions in the most trusted currency. My thesis is that stablecoins are already increasing demand for U.S. Treasury bills and other dollar-denominated liquid assets by purchasers outside the Unted States and that this demand will continue growing. All else equal, this new demand lowers borrowing costs for the U.S. government. However, as a central banker, my focus is on what I believe may be a substantial and long-term force putting downward pressure on a crucial guideline for monetary policymakers known as r*. The neutral rate, or r*, is the policy interest rate that neither stimulates nor restricts economic activity when the economy is operating at its potential once the transitory effects of cyclical economic shocks have abated. There are several open questions with respect to the impact of stablecoins on U.S. monetary policy: How many assets will be managed by stablecoin issuers? Will the funds come from domestic or foreign sources, and where might substitution pull funds out of the banking system? What are the systemic risks related to runs on stablecoins? Since monetary policy must be forward looking, my colleagues and I would be best served exploring these topics now. In these remarks, I'll focus on the consequences for monetary policy if stablecoin growth follows industry expectations. In short, stablecoins may become a multitrillion dollar elephant in the room for central bankers. GENIUS ActWhile I tend to view new regulations skeptically, I'm greatly encouraged by the GENIUS Act. This regulatory apparatus for stablecoins establishes a level of legitimacy and accountability congruent with holding traditional dollar assets. For the purposes of monetary policy, the most important aspect of the GENIUS Act is that it requires U.S.-domiciled issuers to maintain reserves backed on at least a one-to-one basis in safe and liquid U.S. dollar–denominated assets. These reserves can be held in bank deposits, short-term Treasurys, overnight repurchase agreements (repos) or reverse repos backed by U.S. Treasurys, or government money market funds. Depending on the source of funds used to invest in stablecoins, it may constitute new loanable funds in the U.S. economy or the overall amount of money available for borrowing and lending. Even stablecoins outside the ambit of the GENIUS Act are likely to boost demand for Treasurys and other dollar-denominated assets. Stablecoins that do not comply with the GENIUS Act can invest reserves in a much broader range of assets but, to be viewed as reliable stores of value, will likely end up still investing substantially in U.S. dollar securities with minimal credit risk. The inter-quartile range of private-sector estimates compiled by Federal Reserve staff roughly projects stablecoin uptake reaching between $1 trillion and $3 trillion by the end of the decade. For reference, the Fed grew its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities by just over $3 trillion during the latest round of quantitative easing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In total, under $7 trillion in Treasury bills are outstanding today. If these forecasts prove accurate, the magnitude of additional demand from stablecoins will be too large to ignore. Potential for Broad AdoptionThe innovation of public blockchains means that stablecoins can trade freely on rails that anyone in the world can use. This advancement represents potentially transformational change for consumers and businesses outside the U.S., particularly those in emerging market economies (EMEs) or even advanced foreign economies (AFEs) with burdensome restrictions on their payment systems. In many jurisdictions, low-friction payment rails are unavailable. Banking services to convert local currency or assets into dollars may be limited. Basic banking services themselves may be limited. And billions of people worldwide are subject to capital controls preventing convertibility and access to dollars. Globally, savers disproportionately favor dollar-denominated assets, and the ubiquity of capital controls is indicative of that revealed preference. For stablecoins to enter widespread use, there must be a bridge from local fiat currencies into stablecoins. One can imagine many possible bridges, often already in use for existing dollar vehicles: Remittances from immigrants working in the U.S. might take the form of stablecoins; exporters may receive portions of their payment in stablecoins, perhaps undeclared if domiciled in jurisdictions that proscribe stablecoin use; people might trade local currency for cryptocurrency and then use that cryptocurrency to buy a stablecoin; or they might trade physical cash or goods or services or other assets for stablecoins. Stablecoins merely make it easier to traverse some of these bridges and increase incentives for doing so because once stablecoins are in circulation in an economy, they can circulate more freely and cheaply behind capital controls than traditional forms of dollar payments.4 These bridges will not be frictionless or have infinite capacity. For people who want to use dollars either as a store of value or a means of payment but are unable to do so, stablecoins make it incrementally easier. Stablecoins will not instantly obliterate barriers to dollar use, but they will perforate those barriers. Reserve assets and currency provided by the U.S. are global public goods, but some jurisdictions prohibit their citizens' enjoyment of them. Stablecoins might establish an easier means for the financially repressed to enjoy these global public goods and evade draconian restrictions on their finances. For individuals and businesses in many nations, especially those in which dollars are used for large purchases like homes, this also leapfrogs the challenges of high and unstable inflation or volatile exchange rates. To be fair, stablecoin growth may not live up to the forecasts I cited earlier. Potential limits on yield and reward arrangements could limit adoption, particularly in open economies. The presumption that the crypto industry will grow at the prodigious rates of recent years cannot be taken for granted. But even with these considerations, it seems likely to me that the growth in stablecoin usage outside the U.S. will continue at a high rate. One important distinction is that if domestically purchased stablecoins are financed with bank deposits, or foreign purchases are financed with existing dollar-denominated holdings, then that doesn't affect the amount of loanable funds in the financial system. Further, there's some risk that a flow of deposits out of the U.S. banking system and into stablecoins could disintermediate banks, affecting the transmission of monetary policy and stunting the velocity of money. However, because GENIUS Act payment stablecoins do not offer yield and are not backed by federal deposit insurance, I see little prospect of funds broadly fleeing the domestic banking system. The real opportunity in stablecoins is to satiate untapped foreign appetite for dollar assets from savers in jurisdictions where dollar access is limited; by contrast, users in the U.S. and AFEs like the euro zone already freely access Treasurys, dollars, and other instruments that offer yield or deposit insurance. I therefore expect most demand for stablecoins to come from locales unable to access dollar-denominated saving instruments, boosting demand for dollar assets. Implications for Monetary PolicyThe supply–demand balance for loanable funds determines the neutral interest rate, or r*. As I discussed in a recent speech, I believe a range of different factors are putting downward pressure on r* and should be considered in formulating monetary policy.5 Some researchers have tried to estimate how much stablecoin growth might lower interest rates. In 2024, work by Marina Azzimonti and Vincenzo Quadrini estimated that if stablecoins are in widespread use and fully backed by U.S. securities, it could put as much as 40 basis points of downward pressure on interest rates.6 In estimating the effect of the projected growth of stablecoin issuance on demand for Treasurys and other highly liquid dollar assets, it is helpful to make a comparison to what most researchers believe was a large factor during an era of declining interest rates that began around the turn of the millennium—what former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke called the global saving glut.7 In measuring the global saving glut, Bernanke reported that the annual U.S. current account deficit widened by 4 percentage points of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) from 1996 to 2004.8 As I mentioned earlier, projections indicate between $1 trillion to $3 trillion of growth in stablecoins over the next several years. Adoption depends on regulatory clarity, institutional integration, and factors emanating from outside the U.S.—for instance, growth in EMEs, foreign exchange fluctuations, foreign political stability, and so forth. An additional $2 trillion of foreign demand for dollar assets by the end of the decade would, all else equal, increase the current account deficit by roughly 1.2 percentage points of GDP over this period. This increase would represent about 30 percent of the size of the original global saving glut. More bullish stablecoin-uptake forecasts on the order of $4 trillion would double the size of this effect, making it about 60 percent the size of the original global saving glut. These magnitudes would matter for monetary policy. Demand could obviously differ in domestic versus foreign adoption or miss these estimates. My goal is not to pinpoint the most accurate forecast, but to highlight the potential power of this channel. You can fill in your own numbers using this same method—my crystal ball is no clearer than others'. Moreover, the asset mix purchased by the rest of the world 20 years ago differs from that purchased by stablecoin issuers. The effects of a lower neutral rate might therefore manifest in financial markets differently than they did last time. Even relatively conservative estimates of stablecoin growth imply an increase in the net supply of loanable funds in the economy that pushes down r*. If r* is lower, policy rates should also be lower than they would otherwise be to support a healthy economy. A failure of the central bank to cut rates in response to a reduction in r* is contractionary. If a global stablecoin glut looks like a global saving glut, some other consequences may be replicated, too. For instance, a lower r* increases the odds that the zero lower bound (ZLB) binds in the future, limiting the ability of short-term interest rates to move down to provide accommodation but not restraining their ability to move up to restrict activity. Markets may expect policy to spend more time at the ZLB because of that inability to provide accommodation and get away from zero. That may make the fed funds rate more volatile to the upside with respect to other financial conditions, even as downside volatility remains muted by the ZLB, simulating elements of former Chairman Alan Greenspan's "conundrum."9 Moreover, if a global stablecoin glut is driven by flows out of foreign currencies and into the U.S. dollar, it will, all else equal, make the dollar stronger. Depending on the strength of this effect relative to other forces affecting the Fed's price-stability and maximum-employment mandates, that might be something that monetary policy reacts to. Finally, incremental dollarization may reduce the benefits of floating exchange rates. Exchange rates often function as shock absorbers, adjusting rapidly to changes in relative conditions across countries so that nominal prices don't have to. If nominal prices are sticky and exchange rates are not, the cyclical distortions associated with those rigidities are less detrimental for the economy. Increased real price rigidity because exchange rates cannot adjust would intensify the volatility of global business cycles. And Fed policy will have a greater effect on foreign economic growth with greater dollarization, increasing business cycle synchronization. Whether this phenomenon would matter for the U.S. and not just for countries that dollarize a portion of their economies remains speculative.10 America's capital markets are the world's deepest, helping to support economic growth, fund new ideas, and allocate capital efficiently. However, our financial infrastructure, not unlike our physical infrastructure, could use a reboot. Stablecoins may well lead the way on this front, facilitating dollar holdings and payments domestically and abroad. While there has been extensive research on the topic since the advent of stablecoins a decade ago, the scope for rapid increases in issuance makes it now even more imperative to consider what widespread adoption may mean for monetary policy, both in the U.S. and abroad. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2025), proceedings of the Payments Innovation Conference, streamed live on October 21, YouTube (Washington: Board of Governors).  3. For the list of stablecoins circulating, see the DeFiLlama website at https://defillama.com/stablecoins; at the time of writing, 99.6 percent of stablecoins were denominated in dollars. For more on the enduring global preference for dollars, see Carol Bertaut, Bastian von Beschwitz, and Stephanie Curcuru (2025), "The International Role of the U.S. Dollar – 2025 Edition," FEDS Notes, (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 18).  4. Although many countries have existing black markets for dollars, these are likely to be less preferred to stablecoins because of the difficulty of verifying and saving currency. Relative to stablecoins, physical cash is riskier, and both more difficult and costlier to store or move in large volumes. Moreover, many black market dollars trade at a premium because the amount of dollars available is limited.  5.  See Stephen I. Miran (2025), "Nonmonetary Forces and Appropriate Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York, New York, September 22.  6. See Marina Azzimonti and Vincenzo Quadrini (2024), "Digital Assets and the Exorbitant Dollar Privilege (PDF)" AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 114 (May), pp. 153–56. This paper and related work by the same authors—including the 2025 paper "Digital Economy, Stablecoins and the Global Financial System," NBER Working Paper Series 34066 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July)—expand on some of these ideas but do so in a model in which stablecoin issuers can choose to hold much less—or even none—of their assets in Treasury securities. The prediction on the interest rate depends on the fraction of reserves held in Treasury securities by stablecoin issuers. With a low enough fraction, the stablecoin steady-state interest rate can actually also be higher. However, such a pattern does not match what we observe from issuers or the guidelines in the GENIUS Act, and I therefore prefer to assume a high value of the fraction of reserves held in Treasury securities. It follows that the stablecoin steady-state interest rate is lower than the steady-state interest rate in which stablecoins are absent. 7. In his 2005 speech that coined the term and launched a thousand papers, then-Fed Governor Ben Bernanke estimated that the global saving glut began around 2001. See Ben S. Bernanke (2005), "The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit," remarks delivered at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, Virginia, March 10.  8. After peaking in 1995 at 7.91 percent, the 10-year yield fell to 4.92 percent in January 2001.  9. See Alan Greenspan (2005), testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 16, 109th Cong. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), quoted text in paragraph 23.  10. Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2017) note that once the ZLB for global interest rates is reached, the world economy becomes increasingly interdependent as countries can no longer use monetary policy to insulate their economies from world capital flows; see Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2017), "The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum (PDF)," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 31 (Summer), pp. 29–46. 

CalPERS announced today that its investments in climate solutions had grown to nearly $60 billion as of June 30, 2025, a number that represents significant progress toward meeting the $100-billion goal identified in the pension fund’s Climate Action Plan. Launched in November 2023, the Climate Action Plan lays out a global strategy to generate strong performance on behalf of CalPERS’ members by investing in opportunities created by the global shift to a low-carbon economy.  The strategy also seeks to manage climate-related financial risks by investing in activities that improve energy efficiency, support adaptation and resilience and reduce real-world greenhouse gas emissions. The $59.7 billion in climate solutions investments in CalPERS’ portfolio today represents an increase from $47 billion in November 2023. The increase includes both investment appreciation and new dedicated investments in climate solutions. “In just two years, CalPERS has seen significant growth in its Climate Action Plan, growth that is driven by the energy transition,” said CalPERS Chief Executive Officer Marcie Frost. “Climate is a key mega-trend and CalPERS is committed to leading the way and finding the best investments on behalf of our members.”   In the private markets area, CalPERS has made investment commitments in 13 climate-focused funds covering such industries as renewable energy, energy optimization software, drought resistant crops, wildfire fire suppression, electric vehicle charging networks, reusable packaging containers, and battery storage. Some of the funds that CalPERS has invested in since June 2024 include TPG Rise Climate (private equity and infrastructure funds), West Street Climate Credit (Del) LP, Generation IM Sustainable Private Equity Fund II (A), B Capital Climate Fund I, LP, Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners V USD Feeder SCSp, Brookfield Global Transition Fund II-B, LP, and others. Overall, the largest contributors to climate solution investments are real estate and public equity. “The opportunities before us cut across all industries and sectors, and we believe that sound, long-term commitment to climate solutions will deliver results for our members,” said CalPERS Chief Investment Officer Stephen Gilmore. “The global demand for energy will continue to grow and CalPERS is providing the capital necessary to meet the needs that the world will have to power homes, cars and technology, such as artificial intelligence.” CalPERS earned 11.6% on its investments in the most recent fiscal year. The estimated funded status had increased to 82% as of September 30, 2025.

TMX Group Limited today announced October 2025 trading statistics for its marketplaces – Toronto Stock Exchange, TSX Venture Exchange, TSX Alpha Exchange (Alpha), including Alpha-X & Alpha DRK, and Montréal Exchange (MX). Related Document:TMX Group Consolidated Trading Statistics - October 2025

The European Banking Authority (EBA) today launched a data collection, through the competent authorities, to obtain the list of EU counterparties that will be required to apply to the EBA for validation of ISDA SIMM, as well as their contact persons. The EBA underscores the counterparties' obligation to apply for the authorisation of the use of initial margin models and warns of the legal consequences in case of non-authorised use under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). All financial and non-financial counterparties exchanging initial margins (IM) calculated - directly or indirectly - using IM models based on ISDA SIMM should apply to their competent authorities for the authorisation of such models as per EMIR and the EBA’s no-action letter published on 17 December 2024. Counterparties must provide their competent authorities with the information requested. This information will be used to onboard counterparties onto the EBA’s validation system during the first semester of 2026, ahead of counterparties’ applications to the EBA for validation of ISDA SIMM expected in the second semester of 2026. Counterparties failing to apply for the EBA’s validation will no longer be permitted to use ISDA SIMM under EMIR until they rectify their status with the EBA. The EBA’s no-action letter remains in force. Legal basis, background and next steps Financial and non-financial counterparties that are subject to the requirement to exchange initial margin in accordance with Article 36 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2251 (the joint ESAs RTS on uncleared OTC derivatives) and use – directly or indirectly - the ISDA SIMM pro forma model to comply with such requirement, are required to request validation of ISDA SIMM by the EBA in accordance with Article 11(3) of EMIR, in order to carry on using that pro forma model. In addition, financial and non-financial counterparties using an IM model (based or not based on ISDA SIMM) are reminded of their obligation - if not done yet – to apply for authorisation to their competent authority under the regime introduced by the no action letter published on 17 December 2024. This process should be completed ahead of the entry into application of the ISDA SIMM v2.8+2506. Counterparties that have not applied for authorisation from their competent authority will not be able to apply to the EBA for validation of ISDA SIMM in 2026. Counterparties that fail to apply for validation by the EBA will no longer be permitted to use ISDA SIMM until they rectify their status with the EBA. The EBA intends to publish the list of counterparties validated for the use of ISDA SIMM in the EU towards the end of 2026. Any infringement of the rules under Article 11(3) of EMIR may lead to penalties under Article 12 of EMIR. Related content Topic Market infrastructures

On the occasion of the ongoing merger between Helvetia Holding and Baloise Holding, SIX is carrying out an extraordinary index adjustment for the SLI®, SMIM® and SPI® Mid-cap indices. The affected indices will be adjusted as of 22 December 2025. Changes to the SMIM® index basket Admission to the SMIM® GALENICA N CH0360674466 Exclusion from the SMIM® No changes   Changes to the SLI® index basket Admission to the SLI® Helvetia Baloise Holding                                                                         CH0466642201 Exclusion from the SLI® SWATCH GROUP I                                                                              CH0012255151 Changes to the SPI® Small and Mid index baskets Changes from SPI® Small to SPI® Mid DOTTIKON ES N CH0582581713 Changes from SPI® Mid to SPI® Small No changes   Further Information For further information, please refer to the equity index selection list and to the equity index forecast on the website: Index adjustments Access to the Closed User Group required.

A total turnover of 3.575 billion shares worth N107.011 billion in 146,429 deals was traded this week by investors on the floor of the Exchange, in contrast to a total of 7.479 billion shares valued at N145.429 billion that exchanged hands last week in 159,487 deals. Click here for full details.

The Payments Vision Delivery Committee has published its strategy to guide the development of future UK retail payments infrastructure in line with the government’s National Payments Vision. Documents Strategy for Future Retail Payments Infrastructure PDF, 264 KB, 19 pages This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology. Request an accessible format. If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use. Details At Mansion House 2025, the Payments Vision Delivery Committee set out a new model of public and private sector collaboration for the design and delivery of the next generation of UK retail payments infrastructure.     As part of the new model, the Committee has now published its strategic outcomes to guide the development of the future UK retail payments infrastructure, building on the ambitions of the government’s National Payments Vision.

New York Stock Exchange member firms that conduct business with the public reported a third-quarter 2025 after-tax profit of approximately $16 billion and revenues of approximately $135 billion, compared with approximately $11 billion after-tax profit on revenues of about $125 billion in the third-quarter of 2024. NYSE MEMBER FIRMS DEALING WITH PUBLIC ($ in Millions) Note: Data is from NYSE member firms that conduct business with the public. 3rd QTR 20253rd QTR 20242nd QTR 2025YTD 2025YTD 2024 Revenue $135,484 $125,419 $126,612 $385,964 $362,004 Expense $118,174 $113,064 $111,638 $338,288 $327,476 After Tax Profit Loss $15,872 $11,398 $13,937 $44,795 $31,897 After Tax Annualized Return on Capital 16% 12% 14% 15% 11% Assets $5,496,380 $4,941,741 $5,321,880 $5,496,380 $4,941,741 Capital and subordinated liabilities $405,013 $370,071 $391,292 $405,013 $370,071 Commission Revenues $6,498 $5,481 $6,274 $19,038 $15,945 Firms 146 132 130 148 132 Profitable Firms 126 112 109 132 113 Aggregate PreTax Earnings of Profitable Firms $17,464 $12,783 $15,286 $48,587 $36,802 Unprofitable Firms 20 20 21 16 19 Aggregate PreTax Loss of Unprofitable Firms ($154) ($427) ($312) ($611) ($1,214)   LinksNYSE Member Firms Dealing with Public (Financial Summary)Statement of Income (Loss) and Expense UnconsolidatedStatement of Financial Condition