Bitcoin has shown remarkable resilience this week, holding its ground despite hawkish signals from the U.S. Federal Reserve that initially shook equity markets. According to James Butterfill, Head of Research at CoinShares, while the Fed's stance presents short-term headwinds, the underlying structural case for Bitcoin as an alternative monetary asset continues to strengthen. The Fed held its policy rate steady but emphasized solid economic activity and persistent inflation, reinforcing a "higher-for-longer" interest rate outlook. Following the announcement, former Fed Governor Kevin Warsh called for the central bank to reduce its forward guidance and react more directly to incoming data. This news initially sent ripples across markets, with the S&P 500 and Nasdaq falling by approximately 1.2% and 1.3%, respectively. Bitcoin also saw a brief 1.6% dip but recovered, a move Butterfill described as "firmer than many would have expected." "The short-term macro impulse is restrictive, but the structural case for Bitcoin as an alternative monetary asset is not going away," Butterfill noted. He highlighted that persistent inflation and policy uncertainty ultimately bolster Bitcoin's long-term appeal. Adding to the cautious optimism, digital asset fund flows are showing signs of improvement. Outflows from global digital asset ETPs have slowed to just US$149 million, a significant improvement from previous weeks. While not a definitive reversal, this suggests the recent period of intense de-risking may be subsiding. Meanwhile, a significant development in crypto market structure is drawing attention. Decentralized derivatives platform Hyperliquid saw its pre-IPO perpetual contract for SpaceX (SPCX) trade over US$1.3 billion in a single 24-hour period. This surge in activity demonstrates that on-chain venues are becoming powerful engines for price discovery, especially for assets not continuously priced in traditional markets. "This is not the moment to become overly optimistic, but neither is it a moment of capitulation," Butterfill concluded. "The combination of relative resilience, improved flow momentum, and the rapid expansion of venues like Hyperliquid argues for cautious constructiveness rather than renewed pessimism."

MarketAxess Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: MKTX) today announced the launch of TraX® Tape, a data solution that delivers a clean, consolidated view of bond market activity, enriched with additional context and real-time insights. The launch comes as UK and EU transparency reforms increase the availability of bond trading data while adding complexity to how that data is reported and interpreted. TraX Tape addresses these challenges by providing a single, standardised feed that consolidates and enhances market data, enabling clients to interpret trading activity more efficiently and with greater confidence. “Market participants have more data than ever but turning that data into actionable insight remains a challenge,” said Dean Berry, Group COO and CEO of EMEA & APAC at MarketAxess. “TraX Tape is designed to deliver a clearer and more complete view of market activity, helping clients make more informed trading decisions.” Built on MarketAxess TraX data, TraX Tape aggregates data from a global network of dealers and clients and applies proprietary data cleansing processes refined over 10 years. The solution then enriches the regulatory transparency data with additional real-time insights and analytics, including trade direction and pricing context from MarketAxess’ AI-powered pricing engine CP+™. Key features include: Directional indicators on each trade, providing clearer insight into market sentiment A consolidated view of global bond trading activity through a single connection Clean, de-duplicated data to improve usability and reduce operational burden Expanded coverage and earlier visibility into trading activity Integrated analytics, including yield and spread calculations, to support trading and execution analysis “The consolidated tape will bring increased transparency and standardisation to global bond markets,” Berry added. “TraX Tape builds upon that foundation and brings clarity with contextual intelligence that can only come from seeing how bonds actually trade on one of the world’s largest electronic credit platforms. The data tells you what happened, and TraX Tape tells you what it means.”

The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee is responsible for making decisions about Bank Rate. Monetary Policy Summary, June 2026 At its meeting ending on 17 June 2026, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted by a majority of 7–2 to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%. Two members voted to increase Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 4%. Global energy prices have fallen since the previous meeting in response to events in the Middle East. But they remain higher than pre-conflict and have continued to be volatile. The impact of the energy shock on the UK economy remains uncertain. Monetary policy cannot influence energy prices but is being set to ensure that the economic adjustment to them occurs in a way that achieves the 2% inflation target sustainably. The policy stance required to achieve this will depend on the scale and duration of the shock, and how it propagates through the economy. CPI inflation has fallen to 2.8% since the previous meeting, although it is expected to rise later this year as the effects of higher energy prices continue to pass through. The risk of material second-round effects in price and wage-setting, against which policy needs to lean, is greater the longer higher energy prices persist. But the labour market continues to loosen, and signs of a weakening economy could contain inflationary pressures. Interest rates faced by households and businesses remain higher than prior to the conflict, which will act to reduce inflation over time. Taking all the risks to the economic outlook into account, the Committee judges that it is appropriate to maintain Bank Rate at this meeting. The Committee will continue to monitor closely the situation in the Middle East and how its impact propagates through the economy. The Committee stands ready to act as necessary to ensure that CPI inflation remains on track to meet the 2% target in the medium term. Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting ending on 17 June 2026 1: Before turning to its immediate policy decision, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) discussed recent developments in global and UK economic and financial conditions, and how these could affect the medium-term outlook and the MPC’s strategy. Global economic and financial conditions 2: Global energy prices had fallen since the previous meeting in response to events in the Middle East. But they remained higher than pre-conflict and had continued to be volatile. The spot price of Brent crude and UK wholesale gas had averaged $100 per barrel and 116 pence per therm respectively since the April Monetary Policy Report, compared to $66 per barrel and 87 pence per therm in the period leading up to the February Report. In the days immediately leading up to the June MPC meeting, plans for a Middle East peace deal had been announced. Oil and gas prices had fallen in response to around $79 per barrel and 100 pence per therm respectively. Futures curves continued to slope downwards for both oil and gas. 3: The Committee discussed the risks around the outlook for energy prices. Prior to the announcement of a peace deal, there had been some partial mitigants to the impact of the disruption to global energy supply on energy prices, but it was uncertain how long these could be sustained. The coordinated release of strategic oil reserves by the member countries of the International Energy Agency was one such mitigant. There had also been some switching from the use of gas to coal as well as evidence of reduced demand for energy in response to higher prices, particularly in Asia. To some extent this reduction in demand might reflect the temporary deferral of economic activity, meaning it was uncertain how long it could persist in the event of a more prolonged reduction in energy supply from the Middle East. 4: Oil products and broader commodity prices had remained higher than before the conflict and there had been some emerging signs of global supply chain disruption. The price of diesel and jet fuel had increased significantly relative to Brent crude oil when the conflict began. These spreads had remained elevated relative to pre-conflict but had reduced since the Committee’s April meeting. Other commodity prices, such as for fertiliser and metals, had also remained higher than pre-conflict. Some indicators of global supply chain disruption had risen sharply since the start of the war, including some shipping cost indices and a PMI-based global supply chain index calculated by Bank staff. 5: Interest rates faced by households and businesses had remained higher than prior to the conflict. This tightening in financial conditions had been driven mainly by a significant upward shift in short-term overnight index swap (OIS) rates. These rates had also risen materially in the United States and in the euro area, reflecting the global nature of the energy supply shock and its implications for inflation. UK two-year OIS rates were currently around 70 basis points above their pre-war level. There had been full and fast pass-through from increases in such rates to key lending rates for households and businesses. The quoted rate on two-year fixed-rate mortgages was around 80 basis points higher than prior to the conflict and UK investment grade corporate bond yields had risen by around 50 basis points. 6: In the June Market Participants Survey (MaPS), median expectations had been for Bank Rate to remain unchanged at this MPC meeting and, thereafter, for Bank Rate to remain unchanged for the year ahead. That represented a tightening in the median path of around 50 basis points relative to expectations prior to the conflict, at which point reductions in Bank Rate had been expected. 7: In contrast to market participants’ broadly flat most likely path for Bank Rate, the UK short-term interest rate curve sloped upwards over the year ahead. The conflict had led to increased volatility that was correlated across energy, inflation-linked and interest rate markets. The UK OIS curve had continued to oscillate since the April meeting, but within a range that was consistently materially higher than the pre-conflict curve. In the lead up to this MPC meeting, the announcement of a peace deal had contributed to a shift in the OIS curve towards the bottom of its recent range, with an upward slope of around 30 basis points by end-2026. Models used by Bank staff suggested that the upward slope of the OIS curve was driven largely by risk premia. Consistent with that, respondents to the June MaPS survey had attributed most of the gap between the April MaPS median Bank Rate profile and the current market curve to asymmetric risks and compensation for uncertainty. UK current economic conditions 8: Twelve-month CPI inflation had been 2.8% in May, unchanged from April, but down from 3.3% in March. The May outturn had been 0.4 percentage points below the short-term forecast published in the April Report. Downside news relative to the April Report had been spread across food, core goods and services, with an outsized contribution to the news from food price inflation, which had fallen to 2.2%. Some direct effects of the energy shock, especially from the initial post-conflict increase in fuel prices, had already pushed up on CPI inflation. 9: Energy prices had remained volatile. Based on energy prices as of close of business on 15 June, CPI inflation was now expected to be a little under 3% in 2026 Q3 and pick up to a little over 3¼% in Q4. This was below the path expected in the April Report, reflecting both lower energy and non-energy prices. 10: Ofgem’s headline energy price cap for July to September had been increased by £221 (13.5%) to £1862, broadly in line with expectations at the time of the April Report. On 21 May, the government had announced a postponement of the increase in fuel duty planned for September, as part of a set of policy measures to support households and energy-intensive industries. 11: Forward-looking survey indicators of the indirect effects of the energy shock had remained consistent with near-term expectations in the April Report projections. For businesses responding to the DMP Survey, one-year-ahead own-price inflation expectations had fallen in May to 4.0%, from 4.4% in April, although this was 0.6 percentage points higher than the pre-conflict rate in February. 12: Households’ near-term inflation expectations had picked up materially since the start of the conflict. The Bank/Ipsos measure of year-ahead expected inflation had risen sharply, from 3.2% in February to 4.0% in May. The corresponding Citi/YouGov measure had remained well above its pre-Covid average at 4.7% in May, although it had fallen back from its immediate post-conflict peak. Medium-term household expectations had also risen, with the Bank/Ipsos two and five-year ahead measures having increased by 0.3 and 0.2 percentage points respectively in May relative to February. 13: Annual growth in private sector regular Average Weekly Earnings in the three months to April had been 2.9%, a touch lower than had been expected in the April Report. On the face of it, this was below the estimates of target-consistent wage growth published in the February Report, but, adjusting for changes in industry mix, private sector AWE growth was around half a percentage point higher. Growth in bonus payments, which were not included in measures of regular pay, had also been strong. In addition, public sector regular pay had grown by 5.1%, although this strength had in part reflected that the twelve-month comparison had included both the 2025 and 2026 uplifts for some NHS staff. 14: There had been no change since the April Report to the Bank’s Agents’ estimate that basic private sector pay settlements were expected to average 3.5% over 2026. The Agents reported that most of these settlements had been agreed before the recent rise in energy prices, and that contacts did not generally expect that they would be re-opened. Some contacts had expressed concerns that the pace of wage disinflation could slow next year as a result of the conflict. DMP respondents had reported that they expected one-year-ahead wage growth of 3.4%, which had been stable since before the start of the conflict. 15: UK GDP had increased by 0.6% in 2026 Q1, 0.1 percentage points higher than had been expected in the April Report. Evidence from business surveys, however, suggested that this headline figure overstated the underlying momentum, which had remained subdued. In April, monthly GDP had fallen by 0.1%, consistent with a partial unwind of the strength in activity in Q1. The S&P Global UK composite output PMI in May had fallen below the 50 no-change mark for the first time in more than a year as growth in manufacturing had been offset by weaker growth in services. Bank staff estimated that underlying quarterly GDP growth had been around 0.2% in Q1, and would remain at around that rate in Q2. 16: To date, surveys and faster indicators had not generally provided much evidence that the conflict had led to a rapid deterioration in the outlook for growth, although growth was expected to be subdued. The Bank’s Agents’ contacts had reported a further weakening in demand expectations in May, alongside growing concerns about potential future supply shortages. Confidence more generally had been weak, as, according to a range of opinion polls, households and firms had reported persistent negative economic sentiment, both relative to the past and relative to other countries. 17: There had been a mixed picture on labour demand in recent data. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) unemployment rate had fallen to 4.9% in the three months to April, slightly lower than had been expected in the April Report. LFS employment had grown by 0.3%, slightly higher than had been expected in the April Report, but underlying employment growth had remained close to zero. Vacancies had continued to decline, by 2.6% in the three months to May compared to the previous three months, although the redundancy rate had also fallen. Overall, these data continued to be consistent with a gradual loosening in the labour market. This was supported by intelligence from the Bank’s Agents’ contacts, many of whom had reported that weak or delayed demand was leading them to operate below desired utilisation. Overview and the Committee’s discussions 18: The conflict in the Middle East, and its impact on energy prices and the UK economy, remained the dominant source of uncertainty for the inflation outlook. As had been outlined in the April Monetary Policy Report and Minutes, monetary policy could not influence global energy prices. And it would take time for monetary policy to work through the economy, so any action the MPC might take would not prevent higher inflation in coming months. What the MPC would do is set monetary policy to make sure that the effects of the shock did not become embedded into broad-based inflationary pressures, so that inflation fell back to the 2% target and stayed there. 19: In setting policy at this meeting, the Committee continued to judge that weakness in demand and the labour market was likely to lessen the strength of second-round effects from higher global energy prices. But these effects were likely to be stronger, the larger and more persistent was the rise in global energy prices. In ensuring that inflation returned sustainably to the 2% target, monetary policy would continue to need to balance the costs of leaning too little against second-round effects and the costs of responding too much. The right balance was likely to change depending on how events unfolded and propagated through the economy. 20: The Committee was also continuing to consider the three scenarios set out in the April Report, which illustrated a range of possible outcomes for the UK economy given the uncertainty stemming from the conflict. In Scenario A, energy prices were conditioned on market futures curves in the 15 days to 22 April 2026. In Scenarios B and C, the paths of energy prices were assumed to be higher and more persistent to varying degrees. There were no second-round effects from the energy shock in Scenario A. Second-round effects were incorporated in Scenarios B and C, and materially so in Scenario C. 21: At this meeting, the Committee’s discussions focused on: the extent of underlying UK disinflation prior to the conflict; the near-term outlook for inflation and energy prices; the degree to which economic slack would continue to restrain inflation persistence; the evidence of any second-round effects from the energy shock so far; and what continued uncertainty around the impact of geopolitical tensions on the UK economy implied for current and prospective policy-setting. 22: Recent data outturns had provided some greater reassurance that there had been sustained disinflation pre-conflict. Prior to the conflict, expectations had been for inflation to be close to the 2% target from April, and news in energy prices owing to the conflict had more than accounted for the higher outturns in headline inflation in April and May, relative to the February Report. Non-energy price inflation, particularly of goods, had been moderating but in aggregate remained above a target-consistent pace. Wage growth was close to target-consistent levels, although forward-looking indicators suggested that the pace of decline could stall in future. 23: The immediate direct effects of the energy shock on inflation, and some indirect effects through higher input costs for firms, had so far evolved broadly as had been expected in April. The short-term inflation forecast was lower than at the time of the previous meeting, reflecting recent news in energy prices as well as downside news in the May CPI outturn. The Committee re-iterated that monetary policy should typically look through the direct effects and some indirect effects of an energy price shock, but should act to the extent required to prevent those effects becoming embedded in domestic wage and price-setting. 24: Members judged that risks to energy prices were still skewed to the upside. While noting global energy prices had recently moved lower, members judged that even in the event of prompt conflict resolution there could be a logistical delay in restoring energy production and transportation, and they noted the possibility of lingering instability. Accordingly, members were attentive to the risk that prices could remain elevated for a longer period, even if the risk of another sharp spike upwards had diminished somewhat. 25: In considering the potential impact of energy prices on medium-term inflation, as in April, the Committee judged that continued weakness in activity would limit the strength of some second-round effects. Members broadly agreed that a margin of slack had continued to emerge including in the labour market. Demand had remained subdued and consumption growth weak, and both household and business sentiment was weak. Taken together, this would restrain firms’ ability to pass through higher costs to higher prices, and would dampen wage bargaining. At the same time, some members cautioned that the attentiveness of households’ and firms’ inflation expectations after a period of above-target inflation, or structural changes, could increase the magnitude of second-round effects. 26: Clear evidence of signs of second-round effects would only ever emerge with a lag, and the Committee therefore agreed that it was too early to conclude one way or the other from the initial tentative and mixed evidence. On the one hand, firms’ own-price expectations were a little softer than had been expected in April. On the other hand, some members noted that household inflation expectations could have become more sensitive to near-term inflation news than in the past. This could affect the economy via price-setting behaviour as well as wage-setting in 2027. 27: The Committee would monitor the evolution of a wide range of forward-looking data and intelligence to allow timely assessments of the inflation outlook. The size and duration of direct effects of energy prices on UK inflation would clearly be important, as would the scale of indirect effects via increased business costs and the extent to which these were passing through via higher consumer prices or reduced profit margins. Second-round effects were also being monitored through indicators of price and wage-setting behaviour, including inflation expectations, firms’ own price expectations and future wage growth and settlements. The impact of the shock on the real economy would also be monitored, including through indicators of the labour market and economic slack. 28: In considering the near-term policy outlook, members agreed that financial conditions had tightened materially since before the conflict, which was already imparting some restraint to the economy. There had been a significant upward shift in UK short-term interest rates that had passed through to mortgage rates. This in part reflected the pricing out of Bank Rate cuts that had been expected before the conflict. Some of the upward slope in the yield curve also reflected ongoing uncertainty around the scale and duration of the conflict in the Middle East and the associated upside risks to the inflation outlook. 29: The Committee discussed how best policy should respond to uncertainty about the scale and duration of the energy shock. There were risks to balance from the trade-off between returning inflation to target too slowly and prolonged weakness in economic activity. All members nevertheless agreed that the appropriate policy response would depend primarily on the outlook for second-round effects. If higher inflation were to reflect mainly direct energy effects and second-round effects were to remain contained, there was a stronger case for tolerating a slower return of inflation to target, in the context of weak activity. However, there would be a more challenging trade-off if higher energy prices appeared to be feeding into more persistent domestic inflation. In that event, the weight placed on output stabilisation would be likely to diminish, and policy would need to remain restrictive for longer, or become more restrictive. 30: Members agreed that the appropriate policy response should be robust across a range of scenarios, given the uncertainty around how the outlook could evolve. There was a range of views around whether the tightening in financial conditions relative to pre-conflict was sufficient, was reflected in real restrictiveness, and would endure. Most members judged that this tightening provided insurance against inflation risks, while preserving optionality to adjust course as more conclusive evidence emerged. Some members noted that a modest rise in Bank Rate would help to ensure that financial conditions remained consistent with the intended degree of monetary restraint and reduce the risk of later, larger tightening. The immediate policy decision 31: Seven members preferred to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75% at this meeting. For six of these members (Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Swati Dhingra, Clare Lombardelli, Dave Ramsden and Alan Taylor), recent data outturns provided some further evidence that underlying disinflation had been on track pre-conflict. Upside risks to energy prices had receded, although they remained. The higher interest rates facing households and businesses were already acting to reduce inflation over time and therefore a hold in Bank Rate at this meeting was appropriate. There was nevertheless a range of views on how the energy shock might propagate and therefore the policy response that might be required in future. For one member (Catherine L Mann) upside inflation risks were more prominent across possible future outcomes, but an immediate increase in Bank Rate was not required given their view that policy tightening would transmit to the economy rapidly.  32: Two members (Megan Greene and Huw Pill) preferred a 0.25 percentage point increase in Bank Rate at this meeting. These members were less confident in the pace of the underlying disinflation pre-conflict. They were more concerned that households’ and firms’ greater attention to inflation outturns than in the past would lead to larger second-round effects for a given energy price profile. And they noted that the tightening in financial conditions could reverse in the absence of an increase in Bank Rate. Given significant uncertainty about the extent of second-round effects, they preferred to raise rates as part of a risk management strategy. 33: The Chair invited the Committee to vote on the proposition that: Bank Rate should be maintained at 3.75%. 34: Seven members (Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Swati Dhingra, Clare Lombardelli, Catherine L Mann, Dave Ramsden and Alan Taylor) voted in favour of the proposition. Two members (Megan Greene and Huw Pill) voted against the proposition, preferring to increase Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 4%. MPC members’ views 35: Members set out the rationale underpinning their individual votes on Bank Rate. Members are listed alphabetically under each vote grouping. References to scenarios relate to those set out in Section 3 of the April Monetary Policy Report. Votes to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75% Andrew Bailey: There has been a marked fall in energy prices in recent days, reflecting progress on talks involving US and Iran. But the situation remains unpredictable, and there is clearly a risk that energy prices remain elevated for an extended duration. Recent inflation outturns give greater confidence that gradual underlying disinflation has continued. Labour market data show some further softening, and there are further signs of demand weakness. Our remit recognises that attempting to bring inflation back to the target too quickly may cause undesirable volatility in output. Given the context at present of softness in the real economy and uncertainty around the scale and duration of the shock to energy prices, tolerating temporarily above-target inflation as part of a return to target is an appropriate way to approach the trade-off, providing inflation expectations remain contained. I am content at the present time with holding, while accepting that risks to inflation and interest rates are on the upside, as reflected in the upward slope in the sterling yield curve, which appears to be accounted for more by risk premia than expected rates. I would respond promptly to any signals that an extended period of elevated energy prices could be leading to stronger possible second-round effects. Sarah Breeden: Despite recent developments, the outlook for energy prices remains highly uncertain. Monetary policy should look through the direct effects of the energy shock, partially through the indirect effects and act forcefully and early against any material second-round effects. The economic environment means the chance of material second-round effects is small and, although it is early days, there has been nothing in the news since April to change that assessment. Recent releases suggest that, absent the shock, disinflation was firmly on track, and the weak demand outlook should continue to feed through to firms’ pricing decisions. The financing conditions facing households and firms have tightened materially since the conflict, leaning against inflationary pressures and leaving us well placed to monitor how the economy evolves. There are risks around this. Household inflation expectations have risen materially, and although their impact on wage growth should be moderated by the loose labour market, they pose an upside risk to inflation. On the other side, weak demand might pull inflation below target in the medium term. In my view, the current stance of financial conditions balances these risks, but I remain committed to acting early and decisively should material second‑round effects become likely. Swati Dhingra: Although the likelihood of extreme outcomes on both sides appears to have receded, I continue to see the uncertainty around the size of the global commodity shock as dominating the degree to which inflationary pressures risk getting embedded in domestic sources of inflation. Absent the shock, monetary policy would be too restrictive for the cyclical position. Disinflation appeared on track pre-conflict, with nominal indicators trending consistently in the right direction, and broad-based evidence of emerging slack and cumulative weakness in the economy. While these initial conditions would dampen momentum in second-round effects, there remain significant risks from overlapping adjustments to the subsequent supply shocks that have occurred in the recent past. I see the balance of risks to the upside on prices and downside on activity. Maintaining current restrictiveness would weigh against second-round effects and provide time to learn more about the size and duration of the first-round energy and commodity price shocks in the near term. If the situation were to worsen, this may warrant some further tightening. But I do not see a compelling case to increase Bank Rate pre-emptively without new evidence of more intense first-round shocks. Clare Lombardelli: Developments since our last meeting point in different directions for inflation. Disruption to energy prices and supply chains from events in the Middle East has persisted. This will prolong the time that inflation will remain above target due to direct and indirect effects, increasing the risk of second-round effects. Whereas the economic data has continued to show that, absent the energy shock, disinflation was gradually continuing. It is too early to draw any conclusions on second-round effects from the energy shock. So far, evidence has been mixed and the signal is broadly consistent with standard pass‑through. To date there is also no evidence of a rapid deterioration in demand. There are risks for inflation in both directions. Consumers and businesses have faced sustained above-target inflation in recent years which will affect behaviour, expectations and reactions to price rises. They also report negative sentiment which risks further weakening demand. Financing costs have risen since before the conflict, which continues to weigh against the greater inflation pressures. Holding Bank Rate remains appropriate as we learn more about the scale and duration of the shock and its propagation. Were signals to indicate inflation would persist above target, this would require policy to respond more forcefully to inflationary pressures. Catherine L Mann: Activity, labour market, and nominal pressures have moderated. However, there remain differences in pace across public and private sector, as well as between the most recent data and inflation expectations. Private sector wage growth is near target-consistent, but whole economy wage growth has increased. Market-sector services output is soft, although manufacturing and government have provided some momentum to GDP. Volatility in both inflation and financial markets has increased; both are headwinds for business investment. Higher inflation and volatility tend to encourage households to maintain high savings buffers. Hypotheticals for the Middle East conflict include resolution, sporadic continuance, and escalation. Consider the first two. With rapid resolution, activity rebounds, uncertainty clears, but energy prices remain high with infrastructure and inventory rebuild: an activist hike could be needed. With sporadic continuance, uncertainty weighs on activity, but energy prices increase, which could trigger threshold effects: a worsening trade-off, but needing an activist hike. Why wait? Research shows that a forceful Bank Rate decision can have a quick effect on inflation and inflation expectations. So I have time to continue to evaluate measures of inflation expectations and financial restrictiveness to determine whether firms’ pricing and 2027 wage negotiations are on a target-consistent path for the medium term. Dave Ramsden: Events in the Middle East remain the key determinant for inflation, and there remain upside risks from continued energy supply disruption as well as downside risks from subdued activity. There has been a material tightening in financial conditions, which is providing necessary restrictiveness, weighing against the upside balance of risks in the near term. I continue to place about equal weight on Scenarios A and B materialising after the summer, but even less weight than before on Scenario C. The evidence so far on how the economy will be impacted by the energy price shock is uncertain. Data outturns continue to confirm our understanding of the pre-conflict economy. The labour market has continued to loosen steadily, and the domestic disinflation process has also continued. Early, necessarily tentative, indications suggest that second-round effects might be limited, absent further escalation of the energy cost shock. Holding Bank Rate at this meeting keeps options open as we continue to learn more about the path of the conflict. My reaction function will remain state-contingent on both the development of the conflict, and what that means for the outlook for the economy. Alan Taylor: The conflict and its implications for energy prices remain of central importance, even as a deal emerges. Potential second-round effects are an endogenous consequence of the shock. That does not negate a key role for the starting position of slack in the economy and of our restrictive policy stance. Recent data point further against a need for tightening. Absent mechanical direct and indirect energy effects from the conflict, CPI inflation would have been at target in April. Backward-looking wage data suggest that pay growth did not get stuck at elevated levels. Material second-round effects require changes in price and wage-setting behaviour. I believe this channel is likely to be weak given the slack that has accumulated. Policy is restrictive, 75 basis points above my estimate of neutral and where we might have been quite soon. The yield curve shows we have tightened a lot just by holding. One could articulate a case for tightening in risk space, but that is far from my assessment given my own scenario probabilities and trade-offs. Absent worse news, I cannot see a case for tightening now, and an active hold is reasonable. If the conflict resolution holds, and risks diminish, lower rates could be preferred. Votes to increase Bank Rate to 4% Megan Greene: The implementation of a reported peace deal and the evolution of energy prices remain uncertain. Slack should mitigate the extent of second-round effects triggered by the energy shock, but households and businesses are more attentive to rises in inflation today. This is reflected in households’ and firms’ inflation expectations and the sensitivity of long-term expectations to short-term inflation surprises, which suggest expectations may be less solidly anchored. Given significant uncertainty about the extent of second-round effects, we should pursue a risk management strategy. Analysis conducted using the Bank’s endogenous policy toolkit demonstrates that holding Bank Rate assuming lower second-round effects (Scenario B) but discovering next year they were greater (Scenario M, from my latest speech) and course-correcting results in inflation that peaks higher and remains above target the entire outlook. Hiking Bank Rate assuming greater second-round effects, then discovering they were smaller and course-correcting results in a very moderately lower output gap and inflation returns to target at the end of the forecast period. These risks are asymmetric, so we should insure against the possibility of larger second-round effects until we have evidence to determine they are not materialising. A proactive hike now in Bank Rate should help anchor inflation expectations. Huw Pill: Upside risks to the lasting achievement of the 2% inflation target have increased in recent months on account of events in the Gulf and their implications for commodity prices and supply chains. Recognising the significant uncertainty that surrounds the UK inflation outlook, raising Bank Rate to 4% continues to be the most robust monetary policy response to the intensification of these risks. Global energy prices remain volatile, and elevated compared with their pre-hostilities level, despite the announcement of a new ceasefire. Even with a looser labour market, the risk that second-round effects will create greater intrinsic persistence in UK inflation remains. One potentially pernicious channel of second-round effects is catch-up dynamics in pricing decisions as firms and households seek to defend their margins and purchasing power in the face of higher food and energy prices. While overall UK financial conditions have tightened since the conflict began, I continue to favour prompt but modest action on Bank Rate now. This would establish a stance of monetary policy that is well-placed to address the significant uncertainties the MPC faces. It will also put the MPC in a good place from which to respond to the evolution of events from here. Operational considerations 36: On 17 June, the stock of UK government bonds held for monetary policy purposes was £522 billion. 37: The following members of the Committee were present: Andrew Bailey, Chair Sarah Breeden Swati Dhingra Megan Greene Clare Lombardelli Catherine L Mann Huw Pill Dave Ramsden Alan Taylor Brian Bell was present as the Treasury representative. Jonathan Bewes was present on 9 June, as an observer for the purpose of exercising oversight functions in his role as a member of the Bank’s Court of Directors. The Bank of England Act 1998 gives the Bank of England operational responsibility for setting monetary policy to meet the Government’s inflation target. Operational decisions are taken by the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee. The minutes of the Committee meeting ending on 29 July will be published on 30 July 2026.

On Thursday 16 July 2026, ACER will open a public consultation on an Annex to the Guideline on REMIT transaction reporting, covering energy derivative transactions. What is it about? REMIT is the EU-wide framework that detects and deters market manipulation and abuse in wholesale energy markets. The Regulation was revised in 2024 to keep pace with evolving market dynamics, and its secondary legislation was updated in April 2026 with new and revised obligations. To reflect these regulatory developments, ACER is updating its guidance, including a new Guideline on REMIT transaction reporting (see ACER’s consultation). Why are we consulting? To complement the new Guideline, ACER has developed a dedicated Annex on the reporting of energy derivative transactions. The Annex: Clarifies the scope of reporting under REMIT and Regulation (EU) 648/2012 on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (‘EMIR’). Explains how REMIT reporting exemptions apply for derivatives that are already reported under EMIR. ACER is seeking stakeholder input to ensure the Annex is clear, practical and supports consistent data reporting across the EU. Have your say! The public consultation will run from 16 July to 11 September 2026. ACER is hoping to hear from any interested parties, including but not limited to market participants, national regulatory authorities, registered reporting mechanisms (RRMs) and organised marketplaces (OMPs). In this process, ACER will also cooperate and consult with the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). Get ready to share your views

Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) are pleased to announce today (Thursday) a joint pilot project to explore a new digital payment solution for the After-Hours Trading (AHT) session in the derivatives market1. This initiative aims to enhance Hong Kong’s capital market and meet the growing market demand for AHT. In this connection, HKEX and the HKMA are exploring the use of e-HKD – a wholesale central bank digital currency (CBDC) operating on a 24/7 basis – for advance margin payments in the AHT session, enhancing the risk management capabilities of the derivatives market outside regular banking hours, whilst maintaining existing operational workflows. This pilot project will provide more flexibility and efficiency than the existing arrangement for advance margin payments. Currently, Clearing Participants (CPs) must submit advance margin deposit requests to HKFE Clearing Corporation Limited (HKCC) by 3:00 p.m. for funds to be counted for the subsequent AHT session. HKEX is inviting CPs under HKCC to participate in Real-Value Trial Transactions of this pilot initiative on an optional basis. The Real-Value Trial Transactions, as well as any subsequent wider adoption, are subject to regulatory approval, market readiness and other relevant considerations. HKEX Chief Operating Officer, Vanessa Lau, said: “We are delighted to collaborate with the HKMA on this latest initiative to advance market accessibility and strengthen Hong Kong’s capital markets infrastructure. By exploring the use of CBDC, we aim to provide a more flexible and timely payment option outside of regular business hours, and address longstanding operational pain points in the industry. This project reflects the shared commitment of HKEX and the HKMA to embracing innovation, strengthening the resilience of our markets and reinforcing Hong Kong’s position as a leading international financial centre.” HKMA Deputy Chief Executive, Howard Lee, said: “As Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure evolves to meet the growing demands of the market, the HKMA is committed to advancing innovation that enhances efficiency and resilience. The joint pilot with HKEX to enable advance margin payments for AHT using e-HKD demonstrates a wholesale application of CBDC in a live market environment, while underscoring our strong partnership with the industry stakeholders in driving financial innovation.” More details are available on a circular published today on the HKEX website. Note: Hong Kong derivatives market has been growing from strength to strength with an average daily volume (ADV) record of 1.66 million contracts achieved in 2025. This momentum carried into 2026, with ADV exceeding 1.78 million contracts in the first five months.

Important addition to China-related risk management tools offered by HKEX Supporting growth of Hong Kong’s RMB product ecosystem Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) welcomes the announcement today (Thursday) by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) on the target launch of 5-year China Government Bond (CGB) Futures in Hong Kong on 3 August 2026. HKEX Chairman, Carlson Tong, said: “The debut of CGB Futures in Hong Kong with the 5-year tenor as the first contract marks an important milestone in the development of Hong Kong’s Fixed-Income and Currencies (FIC) ecosystem. We thank the regulators in Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland for their staunch support, and we look forward to working closely with our partners and stakeholders to ensure the successful rollout of this new risk-management tool and further enhance two-way capital flows between China and the world.” HKEX Chief Executive Officer, Bonnie Y Chan, said: “The launch of CGB Futures is another exciting step that enriches HKEX’s China-related product suite and FIC offering. Complementing Bond Connect and following the success of Swap Connect, these unique CGB Futures will provide investors of Chinese bonds with an efficient risk management tool, supporting the growth of Hong Kong’s RMB product ecosystem and cementing Hong Kong’s role as the world’s leading offshore RMB hub. We will continue to work with all stakeholders in building Hong Kong’s FIC ecosystem and enriching global investors’ options.” More details about the CGB Futures will be announced in due course. The launch of the contract, part of HKEX’s RMB and Mainland-related suite of products that includes Stock Connect, Bond Connect, Swap Connect and MSCI China A50 Connect Index Futures, will help regional and global investors interested in accessing the Chinese Mainland to more effectively manage their interest rate risks. This will support greater international participation in the domestic equities and fixed-income markets and further broaden investment and risk management opportunities in Hong Kong's markets. The launch of Bond Connect in 2017, part of HKEX’s unique mutual market access programme with the Chinese Mainland, was an important development in driving international participation in the Mainland’s bond market, whilst Swap Connect, which launched in 2023, allows international investors to tap the onshore RMB interest rate swap market. International investors’ onshore bonds holdings in the China Interbank Bond Market have grown steadily from RMB0.8 trillion in June 2017 to around RMB3.2 trillion at the end of May 2026.

Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) is pleased to announce today (Thursday) it has renewed its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China Financial Futures Exchange (CFFEX), affirming a commitment to deepen collaboration between the two exchanges and promote the development of the Hong Kong and Shanghai financial markets. Under the updated MOU, HKEX and CFFEX will enhance cooperation in exploring product and business development, share research and market expertise, as well as facilitate personnel exchanges and training.  Looking ahead, both exchanges will continue to explore new areas of collaboration, leveraging their respective strengths to enhance mutual market connectivity, support the continued development of their markets, as well as the nation’s capital markets more broadly.   HKEX Head of Markets, Gregory Yu (second from right) and CFFEX Executive Vice President, Cai Xianghui (second from left) signed the MOU in Shanghai, witnessed by Shanghai Municipal Financial Services Office Deputy Director, Cao Yanwen (fourth from left), HKEX Chief Executive Officer, Bonnie Y Chan (third from right), and CFFEX Chief Executive Officer, Zhang Xiaogang (third from left).  

FIT GROUP AG is listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange as of today. CEO Dilxwax Acar rang the opening bell to mark the start of trading in the direct market plus segment. NuWays AG is acting as lead manager and capital market coach. ICF Bank is the market maker for the shares with the ISIN DE000A426PD9 in continuous trading. According to the company, based in Schüttorf, Germany, it sells high-quality dietary supplements and health products. In addition, the FIT GROUP AG develops and sells a range of caffeine-based pouch products. “The listing is a significant milestone in the development of our company. With the funds raised, we are embarking on the next phase of growth. We will significantly expand our influencer marketing and consistently drive forward our international expansion – particularly in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands,” says Dilxwax Acar, CEO of FIT GROUP AG. The direct market and direct market plus segments are specifically aimed at growth companies and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). These segments provide the foundation for further development on the capital market and potential equity financing. A large number of partners within the direct network – comprising capital market coaches and direct funding partners – are on hand to provide advice. With the planned registration of direct market plus as an EU SME Growth Market, the Vienna Stock Exchange will further facilitate access to the capital market for SMEs, subject to regulatory approval. A total of 32 securities are currently available for trading in these two segments of the exchange-regulated market Vienna MTF. Download press photo Dilxwax Acar, CEO FIT GROUP AG, and Diyar Acar, CMO FIT GROUP AG (jpg-file 3 MB)

Lisa Danino-Lewis | Chief Growth Officer, CLS: “In May 2026, we saw average daily traded volumes of USD2.53 trillion, an increase of 12.1% compared to May 2025. Over the same period, we saw an increase in volumes across all instruments. The increase was 13.2% for FX swaps, 11% for FX spot and 7% for FX forwards.” * Due to rounding, the numbers presented may not add up precisely to the totals provided and the percentages may not precisely reflect the exact figures.  

There is a significant risk that the financial system will be exploited by criminals to launder money and commit crimes. In 2026, Finansinspektionen (FI) will keep on focusing in particular on sectors and services where we assess that the risks of money laundering, terrorist financing and circumvention of international sanctions are elevated. Supervising that the financial sector counteract crime such as money laundering and terrorism financing is already one of FI's priorities and will continue to be so in 2026. For the third time, FI now publishes the report Prioritised risks in money laundering, terrorist financing and international sanctions. FI's assessment is that several of the risks identified in previous years will continue to apply in 2026. These include the banking sector, services for international payments and trading in crypto-assets that are at increased risk of being exploited in systematic money laundering schemes. Financial undertakings are obliged to prevent and counteract their exploitation for economic crime and to assess the impact of the risks on their own operations. The report provides guidance on where FI sees the greatest risks. – The financial sector is particularly vulnerable to being exploited by criminals. Therefore, it is important that companies do what they can to counteract money laundering, terrorism financing and circumvention of sanctions, says Halszka Onoszko, Head of the Department of Anti-Money Laundering Supervision at FI. In the report, FI highlight risks associated with banks, companies that offer international payments and electronic money, as well as crypto-assets. FI also draw attention to companies that are used as tools of crime and internal enablers in the financial sector. Furthermore, the authority sees continued risks for the financial sector when it comes to international sanctions and preventing terrorism financing. – Digitalization and innovation have created many opportunities but have also given criminals new tools to launder money and commit other crimes. We expect that financial companies need to continue to focus on the risks that can arise with these services and work to counteract them, says Halszka Onoszko. According to the national risk assessment published in June 2026, the overall risk level for money laundering and terrorist financing in the financial sector is now assessed to be higher than it was five years ago. The higher risk level can primarily be attributed to the assessed increase in the threat posed by organized crime.  Our supervision priorities Report: Prioritised risks related to money laundering, terrorism financing and international sanctions ( < 1MB)

EquiLend, the global provider of trading, post-trade, data and insights, and digital solutions for the securities finance industry, and Credit Benchmark, the leading source of consensus credit risk data, today announced a partnership to integrate Credit Benchmark's consensus credit ratings into EquiLend's Onboard+ platform. The integration surfaces Credit Benchmark's consensus rating for each fund, including the number of institutions contributing to that rating, alongside existing onboarding data fields. The added context gives operations, credit and front-office users a clearer view of how the broader market rates a given fund - particularly for funds where official agency ratings are not available - and a reference point against which to evaluate internal ratings. Credit Benchmark's consensus ratings are derived from internal credit risk views contributed by leading global financial institutions, providing a market-wide perspective that is already used by many of the largest banks and asset managers. By embedding that data into Onboard+, EquiLend clients can prioritize counterparty and fund onboarding decisions more efficiently and assess where their firm's view sits relative to peers, all without leaving the platform. "Onboard+ is becoming a standard reference point for counterparty workflow in the securities finance market, and bringing Credit Benchmark's consensus data into that workflow puts an institutional credit lens directly where decisions are being made," said Mark Faulkner, Co-Founder, Credit Benchmark. "Our data is already used by many of the largest banks and asset managers and making it natively available inside Onboard+ accelerates adoption and makes day-to-day onboarding decisions more informed." "Onboard+ is designed to make counterparty onboarding faster and more transparent for the securities finance industry and embedding Credit Benchmark's consensus data is a natural extension of the platform," said Simon Waddington, Head of Post-Trade & Regulatory Solutions, EquiLend. "Our clients have asked for richer credit context within the platform, and this integration delivers it without adding workflow steps, helping to enhance their RWA management and ability to prioritize specific funds."

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Division of Clearing and Risk, Division of Market Oversight, and Market Participants Division today announced they have taken no-action positions related to a request from three service providers, Capitolis Partners LLC, Quantile Technologies Limited (as part of the London Stock Exchange Group plc), and TriOptima AB (as part of OSTTRA) that offer post-trade risk reduction services (PTRRS) for swaps in the form of portfolio rebalancing and basis risk mitigation.    The letter provides a no-action position to the service providers for failure to register as swap execution facilities and notes they have registered with the CFTC as introducing brokers subject to compliance with CFTC regulations and National Futures Association rules.    The no-action letter also benefits any person who engages in portfolio rebalancing and basis risk mitigation services for: failure to enter into a swap or swaps on a designated contract market; swap execution facility; or a swap execution facility that is exempt from registration under the trade execution requirement in section 2(h)(8) of the Commodity Exchange Act; and failure to submit a swap or swaps that are required to be cleared to a derivatives clearing organization under CEA Section 2(h)(1) and part 50 of CFTC regulations.    The no-action letter reiterates the discussion of risk reduction services in the Commission’s 2020 part 43 final rule and clarifies that if PTRRS meet the description in that adopting release then those services do not meet the definition of a publicly reportable swap transaction and are not subject to the real-time public reporting and dissemination requirements in part 43.   The no-action letter is time-limited and subject to the terms and conditions in the letter RELATED LINKS CFTC Staff Letter No. 26-20

The attached ETF option classes will begin trading on the MIAX Options Exchange, MIAX Pearl Options Exchange, MIAX Emerald Options Exchange and MIAX Sapphire Options Exchange on Thursday, June 18, 2026.Market Makers can use the Member Firm Portal (MFP) to manage their option class assignments.  All LMM and RMM Option Class Assignments must be entered prior to 6:00 PM ET on the business day immediately preceding the effective date.  All changes made after 6:00 PM ET on a given day will be effective two trading days later. MIAX Pearl® Options Exchange MIAX Options® Exchange MIAX Emerald® Options Exchange MIAX Sapphire® Options Exchange

Please refer to the Regulatory Circulars listed below for the newly listed symbols and the corresponding market for the underlying security used for openings on the MIAX Exchanges: MIAX Options Regulatory Circular 2026-86 MIAX Pearl Options Regulatory Circular 2026-85 MIAX Emerald Options Regulatory Circular 2026-69 MIAX Sapphire Options Regulatory Circular 2026-89 The newly listed symbols will be available for trading beginning Thursday, June 18, 2026.

Thank you, Łukasz [Chyla], for that kind introduction.  I appreciate the opportunity to take part in the 4th US-CEE Connection Weekend, especially during the year that the United States celebrates the 250th anniversary of its Declaration of Independence.[1] Of course, standing here in the main aula of Jagiellonian University, which was founded in 1364, makes one realize that American institutions remain relatively youthful as compared to their European counterparts. Many of you in this room are aware that Polish-born individuals played key roles in making the American revolution possible.  Among those who helped America secure our independence were Thaddeus Kościuszko and Casimir Pulaski. Kościuszko, a military engineer, arrived in America in 1776 to offer his services to the Continental Army.  Commissioned as an officer, he helped design the fortifications at Saratoga and West Point, which played an important role in turning the tide towards American victory.[2] Today, he is buried not far away from here in Kraków at Wawel Cathedral and honored in the United States with a national memorial in Philadelphia.  Pulaski, a Polish nobleman, was recruited to the revolutionary cause by Benjamin Franklin.  He helped bring organization and proper training to the Continental cavalry and became known as the Father of the American Cavalry.[3] He gave his life in 1779 to the cause of American independence during the Siege of Savannah.[4] Pulaski is also honored in the United States with an annual day of commemoration in Chicago and a monument in Washington, D.C.  The ties between the United States and Poland have continued to endure across the centuries.  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Poland has become one of Europe’s most consequential democracies.  It has transitioned from a communist system to embracing free markets and democratic governance. Its commitment to free enterprise, capitalism, and the rule of law has contributed significantly to Poland becoming one of the fastest-growing economies in the European Union. The U.S. Declaration of Independence spoke of the “pursuit of happiness.”  I view that phrase as encompassing the freedom to choose your occupation, start a business, place your capital at risk, and reap the rewards—or absorb the losses—of your own decisions.[5] It includes the opportunity to compete in a marketplace for goods, services, labor, and ideas.  In so doing, it facilitates economic growth, jobs creation, and innovation.  A Nation of Owners The idea that liberty includes economic freedom is not merely an American ideal.  The leaders of Poland believed in the same idea at the end of the Cold War.  In 1990, Lech Wałęsa took office as Poland’s first democratically elected president since 1926.  In his inaugural address, he set out a goal that Poland should become a “nation of owners.”[6] He understood this as the surest way to rebuild the nation’s wealth and restore economic efficiency and called for practical changes, including privatization, an independent state treasury, and reform of the banking and credit systems.[7] Think about this moment in history.  It was about turning a communist economy into a free market one.  The phrase a “nation of owners” conveyed a concrete meaning.  For two generations, ordinary people did not own or hold a stake in anything.  All property was the property of the state.  A free-market economy cannot suddenly be switched on like a machine, but must be built over time and based on the decentralized decisions of businesses and households, influenced by prices and local knowledge, to produce and consume.  Wałęsa’s vision was ownership in the fullest sense where families would hold a stake in Poland’s economy and business enterprises would be built, owned, and grown by their founders, rather than by the government. Chairman Breeden’s 1990 Project and the Continued Partnership However, without risk capital, the notion of owning and creating a private business remains only a dream.  It is the capital markets where those dreams can become reality.  They are where companies can raise what they need to grow and innovate, and where the people of a country can share in that growth. The question facing Wałęsa was how to build them. That conversation began in 1990 between the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe.  Then-SEC Chairman Richard Breeden delivered a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on the internationalization of securities markets, and much of his focus was on this region.[8] Poland, he reported, had asked the SEC for technical assistance on trading systems, the clearance and settlement of transactions, the licensing of market personnel, and enforcement.  Hungary was about to reopen the Budapest Stock Exchange after 48 years of closure, and Poland was preparing to establish a stock exchange of its own.  That February, a Soviet delegation had visited the SEC to learn how to build capital markets.  Chairman Breeden called it “our Berlin Wall crumbing” for those in the securities field.[9] For Chairman Breeden, helping these countries build free markets was the “right thing to do” and a form of person-to-person foreign aid. The SEC backed that vision with people and a program.  In 1992, drawing on funding from the Support for an Eastern European Democracy Act,[10] the Commission placed a senior advisor inside the Polish Securities Commission for a year, where the advisor helped refine the country’s securities laws.[11] These efforts would eventually reach well beyond Warsaw. In 1991, the SEC held its first International Institute for Securities Market Development, a signature initiative of Chairman Breeden that continues to this day and has trained thousands of regulators from over 100 countries.[12] CEE Success Since the Cold War What Central and Eastern Europe have achieved since 1989 is one of the great economic stories of the modern era.  Across the region, growth has been remarkable.  Since 1990, GDP per capita in countries like Poland and Hungary has grown many times over—more than fifteen times and eight times, respectively.[13] The transformation of capital markets has been just as striking.  The number of publicly listed domestic companies in Poland grew from just nine in 1992 to around 750 today, and the market capitalization of those companies has risen from about $4.5 billion in 1995 to more than $300 billion now—from around 3% of GDP to over 20%.[14] This growth has occurred throughout Central and Eastern Europe, at different paces but along similar institutional lines. The drivers have included trade, foreign direct investment, accession to the European Union, and institutional reform.  Banks, both foreign and domestic, played an important role in financing that early growth—but the next step depends on capital markets in a way the early stages did not. The Next Stage of Growth Needs Capital Markets The financial markets can be particularly effective at allocating capital—a scarce resource—among competing ideas.  They draw on many investors with differing appetites for risk, liquidity, and investment horizons, so they offer the ability to finance even the riskiest, most innovative ideas, in a way that bank lending cannot.  In a bank-dependent economy, the most innovative ideas, which are often the riskiest, can struggle to take hold.  In the United States, by contrast, new businesses can access a multitude of sources for finance, including venture capital, angel investors, and crowdfunding.  Those investors actively seek risk and share in the upside, so the most disruptive ideas get backed more often.  However, the risk of failure can be significant.  Banks, by their nature and the deposits they hold, are not intended to take that kind of equity risk, which is why the capital markets play a crucial role.  In 2024, former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi released his report on European competitiveness.  Europe’s capital markets, he found, remain fragmented, and the flow of savings into them is lower than other major economies—only about 5% of global venture-capital funds are raised in the EU, compared to 52% in the United States.[15] While European households save more than American households, their savings are generally not channeled into higher risk, higher return investments.[16] The result, in the report’s words, is that the EU “relies excessively on bank financing, which is less well-suited to fund innovative projects,” with banks “ill-equipped to finance innovative companies,” lacking the expertise to assess them and the means to value their largely intangible collateral.[17] The pattern is even sharper across Central and Eastern Europe. The banking sector dominates the financial system of most countries in the region, and households hold a higher share of their financial assets in cash and deposits than the EU average—including in Poland, where households hold over half their financial assets in cash and bank deposits.[18] Europe has recognized the need for change.  The European Commission’s Savings and Investments Union seeks to transform the roughly €10 trillion of EU household savings currently sitting in low-yield deposits into capital investment in firms that drive economic growth.[19] In Poland, the proposed Personal Investment Account—the OKI—aims to move savings into capital markets by offering tax-free returns on assets up to a certain amount.[20] These are meaningful steps toward unlocking the potential of capital markets. At the same time, Europe is moving to ease the burden on business.  After launching its “Omnibus” simplification effort in 2025, the EU adopted a directive this past February that narrows two of its most demanding sustainability mandates—the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive.[21] Framed as a matter of competitiveness, it raises the thresholds so that far fewer companies are covered and extends the compliance date for the due-diligence obligations to 2029.[22] The SEC has been making similar adjustments in the United States.  Several weeks ago, the Commission proposed to rescind its own climate-disclosure rule and return to financial materiality as the test on what must be disclosed.  This is a reminder that financial regulation must focus on improving market quality and efficiency, not as a tool to achieve political and social goals in areas where legislatures and governments have failed to act.  Disclosure serves investors and the markets best when it is tied to financial materiality and where the benefits of such disclosure outweigh the costs to produce such disclosure.  I particularly worry about regulatory requirements that place the heaviest burden on smaller and newer companies, which may dissuade such companies from going public at all.  That points to a larger truth: capital does not stand still.  When regulators fail to provide an optimal framework, market participants do not wait around—they go to where the rules work, and when they do, investors lose and competition suffers.  The best way to keep capital at home is not to wall it in, but to build markets worthy of investors.  This work is on-going in the United States as well.  Over the past year, the SEC has reviewed its core disclosure rules to refocus them on what is financially material, to modernize the registered offerings process, and to expand accommodations for smaller and newer companies.  The goal is to have regulations that create-on ramps to more public companies, not obstacle courses.   Conclusion To close my remarks, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the Catholic University of America for its dedication and efforts to facilitate closer ties between Poland and the United States.  Millions of Americans have ancestral ties to Poland.  Yet, for the duration of the Cold War, opportunities for person-to-person exchanges between our two countries were nearly non-existent.  I hope that the next chapter of Poland’s will be shaped, in part, by a deepened connection between the Polish and American people, including in business, government, and education.  Investments in the capital markets will be one element of that connection.  Thirty-five years after this region’s new start of freedom and opportunity, I look forward to watching this important partnership grow to new levels and achieve the mutual benefits that it will bring to our respective nations.  Thank you. [1] My remarks reflect solely my individual views as a commissioner and do not necessarily reflect the views of the full U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or my fellow Commissioners. [2] Nat’l Park Serv., Thaddeus Kosciuszko, https://www.nps.gov/thko/learn/historyculture/kosciuszkobio.htm(last visited Jun. 12, 2026). [3] Mount Vernon, Casimir Pulaski, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/casimir-pulaski (last visited Jun. 12, 2026). [4] Nat’l Park Serv., Casimir Pulaski Memorial, https://www.nps.gov/places/000/brigadier-general-count-casimir-pulaski-memorial.htm(last visited Jun. 12, 2026).  [5] Mark T. Uyeda, Capital, Choice, and the Pursuit of Happiness: Remarks at the SEC Speaks in 2026 (Mar. 19, 2026), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/uyeda-remarks-sec-speaks-031926. [6] Smuniewski, Urych & Zanini, "The Principles of Economic Transformation in Poland After 1989 According to President Lech Wałęsa, European Research Studies Journal, Volume XXIV, Issue 2 - Part 1, 1227, 1233 (Jun. 2021), https://ersj.eu/journal/2185. [7] Id. at 1237. [8] Richard C. Breeden, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: The Challenges and the Promise for the 1990s, 3-6 (May 18, 1990), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1990/051890breeden.pdf. [9] Id. [10] See Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-179, 103 Stat. 1298 (1989). [11] Interview by SEC Hist. Soc’y with Robert Strahota 4 (Apr. 18, 2006), https://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oral-histories/strahota041806Transcript.pdf. [12] Id. at 9. [13]  Calculations by the SEC Div. of Econ. & Risk Analysis (DERA), based on World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. [14] Id. [15] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness—Part A: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe, 29-30 (Sept. 2024), https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en. [16] Id. at 63. [17] Id. at 64. [18] Int’l Monetary Fund, Eur. Dep’t, Republic of Poland: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, 50 (Jan. 2026), https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1polea2026001-source-pdf.pdf. [19] See Eur. Comm’n, Savings and Investments Union Strategy: Better Financial Opportunities for EU Citizens and Businesses (Mar. 19, 2025), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_25_802/IP_25_802_EN.pdf. [20] Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 18, at 50-51. [21] See EU Omnibus I, Directive (EU) 2026/470 (adopted Feb. 24, 2026), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32026L0470&qid=1772093160638. [22] See Press Release, Council of the EU, Council Signs Off on Simplification of Sustainability Reporting and Due Diligence Requirements to Boost EU Competitiveness (Feb. 24, 2026), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/24/council-signs-off-simplification-of-sustainability-reporting-and-due-diligence-requirements-to-boost-eu-competitiveness/

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today clarified the standards for its decisions on filings. OCC filing decisions are governed by 12 CFR 5.13. As stated in the regulation, the OCC may approve, conditionally approve or deny a filing. In addition, the OCC may return a filing as materially deficient where it lacks sufficient information for the OCC to make a determination under the applicable statutory or regulatory criteria. This communication is to remind the public that the OCC strictly adheres to the regulation and to explain how the OCC implements it, which aligns with the agency’s historical practices. The OCC is committed to acting on all filings in a timely manner appropriate to the nature and complexity of the filing. However, the OCC may return a filing without a decision if it finds the filing to be materially deficient. In that respect, it is paramount that filings contain all information necessary for the OCC to evaluate the filing as part of the initial submission. Otherwise, the OCC will return a materially deficient filing before engaging in any meaningful processing of the filing. This includes the failure to furnish required biographical and financial information of individuals and corporate background and financial report for entities, as well as any required information requested by the filing form. In addition, the OCC may return a filing as materially deficient if, after attempting to have the filer furnish all required information for the OCC to assess the statutory or regulatory criteria through an additional information request, the responses do not sufficiently respond to the requests. This includes where the organizers of a de novo charter have not demonstrated that all products and services have been defined with particularity, including how they will be operationalized, or have not fully defined the associated governance, risk management, and compliance management infrastructure to manage these products and services. The OCC approves a filing when it finds the filer has favorably met the appropriate statutory, regulatory and policy criteria related to the filing type. Where appropriate, the OCC will condition an approval to ensure the filer will operate in a safe and sound manner, consistent with OCC policy, and comply with applicable laws and regulations. When the OCC finds a significant supervisory, Community Reinvestment Act (if applicable), or compliance concern exists with respect to the filer, approval is inconsistent with law, regulation, or OCC policy, or the filer fails to provide requested information, the agency plans to deny the filing. A filing is inconsistent with law or regulation if it does not meet the applicable statutory or regulatory criteria for that filing type. Under the regulation, if the OCC denies a filing, the OCC must notify the filer in writing of the reasons for the denial. In addition, the OCC plans to make all denial decisions public in order to provide the industry and all applicable stakeholders awareness of how the OCC has applied the decision criteria in that proposal. The denial of an application does not prohibit the applicant from filing a subsequent application. Ultimately, it is important that the public understand how filings are decided under applicable laws, regulations, and policy. Related Link Bulletin 2026-27, “Filing Decision Process”

FINRA has expelled from membership Reid & Rudiger LLC (the firm) and barred cofounders Clifford Reid and CEO Edward Rudiger, Jr. from association with any member firm for churning and excessively trading customer accounts in violation of Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI) and FINRA rules.  Separately, FINRA suspended the firm’s supervisors, Marc Harrison and Kelli Mezzatesta, who both failed to identify and investigate red flags related to Rudiger’s and Reid’s pervasive misconduct, for three months in all principal capacities. FINRA also fined them $5,000 each and required them to complete 20 hours of supervision-related continuing education.  Excessive trading in a customer's account is trading that generates commissions for the broker but is not in the customer’s best interest. Churning is excessive trading undertaken with an intent to defraud or with reckless disregard for a customer’s interests. “This action underscores FINRA’s unique role as a self-regulatory organization committed to protecting retail investors from misconduct,” said Bill St. Louis, Executive Vice President and Head of Enforcement at FINRA. “The egregious churning and excessive trading in this case resulted in significant customer losses over nearly six years, warranting the firm’s expulsion and permanent bars for the registered representatives responsible.” FINRA determined that the firm and its cofounders excessively traded a total of 20 accounts, several of which were also churned over the course of six years with an intent to defraud or with reckless disregard for customers’ interests. This misconduct caused customers to incur approximately $2 million in commissions and trading costs and approximately $2.7 million in losses.  Both Reid and Rudiger recommended to customers a high-volume, high-cost market-timing strategy that made it virtually impossible for customers to make a profit. This misconduct violated the Care Obligation of Reg BI, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and FINRA Rules 2111, 2020 and 2010.  The misconduct was evident through disproportionate commissions and trading costs that resulted in high cost-to-equity ratios, which represents the return on a customer’s investments that would have been needed to cover commissions and expenses. This included: An account with an annualized cost-to-equity ratio of more than 111%, which means the account would have needed to generate returns of 111% just to break even; An account with an annualized cost-to-equity ratio of more than 69% and a resulting loss of more than $345,000; and An account with an annualized cost-to-equity ratio of more than 67% and a resulting loss of nearly $400,000. The firm and Rudiger, as CEO, failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to detect and act upon churning and excessive trading.  In addition, the firm, as well as Harrison and Mezzatesta, failed to take reasonable steps to supervise the trading in the affected customers’ accounts, despite numerous red flags indicative of excessive trading and churning. They also did not consider customers’ cost-to-equity ratios in the course of trading supervision or use available exception reports that could have assisted in identifying the violative trading. In settling these matters, the firm, as well as Reid, Rudiger, Harrison and Mezzatesta accepted and consented to the entry of FINRA’s findings without admitting or denying them. FINRA makes available disciplinary actions and other information on its Disciplinary Actions Online database. In addition, FINRA publishes on its Monthly Disciplinary Actions page a summary of disciplinary actions against firms and individuals for violations of FINRA rules; federal securities laws, rules and regulations; and the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. FINRA’s use of fine monies is limited to specific purposes set forth in its public Financial Guiding Principles, which are approved by its Board of Governors. FINRA publicly itemizes and discloses how it uses fine monies each year.

Following the publication of Monetary Policy Summary and minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting on 18 June 2026, the Governor will give his usual pooled broadcast interview. The transcript of this interview will be published at 1.30pm on this page: Transcript of the Governor's pooled broadcast interview following the publication of the Monetary Policy Summary and minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting on 18 June 2026

The attached tables and charts released on Wednesday summarize the economic projections made by Federal Open Market Committee participants in conjunction with the June 16-17 meeting. Projections (PDF) | Accessible Mate

The Federal Open Market Committee approved the following statement for release by a 12 – 0 vote: The Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 3-1/2 to 3-3/4 percent, in support of the Federal Reserve's dual mandate. The Committee reaffirmed its policy of maintaining ample reserves in the banking system. Economic activity is expanding at a solid pace despite elevated uncertainty that owes, in part, to the conflict in the Middle East. Productivity growth and capital investment are strong. Job gains have kept pace with the workforce, and the unemployment rate has changed little. Inflation remains elevated relative to the Committee's 2 percent goal, in part reflecting supply shocks that have driven price increases in certain sectors, including energy. The Committee will deliver price stability. Implementation Note issued June 17, 2026